


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THE

PRINCIPLES

J. R. McCulloch
OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY:

WITH SOME INQUIRIES RESPECTING THEIR APPLICATION, AND A
SKETCH OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE SCIENCE.

BY J. R. M'CULLOCH, Esq.,

MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE.

"Non enim me cuiquam mancipavi, nullius nomen fero; multum magnorum virorum iudicio
credo, aliquid et meo vindico. Nam illi quoque, non inventa, sed quærenda nobis
reliquerunt."—SENECA.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

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PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

THE present edition of this work has been prepared on the plan explained in the annexed preface. It has been carefully revised; and while we have endeavoured to set its theoretical doctrines in the clearest point of view, our main object has been still better to elucidate the practical operation of the principles of the science, and to show how they are liable to be influenced by the action of secondary and contingent circumstances. Numerous additions have been made to the chapter which treats of the circumstances that determine the common and average rate of wages; partly because of the magnitude and importance of the class dependent on wages, and partly because of the prevalence of doctrines regarding the employment of labour which appear to be alike false and dangerous. And without pretending to anything like completeness in these respects, we venture to think that there are but few really important economical questions which are not touched upon, more or less fully, in this volume.¹

We have made no material change in any principle or doctrine advanced in the later editions of

¹ We except from this remark those having reference to taxation, which we have made the subject of a separate work.

this treatise: not that we should have had the smallest hesitation in doing so, had we been satisfied that such change was required; but we have seen nothing to lead us to any such conclusion. In some instances we have varied the exposition a little, and have occasionally introduced new illustrations, and modified some of the less important inferences; but the leading doctrines developed in the last two editions continue unaltered in this.

A very complete and elaborate index is now added to the work.

LONDON, *January* 1849.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

THE first edition of this work, which appeared in 1825, was principally a reprint of the article on Political Economy in the Supplement to the "Encyclopædia Britannica," edited by the late Mr Macvey Napier. That article was necessarily, from the limited space within which it had to be compressed, confined to a statement of the fundamental principles of the science, prefaced by a short sketch of its history, and admitted of but few illustrations of the practical working of different systems and measures. If this were a defect in the original essay, it was but slightly amended on its first republication in a separate volume. But, on further reflection, we were led to believe that the work would gain in utility and interest, and that the distinguishing doctrines of the science would, at the same time, be better understood, if more attention were paid to practical considerations, and it were shown how the interests of society were affected, as well by the neglect as by the application of its theories. Hence the second edition of the work.

published in 1830, has much more of a practical character than the first; and while we endeavoured to simplify the theoretical investigations, and to set the general principles and conclusions in a clearer point of view, we added a chapter on the Interference of Government, and greatly extended those portions which treat of the application of the science, or of the influence which its principles, if acted upon, would most likely exert over some of the more important departments of national economy.

Other engagements, while they prevented the publication of a new edition of this work, which has been long out of print, afforded time for additional observation and consideration; and these have farther strengthened the conviction, that the principle on which we proceeded in drawing up the edition of 1830 is, on the whole, the best. In this edition, consequently, a still greater extension has been given to the practical parts, or to inquiries respecting the real or probable influence of different systems of economical legislation, over the wealth and wellbeing of society. The work, indeed, is no longer to be regarded as a mere attempt to trace and exhibit the principles of Political Economy; but also as an attempt, however imperfect, to exhibit their more important applications.

We are aware that, in adopting this course, it may be said that we have stepped beyond the proper limits of the science, and encroached on ground belonging to the legislator and politician. But the truth is, that Political Economy and Politics are so very closely allied, and run into and mix with each

other in so many ways, that they cannot always be separately considered. Mr Senior,¹ the ablest and most distinguished defender of what may be called the restricted system of Political Economy, says "that wealth, and not happiness," is the subject with which the economist has to deal. But, supposing this to be the case, the latter, in explaining the circumstances most favourable for the production of wealth and its accumulation, is not to content himself with showing the influence of the security of property, the division and combination of employments, and the freedom of industry over its production. If he stopped at this point, he would have done little more than announce a few barren generalities, of no real utility. It is not enough to point out the general rule or principle to be appealed to on any given occasion; the really useful and important part is to show how the objections that may be made to the application of such rule or principle may be repelled, to point out its limitations, and to estimate its practical operation and real influence. Every one admits, for example, that security of property, at least to some extent, is indispensable to the production of wealth; but security is not to be confined to the mere freedom to dispose at pleasure of property during one's own life. It is further necessary that individuals should be permitted to exert some degree of authority over the disposal of property in the event of their death; and this being admitted, it follows that all the knotty questions respecting con-

¹ See his able "Essay on Political Economy" in the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana."

ditions in wills, the influence of primogeniture and entails, compared with the system of equal partition, and so forth, come legitimately within the scope of the inquiries belonging to this science ; the economist being bound to show the bearing of each system that may be proposed over the production and distribution of wealth.

It would be easy to give innumerable examples of the way in which this science necessarily involves discussions and inquiries extending beyond what may, at first sight, be supposed to be its natural limits. It may, for example, be laid down as a general rule, that the more individuals are thrown on their own resources, and the less they are taught to rely on extrinsic and adventitious assistance, the more industrious and economical will they become, and the greater, consequently, will be the amount of public wealth. But even in mechanics, the engineer must allow for the friction and resistance of matter ; and it is still more necessary that the economist should make a corresponding allowance, seeing that he has to deal not only with natural powers, but with human beings enjoying political privileges, and imbued with the strongest feelings, passions, and prejudices. Although, therefore, the general principle as to self-reliance be as stated above, the economist or the politician who should propose carrying it out to its full extent in all cases and at all hazards, would be fitter for bedlam than for the closet or the cabinet. When any great number of work-people are thrown out of employment, they must be provided for by extraneous assistance in one way or other ; so that the

various questions with respect to a voluntary and compulsory provision for the destitute poor, are as necessary parts of this science as the theories of rent and of profit.

It is obvious, too, that all the complicated and difficult questions, with respect to the influence of taxes and loans over the wealth and wellbeing of the public, come within the scope of this science, and form, indeed, one of its most attractive departments. But, owing to their extent and difficulty, we have been unable to profit by the interest they might have given to this work. We hope, however, to be able, at some not very distant period, to investigate, in detail, the various matters connected with taxation; and to embody the results of our researches in a supplementary volume on its principles and practical influence.¹

We are also inclined to dissent from Mr Senior, when he lays it down that the economist "is not to give a single syllable of advice," and that "his business is neither to recommend nor dissuade, but to state general principles!" This, no doubt, is a part of his business; but we cannot bring ourselves to believe that it is either the whole or even the greater part of it. On the contrary, it appears to us that the economist is bound, whenever he sees cause, to dissuade, censure, and commend, quite as much as the politician, or any one else. In treating, for example, of the influence of restrictions, is he not to censure those which, by fettering the freedom of industry,

¹ In 1845 we published an 8vo volume "On the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the Funding System."

hinder the production of wealth? and is he not to commend the measures by which, and the ministers by whom, such restrictions are abolished? The economist who confines himself to the mere enunciation of general principles, or abstract truths, may as well address himself to the Pump in Aldgate, as to the British public. If he wish to be anything better than a declaimer, or to confer any real advantage on any class of his countrymen, he must leave general reasoning, and show the extent of the injury entailed on the community by the neglect of his principles; how their application may be best effected; and the advantages of which it will be productive. This science has its practical as well as its theoretical portion; and the economist will abdicate his principal functions if he do not call the public attention to every institution or regulation which appears, on a careful inquiry, to be adverse to the increase of public wealth and happiness. Unless he do this, he can be little else than a mere ideologist, about whose speculations most people will, very properly, care little or nothing.

We have elsewhere (Introductory Discourse) endeavoured to point out the distinction between Politics and Political Economy; and here we shall merely observe, that, though all inquiries into the constitution and character of Governments be foreign to the business of the economist, it is his province to examine such laws or regulations as may appear (whether directly or indirectly is immaterial) to influence the production and distribution of wealth. It may be inexpedient for him to give any opinion

upon the policy of measures involving various considerations; but, if he make a fair estimate of their influence in an economical point of view, and show their probable operation over the wealth and comforts of the people, he is acting strictly in his sphere, and is entitling himself to the gratitude of his country.

Besides improperly limiting the sphere of the science, and depriving it of all practical utility, Mr Senior appears to take an erroneous view of the evidence on which its principles and conclusions are founded. He affirms, for example, that the facts on which its general principles rest may be stated in a very few sentences, or rather in a very few words; and that the difficulty is merely in reasoning from them. But while we admit the difficulty of drawing correct inferences, we greatly doubt whether the general principles can be so easily established as Mr Senior supposes. He lays it down, for example, as a general principle, or rather axiom, that, supposing agricultural skill to remain the same, additional labour employed on the land will, speaking generally, yield a less return. But though this proposition be undoubtedly true, it is at the same time quite as true that agricultural skill never remains the same for the smallest portion of time; and that its improvement may countervail, for any given period, the decreasing fertility of the soils to which recourse is necessarily had in the progress of civilisation. It would, indeed, be easy to show, that the worst lands now under tillage in England, yield more produce per acre, and more as compared with the outlay, than

the best lands did in the reigns of the Edwards and the Henrys. It is, therefore, to no purpose to say, that the science rests on principles of this description. They, no doubt, form a part of its foundation; but as they are modified in different degrees by others, the only general principles of any practical value are those deduced from observations made on their combined action; or, in other words, on the phenomena really manifested in the progress of society. “*Il ne suffit,*” to use the words of M. Say, “*de partir des faits : il faut se placer dedans, marcher avec eux, et comparer incessamment les conséquences que l’on tire avec les effets qu’on observe. L’économie politique, pour être véritablement utile, ne doit pas enseigner, fût-ce par des raisonnemens justes, et en partant des premisses certaines, ce qui doit nécessairement arriver; elle doit montrer comment ce qui arrive réellement est la conséquence d’un autre fait réel. Elle doit decouvrir la chaîne que les lie, et toujours constater par l’observation, l’existence des deux points où la chaîne des raisonnemens se rattache.*”¹

That a free commercial intercourse amongst different nations would be for their mutual advantage, is a proposition which is very generally true; and being so, every proposal for a restriction on commerce may be fairly presumed to be inexpedient till the reverse be established. There can, however, be no manner of doubt that there are cases, though but few in number, in which nations would grossly overlook their own interests if they permitted a free intercourse with

¹ Traité D’Economie Politique, Discours Preliminaire.

their neighbours. Suppose, for example, we had a monopoly of the supply of coal, it would not be difficult to show that it would be good policy, with a view to the increase of national wealth and security, either wholly to prohibit, or to lay a high duty on its exportation; and so in other instances.

The recent history of the theory of population affords a striking instance of the abuse of general principles, or rather of the folly of building exclusively upon one set of principles, without attending to the influence of the antagonist principles by which they are partly or wholly countervailed. The principle of increase, as explained by Mr Malthus,¹ and more recently by Dr Chalmers, appeared to form an insuperable obstacle to all permanent improvement in the condition of society, and to condemn the great majority of the human race to a state approaching to destitution. But farther inquiries have shown that the inferences drawn by these and other authorities from the principle now referred to, are contradicted by the widest experience; that the too rapid increase of population is almost always prevented by the influence of principles which its increase brings into activity; that a vast improvement has taken place in the condition of the people of most countries, particularly of those in which population has in-

¹ Esclave d'une idée dominante, l'auteur de *l'Essai sur la Population* s'y abandonne sans réserve; en combattant des exagérations, il se livre à des exagérations contraires; à des vérités utiles, se mêle des apperçus qui ne sont que spécieux; et pour vouloir en tirer des applications absolues, il en fausse les conséquences.—*Degerando Bienfaisance Publique*, i. Introd. p. 23.

creased with the greatest rapidity ;¹ and that, so far from being inimical to improvement, we are really indebted to the principle of increase for most part of our comforts and enjoyments, and for the continued progress of arts and industry.²

The real difficulty does not, therefore, lie in discussing matters connected with this science, in the statement of general principles, or in reasoning fairly from them ; but it lies in the discovery of the secondary or modifying principles, which are always in action, and in making proper allowance for their influence. Food is indispensable to existence ; and it may, therefore, be laid down as a general principle, that this necessity on the one hand, and the difficulty of getting food on the other, tend to make every man die of hunger. Such, however, and so powerful are the countervailing influences, that not one individual out of 10,000 dies of want ; and such being the case, a theory which should overlook these influences would not, we think, be good for much.

We have had occasion, in several parts of the following work, to regret that the evidence to which

¹ La population de la Bohème a triplé en 70 ans. Elle s'est élevée de 1,361,000 âmes à 4,040,000 dans l'intervalle de 1762 à 1835 ; et jamais ses habitans n'ont joui d'une plus grande aisance. —(*Degerando Bienfaisance Publique*, i. 204.) A similar progress, though not always in quite so striking a degree, has been made during the same period in most Continental states, and in Great Britain and the United States. And Ireland would have been no apparent exception to the principle, but for the pernicious toleration given to the mendicant agitation by which she has been so long disturbed and disgraced.

² See the chapter on Population in this work.

it is in our power to appeal, is insufficient to enable any certain conclusions to be come to with respect to some of the more important questions involved in the application of the science. Generally, indeed, we may predicate, with considerable confidence, the more immediate results that would follow the adoption of any novel system of measures; but it is extremely difficult, or rather, perhaps, impossible, without an extensive analogous experience, to foretell its remoter consequences; because we must, in the absence of such experience, be necessarily in the dark respecting the nature and influence of the modifying principles which a change of measures would no doubt bring into action. Notwithstanding the pretensions so frequently put forward by politicians and economists, some of the more interesting portions of the sciences which they profess are still very imperfectly understood; and the important art of applying them to the affairs of mankind, so as to produce the greatest amount of permanent good, has made but little progress, and is hardly, indeed, advanced beyond infancy. *Initiatus nos credimus dum in vestibulo hæremus.* Nor, considering the totally different circumstances under which society is now placed, from those under which it was placed in previous ages, and the consequent want of applicable experience, is this deficiency of knowledge to be wondered at. The LEGES LEGUM, to which Lord Bacon says appeal may be made, to learn *quid in singulis legibus bene aut perperam positum aut constitutum sit*, have yet, in great measure, to be ascertained. However humiliating the confession, it is

certainly true that, owing to the want of information, not a few of the most interesting problems in economical legislation are at present all but insoluble ; and it must be left to the economists of future ages, who will, no doubt, be able to appeal to principles that have not yet developed themselves, or that have escaped observation, to perfect the theoretical, and to complete or reconstruct the practical part of the science.

But, however we may differ from Mr Senior in our view of the principles of the science, and the mode of its application to the business of life, we cordially agree in all that he has stated as to the duty of every one who attempts to explain its principles, or to show how they should be applied :—
“ Employed as he is upon a science in which error, or even ignorance, may be productive of such intense and extensive mischief, he is bound, like a jurymen, to give deliverance true according to the evidence, and to allow neither sympathy with indigence, nor disgust at profusion or at avarice ; neither reverence for existing institutions, nor disgust at existing abuses ; neither love of popularity, nor of paradox, nor of system, to deter him from stating what he believes to be the facts, or from drawing from those facts what appear to be the legitimate conclusions.”

We have endeavoured as well as we could to conduct our investigations under a deep sense of the obligations so forcibly set forth in this admirable paragraph. Where, however, the subjects are so very difficult, and the evidence not unfrequently conflicting, incomplete, and questionable, we doubt

whether we have been always sagacious enough to arrive at a "true deliverance." But we have done our best to avoid error; and while we have not hesitated to speak with the utmost freedom of the institutions, systems, and opinions we have had to review, we are not conscious of having, in any instance, allowed our judgment to be warped by personal feeling or political prejudice.

LONDON, *November* 1842.

MR M'CULLOCH'S PUBLICATIONS.

Besides this Treatise, Mr M'CULLOCH has published the following Works, viz. :—

1. A DICTIONARY, PRACTICAL, THEORETICAL, AND HISTORICAL, OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION. Illustrated with Maps and Plans. A New Edition, in one very thick and closely printed vol. 8vo. London, 1849.
N.B.—A Supplement to the edition of 1847 may be had separately.
2. A DICTIONARY, GEOGRAPHICAL, STATISTICAL, AND HISTORICAL, of the various Countries, Places, and principal Natural Objects in the World. Third Edition. 2 thick vols. 8vo. Illustrated with Maps. London, 1849.
N.B.—A Supplement to the previous edition may be had separately.
3. A DESCRIPTIVE AND STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, exhibiting its Extent, Physical Capacities, Population, Industry, and Civil and Religious Institutions. Third and greatly improved Edition, 2 thick vols. 8vo. London, 1847.
4. SMITH'S WEALTH OF NATIONS ; with a Life of the Author, Notes, and Supplemental Dissertations. New Edition. 1 vol. 8vo, double columns. London, 1846.
5. A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF TAXATION AND THE FUNDING SYSTEM. 1 vol. 8vo. London, 1845.
6. THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY : a Classified Catalogue of Select Publications in the different Departments of that Science ; with Historical, Critical, and Biographical Notices. 1 vol. 8vo. London, 1845.
7. A TREATISE ON THE SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY VACANT BY DEATH ; including Inquiries into the Influence of Primogeniture, Entails, Compulsory Partition, Foundations, &c., over the Public Interests. 1 vol. 8vo. London, 1848.

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PRINCIPLES

OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

INTRODUCTION.

RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE SCIENCE.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY¹ may be defined to be the science of the laws which regulate the production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption of those articles or products that are necessary, useful, or agreeable to man, and which at the same time possess exchangeable value.

¹ *Economy*, from οἶκος, a house, or family, and νόμος, a law—the government of a family. Hence, Political Economy may be said to be to the State what domestic economy is to a family.

When it is said that an article or product is possessed of exchangeable value, it is meant that there are individuals disposed to give some quantity of labour, or of some other article or product, obtainable only by means of labour, in exchange for it.

The power or capacity which particular articles or products have of satisfying one or more of the various wants and desires of which man is susceptible, constitutes their *utility*, and renders them objects of demand.

An article may be possessed of the highest degree of utility, or of power to minister to our wants and enjoyments, and may be universally made use of, without possessing exchangeable value. This is an attribute or quality of those articles only which it requires some portion of voluntary human labour to produce, procure, or preserve. Without utility of some kind or other, no article can ever become an object of demand; but how necessary soever any article may be to our comfort, or even existence, still, if it be a spontaneous production of nature—if it exist independently of human agency—and if every individual may command it in indefinite quantities, without any voluntary exertion or labour, it is destitute of value, and can afford no basis for the reasonings of the economist. A commodity, or product, is not valuable, merely because it is useful or desirable; but it is valuable when, besides being possessed of these qualities, it can only be procured through the intervention of labour. It cannot justly be said, that the food with which we appease the cravings of

hunger, or the clothes by which we defend ourselves from the inclemency of the weather, are more useful than atmospheric air; and yet they are possessed of that exchangeable value of which the latter is totally destitute. The reason is, that food and clothes are not, like air, gratuitous products; they cannot be had at all times, and in any quantity, without exertion; on the contrary, labour is always required for their production, or appropriation, or both; and as no one will voluntarily sacrifice the fruits of his industry without receiving an equivalent, they are truly said to possess exchangeable value.

The economist does not investigate the laws which determine the production and distribution of such articles as exist, and may be obtained in unlimited quantities, independently of all voluntary human agency. The results of the industry of man are the only subjects which engage his attention. Political Economy might, indeed, be called the *science of values*; for, nothing destitute of exchangeable value, or which will not be received as an equivalent for something else which it has taken some labour to produce or obtain, can ever properly be brought within the scope of its inquiries.

The word *value*, has, no doubt, been frequently employed to express, not only the exchangeable worth of a commodity, or its capacity of exchanging for other commodities, but also its *utility*, or capacity of satisfying our wants, or of contributing to our comforts and enjoyments. But it is obvious, that the utility of commodities—that the capacity of bread,

for example, to appease hunger, and of water to quench thirst—is a totally different and distinct quality from their capacity of exchanging for other commodities. Smith perceived this difference, and showed the importance of carefully distinguishing between utility, or, as he expressed it, “*value in use*,” and value in exchange. But he did not always keep this distinction in view, and it has been very often lost sight of by subsequent writers. There can be no doubt, indeed, that the confounding of these opposite qualities has been a principal cause of the confusion and obscurity in which many branches of the science, not in themselves difficult, are still involved. When, for example, it is said that water is highly valuable, the phrase has a very different meaning from what is attached to it when it is said that gold is valuable. Water is indispensable to existence, and has, therefore, a high degree of utility, or of “*value in use* ;” but as it can generally be obtained in large quantities, without much labour or exertion, it has, in most places, a very low value in exchange. Gold, on the other hand, is of comparatively little utility ; but as it exists only in limited quantities, and requires a great deal of labour for its production, it has a comparatively high exchangeable value, and may be exchanged or bartered for a proportionally large quantity of most other commodities. Those who confound qualities so different can hardly fail to arrive at the most erroneous conclusions. And hence, to avoid all chance of error from mistaking the sense of so important a word as value, we shall

not use it except to signify exchangeable worth, or value in exchange; and shall always use the word utility to express the power or capacity of an article to satisfy our wants, or gratify our desires.

Political Economy has sometimes been termed "the science which treats of the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth;" and if by wealth be meant those useful or agreeable articles or products which possess exchangeable value, the definition would seem to be unexceptionable. If, however, the term wealth be understood in either a more enlarged or contracted sense, it will be faulty. Mr. Malthus, for example, has supposed wealth to be identical with "those material objects which are necessary, useful, and agreeable to man."¹ But the inaccuracy of this definition is evident, though we should waive the objections which may perhaps be justly taken to the introduction of the qualifying epithet "material." In proof of this, it is sufficient to mention, that atmospheric air, and the heat of the sun, are both material, necessary, and agreeable products; though their independent existence, and their incapacity of appropriation, by depriving them of exchangeable value, place them, as already seen, without the pale of the science.

Dr. Smith nowhere states the precise meaning he attached to the term wealth; but he most commonly describes it to be "the annual produce of land and labour." Mr. Malthus, however, has justly objected

¹ "Principles of Political Economy," p. 28.

to this definition, that it refers to the sources of wealth before it is known what wealth is, and that it includes all the useless products of the earth, as well as those appropriated and enjoyed by man.

The definition previously given does not seem to be open to any of these objections. By confining the science to a discussion of the laws regulating the production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption of articles or products possessed of exchangeable value, we give it a distinct and definite object. When thus properly restricted, the researches of the economist occupy a field exclusively his own. He runs no risk of wasting his time in inquiries which belong to other sciences, or in unprofitable investigations respecting the production and consumption of articles which cannot be appropriated, and which exist independently of human industry.

No article can be regarded as forming a portion of the wealth either of individuals or states, unless it be susceptible of appropriation. We shall, therefore, endeavour invariably to employ the term wealth to distinguish such products only as are obtained by the intervention of human labour, and which, consequently, may be appropriated by one individual, and enjoyed exclusively by him. A man is not said to be wealthy because he has an indefinite command over atmospheric air, or over the articles with which he, in common with others, is gratuitously supplied by nature; for, this being a privilege which he enjoys along with every one else, it can form no ground of distinction: but he is said to be wealthy, according

to the degree in which he can afford to command those necessities, conveniencies, and luxuries, that are not the gifts of nature, but the products of human industry.

The object of Political Economy is to point out the means by which the industry of man may be rendered most productive of those necessities, comforts, and enjoyments, which constitute wealth; to ascertain the circumstances most favourable for its accumulation; the proportions in which it is divided among the different classes of the community; and the mode in which it may be most advantageously consumed. The intimate connexion of such a science with all the best interests of society is abundantly obvious. There is no other, indeed, which comes so directly home to the every-day occupations and business of mankind. The consumption of wealth is indispensable to existence; but the eternal law of Providence has decreed, that wealth can only be procured by industry; that man must earn his bread in the sweat of his brow. This twofold necessity renders the acquisition of wealth a constant and principal object of the exertions of the vast majority of the human race; has subdued the natural aversion of man from labour; given activity to indolence; and armed the patient hand of industry with zeal to undertake, and perseverance to overcome, the most irksome and disagreeable tasks.

But when wealth is thus necessary, and when the desire to acquire it is sufficient to make us submit to

the greatest privations, the science which teaches the means by which its acquisition may be best promoted, and we may obtain the greatest amount of wealth with the least difficulty, must certainly deserve to be carefully studied and meditated. There is no class of persons to whom it can be considered as either extrinsic or superfluous. There are some, doubtless, to whom it may be of more advantage than to others; but it is of the utmost consequence to every one. The prices of all sorts of commodities; the profits of the farmer, manufacturer, and merchant; the rent of the landlord; the employment and wages of the labourer; the influence of regulations affecting the freedom of industry; the incidence and operation of taxes and loans,—all depend on principles which it belongs to this science to ascertain and elucidate.

Neither is wealth necessary only because it affords the means of subsistence: without it we should never be able to cultivate and improve our higher and nobler faculties. Where wealth has not been amassed, individuals, being constantly occupied in providing for their immediate wants, have no time left for the culture of their minds; so that their views, sentiments, and feelings, become alike contracted and illiberal. The possession of a decent competence, or the power to indulge in other pursuits than those which directly tend to satisfy our animal wants and desires, is necessary to soften the selfish passions; to improve the moral and intellectual character; and to ensure any considerable proficiency in liberal studies and pursuits. And hence, the acquisition of

wealth is not desirable merely as the means of procuring immediate and direct gratifications, but is indispensably necessary to the advancement of society in civilization and refinement. Without the tranquillity and leisure afforded by the possession of accumulated wealth, those speculative and elegant studies which expand and enlarge our views, purify our taste, and lift us higher in the scale of being, can never be successfully prosecuted. Barbarism and refinement depend far more on the amount of their wealth than on any other single circumstance in the condition of a people. It is impossible, indeed, to name a nation, distinguished in philosophy or the fine arts, that has not been, at the same time, celebrated for its riches. Pericles and Phidias, Petrarch and Raphael, immortalized the flourishing ages of Grecian and Italian commerce. The influence of wealth is, in this respect, almost omnipotent. It raised Venice from the bosom of the deep; and made the desert and sandy islands on which she is built, and the unhealthy swamps of Holland, the favoured abodes of literature, science, and art. In our own country its effects have been equally striking. The number and eminence of our philosophers, poets, scholars, and artists, have increased proportionally to the increase of the public wealth, or to the means of rewarding and honouring their labours.

The possession of wealth being thus indispensable to individual existence and comfort, and to the advancement of nations in civilization, it may justly excite our astonishment, that so few efforts should

have been made, down to a very late period, to investigate its sources; and that the study of this science is not even yet considered as essential in a comprehensive system of education. A variety of circumstances might be mentioned which have contributed to its unmerited neglect; but the institution of domestic slavery in the ancient world, and the darkness of the period when the plan of education in the universities of modern Europe was first formed, seem to have had the greatest influence.

The citizens of Greece and Rome considered it degrading to engage in those occupations which form the principal business of the inhabitants of modern Europe. Instead of endeavouring to enrich themselves by their own exertions, they trusted to the reluctant labour of slaves, or to subsidies extorted from conquered countries. In some Grecian states, the citizens were prohibited from engaging in either manufactures or commerce; and though this prohibition did not exist in Athens and Rome, these employments were, notwithstanding, regarded by their citizens as unworthy of freemen, and were, in consequence, carried on only by slaves, or by the very dregs of the people. Even Cicero, who had mastered all the philosophy of the ancient world, and raised himself above many of the prejudices of his age and country, does not scruple to affirm, that there can be nothing ingenuous in a workshop; that commerce, when conducted on a small scale, is mean and despicable; and when most extended, barely tolerable

—*non admodum vituperanda* !¹ Agriculture, indeed, was treated with more respect. Some of the most distinguished characters in the earlier ages of Roman history had been actively engaged in rural affairs; but, despite their example, the cultivation of the soil, in the flourishing period of the Republic, and under the Emperors, was mostly carried on by slaves, belonging to the landlord, and employed on his account. The mass of Roman citizens either engaged in the military service,² or derived a precarious and dependent subsistence from the supplies of corn furnished by the conquered provinces. In such a society the relations subsisting in modern Europe between landlords and tenants, masters and servants, were nearly unknown; and the ancients were, in consequence, all but entire strangers to those interesting and important questions arising out of the rise and fall of rents and wages, which form so important a branch of economical science. The philosophy

¹ “*Illiberales autem et sordidi questus mercenariorum, omniumque quorum operæ, non quorum artes emuntur. Est enim illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur à mercatoribus quod statim vendant, nihil enim proficiunt, nisi admodum mentiantur!* Opificesque omnes in sordidâ arte versantur, *nec enim quidquam ingenuum potest habere officina.* * * * Mercatura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin autem magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans, multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum vituperanda.”—*De Officiis*, lib. i. sect. 42.

² “*Rei militaris virtus præstat cæteris omnibus; hæc populo Romano, hæc huic urbi æternam gloriam peperit.*”—CICERO *pro Murenâ*.

of antiquity was also extremely unfavourable to the cultivation of Political Economy. The luxurious or more refined mode of living of the rich was regarded by the ancient moralists as an evil of the first magnitude.¹ They considered it as subversive of those warlike virtues which were the principal objects of their admiration ; and they, therefore, denounced the passion for accumulating wealth as fraught with the most injurious consequences. It was impossible that this science could become an object of attention to minds imbued with such prejudices ; or that it could be studied by those who contemned its objects, and vilified the labour by which wealth is produced.

At the establishment of our universities, the clergy being almost the exclusive possessors of the little knowledge then in existence, their peculiar feelings and pursuits naturally had a marked influence over the plans of education they were employed to frame. Grammar, rhetoric, logic, school divinity, and civil law, comprised the whole course of study. To have appointed professors to explain the principles of commerce, and the means by which labour might be rendered most efficient, would have been considered as at once superfluous and degrading to the dignity of science. The ancient prejudices against commerce, manufactures, and luxury, retained a powerful influence in the middle ages. None then

¹ "Paulatim," says Tacitus, speaking of the effects of the increasing wealth of the Romans, "discessum ad delinamenta victorum, balnea, et conviviorum elegantiam, *idque apud imperitos humanitas vocatur.*"—Annal. lib. ii.

possessed any clear ideas in regard to the true sources of national wealth, happiness, and prosperity. The intercourse among states was extremely limited, and was maintained rather by marauding incursions and piratical expeditions in search of plunder, than by a commerce founded on the gratification of real and reciprocal wants.

These circumstances sufficiently account for the late rise of the science, and the little attention paid to it down to a very recent period. And since it has become an object of more general attention and inquiry, the differences which have subsisted among the more eminent of its professors have proved exceedingly unfavourable to its progress, and have generated a disposition to distrust its best established conclusions.

It is clear, however, that those who distrust the conclusions of Political Economy, because of the variety of systems that have been advanced to explain the phenomena about which it is conversant, might on the same ground distrust the conclusions of almost every other science. The discrepancy between the various systems that have successively been sanctioned by the ablest physicians, chemists, natural philosophers, and moralists, is quite as great as the discrepancy between those advanced by the ablest economists. But who would therefore conclude, that medicine, chemistry, natural philosophy, and morals, rest on no solid foundation, or that they are incapable of being formed into systems of well-established and consentaneous truths? We do not

refuse our assent to the demonstrations of Newton and Laplace, because they subverted the hypotheses of Ptolemy, Tycho Brahé, and Descartes; and why should we refuse our assent to the demonstrations of Smith and Ricardo, because they have subverted the false theories that were previously advanced respecting the sources and the distribution of wealth? Political Economy has not been exempted from the fate common to the other sciences. None of them has been instantaneously carried to perfection; more or less of error has always insinuated itself into the speculations of their earliest cultivators. But the errors with which this science was formerly infected are now fast disappearing; and a few observations will suffice to show, that it really admits of as much certainty in its conclusions as any science founded on *fact and experiment* can possibly do.

The principles on which the production and accumulation of wealth and the progress of civilization depend, are not the offspring of legislative enactments. Man must exert himself to produce wealth, because he cannot exist without it; and the desire implanted in the breast of every individual, of rising in the world and improving his condition, impels him to save and accumulate. The principles which form the basis of this science make, therefore, a part of the original constitution of man, and of the physical world; and their operation may, like that of the mechanical principles, be traced by the aid of observation and analysis. There is, however, a material

distinction between the physical and the moral and political sciences. The conclusions of the former apply in every case, while those of the latter apply only in the majority of cases. The principles which determine the production and accumulation of wealth are inherent in our nature, and exert a powerful, though not always the same degree of influence over the conduct of every individual; and the theorist must, therefore, satisfy himself with framing rules to explain their operation in the majority of instances, leaving it to the sagacity of the observer to modify them so as to suit individual cases. Thus it is an admitted principle in Morals, as well as in Political Economy, that by far the largest portion of mankind have a clearer view of what is conducive to their own interests, than it is at all likely any other man or select number of men should have; and, consequently, that it is sound policy to allow each individual to follow the bent of his inclination, and to conduct his affairs in any way he may think proper. This is the general theorem; and it is one which is established on the most comprehensive experience. It is not, however, like the laws which regulate the motions of the planetary system; it will hold in nineteen out of twenty instances, but the twentieth may be an exception. But it is not required of the economist, that his theories should square with the peculiarities of particular persons. His conclusions are drawn from observing the principles which are found to determine the conduct of mankind, as presented on the large scale of nations and empires.

He has to deal with man in the aggregate ; with states, and not with families ; with the passions and propensities which actuate the bulk of the human race, and not with those which are occasionally found to influence a solitary individual.

It should always be borne in mind, that it is never any part of the business of the economist to inquire into the means by which the fortunes of individuals have been increased or diminished, except to ascertain in how far they have affected the public interests. These should always form the exclusive objects of his attention. He is not to frame systems, and devise schemes, for increasing the wealth and enjoyments of particular classes ; but to apply himself to discover the sources of national wealth and universal prosperity, and the means by which they may be rendered most productive.

Nothing, indeed, is more common than to hear it objected to some of the best established truths in political and economical science, that they are at variance with certain facts, and that therefore they must be rejected. Most frequently, however, these objections originate in an entire misapprehension of the nature of the science. It would be easy to produce thousands of instances of individuals who have been enriched by monopolies, as they are sometimes by robbery and plunder ; though it would be not a little rash thence to conclude, without further inquiry, that the community may be enriched by such means ! This, however, is the single consideration to which the economist has to attend. The question never is,

whether a greater or smaller number of persons may be enriched by the adoption of a particular measure, or by a particular institution, but whether its tendency be to enrich the public. Admitting that monopolies and restrictive regulations frequently enable individuals to accumulate ample fortunes, instead of this being, as is often contended, any proof of their real advantageousness, it is quite the reverse. It has been demonstrated over and over again, that if monopolies and exclusive privileges enrich the few, they must, to the same extent, impoverish the many; and are, therefore, as destructive of that NATIONAL WEALTH, to promote which should be the principal object of every institution, as they are of the freedom of industry.

To arrive at a well-founded conclusion in this science, it is not, therefore, enough to observe results in particular cases, or as they affect particular individuals; we must further inquire whether these results be constant and universally applicable, and whether the same circumstances which have given rise to them in one instance, would in every instance, and in every state of society, be productive of the same or similar results. A theory which is inconsistent with a uniform and constant fact must be erroneous; but the observation of a particular result at variance with our customary experience, especially if we have not had the means of discriminating the circumstances attending it, should not induce us hastily to modify or reject a principle which accounts satisfactorily for the greater number of appearances.

*I have proved all the many &c, the rest is
 only proof and destruction of national wealth.*

The example of the few arbitrary princes who have been equitable, humane, and generous, is not enough to overthrow the principle which teaches, that it is the nature of irresponsible power to debauch and vitiate its possessors—to render them haughty, cruel, and suspicious: nor is the example of those who, attentive only to present enjoyment, and careless of the future, lavish their fortunes in boisterous dissipation or vain expense, sufficient to invalidate the conclusion, that the passion for accumulation is infinitely stronger and more universally operative than the passion for expense. Had this not been the case, mankind could never have emerged from the condition of savages. The multiplied and stupendous improvements made in different ages and nations—the forests that have been cut down—the marshes and lakes that have been drained and subjected to cultivation—the harbours, roads, and bridges, that have been constructed—the cities and edifices that have been raised—are *all* consequences of a saving of income; and establish, despite a thousand instances of prodigality, the ~~vast~~ ascendancy and superior force of the accumulating principle.

The want of attention to these considerations has occasioned much of the error and misapprehension with which this science has been infected. Almost all the absurd theories and opinions that have successively appeared, have been supported by an appeal to facts. But a knowledge of facts, without a knowledge of their mutual relation, without being able to show why the one is a cause and the other

an effect, is, to use the illustration of M. Say, really no-better than the undigested erudition of an almanack-maker, and can afford no means of judging of the truth or falsehood of a principle.

Neither should it be forgotten, that the alleged facts so frequently brought forward to show the fallacy of general principles, are, in most cases, so carelessly observed, and the circumstances under which they have taken place so indistinctly defined, as to be altogether unworthy of attention. To observe accurately, requires a degree of intelligence and acuteness, a freedom from prejudice, and a patience of investigation, belonging to a few only. "There is," to borrow the words of Dr. Cullen, "a variety of circumstances tending to vitiate the statements dignified with the name of experience. The simplest narrative of a case almost always involves some theories. It has been supposed that a statement is more likely to consist of unsophisticated facts, when reported by a person of no education; but it will be found an invariable rule, that the lower you descend in the medical profession, the more hypothetical are the prevailing notions. Again, how seldom is it possible for any case, however minutely related, to include all the circumstances with which the event was connected! Indeed, in what is commonly called experience, we have only a rule transferred from a case imperfectly known, to one of which we are equally ignorant. Hence, that most fertile source of error, the applying deductions drawn from the result of one case to another case, the circumstances

of which are not precisely similar. Without principles deduced from analytical reasoning, experience is a useless and a blind guide.”¹

Every one who has had occasion to compare the discordant statements of the mass of common observers, with respect to the practical bearing and real influence of any measure affecting the public economy, must be convinced that Dr. Cullen’s reasoning is still more applicable to political and economical science than to medicine. Circumstances which altogether escape the notice of ordinary observers, often exercise a powerful influence over national prosperity; and those again which strike them as most important, are often comparatively insignificant. The condition, too, of nations is affected by so many circumstances, that without the greatest skill and caution, joined to a searching and refined analysis, and a familiar acquaintance with scientific principles, it is, in most cases, quite impossible to discriminate between cause and effect, and to avoid ascribing results to one set of causes that have been occasioned by some other set. No wonder, therefore, when such is the difficulty of observing, that “the number of false facts afloat in the world, should infinitely exceed that of the false theories.”² And after all, how carefully soever an isolated fact may be observed, it can never, for the reasons already stated, form a foundation for a theorem either in the moral or political sciences. Those, indeed, who bring forward

¹ Cullen’s MS. Lectures.

² A remark of Dr. Cullen.

theories resting on so narrow a basis, are almost invariably empirics, whose vanity or interest prompts them to set up conclusions drawn from their own limited range of observation, in opposition to those that have been sanctioned by the general experience of mankind.

But although we are not to reject a received principle because of the apparent opposition of a few results, with the particular circumstances of which we are unacquainted, we should place no confidence in its solidity unless it have been deduced from a very comprehensive and careful induction. The economist will not arrive at any thing like a true knowledge of the laws regulating the production, accumulation, distribution, and consumption of wealth, if he do not draw his materials from a very wide surface. He should study man in every different situation; he should have recourse to the history of society, arts, commerce, and civilization; to the works of legislators, philosophers, and travellers; to every thing, in short, that can throw light on the causes which accelerate or retard the progress of nations: he should mark the changes which have taken place in the fortunes and condition of the human race in different regions and ages of the world; he should trace the rise, progress, and decline of industry; and, above all, he should carefully analyze and compare the effects of different institutions and regulations, and discriminate the various circumstances wherein an advancing and declining society differ from each other. These investigations

disclose the real causes of national opulence and refinement, and of poverty and degradation; and provided they are sufficiently comprehensive, and that the circumstances under which observed events have taken place, correspond in the more essential respects with those under which it is meant to apply the experience deduced from them, they furnish the statesman with the means of devising a scheme of administration calculated to ensure the continued advancement of the society.

But at the same time it must be acknowledged, that however extensive our investigations, the experience to which we are at present able to appeal, appears to be insufficient for the satisfactory solution of some of the more difficult practical problems involved in the application of the science. The state of society in antiquity, when the bulk of the labouring classes consisted of slaves, and its state in the middle ages, and down almost to our own times, was extremely different from its present state; so that the lessons derived from past experience, the only sure ground on which to build in such matters, are, unfortunately, but little applicable to the new order of things. With respect, indeed, to the mere production of wealth, and to what may be called the strictly scientific parts of the science, there is now but little, if any, room for doubt or hesitation. But it is otherwise with many practical questions in which the public prosperity is deeply interested. Some of these will be noticed in other parts of this work; and at present we shall content ourselves with merely referring, by

way of illustration, to such questions as those respecting the consequences of the excessive growth of manufactures in particular countries; the practice of equally dividing the fixed property belonging to individuals, on their demise, among their different children, as compared with the practices of primogeniture and entail; the interference with parental authority, in regulating the labour and education of children; the principle and administration of the laws for the support of the poor, and of those for the establishment of public works, &c. These are all questions of vast importance, in regard to which we are at this moment, perhaps, without the means of coming to any conclusions on which it would be altogether safe to rely. We must, ~~it is true,~~ despite our imperfect means of information, legislate upon some or all of these matters; and should, ~~of course,~~ adopt such measures as may, on a careful consideration of the circumstances, seem, on the whole, most likely to secure the object in view. But we should think, that but few who reflect, though it were only cursorily, on the novelty, (for they are but of yesterday,) and consequently the difficulty as well as importance of these and similar questions, will be inclined to adopt a dogmatical tone, or to pronounce confidently in regard to the results of any measures, however well considered, that may at present be proposed with respect to them.

But, notwithstanding the uncertainty with which they must sometimes be mixed up, such inquiries cannot fail to excite the deepest interest in every

ingenuous mind. The laws by which the motions of the celestial bodies are regulated, and over which man cannot exercise the smallest influence, are yet universally allowed to be noble and rational objects of study. But the laws which regulate the movements of human society—which cause one people to advance in opulence and refinement, at the same time that another is sinking into the abyss of poverty and barbarism—have an infinitely stronger claim on our attention; both because they relate to objects which exercise a direct influence over human happiness, and because their effects may be, and in fact are, continually modified by human interference. National prosperity does not depend nearly so much on advantageous situation, salubrity of climate, or fertility of soil, as on the adoption of measures, fitted to stimulate the genius of the inhabitants, and to give perseverance and activity to industry. The establishment of a wise system of public economy compensates for almost every other deficiency; and has rendered regions naturally inhospitable and unproductive, the comfortable abodes of a refined, a crowded, and a wealthy population: but where it is wanting, the best gifts of nature are of little value; and countries possessed of the greatest capacities of improvement, and abounding in all the materials necessary for the production of wealth, with difficulty furnish a miserable subsistence to hordes distinguished only by their barbarism and wretchedness.

Those who reflect on the variety and extent of

knowledge required for the construction of a sound theory of Political Economy, will cease to feel any surprise at the errors into which its cultivators have been betrayed, or at the discrepancy of the opinions that are still entertained on a few important points. Political Economy is of very recent origin. Though various treatises of considerable merit had previously been published on some of its detached parts, it was not treated as a whole, or in a scientific manner, until about the middle of last century. This circumstance is of itself enough to account for the number of erroneous systems that have since appeared. Instead of deducing their general conclusions from a comparison of particular facts, and a careful examination of the phenomena attending the operation of different principles, and of the same principles under different circumstances, the first cultivators of almost every branch of science begin by framing their theories on a very narrow and insecure basis. Nor is it really in their power to go to work differently. Observations are scarcely ever made, or particulars noted, for their own sakes. It is not until they begin to be sought after, as furnishing the only test by which to ascertain the truth or falsehood of some popular theory, that they are made in sufficient numbers, and with sufficient accuracy. It is, in the peculiar phraseology of this science, the effectual demand of the theorist that occasions the production of the facts or raw materials he is afterwards to work into a system. The history of the science strikingly exemplifies the truth of this remark. Being, as already

observed, entirely unknown to the ancients, and but little attended to by our ancestors down to a comparatively late period, most of those circumstances which would have enabled us to judge of the wealth and civilization of the most celebrated states of antiquity, and of Europe during the middle ages, have either been thought unworthy of notice by the historian, or have been very imperfectly and carelessly detailed. Those, therefore, who first began to trace its general principles, had but a comparatively limited and scanty experience on which to build their conclusions. Nor did they even avail themselves of the few historical facts with which they might easily have become acquainted; but, for the most part, confined their attention to such as happened to come within the narrow sphere of their own observation.

The circumstance of the money of all civilized countries having principally consisted of gold and silver, naturally gave birth to the once prevalent opinion that wealth consisted exclusively of the precious metals. Having been used both as standards by which to measure the value of different commodities, and as the equivalents for which they were most frequently exchanged, they acquired an artificial importance, not merely in the estimation of the vulgar, but in that also of persons of the greatest discernment. The simple and decisive consideration, that to buy and to sell is merely to barter one commodity for another—to exchange a certain quantity of corn or cloth, for example, for a certain quantity of gold or silver, and *vice versa*—was entirely overlooked. The attention

was gradually transferred from the money's worth to the money itself; and the wealth of individuals and of states came to be measured by the quantity of the precious metals actually in their possession; and not, as it should have been, by the abundance of their disposable products, or by the quantity and value of the commodities with which they could afford to purchase these metals. And hence the policy, as obvious as it was universal, of attempting to increase the amount of national wealth by forbidding the exportation of gold and silver, and encouraging their importation.

It appears from a passage of Cicero, that the exportation of the precious metals from Rome had been frequently prohibited during the Republic;¹ and this prohibition was repeatedly renewed, though to very little purpose, by the Emperors.² Neither, perhaps, has there been a state in modern Europe which has not expressly forbidden the exportation of gold and silver. It is said to have been interdicted by the law of England previously to the Conquest; and various statutes were subsequently passed to the same effect; one of which, (3d Henry VIII. cap. 1,) enacted

¹ "*Exportari aurum non oportere, cum sæpe antea senatus, tum me consule, gravissime judicavit.*" — Orat. pro L. Flacco, cap. 28.

² Pliny, when enumerating the silks, spices, and other Eastern products imported into Italy, says, "*Minimâque computatione millies centena millia sestertiûm annis omnibus, India et Seres, peninsulaque illa (Arabia) imperio nostro adimunt. Tanto nobis deliciæ et faminiæ constant.*" — Hist. Nat. lib. xii. cap. 18.

so late as 1512, declared, that all persons carrying over sea any coins, plate, jewels, &c. should, on detection, forfeit double their value.

The extraordinary extension of commerce during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries occasioned the substitution of a more refined and complex system for increasing the supply of the precious metals, in the place of the coarse and vulgar one that had previously obtained. The establishment of a direct intercourse with India by the Cape of Good Hope, seems to have had the greatest influence in effecting this change. The precious metals have usually been among the most advantageous articles of export to the East: and, notwithstanding the old and deeply-rooted prejudices against their exportation, the East India Company obtained, when first instituted, in 1600, leave annually to export foreign coins, or bullion, of the value of £30,000; on condition, however, of their importing, within six months after the termination of every voyage, except the first, as much gold and silver as they exported. But the enemies of the Company contended, that this condition was not complied with; and that it was besides contrary to all principle, and highly injurious to the public interests, to permit gold and silver to be sent out of the kingdom. The merchants, and others interested in the support of the Company could not controvert the reasonings of their opponents, without openly impugning the ancient policy of absolutely preventing the exportation of the precious metals. They did not, indeed, venture to contend, and it probably did

not occur to them, that the exportation of bullion to India was advantageous, because the commodities bought by it were of greater value in England; but they contended, that its exportation was advantageous, because the commodities brought from India were chiefly re-exported to other countries, from which a greater amount of bullion was obtained in payment for them than had been originally required for their purchase in the East. Mr. Thomas Mun, the ablest of the Company's advocates, ingeniously compares the operations of the merchant in conducting a trade carried on by the exportation of gold and silver, to the seed-time and harvest of agriculture. "If we only behold," says he, "the actions of the husbandman in the seed-time, when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we shall account him rather a madman than a husbandman. But when we consider his labours in the harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we shall find the worth and plentiful increase of his actions."¹

Such was the origin of what has been called the MERCANTILE SYSTEM: and, when compared with the previous prejudice, for it hardly deserves the name of system, which wholly interdicted the exportation

¹ "Treasure by Foreign Trade," orig. ed. p. 50.—This work was published in 1664, a considerable period after Mr. Mun's death. Most probably it had been written about 1635 or 1640. Mun had previously advanced the same doctrines, nearly in the same words, in his *Defence of the East India Trade*, originally published in 1621, and in a petition drawn up by him, and presented by the East India Company to Parliament, in 1628.

of gold and silver, it must be allowed that its adoption was a considerable step in the progress to sounder opinions. The supporters of the mercantile system, like their predecessors, held that gold and silver alone constituted wealth ; but they argued that sound policy dictated the propriety of allowing their exportation to foreigners, provided the commodities imported in their stead, or a portion thereof, were afterwards sold to other foreigners for more bullion than had been expended on their purchase ; or provided the importation of the foreign commodities occasioned the exportation of so much more native produce than would otherwise have been exported, as should more than equal their cost. These opinions necessarily led to the famous doctrine of the *Balance of Trade*. It was obvious that the precious metals could not be obtained in countries destitute of mines, except in return for exported commodities ; and the grand object of the supporters of the mercantile system being the monopoly of the largest possible supply of the precious metals, they adopted various schemes for encouraging the exportation, and restraining the importation of almost all products, except gold and silver, that were not intended for future exportation. When the value of the exports exceeded that of the imports, the excess was denominated a favourable balance ; and was regarded as forming, at one and the same time, the sole cause and measure of the progress of countries in the career of wealth : for, it was taken for granted, that the equivalent of the balance must inevitably be brought home in gold

and silver, or in those metals which were then believed to be the only real riches individuals or nations could possess.

These principles and conclusions, though absolutely erroneous, afford a tolerable explanation of a few very obvious phenomena; and what did more to recommend them, they were in perfect unison with the popular prejudices on the subject. The merchants and practical men, who founded the mercantile system, did not consider it necessary to subject the principles they assumed to any very refined analysis or examination. But, taking for granted that the common consent of mankind was a sufficient guarantee for their truth, they applied themselves to the discussion of the practical measures calculated to give them the greatest efficacy.

“Although a kingdom,” says Mr. Mun, “may be enriched by gifts received, or by purchase taken, from some other nations; yet these are things uncertain, and of small consideration when they happen. The ordinary means, therefore, to increase our wealth and treasure, is by foreign trade; wherein we must ever observe this rule—to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value. For, suppose, that when this kingdom is plentifully served with cloth, lead, tin, iron, fish, and other native commodities, we do yearly export the overplus to foreign countries to the value of £2,200,000, by which means we are enabled, beyond the seas, to buy and bring in foreign wares for our use and consumption to the value of £2,000,000: by this order duly kept in our

trading, we may rest assured that the kingdom shall be enriched yearly £200,000, which must be brought to us as so much treasure; because that part of our stock which is not returned to us in wares must necessarily be brought home in treasure.”¹

The advantage of foreign commerce is here supposed to depend wholly on the amount of gold and silver which, it is assumed, must be brought home in payment of the excess of exported products. Mr. Mun lays no stress whatever on the circumstance of its reducing the price of almost every description of commodities, by giving birth to the territorial division of labour amongst different countries; and of its also enabling each particular people to obtain an infinite variety of useful and agreeable products, of which they would, otherwise, be wholly destitute. We are desired to consider all this accession of wealth, all the vast additions made by commerce to the motives which stimulate, and the comforts and enjoyments which reward the labour of the industrious, as nothing, and to fix our attention exclusively on the balance of £200,000 of gold and silver! This is much the same as if we were to estimate the comfort and utility of clothes, by the number and glare of the metal buttons by which they are fastened. And yet Mr. Mun’s rule for estimating the advantageousness of foreign commerce was long regarded, by most merchants, writers, and practical statesmen, as infallible; and such is the inveteracy of ancient prejudices, that we are still, every now and then,

¹ “Treasure by Foreign Trade,” p. 11.

congratulated on the excess of our exports over our imports!

There were many circumstances, however, besides the factitious importance ascribed to the precious metals, which led to the enactment of regulations restricting the freedom of industry, and secured the ascendancy of the mercantile system. The feudal governments established in the countries that had formed the western division of the Roman empire, having speedily lost their authority, their subjects were involved in confusion and anarchy. The princes, unable of themselves to restrain the usurpations of the greater barons, endeavoured to strengthen their influence and consolidate their power, by attaching the inhabitants of cities and towns to their interests. For this purpose, they granted them charters, which abolished every existing mark of servitude, and formed them into corporations, or bodies politic, governed by councils and magistrates of their own selection. The order and good government that were, in consequence, established in cities and towns, and the security enjoyed by their inhabitants, while the rest of the country was a prey to rapine and disorder, stimulated their industry, and gave them a decided superiority over the cultivators of the soil. It was from them that the princes derived the greater part of their supplies of money; and it was by their co-operation that they were enabled to subdue the pride and independence of the barons. But the citizens did not render this continued assistance to their sovereigns merely by

way of compensation for the original gift of their charters. They were continually soliciting new privileges. And it was not to be expected that those whom they had laid under so many obligations, and who justly regarded them as forming the most industrious and deserving portion of their subjects, should feel any great disinclination to gratify their wishes. Hence, the exportation of corn, and of the raw materials used in their manufactures, was prohibited, that they might obtain cheap provisions, and be able to carry on their industry under the most favourable circumstances; at the same time that heavy duties and absolute prohibitions were employed to prevent the importation of manufactured articles from abroad, and to secure them the monopoly of the home market. The privilege was, also, granted to the citizens of towns-corporate, of preventing, within their limits, any individual from carrying on any branch of industry without their leave. These, with a variety of subordinate regulations intended to force the importation of the raw materials required in manufactures, and the exportation of manufactured goods, were the principal features of the system of public economy adopted, in the view of encouraging domestic industry, in every country of Europe, in the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. The freedom of intercourse, that had been partially recognised by their ancient laws, was almost totally destroyed; and the spirit of invention was restrained still more, perhaps, by vicious systems of legislation than by the real difficulties that opposed

its development. To such an excess was the protective system at one time carried, that it was not uncommon to forbid the use of new manufactures, even when produced at home, lest they might interfere with those already established. So late as 1721, the wearing of calicoes was prohibited, for the avowed purpose of encouraging the woollen and silk manufactures, by the imposition of a penalty of £20 on the seller, and of £5 on the wearer. In 1736 this law was repealed as to British calicoes, provided, however, that the warp were of linen yarn. It is almost superfluous to add, that, without the repeal of these absurd statutes, the cotton manufacture could not have made any progress amongst us.

But the exclusion of all competition, and the monopoly of the home market were not enough to satisfy the manufacturers and merchants. Having obtained all the advantage they could from the public, they next attempted to prey on each other. Such of them as possessed most influence procured the privilege of carrying on particular branches of industry to the exclusion of every one else. This abuse was carried to a most oppressive height in the reign of Elizabeth, who granted an infinite number of new patents; and the grievance became at length so insupportable as to make all classes join in petitioning for its abolition; and this, after much opposition on the part of the Crown, which looked upon the power to erect monopolies as a very valuable branch of the prerogative, was effected by an act passed in 1624, (21 Jac. I. cap. 3.) By abolishing a number of oppressive

monopolies, and restoring the freedom of internal industry, this act did more, perhaps, than any other in the statute-book to accelerate the progress of improvement; but it touched none of the fundamental principles of the mercantile or manufacturing system; and the privileges of all bodies-corporate were exempted from its operation.

In France the interests of the manufacturers were warmly espoused by the celebrated M. Colbert, minister of finance during the most splendid period of the reign of Louis XIV.; and the year 1664, when the famous tariff, compiled under his direction, was promulgated, has been sometimes considered, though, as has been seen, erroneously, as the era of the mercantile system.¹

The restrictions in favour of the manufacturers were all zealously supported by the advocates of the mercantile system and the balance of trade. The facilities given to the exportation of goods manufactured at home, and the obstacles thrown in the way of importation from abroad, seemed peculiarly well fitted for making the exports exceed the imports, and procuring a favourable balance. Instead, therefore, of these regulations being regarded as the offspring of a selfish, monopolizing spirit, they were looked upon as having been dictated by the soundest policy. The interests of the manufacturers and merchants were universally supposed to be identified with each other, and also with those of the public. The acquisition of a favourable balance of payments

¹ See Mengotti, "*Dissertazione sul Colbertismo*," cap. xi.

was the grand object to be accomplished ; and heavy duties and restrictions on importation, and bounties on exportation, were the means by which it was to be attained. It cannot excite surprise, that a system having so many popular prejudices in its favour, and which afforded a plausible apology for the exclusive privileges enjoyed by the manufacturing and commercial classes, should have early attained, or that it should still preserve, notwithstanding the overthrow of its principles, much practical influence.¹

“It is,” says M. Storch, “no exaggeration to affirm, that there are very few political errors which have produced more mischief than the mercantile system. Armed with power, it has commanded and forbid, where it should only have protected. The regulating mania which it has inspired, has tormented industry in a thousand ways, to force it from its natural channels. It has made each nation regard the welfare of its neighbours as incompatible with its own ; hence the reciprocal desire of injuring and impoverishing each other ; and hence that spirit of commercial rivalry which has been the immediate or remote cause of the greater number of modern wars. This system has stimulated nations to employ force or cunning to extort commercial treaties, productive of no real advantage to themselves, from the weakness or igno-

¹ Melon and Forbonnais in France ; Genovesi in Italy ; Mun, Sir Josiah Child, Dr. Davenant, the authors of the *British Merchant*, and Sir James Steuart, in England, are the ablest writers who have espoused, some with more, and some with fewer exceptions, the leading principles of the mercantile system.

rance of others. It has formed colonies, that the mother country might enjoy the monopoly of their trade, and force them to resort only to her markets. In short, where this system has been productive of the least injury, it has retarded the progress of national prosperity; every where else it has deluged the earth with blood, and has depopulated and ruined some of those countries whose power and opulence it was supposed it would carry to the highest pitch.”¹

The shock given to previous prejudices and systems by those great discoveries and events, which will for ever distinguish the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the greater attention which the progress of civilization and industry naturally drew to the sources of national power and opulence, prepared the way for the downfall of the mercantile system. The advocates of the East India Company, whose interests had first made them question the prevailing doctrines as to the exportation of bullion, gradually assumed a higher tone; and at length boldly contended that bullion was nothing but a commodity, and that there was no good reason for restraining its free exportation. Similar opinions were soon after avowed by others. Many eminent merchants began to look with suspicion on several of the received maxims; and acquired more correct and comprehensive views of the principles of commercial intercourse. The

¹ Storch, “Cours d'Economie Politique,” tom. i. p. 102. Paris edition.

new ideas ultimately made their way into the House of Commons; and in 1663, the statutes prohibiting the exportation of foreign coin and bullion were repealed; full liberty being given to the East India Company and to private traders, to export them in unlimited quantities.

In addition to the controversy about the East India trade, the discussions respecting the foundation of the colonies in America and the West Indies, the establishment of a compulsory provision for the support of the poor, the prohibition of the export of wool, &c., attracted, in the seventeenth century, an extraordinary portion of the public attention to questions connected with the commercial and domestic policy of the country. In its course a more than usual number of tracts were published on economical subjects. And though the authors of the greater number were strongly imbued with the prejudices of the age, it cannot be denied, that several amongst them emancipated themselves from their influence, and have an unquestionable right to be regarded as the founders of the modern theory of commerce—as the earliest expositors of those sound and liberal doctrines, which show that the prosperity of states can never be promoted by restrictive regulations, or by the depression of their neighbours—that the genuine spirit of commerce is inconsistent with the selfish and shallow policy of monopoly—and that the self-interest of mankind, not less than their duty, requires them to live in peace, and to cultivate a fair and friendly intercourse with each other.

Besides Mun, Sir Josiah Child,¹ (whose work, though founded on the principles of the mercantile system, contains many sound and liberal views,) Sir William Petty,² and Sir Dudley North, are the most distinguished economical writers of the seventeenth century. The latter not only rose above the established prejudices of the time, but had sagacity enough to detect the more refined and less obvious errors that were newly coming into fashion. His tract, entitled, "Discourses on Trade, principally directed to the Cases of Interest, Coinage, Clipping, and Increase of Money," published in 1691, contains a far more able statement of the true principles of commerce than any that had then appeared. North is throughout the intelligent and consistent advocate of commercial freedom. He is not, like the most eminent of his predecessors, well informed on one subject, and erroneous on another. His system is consentaneous in its parts, and complete. He shows that, in commercial matters, nations have the same interests as individuals; and forcibly exposes the absurdity of supposing, that any trade advantageous to the merchant can be injurious to the public. His opinions respecting a seignorage on coinage and sumptuary laws, then very popular, are equally enlightened.

¹ "A New Discourse of Trade," first published in 1668; but greatly enlarged and improved in the second edition, published in 1690.

² "Quantulumcunque," published in 1682; "Political Anatomy of Ireland," published in 1672; and other works.

The general principles laid down and illustrated in this tract, are announced in the preface as follows:—

“That the world as to trade is but as one nation or people, and therein nations are as persons.

“That the loss of a trade with one nation is not that only, separately considered, but so much of the trade of the world rescinded and lost, for all is combined together.

“That there can be no trade unprofitable to the public; for if any prove so, men leave it off; and wherever the traders thrive, the public, of which they are a part, thrive also.

“That to force men to deal in any prescribed manner, may profit such as happen to serve them; but the public gains not, because it is taken from one subject to give to another.

“That no laws can set prices in trade, the rates of which must and will make themselves. But when such laws do happen to lay any hold, it is so much impediment to trade, and therefore prejudicial.

“That money is a merchandise, whereof there may be a glut as well as a scarcity, and that even to an inconvenience.

“That a people cannot want money to serve the ordinary dealing, and more than enough they will not have.

“That no man will be the richer for the making much money, nor have any part of it, but as he buys it for an equivalent price.

“That the free coynage is a perpetual motion found out, whereby to melt and coyn without ceasing,

and so to feed goldsmiths and coyners at the public charge.

“That debasing the coyn is defrauding one another, and to the public there is no sort of advantage from it; for that admits no character, or value, but intrinsick.

“That the sinking by alloy or weight is all one.

“That exchange and ready money are the same, nothing but carriage and recarriage being saved.

“That money exported in trade is an increase to the wealth of the nation; but spent in war, and payments abroad, is so much impoverishment.

“In short, that all favour to one trade, or interest, is an abuse, and cuts so much of profit from the public.”

Unluckily, this admirable tract never obtained any considerable circulation. There is good reason, indeed, for supposing that it was designedly suppressed.¹ At all events, it speedily became excessively scarce; and we are not aware that it was ever quoted by any subsequent writer previously to the first edition of this work.

The same enlarged views that had found so able a supporter in Sir Dudley North, were afterwards advocated to a greater or less extent by Locke,² the anonymous author of a pamphlet on the East India

¹ See the Honourable Roger North's "Life of his Brother, the Honourable Sir Dudley North," p. 179.

² "Considerations on the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money," 1691; and "Further considerations on Raising the Value of Money," 1695.

Trade,¹ Vanderlint,² Richardson,³ Hume,⁴ and Harris.⁵ But their efforts were ineffectual to the subversion of the mercantile system. Their notions respecting the nature of wealth were confused and contradictory; and as they neither attempted to investigate its sources, nor to trace the causes of national opulence, their arguments in favour of a liberal system of commerce had somewhat of an empirical aspect, and failed of making the impression that is always made by reasonings logically deduced from well-established principles, and shown to be consistent with experience. The opinions entertained by Locke, respecting the paramount influence of labour in the production of wealth, were at once original and correct; but he did not prosecute his investigations in the view of elucidating the principles of the science, and made no reference to them in his subsequent writings. And though Harris adopted Locke's views, and deduced from them some important practical inferences, his general principles are merely introduced by way of preface to his *Treatise on Money*; and are not explained at any length, or in that systematic manner necessary in scientific investigations.

¹ "Considerations on the East India Trade," 1701. This is a very remarkable pamphlet. The author has successfully refuted the various arguments advanced in justification of the prohibition of importing East Indian manufactured goods; and has given a very striking illustration of the effects of the division of labour.

² "Money Answers all Things," 1734.

³ "Essay on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade," 1744.

⁴ "Political Essays," 1752.

⁵ "Essay on Money and Coins," 1757.

But what had thus been left undone by others, was now attempted by a French philosopher, equally distinguished for the subtlety and originality of his understanding, and the integrity and simplicity of his character. The celebrated M. Quesnay, a physician attached to the court of Louis XV., has the merit of being the first who attempted to investigate and analyze the sources of wealth, in the view of ascertaining the fundamental principles of Political Economy: and who, in consequence, gave it a systematic form, and raised it to the rank of a science. Quesnay's father was a small proprietor; and having been educated in the country, he was naturally inclined to regard agriculture with more than ordinary partiality. At an early period of his life he was struck with its depressed state in France, and set himself to discover the causes which had prevented its making that progress which the industry of the inhabitants, the fertility of the soil, and the excellence of the climate, seemed to ensure. In the course of this inquiry he speedily discovered that the prevention of the exportation of corn, and the preference given in the policy of Colbert to manufactures and commerce over agriculture, formed the most powerful obstacles to the progress and improvement of the latter. But Quesnay was not satisfied with exposing the injustice of this preference, and its pernicious consequences: his zeal for the interests of agriculture led him, not merely to place it on the same level with manufactures and commerce, but to raise it above them, by endeavouring to show that it is the only

species of industry which contributes to the riches of a nation. Founding on the indisputable fact, that every thing which either ministers to our wants or desires, must be originally derived from the earth, Quesnay assumed as a self-evident truth, and as the basis of his system, that the *earth is the only source of wealth*; and held that labour is altogether incapable of producing any new value, except when employed in agriculture, including under that term fisheries and mines. The changes produced by the powerful influence of the vegetative powers of nature, and his inability to explain the origin and causes of rent, confirmed him in this opinion. The circumstance, that of all who engage in industrious undertakings, none but the cultivators of the soil pay rent for the use of natural agents, appeared to him to prove that agriculture is the only species of industry which yields a nett surplus (*produit net*) over and above the expenses of production. Quesnay allowed that manufacturers and merchants are highly useful; but, as they realize no nett surplus in the shape of rent, he contended that the value which they add to the raw material of the commodities they manufacture, or carry from place to place, is barely equivalent to the value of the capital or stock consumed by them during the time they are necessarily engaged in these operations. These principles being established, Quesnay proceeded to divide society into three classes; the *first*, or *productive* class, by whose agency all wealth is produced, consists of the farmers and labourers engaged in agriculture, who subsist on

a portion of the produce of the land reserved to themselves as the wages of their labour, and as a reasonable profit on their capital: the *second*, or *proprietary* class, consists of those who live on the rent of the land, or on the *nett surplus produce* raised by the cultivators after their necessary expenses have been deducted: and the *third*, or *unproductive* class, consists of manufacturers, merchants, menial servants, &c., who subsist entirely on the wages paid them by the other two classes; and whose labour, though exceedingly useful, adds nothing to the national wealth. It is obvious, supposing this classification to be made on just principles, that all taxes must fall on the landlords. The third, or unproductive class, have nothing but what they receive from the other two classes, who pay them only what is required to enable them to subsist and continue their services; and if any deduction were made from the fair and reasonable profits and wages of the husbandmen, or *productive class*, it would paralyze their exertions and spread poverty and misery throughout the land, by drying up the only source of wealth. Hence it necessarily follows, on this theory, that the entire expenses of government, and the various public burdens, must, however imposed, be in the end defrayed out of the *produit net*, or rent of the landlords; and consistently with this principle, Quesnay proposed that all the existing taxes should be repealed, and that a single tax, (*impôt unique*,) laid directly on the nett produce, or rent, of the land, should be imposed in their stead.

But, however much impressed with the importance

of agriculture over every other species of industry, Quesnay did not solicit for it any exclusive favour or protection. He successfully contended, that the interests of the agriculturists, and of all the other classes, would be best promoted by establishing a system of perfect freedom. “Qu’on maintienne,” says he, in one of his general maxims, “l’entière liberté du commerce ; *car la police du commerce intérieur et extérieur la plus sûre, la plus exacte, la plus profitable à la nation et à l’état, consiste dans LA PLEINE LIBERTÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE.*”¹ Quesnay showed that it could never be for the interest of the proprietors and cultivators of the soil to fetter or discourage the industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers ; for the greater their liberty, the greater will be their competition, and their services will, in consequence, be rendered so much the cheaper. Neither, on the other hand, can it ever be for the interest of the unproductive classes to harass or oppress the agriculturists, by preventing the free exportation of their products, or by any sort of restrictive regulations. When the cultivators enjoy the greatest degree of freedom, their industry, and, consequently, their nett surplus produce — the only fund whence any accession of national wealth can ever be derived — will be augmented to the greatest possible extent. According to this “liberal and generous system,”² the establishment of perfect liberty, perfect security, and perfect justice, is the

¹ “Physiocratie,” première partie, p. 119.

² “Wealth of Nations,” 1 vol. 8vo, p. 303.

only, as it is the infallible, means of securing the highest degree of prosperity to all classes.

“On a vu,” says the ablest expositor of this system, M. Mercier de la Rivière, “qu’il est de l’essence de l’ordre que l’intérêt particulier d’un seul ne puisse jamais être séparé de l’intérêt commun de tous ; nous en trouvons une preuve bien convaincante dans les effets que produit naturellement et nécessairement la plénitude de la liberté qui doit régner dans le commerce, pour ne point blesser la propriété. L’intérêt personnel, encouragé par cette grande liberté, presse vivement et perpétuellement chaque homme en particulier de perfectionner, de multiplier les choses dont il est vendeur ; de grossir ainsi la masse des jouissances qu’il peut procurer aux autres hommes, afin de grossir, par ce moyen, la masse des jouissances que les autres hommes peuvent lui procurer en échange. *Le monde alors va de lui-même* ; le désir de jouir, et la liberté de jouir, ne cessant de provoquer la multiplication des productions et l’accroissement de l’industrie, ils impriment à toute la société un mouvement qui devient une tendance perpétuelle vers son meilleur état possible.”¹

As other opportunities will be afforded of examining the principles of this very ingenious theory, it is sufficient at present to remark, that, in assuming agriculture to be the only source of wealth, because the matter or substance of commodities must be originally derived from the earth, Quesnay and his

¹ “L’Ordre Nat. et Essent. des Sociétés Politiques,” ii. 444.

followers mistook altogether the nature of production, and really supposed wealth to consist of matter; whereas, in its natural state, matter is very rarely possessed of any immediate or direct utility, and is invariably destitute of value. The labour required to appropriate matter, and to fit and prepare it for our use, is the only means by which it acquires value, and becomes wealth. The latter is not produced by making any additions to the matter of our globe, that being a quantity susceptible neither of augmentation nor diminution. All the operations of industry are intended to create wealth by giving utility to matter already in existence; and it will be afterwards seen, that the labour employed in manufactures and commerce is, in all respects, as creative of utility, and consequently of wealth, as the labour employed in agriculture. Neither is the cultivation of the soil, as M. Quesnay supposed, the only species of industry which yields a surplus after the expenses of production are deducted. So long as none but the best of the good soils are cultivated, no rent, or *produit net*, is obtained from the land; and it is only after recourse has been had to poorer soils, and when, consequently, the productive powers of the labour and capital employed in cultivation begin to diminish, that rent begins to appear: so that, instead of being a consequence of the superior productiveness of agricultural industry, rent is in fact a consequence of one piece of land being more productive than others!

The "Tableau Economique," comprising a set of formulæ constructed by M. Quesnay, intended to

exhibit the various phenomena accompanying the production of wealth, and its distribution among the productive, proprietary, and unproductive classes, was published at Versailles, with accompanying illustrations, in 1758; and the novelty and ingenuity of the theory which it expounded, its systematic shape, and the liberal system of commercial intercourse which it recommended, speedily obtained for it a very high degree of reputation.¹ It is to be regretted, that the friends and disciples of Quesnay, among whom we have to reckon the Marquis de Mirabeau, Mercier de la Rivière, Dupont de Nemours, Saint Peravy, Turgot, and other distinguished individuals in France, Italy, and Germany, should, in their zeal for his peculiar doctrines, which they enthusiastically exerted themselves to defend and propagate, have exhibited more of the character of partisans, than of (what they really were) sincere and honest inquirers after truth. Hence it is that they have always been regarded as a sect, known by the name of *Economists*, or *Physiocrats*; and that their works are characterized by an unusual degree of sameness.²

¹ See Appendix, Note A, for some further remarks on the economical theory.

² The following are the principal works published by the French Economists:—

“Tableau Economique, et Maximes Générales du Gouvernement Economique,” par François Quesnay. 4to, Versailles, 1758.

“Théorie de l’Impôt,” par M. de Mirabeau. 4to and 12mo, 1760.

“La Philosophie Rurale,” par M. de Mirabeau. 4to, and 3 tom. 12mo, 1763.

But, despite their defects, there can be no question that the labours of the Economists powerfully contributed to accelerate the progress of the science. It was now found to be necessary, in reasoning on subjects connected with national wealth, to subject its sources, and the laws which regulate its production and distribution, to a more accurate and searching analysis. In the course of this examination, it was speedily ascertained that both the mercantile and

“*L’Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés Politiques*,” par Mercier de la Rivière. 4to, and 2 tom. 12mo, 1767.

“*Sur l’Origine et Progrès d’une Science Nouvelle*,” par Dupont de Nemours. 1767.

“*La Physiocratie, ou Constitution Naturelle du Gouvernement le plus avantageux au Genre Humain ; Recueil des Principaux Ouvrages Economiques de M. Quesnay*,” rédigé et publié par Dupont de Nemours, deux parties. 1767.

“*Lettres d’un Citoyen à un Magistrat, sur les Vingtîèmes et les autres Impôts*,” par l’Abbé Baudeau. 12mo, 1768.

“*Mémoire sur les Effets de l’Impôt indirect ; qui a remporté le Prix proposé par la Société Royale d’Agriculture de Limoges*,” (par Saint Peravy.) 12mo, 1768.

“*Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses*,” par Turgot. 8vo, 1771. This is the best of all the works founded on the principles of the Economists ; and is, in some respects, the best work on the science published previously to the “*Wealth of Nations*.”

The “*Journal d’Agriculture*,” and the “*Ephémérides du Citoyen*,” contain many valuable articles contributed by Quesnay and other leading Economists. The “*Ephémérides*” was begun in 1767, and was dropped in 1775 : it was first conducted by the Abbé Baudeau, and afterwards by Dupont.

The reader will find a pretty full account of the life of Quesnay, which, unlike that of most literary men, abounded in incident and adventure, in the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

economical theories were erroneous and defective; and that, to establish the science on a firm foundation, it was necessary to take a much more extensive survey, and to seek for its principles, not in a few partial and distorted facts, or in metaphysical abstractions, but in the connexion subsisting among the various phenomena manifested in the progress of civilization. The Count di Verri, whose *Meditazioni sulla Economia Politica* were published in 1771, demonstrated the fallacy of the opinions entertained by the Economists respecting the superior productiveness of the labour employed in agriculture; and showed that all the operations of industry really consist of modifications of matter already in existence.¹ But Verri did not trace the consequences of this important principle; and possessing no clear and definite notions of what constituted wealth, did not attempt to discover the means by which labour might be facilitated. He made some valuable additions to particular branches of the science, and had sufficient acuteness to detect errors in the systems of others; but the task of constructing a better system in their stead required talents of a far higher order.

At length, in 1776, our illustrious countryman,

¹ “*Accostare e sperare sono gli unici elementi che l’ingegno umano ritrova analizando l’idea della riproduzione; e tanto è riproduzione di valore e di ricchezza se la terra, l’aria, e l’acqua ne campi si trasmutino in grano, come se colla mano dell’uomo il gluttile di un insetto si trasmuti in velluto, o vero alcuni pezzetti di metallo si organizzino a formare una ripetizione.*”—*Meditazioni sulla Economia Politica*, § 3.

Adam Smith, published the “Wealth of Nations,”—a work which has done for Political Economy what the treatise of Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, did for public laws. In this work the science was, for the first time, treated in its fullest extent; and the fundamental principles on which the production of wealth depends, established beyond the reach of cavil and dispute. In opposition to the Economists, Smith has shown that labour is the only source of wealth; and that the wish to augment our fortunes and to rise in the world—a wish that comes with us into the world, and never leaves us till we sink into the grave—is the cause of wealth being saved and accumulated: he has shown that labour is productive of wealth when employed in manufactures and commerce, as well as when it is employed in the cultivation of the land; he has traced the various means by which labour may be rendered most efficient; and has given an admirable analysis and exposition of the prodigious addition made to its powers by its division among different individuals and countries, and by the employment of accumulated wealth, or capital, in industrious undertakings. He has also shown, in opposition to the commonly received opinions of the merchants and statesmen of his time, that wealth does not consist in the abundance of gold and silver, but in that of the various necessities, conveniencies, and enjoyments of human life; that it is in every case sound policy to leave individuals to pursue their own interests in their own way; that, in prosecuting branches of industry

advantageous to themselves, they necessarily prosecute such as are, at the same time, advantageous to the public; and that every regulation intended to force industry into particular channels, or to determine the species of commercial intercourse to be carried on between different parts of the same country, or between distant and independent countries, is impolitic and pernicious, subversive of the rights of individuals, and adverse to the progress of real opulence and lasting prosperity.

The fact that the distinct statement of some of the more important of these principles, and that traces of them all, may be found in the works of previous writers, does not detract in any, or but in a very inconsiderable degree, from the merits of Dr. Smith. In adopting the discoveries of others, he made them his own; he demonstrated the truth of principles on which his predecessors had, in most cases, stumbled by chance; separated them from the errors by which they had been encumbered; traced their remote consequences; pointed out their limitations, mutual dependence, and practical importance; and reduced them into a harmonious and beautiful system.

But, however excellent, still it cannot be denied that there are errors, and those too of no slight importance, in the "Wealth of Nations." Smith does not say that, in prosecuting such branches of industry as are most advantageous to themselves, individuals necessarily prosecute such as are, at the same time, most advantageous to the public. His leaning to the

system of the Economists, (a leaning perceptible in every part of his work,) made him so far swerve from the sounder principles of his own system, as to admit that the preference shown by individuals in favour of particular employments, is not always a true test of their public utility. He considered that agriculture, though not the only productive employment, is the most productive of any; that the home trade is more productive than a direct foreign trade; and the latter than the carrying trade. It is clear, however, that these distinctions are fundamentally erroneous. A state being formed of the individuals inhabiting a particular country, it follows, that whatever is most for their separate advantage, must also be most for the advantage of the state or of themselves collectively considered; and it is obvious, that the interest of the parties will prevent their engaging in manufacturing and commercial undertakings, unless they yield as large profits, and are, consequently, as publicly beneficial, as agriculture. Dr. Smith's opinion with respect to the unproductiveness of labour not realized in a fixed and vendible commodity, appears, at first sight, to rest on no better foundation than the opinion of the Economists with respect to the unproductiveness of commerce and manufactures; and its fallacy will be fully established in the sequel of this work. Perhaps, however, the principal defect of the “Wealth of Nations” consists in the erroneous doctrines laid down with respect to the invariable value of corn, and the influence of fluctuations of wages and profits over prices. These

prevented Dr. Smith from acquiring clear and accurate notions respecting the nature and causes of rent, and the laws which govern the rate of profit; and have, in consequence, vitiated the theoretical conclusions in those parts of his work which treat of the distribution of wealth and the principles of taxation.

But, after every reasonable allowance has been made for these and other defects, enough still remains to justify us in considering Smith as the real founder of the modern theory of Political Economy. If he have not left a perfect work, he has, at all events, left one which contains a greater number of useful truths than has ever been given to the world by any other individual; and he has pointed out and smoothed the route, by following which, subsequent philosophers have been able to perfect much that he had left incomplete, to rectify the mistakes into which he fell, and to make many new and important discoveries. Whether, indeed, we regard the soundness of its leading doctrines, the liberality and universal applicability of its practical conclusions, or its powerful and beneficial influence over the progress of the science, and, above all, over the policy and conduct of nations, the "Wealth of Nations" must be placed in the foremost rank of those works that have helped to liberalize, enlighten, and enrich mankind.

Political Economy was long confounded with politics; and it is undoubtedly true that they are very intimately connected, and that it is frequently impossible to treat questions which belong to the

one, without referring more or less to the principles and conclusions of the other. But in their leading features they are, notwithstanding, sufficiently distinct. The laws which regulate the production and distribution of wealth are the same in every country and stage of society. Those circumstances which are favourable or unfavourable to the increase of riches and population in a republic, may equally exist, and will have exactly the same influence, in a monarchy. That security of property, without which there can be no steady and continued exertion; that freedom of engaging in every different branch of industry, so necessary to call the various powers and resources of human talent and ingenuity into action; and that economy in the public expenditure, so conducive to the accumulation of national wealth, are not attributes which belong exclusively to any particular species of government. If free states have usually made the most rapid advances in wealth and population, it is an indirect, more than a direct consequence of their political constitution: it results rather from the right of property being in general more respected, the exercise of industry less fettered, and the public income more judiciously levied and expended, under popular governments, than from the circumstance merely of a greater proportion of the people being permitted to exercise political rights and privileges: give the same securities to the subjects of an absolute monarch, and they will make the same advances. Industry does not require to be stimulated by extrinsic advantages: the additional comforts and

enjoyments which it procures have always been found sufficient to ensure the most persevering exertions; and whatever may have been the form of government, those countries have always advanced in the career of improvement, in which the public burdens have been moderate, the freedom of industry maintained, and every individual allowed peaceably to enjoy the fruits of his labour, to cultivate his mind, and to communicate his ideas to others. The wealth of a country does not, therefore, depend so much on its political organization, as on the talents and spirit of its rulers. Economy, moderation, and intelligence, on the part of those in power, have frequently elevated absolute monarchies to a very high degree of opulence and prosperity; while, on the other hand, the various advantages derived from a more liberal system of government have not always been able to preserve free states from being impoverished and exhausted by the extravagance, intolerance, and short-sighted policy of their rulers.

This science is, therefore, sufficiently distinct from Politics. The politician examines the principles on which government is founded; he endeavours to determine in whose hands the supreme authority may be most advantageously placed; and unfolds the reciprocal duties and obligations of the governing and governed portions of society. The political economist does not take so high a flight. It is not of the constitution of the government, but of its ACTS only, that he presumes to judge. Whatever measures affect the production and distribution of

wealth, necessarily come within the scope of his observation, and are freely canvassed by him. He examines whether they are in unison with the principles of the science, and fitted to promote the public interests: if they are, he shows the nature and extent of the benefits of which they will be productive; while, if they are not, he shows in what respect they are defective, and to what extent they will most probably be injurious. But he does this without inquiring into the constitution of the government which has enacted these measures. The circumstance of their having emanated from the privy council of an arbitrary monarch, or the representative assembly of a free state, though in other respects of supreme importance, cannot affect the immutable principles by which he is to form his opinion upon them.

Besides being confounded with Politics, Political Economy has sometimes been confounded with Statistics; but they are still more easily separated and distinguished. The object of the statist is to describe the condition of a country at some given period; while the object of the economist is to discover the causes which have brought it into that condition, and the means by which its wealth and population may be indefinitely increased. He is to the statist what the physical astronomer is to the mere observer. He takes the facts furnished by the researches of statisticians; and after comparing them with each other, and with those deduced from other sources, he applies himself to discover their relation and dependence. By a patient induction, by carefully observing

the circumstances attending the operation of particular principles, he discovers the effects of which they are really productive, and how far they are liable to be modified by the operation of other principles. It is thus that the various general laws which regulate and connect the apparently conflicting, but really harmonious interests of every different order in society, may be discovered, and established with all the certainty that belongs to conclusions derived from experience and observation.

PRINCIPLES

OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PART I.

PRODUCTION AND ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH.

CHAPTER I.

Definition of Production—Labour the only Source of Wealth.

ALL the operations of nature and art are reducible to, and really consist of, *transmutations*, that is, of changes of form and of place. By production, in this science, is not meant the production of matter, that being the exclusive attribute of Omnipotence, but the production of utility, and consequently of value, by appropriating and modifying matter already in existence, so as to fit it to satisfy our wants, and contribute to our enjoyments.¹ The labour which is thus

¹ This point has been forcibly stated by M. Destutt Tracy. "Non-seulement," says he, "nous ne créons jamais rien, mais il nous est même impossible de concevoir ce que c'est que *créer* ou *anéantir*, si nous entendons rigoureusement par ces mots, *faire quelque chose de rien*, ou *reduire quelque chose à rien*; car nous n'avons jamais vu un être quelconque sortir du néant ni y rentrer. De-là cet axiome admis par toute l'antiquité,—rien ne vient de *rien*, et ne peut redevenir *rien*. Que faisons-nous donc par notre travail, par notre action sur tous les êtres qui nous entourent? Jamais rien, qu'opérer dans ces êtres des changemens de forme ou de lieu qui les approprient à notre usage, qui les rendent utiles à la satisfaction de nos besoins. Voilà ce que nous devons entendre par produire; c'est donner aux choses une utilité qu'elles n'avoient pas. Quel que soit notre travail, s'il n'en résulte point d'utilité, il est infructueux; s'il en résulte, il est productif."—*Traité d'Economie Politique*, p. 82.

employed is the only source of wealth. Nature spontaneously furnishes the matter of which all commodities are made; but until labour has been applied to appropriate that matter, or to adapt it to our use, it is wholly destitute of value, and is not, nor ever has been, considered as forming wealth.¹ Place us on the banks of a river, or in an orchard, and we shall infallibly perish, of thirst or hunger, if we do not, by an effort of industry, raise the water to our lips, or pluck the fruit from its parent tree. It is seldom, however, that the mere appropriation of matter is sufficient. In the vast majority of cases, labour is required not only to appropriate it, but also to convey it from place to place, and to give it that peculiar shape, without which it may be totally useless and incapable of ministering either to our necessities or our comforts. The coal used as fuel is buried deep in the bowels of the earth, and is absolutely worthless until the miner has extracted it from the mine, and brought it into a situation where it may be made use of. The stones and mortar used in building houses, and the rugged and shapeless materials that have been fashioned into the various articles of convenience and ornament with which they are furnished, were, in their original state, destitute alike of value and utility. And of the innumerable variety of animal, vegetable, and mineral products, which form the materials of food and clothes, none was originally serviceable, while many were extremely noxious to man. It is his *labour* that has given them utility, that has subdued their bad qualities, and made them satisfy his wants, and minister to his comforts and enjoyments.

¹ The writer of an article in "The Quarterly Review," (No. 60, Art. I.,) contends, that the earth is a source of wealth, because it supplies us with the matter of commodities. But this, it is obvious, is the old error of the economists reproduced in a somewhat modified shape. It would, in truth, be quite as correct to say that the earth is a source of pictures and statues, because it supplies the materials made use of by painters and statuary, as to say that it is a source of wealth, because it supplies the matter of commodities.

“Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased.”¹

Those who observe the progress and trace the history of the human race, in different countries and states of society, will find that their comfort and happiness have, in all cases, been principally dependent on their ability to appropriate the raw products of nature, and to adapt them to their use. The savage, whose labour is confined to the gathering of wild fruits, or the picking up of shell-fish on the sea-coast, is placed at the very bottom of the scale of civilization, and is, in point of comfort, decidedly inferior to many of the lower animals. The *first* step in the progress of society is made when man learns to hunt wild animals, to feed himself with their flesh, and clothe himself with their skins. But labour, when confined to the chase, is extremely barren and unproductive. Tribes of hunters, like beasts of prey, whom they closely resemble in their habits and modes of subsistence, are but thinly scattered over the surface of the countries which they occupy; and notwithstanding the fewness of their numbers, any unusual deficiency of game never fails to reduce them to the extremity of want. The *second* step in the progress of society is made when the tribes of hunters and fishers apply themselves, like the ancient Scythians and modern Tartars, to the domestication of wild animals and the rearing of flocks. The subsistence of herdsmen and shepherds is much less precarious than that of hunters, but they are almost entirely destitute of those comforts and elegancies which give to civilized life its chief value. The *third* and most decisive step in the progress of civilization—in the great art of producing the necessaries and conveniencies of life—is made when the wandering tribes of hunters and shepherds renounce their migratory habits, and become agriculturists and manufacturers. It is then that

¹ “Wealth of Nations,” p. 14. My edition, in one vol., is uniformly quoted.

man begins fully to avail himself of his productive powers. He then becomes laborious, and, by a necessary consequence, his wants are then, for the first time, fully supplied, and he acquires an extensive command over the articles necessary for his comfort as well as his subsistence.¹

The importance of labour in the production of wealth was very clearly perceived by Hobbes and Locke. At the commencement of the 24th chapter² of the "*Leviathan*," published in 1651, Hobbes says, "The *nutrition* of a commonwealth consisteth in the *plenty* and *distribution* of *materials* conducing to life.

"As for the plenty of matter, it is a thing limited by nature to those commodities which (from the two breasts of our common mother) *land* and *sea*, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to mankind.

"For the matter of this nutriment, consisting in animals, vegetables, minerals, God hath freely laid them before us, in or near to the face of the earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour and industry of receiving them. Insomuch that *plenty dependeth* (next to God's favour) *on the labour and industry of man*."

But Mr. Locke had a much clearer apprehension of this doctrine. In his "*Essay on Civil Government*," published in 1689, he has entered into a lengthened, discriminating, and able analysis, to show that it is from labour that the products of the earth derive almost all their value. "Let any one consider," says he, "what the difference is between

¹ This progress has been pointed out by Varro:—"Gradum fuisse naturalem, cum homines viverunt ex iis rebus quæ inviolata ultrò ferret terra. Ex hac vitâ in secundam descendisse pastoritiam, cum, propter utilitatem, ex animalibus quæ possent sylvestria, deprehenderent, ac concluderent, et mansuescerent. In quæis primum, non sine causâ, putant oves assumptas, et propter, utilitatem et propter placiditatem. Tertio denique gradu, à vitâ pastorali ad agriculturam descenderunt; in quâ ex duobus gradibus superioribus retinuerunt multa, et quò descenderunt ibi processerunt longè, dum ad nos perveniret."—*De Re Rusticâ*, lib. ii. cap. 1.

² "Of the Nutrition and Procreation of a Commonwealth."

an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man, *nine-tenths* are the effects of labour; nay, if we will rightly consider things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them *ninety-nine hundredths* are wholly to be put on the account of labour.

“There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty, *i. e.* a fruitful soil apt to produce in abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet, for *want of improving it by labour*, have not one-hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy; and the king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England.

“To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life through their several progresses, before they come to our use, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry. Bread, wine, and cloth, are things of daily use and great plenty; yet, notwithstanding, acorns, water, and leaves or skins, must be our bread, drink, and clothing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities; for, whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves, skins, or moss, that is solely owing to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us; which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the

far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world ; and the ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in as any, or, at most, but a very small part of it ; so little, that even amongst us, land that is wholly left to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, *waste* : and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.

“ An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value (utility.) But yet, the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year is worth five pounds, and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here ; at least, I may truly say, not $\frac{1}{1000}$. 'Tis labour, then, which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing. 'Tis to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products ; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land which lies waste, is all the effect of labour. For 'tis not barely the ploughman's pains, the reaper's and thrasher's toil, and the baker's sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat ; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being seed to be sown, to its being made bread, must all be charged on the account of *labour*, and received as an effect of that : nature and the earth furnishing only the almost worthless materials as in themselves. 'Twould be a strange catalogue of things that industry provided and made use of about every loaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them. Iron, wood, leather, barks, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dyeing-drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship that brought away the commodities made use of by any of the workmen to any part of the work ; all

which 'twould be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up."¹

Locke has here all but established the fundamental principle on which the science rests. Had he carried his analysis a little farther, he could not have failed to perceive that neither water, leaves, skins, nor any one of the spontaneous productions of nature, has any value, except what it derives from the labour required for its appropriation. The utility of such products makes them be demanded; but it does not give them value. This is a quality which can be communicated only through the agency of voluntary labour of some sort or other. An object which it does not require any portion of labour to appropriate or to adapt to our use, may be of the very highest utility; but, as it is the free gift of nature, it is utterly impossible that it should possess the smallest value.²

¹ "Of Civil Government," book ii. §§ 40, 41, 42, and 43. This is a very remarkable passage. It contains a more distinct and comprehensive statement of the fundamental doctrine, that labour is the constituent principle of value, than is to be found in any other writer previous to Smith, or than is to be found even in the "Wealth of Nations." But Locke does not seem to have been sufficiently aware of the real value of the principle he had elucidated, and has not deduced from it any important practical conclusion. On the contrary, in his tract on "Raising the Value of Money," published in 1691, he lays it down broadly, that all taxes, however imposed, must ultimately *fall on the land*; whereas it is plain he ought, consistently with the above principle, to have shown, that they would fall, not exclusively on the produce of land, but generally on the produce of industry, or on all species of commodities.

² Bishop Berkeley entertained very just opinions respecting the source of wealth. In his "Querist," published in 1735, he asks,—“Whether it were not wrong to suppose land itself to be wealth? And whether the industry of the people is not first to be considered, as that which constitutes wealth, which makes even land and silver to be wealth, neither of which would have any value, but as means and motives to industry? Whether, in the wastes of America, a man might not possess twenty miles square of land, and yet want his dinner, or a coat to his back?”—*Querist*, Numbers 38 and 39.

M. Say appears to think ("Discours Préliminaire," p. 37) that Galiani was the *first* who showed, in his treatise "Della Moneta," published in 1750, that labour is the only source of wealth. But the passages now laid before the reader prove the erroneousness of this opinion. Galiani has entered into

That commodities could not be produced without the co-operation of the powers of nature, is most certain; and we are very far, indeed, from seeking to depreciate the obligations we are under to our common mother, or from endeavouring to exalt the benefits man owes to his own exertions by concealing or underrating those which he enjoys by the bounty of nature. But it is the distinguishing characteristic of the services rendered by the latter, that they are gratuitous. They are infinitely useful, and they are, at the same time, infinitely cheap. They are not, like human services, sold for a price; they are merely appropriated. When a fish is caught, or a tree is felled, do the nereids or wood-nymphs make their appearance, and stipulate that the labour of nature in its production should be paid for before it be carried off and made use of by man? When the miner has dug his way down to the ore, does Plutus hinder its appropriation? Nature is not, as so many would have us to suppose, frugal and grudging. Her rude products, and her various capacities and powers, are all offered freely to man. She neither demands nor receives a return for her favours. Her services are of inestimable utility; but being granted freely and unconditionally, they are wholly destitute of value, and are consequently without the power of communicating that quality to any thing.

The utility of water, or its capacity to slake thirst, is equal at all times and places; but this quality being communicated to it by nature, adds nothing to its value, which is, in all cases, measured by the labour required for its appropriation. A very small expenditure of labour being required to raise water from a river to the lips of an indi-

no analysis or argument to prove the correctness of his statement; and as it appears from other parts of his work that he was well acquainted with Locke's "Tracts on Money," a suspicion naturally arises that he had seen the "Essay on Civil Government," and that he was really indebted to it for a knowledge of this principle. This suspicion derives strength from the circumstance of Galiaui being still less aware than Locke of the value of the discovery.—See *Trattato della Moneta*, p. 39, ediz. 1780.

vidual on its banks, its value, under such circumstances, is very trifling indeed. But when, instead of being upon its banks, the consumers of the water are five, ten, or twenty miles distant, its value, being increased proportionally to the greater expenditure of labour upon its conveyance, may become very considerable. This principle holds universally. The utility of coal, or its capacity of furnishing heat and light, makes it an object of demand; but this utility, being a free gift of nature, has no influence over its value or price: this depends entirely on the labour required to extract the coal from the mine, and to convey it to the place where it is to be consumed.

“Si je retranche,” to use a striking illustration of this doctrine given by M. Canard, “de ma montre, par la pensée, tous les travaux qui lui ont été successivement appliqués, il ne restera que quelques grains de minéral placés dans l’intérieur de la terre, d’où on les a tirés, et où ils n’ont aucune valeur. De même, si je décompose le pain que je mange, et que j’en retranche successivement tous les travaux successifs qu’il a reçus, il ne restera que quelques tiges d’herbes graminées, éparses dans des déserts incultes, et sans aucune valeur.”¹

Those who contend, as almost all the continental economists do, that the agency of natural powers adds to the value of commodities, uniformly confound utility and value—that is, as was formerly observed, they confound the power and capacity of articles to satisfy our wants and desires with the quantity of labour required to produce them, or the quantity for which they would exchange. These qualities are, however, as radically different as those of weight and colour. To confound them is to stumble at the very threshold of the science. It is but too clear, that those who do so have yet to make themselves acquainted with its merest elements.

It is true that natural powers may sometimes be appro-

¹ “Principes d’Economie Politique,” p. 6.

priated or engrossed by one or more individuals to the exclusion of others, and those by whom they are so engrossed may exact a price for their services; but does that show that these services cost the engrossers any thing? If A have a waterfall on his estate, he may, probably, get a rent for it. It is plain, however, that the work performed by the waterfall is as completely gratuitous as that which is performed by the wind that acts on a windmill. The only difference between them consists in this, that all individuals having it in their power to avail themselves of the services of the wind, no one can intercept the bounty of nature, and exact a price for that which she freely bestows; whereas A, by appropriating the waterfall, and consequently acquiring a command over it, may prevent its being used at all, or sell its services. He can oblige B, C, and D, to pay for liberty to use it; but as they pay for that which costs him nothing, he gains the whole that they lose; so that the services rendered by the waterfall are plainly so much clear gain, so much work performed gratuitously for society.

Had Mr. Senior attended to this illustration, he would not have said, at least without the necessary qualification, that if ærolithes consisted wholly of gold, they would, according to the principles now laid down, be destitute of value.¹ If, indeed, they were so very abundant as to furnish every one with as much gold as he desired, they would have no value whatever, other than what they might derive from the trouble of gathering them: but if they existed only in limited quantities, and were quite incapable of supplying the demand for gold, the fortunate finder of one of them would be able to sell or exchange it for the same quantity of produce it would have commanded had it been produced, like other gold, by the labour of the miner, smelter, &c. It is obvious, however, that its value is in this case derived from circumstances which, though extrinsic to itself, depend

¹ Art. Political Economy, Encyclopædia Metropolitana.

wholly on the expenditure of labour; and that, in fact, it is measured or determined by the quantity of labour ordinarily required to produce gold, precisely in the same way that the value of the waterfall is determined by the quantity of labour it will save to the party by whom it may be bought or rented.

It is to labour, therefore, and to it only, that man owes every thing possessed of value. *Dii laboribus omnia vendunt.* Labour is the talisman that has raised him from the condition of the savage, that has changed the desert and the forest into cultivated fields, that has covered the earth with cities, and the ocean with ships, that has given us plenty, comfort, and elegance, instead of want, misery, and barbarism. What was said of the enchantress Enothea, may be truly applied to labour:

Quicquid in orbe vides, paret mihi. Florida tellus,
Cum volo, fundit opes; scopulique, atque horrida saxa
Niliades jaculantur aquas.

The advantages of industry have never been set in so striking a light as by Dr. Barrow. The following extract from one of his sermons, will show that such is the case, and will gratify alike and instruct the reader:—

“It is industry whereto the public state of the world, and of each commonweal therein, is indebted for its being, in all conveniencies and embellishments belonging to life, advanced above rude and sordid barbarism; yea, whereto mankind doth owe all that good learning, that morality, those improvements of soul, which elevate us beyond brutes.

“To industrious study is to be ascribed the invention and perfection of all those arts whereby human life is civilized, and the world cultivated with numberless accommodations, ornaments, and beauties.

“All the comely, the stately, the pleasant, and useful works which we do view with delight, or enjoy with comfort, industry did contrive them, industry did frame them.

“Industry reared those magnificent fabrics, and those commodious houses; it formed those goodly pictures and statues; it raised those convenient causeys, those bridges, those aqueducts; it planted those fine gardens with various flowers and fruits; it clothed those pleasant fields with corn and grass; it built those ships, whereby we plough the seas, reaping the commodities of foreign regions.

“It hath subjected all creatures to our command and service, enabling us to subdue the fiercest, to catch the wildest, to render the gentler sort most tractable and useful to us. It taught us from the wool of the sheep, from the hair of the goat, from the labours of the silkworm, to weave us clothes to keep us warm, to make us fine and gay. It helpeth us from the inmost bowels of the earth to fetch divers needful tools and utensils. It collected mankind into cities, and compacted them into orderly societies, and devised wholesome laws, under shelter whereof we enjoy safety and peace, wealth and plenty, mutual succour and defence, sweet conversation and beneficial commerce.

“It by meditation did invent¹ all those sciences whereby our minds are enriched and enobled, our manners are refined and polished, our curiosity is satisfied, our life is benefited. What is there which we admire, or wherein we delight, that pleaseth our mind, or gratifieth our sense, for the which we are not beholden to industry?

“Doth any country flourish in wealth, in grandeur, in prosperity? It must be imputed to industry, to the industry of its governors settling good order, to the industry of its people following profitable occupations: so did Cato, in that notable oration of his in Sallust,² tell the Roman senate, that it was not by the force of their arms, but by the industry of their ancestors, that commonwealth did arise to such a pitch of greatness. When sloth creepeth in, then all things corrupt and decay; then the public

¹ Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes.—Virg. Georg. I. 133.

² Cat. apud Sallust, in bello Catil.

state doth sink into disorder, penury, and a disgraceful condition.”¹

The fundamental principle, that it is only through the agency of labour that the various articles and conveniences required for the use and accommodation of man can be obtained, being thus established, it necessarily follows, that the great practical problem involved in that part of the science which treats of the *production* of wealth, must resolve itself into a discussion of the means by which labour may be rendered most efficient, or by which the greatest amount of necessary, useful, and desirable products may be obtained with the least outlay of labour. Every measure that has any tendency to add to the power of labour, or, which is the same thing, to reduce the cost of commodities, must add proportionally to our means of obtaining wealth; while every measure or regulation that has any tendency to waste labour, or to raise the cost of commodities, must equally lessen these means. Here, then, is the simple and decisive test by which we are to judge of the expediency of all measures affecting the wealth of the country, and of the value of all inventions. If they make labour more productive—if by reducing the value of commodities, they render them more easily obtainable, and bring them within the command of a greater portion of society, they must be advantageous; while, if their tendency be different, they must as certainly be disadvantageous. Considered in this point of view, that great branch of the science which treats of the *production* of wealth will be found to be abundantly simple, and easily understood.

Labour, according as it is applied to the raising of raw produce—to the fashioning of that raw produce when raised, into articles of utility, convenience, or ornament—or to the conveyance of raw and wrought produce from one country or place to another, and their distribution among the consumers,—is said to be agricultural, manufacturing, or com-

¹ Barrow's Second Sermon on Industry.

mercial. An acquaintance with the particular processes and most advantageous methods of applying labour in each of these grand departments of industry, forms the peculiar and appropriate study of the agriculturist, manufacturer, and merchant. It is not consistent with the objects of the political economist to enter into the details of particular businesses and professions. He confines himself to an investigation of the means by which labour in general may be rendered most productive, and how its powers may be increased in *all* the departments of industry.

Most writers on Political Economy have entered into lengthened discussions with respect to the difference between what they have termed productive and unproductive labour. But it is not easy to discover any real ground for most of those discussions, or for the distinctions that have been set up between one sort of labour and another. The subject is not one in which there is apparently any difficulty. It is not at the species of labour carried on, but at its *results*, that we should look. So long as an individual employs himself in any way not detrimental to others, and accomplishes the object he has in view, his labour is obviously productive; while, if he do not accomplish it, or obtain some sort of equivalent advantage from the exertion of the labour, it is as obviously unproductive. This definition seems sufficiently clear, and leads to no perplexities; and it will be shown, in another chapter, that it is not possible to adopt any other without being involved in endless difficulties and contradictions.

In thus endeavouring to exhibit the importance of labour, and the advantages which its successful prosecution confers on man, it must not be supposed that reference is made to the labour of the hand only. This species, indeed, comes most under observation; it is that, too, without which we could not exist, and which principally determines the value of commodities. It is questionable, however, whether it be really more productive than the labour of the mind. There are other instruments beside the plough, the spade, and the

shuttle. The hand is not more necessary to execute than the head to contrive. Some very valuable discoveries have no doubt been the result of accident ; while others have naturally grown out of the progress of society, without being materially advanced by the efforts of any single individual. These, however, have not been their only, nor, perhaps, their most copious sources ; and every one, how little soever he may be acquainted with the history of his species, is aware that we are indebted to the labour of the mind, to patient study and long-continued research, for numberless inventions, some of which have made almost incalculable additions to our powers, and changed, indeed, the whole aspect and condition of society.

CHAPTER II.

Progressive Nature of Man — Means by which the Productive Powers of Labour are increased.—SECTION I. *Right of Property.*—SECTION II. *Division of Employments.*—SECTION III. *Accumulation and Employment of Capital—Definition and Source of Profit—Circumstances most favourable for the Accumulation of Capital.*

IT is the proud distinction of the human race, that their conduct is determined by reason, which, though limited and fallible, is susceptible of indefinite improvement. In the infancy of society, indeed, being destitute of that knowledge which is the result of long experience and study, without that dexterity which is the effect of practice, and without the guidance of those instincts which direct other animals, man seems to occupy one of the lowest places in the scale of being. But the faculties of most animals come rapidly to maturity, and admit of no further increase or diminution; whereas, the human species is naturally progressive. In addition to the necessity which obliges man to exert himself to provide subsistence, he is, almost uniformly, actuated by a wish to improve his condition; and he is endowed with sagacity adequate to devise the means of gratifying this desire. By slow degrees, partly by the aid of observation, and partly by contrivances of his own, he gradually learns to augment his powers, and to acquire an increased command over the necessaries, conveniencies, and enjoyments of human life. Without the unerring instinct of the ant, the bee, or the beaver, he becomes, from a perception of their advantage, the greatest storemaster and builder in the world; and without the strength of the elephant, the swiftness of the hound, or the ferocity of the tiger, he subjects every animal to his power. Having felt the advantages resulting from improved

accommodations, he becomes more desirous to extend them. The attainment of that which seemed, at the commencement of the undertaking, to be an object beyond which his wishes could not expand, becomes an incentive to new efforts. "Man never is, but always to be blessed." The gratification of a want or desire is merely a step to some new pursuit. In every stage of his progress, he is destined to contrive and invent, to engage in new undertakings, and, when these are accomplished, to enter with fresh energy upon others. "Even after he has attained to what, at a distance, appeared to be the summit of his fortune, he is in reality only come to a point at which new objects are presented to entice his pursuits, and towards which he is urged with the spurs of ambition, while those of necessity are no longer applied. Or, if the desire of any thing better than the present should at any time cease to operate on his mind, he becomes listless and negligent, loses the advantages he had gained, whether of possession or skill, and declines in his fortune, till a sense of his own defects and his sufferings restore his industry."¹

It has been said that nations, like individuals, have their periods of infancy, maturity, decline, and death. But though the comparison strikes at first, and history affords many apparent instances of its truth, it is, notwithstanding, inapplicable. The human body is of frail contexture and limited duration; but nations are perpetually renovated; the place of those who die is immediately filled up by others, who, having succeeded to the arts, sciences, and wealth of those by whom they were preceded, start with unprecedented advantages in their career. It is plain, therefore, that if the principle of improvement were not countervailed by hostile aggression, vicious institutions, or some other adventitious circumstance, it would always operate, and would secure the constant advancement of nations.

Powerful, however, as is the passion to rise—to ascend still higher in the scale of society—the advance of the arts

¹ Ferguson's "Principles of Moral and Political Science," vol. i. p. 56.

has not been left wholly to depend on its agency. Had such been the case, it is reasonable to suppose that the earlier inventions and discoveries would, by rendering others of comparatively less importance, have slackened the progress of civilization. But in the actual state of things, no such relaxation can ever take place. The principle of increase implanted in the human race is so very powerful, that population never fails of speedily expanding to the limits of subsistence, how much soever they may be extended. Indeed, its natural tendency is to exceed these limits, or to increase the number of people faster than the supplies of food and other necessary accommodations provided for their support. This tendency, as will be afterwards shown, is, in civilized societies, checked and regulated by the prudential considerations to which the difficulty of bringing up a family necessarily gives rise. But, despite their influence, the principle of increase is at all times, and under every variety of circumstances, so very strong as to call forth unceasing efforts to increase the means of subsistence. It forms, in fact, a constantly operating principle to rouse the activity and stimulate the industry of man. The most splendid inventions and discoveries do not enable him to intermit his efforts;—if he did, the increase of population would speedily change his condition for the worse, and he would be compelled either to sink to a lower station, or to atone for his indolence by renewed and more vigorous exertions. The continued progress of industry and the arts is thus secured by a double principle: man is not merely anxious to advance; he dares not, without manifest injury to himself, venture to stand still. But, because such is our lot, because we are constantly seeking an imaginary repose and felicity we are never destined to realize, are we, therefore, as some have done, to arraign the wisdom of Providence? Far from it. In the words of the able and eloquent philosopher to whom we have just referred, “We ought always to remember that these labours and exertions are themselves of principal value, and to be reckoned amongst the foremost blessings to

which human nature is competent ; that mere industry is a blessing apart from the wealth it procures ; and that the exercises of a cultivated mind, though considered as means for the attainment of an external end, are themselves of more value than any such end whatever.”¹

In tracing the progress of mankind from poverty and barbarism to wealth and civilization, there are three circumstances, the vast importance of which must strike even the most careless observer ; and without whose conjoined existence and co-operation, labour could not have become considerably productive, nor society made any perceptible progress. The *first* is the establishment of a right of property, or the securing to every individual the quiet enjoyment of his natural powers, and of the products, lands, and talents he may have inherited or acquired by labour or industry. The *second* is the introduction of exchange or barter, and the consequent appropriation of particular individuals to particular employments. And the *third* is the accumulation and employment of the produce of labour, or, as it is more commonly termed, of capital, or stock. All the improvements that ever have been, or ever can be made, in the art of producing necessities, comforts, and conveniencies, may be classed under one or other of these three heads. It is, therefore, indispensable that principles so important, and which lie at the very bottom of the science, should be well understood.

SECT. I.—RIGHT OF PROPERTY.

It would occupy the reader's time to no good purpose were we to state the different theories that have been advanced by jurists, and writers on public law, to account for the origin of the right of property. This, indeed, appears to be sufficiently obvious. All the rude products furnished by nature have to be appropriated ; and, as already seen, not one in a thousand, perhaps, of these products is, in its natural

¹ Ferguson's "Principles of Moral and Political Science," vol. i. p. 250.

state, capable either of supplying our wants or administering to our comforts. Hence the necessity, not only of applying labour to appropriate natural products, but to fashion and prepare them so as to be useful; and hence, also, the origin of the right of property.

If a number of individuals be set down together on the shore of an unoccupied and unappropriated island, each will have quite as good a right as another to take the game or the fruit. But those who do so, or who, through their skill and industry, appropriate a portion of the common stock, will obviously be entitled to the exclusive use of such portion. We shall not undertake to decide whether there be or be not a principle inherent in man that at once suggests to every individual not to interfere with what has been produced or appropriated by the labour of others; it is sufficient to know that the briefest experience would point out to every one the necessity of respecting this principle. If A climb a tree and bring down fruit, which, as soon as he comes to the ground, is taken from him by others, he will not again engage in any similar undertaking, till he be well assured that he shall be permitted exclusively to profit by what has been obtained through his sole exertions; nor will others engage in any such undertaking without a similar assurance. No doubt, therefore, the right of property had a very remote origin. The necessity for its establishment is so very obvious and urgent, that it must have been all but coeval with the formation of societies. All have been impressed with the reasonableness of the maxim which teaches, that the produce of a man's labour and the work of his hands are exclusively his own. Even among the rudest savages the principle of *meum* and *tuum* is recognised; the bows and arrows of the huntsman, and the game he has killed, being regarded by him as his own, and his right to their exclusive possession being respected by his fellows. The right of property, like other rights, is, no doubt, perfected only by degrees. Thus, among hunters, the *feræ naturæ* on which they subsist, not being bred under the

care or inspection of individuals, are, so long as they run wild in the forest, the common property of the tribe, and only become the property of individuals after they have been appropriated or taken by their labour or ingenuity. As society advances, the right of property expands. The modern Tartars, like the ancient Scythians, estimate their wealth by the number of their cattle. Their right to the animals which they have domesticated and reared is deemed sacred and inviolable; but the pasture-grounds belong, like the hunting-grounds of the Indians, to the whole society; and as the flocks are driven from one place to another, the grounds may be successively depastured by the cattle of every different individual. The moment, however, that men began to renounce the pastoral for the agricultural mode of life, a right of property in land began to be established. The soil cannot be cultivated, its fertility cannot be increased, nor can it be made to produce those crops which yield the largest supplies of food, and other necessary accommodations, without continuous labour and persevering attention. Hence the origin of property in land. Nothing, it is plain, would ever tempt any one to engage in a laborious employment; he would neither domesticate wild animals nor clear and cultivate the ground, if, after months and years of toil, when his flocks had become numerous and his harvests were ripening for the sickle, a stranger were allowed to rob him of the reward of his industry. The utility, or rather necessity, of making some general regulations, that should secure to every individual the peaceable enjoyment of the produce he had raised, and of the ground he had cultivated and improved, is so very obvious that it suggested itself to the first legislators. The author of the book of Job places those who removed their neighbours' landmarks at the head of his list of wicked men; and the early Greek and Roman legislators placed these marks under the especial protection of the god Terminus, and made their removal a capital offence.¹

¹ Goguet, "De l'Origine des Loix," &c., lib. i. art. 2.

It is obvious, from what has now been stated, that the law of the land is not, as Dr. Paley has affirmed, the real foundation of the right of property. It rests on a more remote and a more solid basis. * It grows out of the circumstances under which man is placed; and could not be overthrown or set aside without depopulating the earth, and throwing mankind back into primæval barbarism. The obvious utility of securing to each individual the peaceable enjoyment of the produce acquired by his industry, and of the land he had cultivated and improved, undoubtedly formed the irresistible reason that induced every people emerging from barbarism to establish this right. It is, in fact, the foundation on which the other institutions of society mainly rest; and as Cicero has truly stated, it was chiefly for the protection of property that civil government was instituted. *Hanc enim ob causam maximè, ut sua tuerentur, respublicæ civitatesque constitutæ sunt. Nam etsi duce naturæ, congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiæ rerum suarum, urbium præsidia quærebant.*¹ Where property is not publicly guaranteed, men must look on each other as enemies rather than as friends. The idle and improvident are always desirous of seizing on the wealth of the laborious and frugal; and, were they not restrained by the strong arm of the law from prosecuting their attacks, they would, by generating a feeling of insecurity, effectually check both industry and accumulation, and sink all classes to the same level of hopeless misery as themselves. The security of property is, indeed, quite as indispensable to accumulation as to production. No man ever denies himself an immediate gratification when it is within his power, unless he believe that by doing so he has a fair prospect of obtaining a greater accession of comforts and enjoyments, or of avoiding some considerable evil, at some future period. Where property is protected, an individual who produces as much by the labour of one day as is sufficient to maintain him two, is not idle during the

¹ "De Officiis," lib. ii. cap. 21.

second day, but accumulates the surplus above his wants as a reserve stock; the increased security and enjoyments which the possession of such stock or capital brings along with it, being, in the great majority of cases, more than sufficient to counterbalance the desire of immediate gratification. But, wherever property is insecure, we look in vain for the operation of this principle. "It is plainly better for us," is then invariably the language of the people, "to enjoy while it is in our power, than to accumulate property which we shall not be permitted to dispose of, and which will either expose us to the extortion of a rapacious government, or to the unrestrained depredations of those who exist only by the plunder of their more industrious neighbours."

But it must not be imagined that the security of property is violated only when a man is deprived of the power of peaceably enjoying the fruits of his industry: it is also violated, and perhaps in a still more unjustifiable manner, when he is prevented from using the powers given him by nature, in any way, not injurious to others, he considers most beneficial for himself. Of all the species of property which a man can possess, the faculties of his mind and the powers of his body are most particularly his own. He should, therefore, be permitted to enjoy, that is, to use or exert, these faculties and powers at his discretion. And hence this right is as much infringed upon when a man is interdicted from engaging in a particular branch of business, as when he is unjustly deprived of the property he has produced or accumulated. All monopolies which give to a few individuals the power of carrying on certain branches of industry to the exclusion of others, are thus, in fact, established in direct violation of the property of every one else. They prevent them from using their natural capacities or powers in what they might have considered the best manner; and, as every man not a slave is justly held to be the best, and, indeed, only judge of what is advantageous for himself, the most obvious principles of justice and the right of property are both subverted when he is

excluded from any employment. In like manner, this right is violated whenever any regulation is made to force an individual to employ his labour or capital in a particular way. The property of a landlord is violated when he is compelled to adopt any system of cultivation, even though it were really preferable to that which he was previously following; the property of a capitalist is violated when he is obliged to accept a particular rate of interest for his stock; and the property of a labourer is violated when he is obliged to employ himself in any particular occupation, or for a fixed rate of wages.

The finest soil, the finest climate, and the finest intellectual powers, can prevent no people from becoming barbarous, poor, and miserable, if they have the misfortune to be subjected to a government which does not respect and maintain the right of property. This is the greatest of calamities. The ravages of civil war, pestilence, and famine, may be repaired; but nothing can enable a nation to contend against the deadly influence of an established system of violence and rapine. The want of security, or of any lively and well-founded expectation among the inhabitants of their being permitted freely to dispose of the fruits of their industry, is the principal cause of the present wretched state of the Ottoman dominions, as it was of the decline of industry and arts in Europe during the middle ages. When the Turkish conquerors overran those fertile and beautiful countries in which, to the disgrace of the European powers, they are still permitted to encamp, they parcelled them among their followers, on condition of their performing certain military services, on a plan corresponding, in many important particulars, to the feudal system of our ancestors. But none of these possessions, except such as have been assigned to the church, or left to it in trust, are hereditary. The others revert, on the death of the present possessors, to the sultan, the sole proprietor of all the immovable property in the empire. The majority of the occupiers of land in Turkey, having, in consequence of

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this vicious system, no adequate security that their possessions will be allowed to descend, on their death, to their children or legatees, are comparatively careless of futurity ; and as none can feel any interest in the fate of an unknown successor, no one ever executes any improvement of which he does not expect to reap all the advantage during his own life. This is the cause why the Turks are so extremely careless about their houses : they seldom construct them of solid or durable materials ; and it would be a gratification to them to be assured that they would fall to pieces the moment after they have breathed their last. Under this miserable government, the palaces have been changed into cottages and the cities into villages. The long-continued want of security has extinguished the very spirit of industry, and destroyed not only the power, but even the desire to emerge from barbarism.¹

Had it been possible for arbitrary power to profit by the lessons of experience, it must long since have perceived that its own wealth, as well as the wealth of its subjects, would be most effectually promoted by maintaining the inviolability of property. Were the Turkish government to establish a vigilant system of police—to secure to each individual the power freely to dispose of the fruits of his labour, and to substitute a regular plan of taxation in the place of the present odious system of extortion and tyranny, industry would revive ; capital and population would be augmented ; and moderate duties, imposed on a few articles in general demand, would bring a much larger sum into the coffers of the treasury than all that is now obtained by force and violence. The *stated* public burdens to which the Turks

¹ Thornton's "Account of the Turkish Empire," vol. ii. p. 63. "The Turks," says Denon, "bâtissent le moins qu'ils peuvent ; ils ne réparent jamais rien : un mur menace ruine, ils l'étaient ; il s'éboule, ce sont quelques chambres de moins dans la maison ; ils s'arrangent à côté des décombres : l'édifice tombe enfin, ils en abandonnent le sol, où, s'ils sont obligés d'en déblayer l'emplacement, ils n'emportent le plâtras que le moins loin qu'ils peuvent."—Tom. i. p. 193.

are subject are light compared with those imposed on the English, the Hollanders, or the French. But the latter know that when they have paid the taxes due to government, they will be permitted peaceably to enjoy or accumulate the residue of their wealth; whereas, the subjects of Eastern despotisms have, generally speaking, no security that the moment after they have paid the stated contributions, the pacha, or one of his satellites, may not strip them of every remaining farthing! Security is the foundation, the principal element in every well-digested system of finance. When maintained inviolate, it enables a country to support, without much difficulty, a very heavy load of taxes; but where there is no security, where property is a prey to rapine and spoliation, to the attacks of the needy, the powerful, or the profligate, the smallest burdens are justly regarded as oppressive, and uniformly exceed the means of the impoverished and spiritless inhabitant.

Mr. Brydone states, that it was customary for the more intelligent Sicilians with whom he conversed respecting the natural riches of their celebrated island and its capacities of improvement, to observe,—“Yes, if these were displayed, you would have reason, indeed, to speak of them. Take a look of these mountains, they contain rich veins of every metal, and many of the Roman mines still remain. But to what end should we explore them? *It is not we that should reap the profit.* Nay, a discovery of any thing very rich might possibly prove the ruin of its possessor. No, in our present situation, the hidden treasures of the island must ever remain a profound secret. Were we happy enough to enjoy the blessings of your constitution, you might call us rich indeed. Many hidden doors of opulence would then be opened, which now are not even thought of, and we should soon reassume our ancient name and consequence.”¹

The Jews have been supposed to afford an instance of a people whose property has been long exposed to an almost

¹ “Tour in Sicily and Malta,” p. 351.

uninterrupted series of attacks, and who have, notwithstanding, continued to be rich and industrious. But when rightly examined, it will be found that the case of the Jews forms no exception to the general rule. The strong prejudices which have been almost universally entertained against them, have, in most countries, prevented their acquiring property in land, and have also excluded them from all participation in their charitable institutions. Having, therefore, no extrinsic support on which to depend, in the event of their becoming infirm or destitute, they had a powerful additional motive to save and accumulate; and being driven from agriculture, they were compelled to addict themselves to commerce and the arts. In an age when the mercantile profession was generally looked upon as mean and sordid, and when, of course, they had comparatively few competitors, they, no doubt, made considerable profits; though these have been very greatly exaggerated. It was natural that those indebted to the Jews should represent their gains as enormous; for this inflamed the existing prejudices against them, and afforded a miserable pretext for defrauding them of their just claims. There are a few rich Jews in most of the large cities of Europe; but the majority of that race has ever been, and still is, as poor as its neighbours.

Let us not, therefore, deceive ourselves by supposing that it is possible for any people to emerge from barbarism, or to become wealthy, prosperous, and civilized, without the security of property. Security is indispensable to the successful exertion of the powers of industry. Where it is wanting, it is idle to expect either riches or civilization.¹ "The establishment of property is in fact," to

¹ "Ce n'est que là où les propriétés sont assurées, où l'emploi des capitaux est abandonné au choix de ceux qui les possèdent; ce n'est que là dis-je, que les particuliers seront encouragés à se soumettre aux privations les plus dures pour compenser par leurs épargnes les retards que la profusion du gouvernement peut apporter aux progrès de la richesse nationale. Si l'Angleterre, malgré ses guerres ruineuses, est parvenue à un haut degré

borrow the statement of one of the ornaments of the English church, "the source from which all the arts of civilization proceed. Before this establishment takes place, the indolent suffer no inferiority, the active receive no gain; but from the date of the recognition of property to the individual, each man is rich, and comfortable, and prosperous, setting aside the common infirmities which flesh is heir to, according to his portion of effective industry or native genius. From this period he is continually impelled by his desires from the pursuit of one object to another, and his activity is called forth in the prosecution of the several arts which render his situation more easy and agreeable."¹

It is clear from what has been previously stated, and from the nature of the thing, that nothing can become property unless it be susceptible of appropriation; and, on this ground, it has sometimes been objected to the game laws, that they make a property of that which, being incapable of appropriation, should belong to the community, or to the captors. In support of this view of the matter, the rule of the Roman law has been appealed to, where it is laid down—*Feræ igitur bestię, et volucres, et pisces, et omnia animalia quę mari, cœlo, et terra nascuntur, simulatque ab aliquo capta fuerint, jure gentium statim illius esse incipiunt; quod enim ante nullius est, id naturale ratione occupanti conceditur.*² But it is distinctly laid down in the same article, whence we have borrowed this paragraph, that the proprietor of an estate has full power to prohibit any one from entering on it to kill wild animals. Without this proviso, there would not, in fact, be any such thing as a real property in land; and this is, in truth, all that is

d'opulence; si, malgré les contributions énormes dont le peuple y est chargé, son capital est pourtant accru dans le silence par l'économie des particuliers, il ne faut attribuer ces effets qu'à la liberté des personnes et à la sûreté des propriétés qui y régissent, plus que dans aucun autre pays de l'Europe, la Suisse exceptée."—STORCH, *Cours d'Economie Politique*, tom. i. p. 260.

¹ Sumner's "Records of the Creation," 4th ed. vol. ii. p. 51.

² *Instit.* lib. ii. tit. i. § 12.

meant when it is said that game is property. A partridge or hare is mine so long as it remains on my estate; but the moment it transfers itself to another estate, it becomes the property of its owner. Poachers are punished not because they have killed wild animals, but partly and principally because in doing so they invade the right of property by killing it without leave on lands belonging to other parties, on which they have no right to enter, and partly because they have not paid the tax demanded by government from all who kill game.

It is sometimes indispensable, for the interests of society, to appropriate the whole, or a portion of the landed property of one or more individuals to some public purpose, as the formation of a road, a canal, &c. But property should never be wantonly taken for such purposes, nor till the advantages to be obtained by its cession have been fully established before some competent tribunal; and when this has been done, full compensation should in every case be made to those who are thus called upon to give up their property for the promotion of the public interests.

Before dismissing this subject, we may observe, that Rousseau and the Abbé Mably have made an objection to the right of private property, which has been, in some measure, sanctioned by Beccaria and others.¹ They allow that its institution is advantageous for the possessors of property; but they contend, that it is disadvantageous for those who are poor and destitute. It condemns, they affirm, the greater portion of mankind to a state of misery, and provides for the exaltation of the few by the depression of the many! The sophistry of this reasoning is so apparent, as hardly to require being pointed out. The right of property has not made poverty, but it has powerfully contributed to make wealth. Previously to its establishment, the most civilized nations were sunk

¹ Speaking of theft, Beccaria calls it, "*Il delitto di quella infelice parte di uomini, a cui il diritto di proprietà (terribile, e forse non necessario diritto,) non ha lasciato, che una nuda sussistenza.*"— *Dei Delitti e delle Pene*, § 22.

to the same level of wretchedness and misery as the savages of New Holland and Kamtchatska. All classes have been benefited by the change; and it is mere error and delusion to suppose that the rich have been benefited at the expense of the poor. The right of property gives no advantage to one over another. It deals impartially by all. It does not say, Labour and I shall reward you; but it says, "*Labour, and I shall take care that none be permitted to rob you of the produce of your exertions.*" The protection afforded to property by all civilized societies, though it has not made all men rich, has done more to increase their wealth than all their other institutions put together. But, the truth is, that differences of fortune are as consonant to the nature of things, and are as really a part of the order of Providence, as differences of sex, complexion, or strength. No two individuals will ever be equally fortunate, frugal, and industrious; and supposing an equality of fortunes were at any time forcibly established, it could not be maintained for a week: some would be more inclined to spend than others; some would be more laborious and inventive; and some would have larger families. The establishment of the right of property enables industry and forethought to reap their due reward; but they do this without its inflicting the smallest imaginable injury upon any thing else. There may, no doubt, be institutions which tend to increase those inequalities of fortune that are natural to society, but the right of property is not one of them. Its effects are altogether beneficial. It is a rampart raised by society against its common enemies—against rapine and violence, plunder and oppression. Without its protection, the rich would become poor, and the poor would be totally unable to become rich—all would sink to the same bottomless abyss of barbarism and poverty. "The security of property," to use the just and forcible expressions of an able writer, "has overcome the natural aversion of man from labour, has given him the empire of the earth, has given him a fixed and permanent

residence, has implanted in his breast the love of his country and of posterity. To enjoy immediately—to enjoy without labour, is the natural inclination of every man. This inclination must be restrained : for its obvious tendency is to arm all those who have nothing against those who have something. The law which restrains this inclination, and which secures to the humblest individual the quiet enjoyment of the fruits of his industry, is the most splendid achievement of legislative wisdom—the noblest triumph of which humanity has to boast.”¹

SECT. II.—DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENTS AMONG INDIVIDUALS.

The division and combination of employments can only be imperfectly established in rude societies and thinly-peopled countries. But in every state of society, in the rudest as well as the most improved, we may trace its operation and effects. The various physical powers, talents, and propensities, with which men are endowed, fit them for different occupations ; and a regard to mutual interest and convenience naturally leads them, at a very early period, to establish a system of barter and a division of employments. It was speedily seen, that by separating and combining their efforts, so as to bring about some desirable end, they might, with ease, accomplish tasks that could not otherwise be attempted. Even in the simplest businesses this co-operation is required ; neither hunting nor fishing, any more than agriculture or manufactures, can be advantageously carried on by solitary individuals. Man is the creature of society ; and is compelled, in every stage of his progress, to depend for help on his fellows. *Quòd alio fortes sumus, quàm quòd mutuis juramur officiis?* Instead of trusting to his own efforts for a provision of the various articles required for his subsistence, comfort, and security, he instinctively associates himself with others, and finds in this association

¹ Bentham, “*Traité de Législation*,” tom. ii. p. 37.

the principal source of his superior power. Perceiving that he can obtain an incomparably greater command of all that he deems useful or desirable by applying himself in preference to some one department of industry, he limits his attention to it only. As society advances, this division extends itself on all sides: one man becomes a tanner, or dresser of skins; another a shoemaker; a third a weaver; a fourth a house-carpenter; a fifth a smith, and so on; one undertakes the defence of the society, and one the distribution of justice; and each endeavours to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for the particular calling in which he is engaged: the wealth and comforts of all classes are, in consequence, prodigiously augmented. In countries where the division of labour is carried to a considerable extent, agriculturists are not obliged to spend their time in clumsy attempts to manufacture their own produce; and manufacturers cease to interest themselves about the raising of corn and the fattening of cattle. The facility of exchanging is the vivifying principle of industry: it stimulates agriculturists to adopt the best system of cultivation and to raise the largest crops, because it enables them to exchange whatever portion of the produce of their lands exceeds their wants, for other commodities contributing to their comforts and enjoyments; and it stimulates manufacturers and merchants to increase the quantity and variety, and to improve the quality of their goods, that they may thereby obtain greater supplies of raw produce. A spirit of industry is thus universally diffused; and the apathy and languor which characterize a rude state of society, entirely disappear.

But the facility of exchanging, or the being able readily to barter our own surplus produce for such parts of the surplus produce of others as we may wish to obtain and they may choose to part with, is not the only advantage of the separation of employments. Besides enabling each individual to addict himself in preference to those departments which suit his taste and disposition, it adds very

largely to the efficacy of his powers, and enables him to produce a much greater quantity of useful and desirable articles than if he engaged indiscriminately in different businesses. Dr. Smith, who has treated this subject in the most masterly manner, has classed the circumstances which conspire to increase the productiveness of industry, when labour is divided, under the following heads:—*First*, the increased skill and dexterity of the workmen; *second*, the saving of time which is commonly lost in passing from one employment to another; and, *third*, the circumstance of the division of employments having a tendency to facilitate the invention of machines and processes for saving labour. A few observations on each of these heads are subjoined.

1st, *With respect to the improvement of the skill and dexterity of the labourer*:—it is sufficiently plain, that when a person's whole attention is devoted to one branch of business, when all the energies of his mind and powers of his body are made to converge, as it were, to a single point, he must attain to a degree of proficiency in that particular branch, to which no individual engaged in a variety of occupations can be expected to reach. A peculiar play of the muscles, or *slight of hand*, is necessary to perform the simplest operation in the best and most expeditious manner; and this can only be acquired by habitual and constant practice. Dr. Smith has given a striking example, in the case of the nail-manufacturer, of the extreme difference between training a workman to the precise occupation in which he is to be employed, and training him to a similar and closely allied occupation. "A common smith," says he, "who, though accustomed to handle the hammer, has never been used to make nails, if, upon some particular occasion, he is obliged to attempt it, will scarce, I am assured, be able to make above two or three hundred nails in a day, and those, too, very bad ones. A smith who has been accustomed to make nails, but whose sole or principal business has not been that of a nailer, can seldom, with his utmost diligence, make

more than eight hundred or a thousand nails in a day. But I have seen several boys, under twenty years of age, who had never exercised any other trade but that of making nails, and who, when they exerted themselves, could make, each of them, upwards of *two thousand three hundred nails in a day*;"¹ or nearly three times the number of the smith who had been accustomed to make them, but who was not entirely devoted to that particular business!

2d, The influence of the division of labour in preventing that *waste of time in moving from one employment to another*, which must always take place when an individual engages in different occupations, is even more obvious than its influence in improving his skill and dexterity. When the same person carries on different employments, in different and perhaps distant places, and with different sets of tools, he must plainly lose a considerable portion of time in passing between them. If the different employments in which he has to engage be carried on in the same workshop, the loss of time will be less, but even in that case it will be considerable. "A man," as Dr. Smith has justly observed, "commonly saunters a little in turning his hand from one sort of employment to another. When he first begins the new work, he is seldom very keen and hearty; his mind, as they say, does not go along with it, and for some time he rather trifles than applies to good purpose. The habit of sauntering and of indolent careless application, which is naturally, or rather necessarily acquired by every country workman, who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour, and to apply his hand in twenty different ways almost every day of his life, renders him almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous application, even on the most pressing occasions. Independent, therefore, of his deficiency in point of dexterity, this cause alone must always reduce considerably the quantity of work which he is capable of performing."²

¹ "Wealth of Nations," p. 4.

² *Ib.* p. 5.

It may, perhaps, be worth while to remark in passing, that something similar to this effect in mechanical operations takes place with respect to the intellectual powers : when we pass abruptly from one speculation or study to another, some time always elapses before the attention is re-engaged, and the new train of ideas and facts brought fully under our view. Most persons must have experienced this ; and it appears to form an insuperable objection to a practice which has been sometimes recommended, of distributing the day into different portions, appropriated to the study of different branches of literature and science. Where mere accomplishment, or the obtaining of a superficial acquaintance with a variety of subjects, is the object, this plan is, perhaps, the best of any. But those who read or study in the view of making themselves masters of any art or science, will, if we may so speak, get through much more intellectual work, and to much better purpose, in a given time, by preserving the train of thought unbroken, so as to bring one speculation or investigation to a close before commencing another.

3d, With regard to the influence of the division of employments in *facilitating the invention of machines and processes for saving labour*, it is obvious that those engaged in any branch of industry will be more likely to discover easier and readier methods of carrying it on, when their whole attention is devoted exclusively to it, than when it is dissipated upon a variety of objects. But it is a mistake to suppose, as has been sometimes done, that the inventive genius of workmen and artificers only is whetted and improved by the division of labour. As society advances, the study of particular branches of science and philosophy becomes the principal or sole occupation of the most ingenious men. Chemistry becomes a distinct science from natural philosophy ; the physical astronomer separates himself from the astronomical observer, the political economist from the politician ; and each, meditating exclusively or principally on his peculiar department of science, attains

to a degree of proficiency and expertness in it which the general scholar seldom or never reaches.

It would be invidious to refer to living, or even very recent instances, in proof of the error of those who endeavour to distinguish themselves by their attainments, not in one or two only, but in many departments of human knowledge. The reputation of such individuals is almost always ephemeral; for though they may be superficially acquainted with more things than most men, they seldom or never acquire that deep and thorough comprehension of any one art or science that is acquired by those who make it the principal or the exclusive object of their study. Great as is the fame of Leibnitz, perhaps the most universally informed and versatile genius of modern times, there is reason to think that it would have been greater and more durable had his energies been more concentrated. "But," to borrow the language of Gibbon, "even *his* powers were dissipated by the multiplicity of his pursuits. He attempted more than he could finish; he designed more than he could execute; his imagination was too easily satisfied with a bold and rapid glance on the subject which he was impatient to leave; and Leibnitz may be compared to those heroes, whose empire has been lost in the ambition of universal conquest."¹

But, if these remarks may be justly applied even to Leibnitz, what can ordinary men expect who engage indiscriminately in every line of study? They may have a smattering of many things, but they can have no solid knowledge. If we would attain to eminence, we must husband our resources; and apply them so as to perfect ourselves as much as possible in some one pursuit.

And hence, in labouring to promote our own ends by applying ourselves to the study or the practice of some particular art or science, we necessarily follow that course which is most advantageous for all. Like the different parts of a

¹ Miscellaneous Works, iii. 363, 8vo. edition.

well-constructed engine, the inhabitants of a civilized country are all mutually dependent on, and connected with each other. Without any previous concert, and obeying only the powerful and steady impulse of self-interest, they universally conspire to the same great end ; and contribute, each in his respective sphere, to furnish the greatest supply of necessaries, conveniencies, and enjoyments.

This dependence and combination is not found only or principally in the mechanical employments : it extends to the labours of the head as well as to those of the hands ; and pervades and binds together all classes and degrees of society. “ The great author of order hath so distributed the ranks and offices of men, in order to mutual benefit and comfort, that one man should plough, another thrash, another grind, another labour at the forge, another knit or weave, another sail, another trade, another supervise all these, labouring to keep them all in order and peace ; that one should work with his hands and feet, another with his head and tongue ; all conspiring to one common end, the welfare of the whole, and the supply of what is useful to each particular member ; every man so reciprocally obliging and being obliged, the prince being obliged to the husbandman for his bread, to the weaver for his clothes, to the mason for his palace, to the smith for his sword ; those being all obliged to him for his vigilant care in protecting them, for their security in pursuing the work, and enjoying the fruit of their industry.”¹

One of the most advantageous results of the division of labour is to be found in the circumstance of its enabling manufacturers or others engaged in any complicated business, or department of industry, to employ work-people of very various degrees of skill and force. In the cotton manufacture, for example, some processes that are indispensable may be quite as well performed by children and women as by the most expert and powerful workmen. It is clear, however, that but for the distribution of the labour required to bring

¹ Barrow's Second Sermon on Industry.

about any result among different individuals possessing the degree of skill and strength necessary in each particular part of the process, none could be employed but those who possessed the skill and strength required in the most difficult and laborious; and consequently workmen at 30s. or 40s. a-week would have to engage in tasks that might be as well or better performed by girls at 5s. or 6s. a-week. Hence, in all the great departments of industry, the more able, dexterous, and skilful labourers are employed only in the processes which require peculiar strength, dexterity, and skill; those which require these qualities in a less degree being carried on by sets of inferior and, consequently, cheaper labourers. The success of most industrious undertakings depends, indeed, in a great measure, on the sagacity with which this distribution of employments is made, or with which the skill and power of the work-people are proportioned to the results to be produced.¹

It is necessary to bear in mind, that the advantages derived from the division of labour, though they may be, and in fact are, partially enjoyed in every country and state of society, can only be carried to their full extent where there is a great power of exchanging, or an *extensive market*. There are many employments which cannot be separately carried on without the precincts of a large city; and, in all cases, the division becomes more perfect, according as the demand for the produce is extended. It is stated by Smith, that ten labourers, employed in different departments in a pin manufactory, could produce 48,000 pins a-day, and since his time the number has been doubled; but it is evident, that if the demand were not sufficient to take off this number, ten men could not be constantly employed in the pin-making business; and the division of employments in it could not, of course, be carried so far. The same principle holds universally. A cotton mill could not be constructed

¹ For a further illustration of this principle see *Babbage's Economy of Manufactures*, p. 172.

in a small country having no intercourse with its neighbours. The demand and competition of Europe and America have been necessary to carry the manufactures of Glasgow, Manchester, and Birmingham, to their present state of improvement.

The various provisions made by society for its protection, and for securing and preserving the rights and privileges of individuals, owe their origin to this principle. "Government itself is wholly founded on a sense of the advantages resulting from the division of employments. In the rudest state of society each man relies principally on himself for the protection both of his person and of his property. For these purposes he must be always armed, and always watchful; what little property he has must be movable, so as never to be far distant from its owner. Defence or escape occupy almost all his thoughts, and almost all his time; and after all these sacrifices, they are very imperfectly effected. 'If ever you see an old man here,' said an inhabitant of the confines of Abyssinia to Bruce, 'he is a stranger: the natives all die young by the lance.'

"But the labour which every individual, who relies on himself for protection, must himself undergo, is more than sufficient to enable a few individuals to protect themselves, and also the whole of a numerous community. To this may be traced the origin of governments. The nucleus of every government must have been some person who offered protection in exchange for submission. On the governor, and those with whom he is associated, or whom he appoints, is devolved the care of defending the community from violence and fraud; and so far as internal violence is concerned, and that is the evil most dreaded in civilized society, it is wonderful how small a number of persons can provide for the security of multitudes. About 15,000 soldiers, and not 15,000 policemen, watchmen, and officers of justice, protect the persons and property of the eighteen millions of inhabitants of Great Britain. There is scarcely a trade that does not engross the labour of a greater number of persons than

are employed to perform this the most important of all services.”¹

The influence of the division of labour in augmenting and perfecting the products of industry, had been noticed by several writers who preceded Dr. Smith, especially by Harris and Turgot; but none of them did what Smith has done. None of them fully traced its operation, or showed that the power of engaging in different employments depends on the power of exchanging; and that, consequently, the advantages derived from the division of labour are dependent upon, and regulated by, the extent of the market. This is a principle of the greatest value; and by establishing it Smith shed a new light on the science, and laid the foundation of many important practical conclusions. “Présentée de cette manière,” says M. Storch, “l’idée de la division du travail étoit absolument neuve; et l’effet qu’elle a fait sur les contemporains de Smith, prouve bien qu’elle l’étoit réellement pour eux. Telle qu’elle se trouve indiquée dans les passages que je viens de citer, elle n’a fait aucune impression. Développée par Smith, cette idée a d’abord saisi tous ses lecteurs; tous en ont senti la vérité et l’importance; et cela suffit pour lui en assurer l’honneur, lors même que son génie eut été guidé par les indications de ses devanciers.”²

SECT. III.—DEFINITION OF CAPITAL — MODE IN WHICH IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE FORMATION OF WEALTH — CIRCUMSTANCES MOST FAVOURABLE FOR ITS ACCUMULATION.

The capital of a country consists of *those portions of the produce of industry existing in it, which may be DIRECTLY employed either to support human beings, or to facilitate production*. This definition differs from that of Smith, which has been adopted by most economists. He divides the whole produce of industry belonging to a country, or its *stock*, into *capital* and *revenue*; the first consisting of such

¹ Senior on Political Economy.

² Tom. iv. p. 9.

portions of stock as are employed in the view of reproducing some species of commodities ; and the second consisting of whatever is employed to maintain or gratify the inhabitants, without any ulterior object. According to Smith, all this latter part is unproductively consumed, and contributes nothing to the increase of wealth. But these distinctions seem to be for the most part imaginary. Portions of stock employed without any immediate view to production, are often by far the most productive. Consistently with Smith's definition, the stock that Arkwright and Watt made use of themselves, must be said to have been employed unproductively, or as revenue ; and yet it is certain that, by enabling them to subsist and continue their operations, it contributed incomparably more to increase their wealth, and that of the country, than any equal amount of stock expended on the artisans in their service. It is always extremely difficult to say when stock is, or is not, productively employed ; and any definition of capital which involves the determination of such a point, serves only to embarrass and obscure what is otherwise abundantly simple. In our view of the matter, it is enough to entitle an article to be considered capital, that it can directly contribute to the support of man, or assist him in appropriating or producing commodities. It may not, it is true, be employed for either of these purposes ; and though it were, it might not be employed so as to produce the anticipated results. But the mode of employing an article, and the consequences of that employment, are perfectly distinct considerations from the question, whether that article be capital. For any thing that can *à priori* be known to the contrary, a horse yoked to a gentleman's coach may be as productively employed as if it were yoked to a brewer's dray ; but whatever difference may obtain in the cases, the identity of the animal is not affected,—it is equally possessed, in the one and the other, of the capacity to assist in production ; and should, therefore, be regarded, independently of other considerations, as a part of the capital of the country.

It is usual to distribute capital into two great divisions, one denominated *circulating*, and the other *fixed* capital; the former comprising those portions of capital that are most rapidly consumed — such as the food, clothes, and other articles necessary for the subsistence of man, the corn used as seed and in the feeding of horses, coal, &c.; while the lower animals, the houses, and the various instruments and machines, that either are or may be employed in production, are classed under the head of fixed capital. But, though this distinction be convenient for some purposes, no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between the different varieties of capital, all of which are indispensable to the successful prosecution of most branches of industry. Without circulating capital, or food and clothes, it would plainly be impossible to engage in any sort of undertaking where the return was at all distant; and without fixed capital, or tools and engines, there are very few sorts of labour that could be carried on at all, or with any advantage. But the foresight and inventive faculty of man, lead him, in the earliest ages and rudest states of society, to provide a reserve of food, and to contrive tools and instruments to assist him in his operations. The American hunters make use of clubs and slings to abridge their labour, and facilitate the acquisition of game; and the same principle which prompts them to construct and avail themselves of those rude instruments, never ceases to operate; it is always producing new improvements; and, in an advanced period, substitutes ships for canoes, muskets for slings, steam-engines for clubs, and cotton-mills for distaffs.

Hence it is only by the employment and co-operation of both descriptions of capital, that wealth can be largely produced, and universally diffused. An agriculturist might have an ample supply of carts and ploughs, of oxen and horses, and, generally, of all the instruments and animals used in his department of industry; but were he destitute of *circulating* capital, or of food and clothes, he would be unable to avail himself of their assistance, and instead of

tilling the ground, would have to resort to some species of appropriative industry : and, on the other hand, supposing he were abundantly supplied with provisions, what could he do without the assistance of *fixed* capital, or tools ? What could the most skilful husbandman perform without his spade and his plough ? — a weaver without his loom ? — a carpenter without his saw, his hatchet, and his planes ?

The division and combination of employments cannot be carried to any considerable extent without the previous accumulation of capital. Before labour can be divided, “ a stock of goods of different kinds must be stored up somewhere, sufficient to maintain the labourer, and to supply him with materials and tools. A weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his peculiar business, unless there is beforehand stored up somewhere, either in his own possession or in that of some other person, a stock sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, till he has not only completed but sold his web. This accumulation must, evidently, be previous to his applying himself for so long a time to such a peculiar business.”¹

As the accumulation of capital must have preceded any very extensive division and combination of employments, so their subsequent division and combination can only be perfected as capital is more and more accumulated. Accumulation and division act and re-act on each other. The greater the amount of their capital, the better, speaking generally, can the employers of labour distribute the work to be done among the individuals in their employment, who, consequently, have, as already explained, a greater chance of discovering machines and processes for facilitating their various tasks. The industry, therefore, of every country not only directly increases with the increase of the stock or capital which sets it in motion ; but, by means of this increase, the division of labour is extended, new and more

¹ “ *Wealth of Nations*,” p. 119.

powerful implements and machines are invented, and the same quantity of labour is made to produce a much greater quantity of commodities.

Besides enabling labour to be divided, capital contributes to facilitate labour and produce wealth in the three following ways:—

First,—It enables work to be executed that could not be executed, or commodities to be produced that could not be produced, without it.

Second,—It saves labour in the production of almost every species of commodities.

Third,—It enables work to be executed better, as well as more expeditiously.

With regard to the *first* advantage derived from the employment of capital, or the circumstance of its *enabling commodities to be produced that could not be produced without it*, it is plain, as has been already observed, that the production of such commodities as require a considerable period for their completion, could not be attempted unless a stock of circulating capital, or of food and clothes sufficient for the maintenance of the labourer while employed on them, were previously provided. But the employment of fixed capital, or of tools and machines, is frequently as necessary to the production of commodities as the employment of circulating capital. Stockings, for example, could not be produced without wires; and, although the ground might be cultivated without a plough, it could not be cultivated without a spade or a hoe. If we run over the vast catalogue of the arts practised in a civilized country, it will be found that extremely few can be carried on by the mere employment of the fingers, or rude tools with which man is furnished by nature. It is almost always necessary to provide ourselves with the results of previous industry and invention, and to strengthen our feeble hands by arming them, if we may so speak, “with the force of all the elements.”

In the *second* place, besides supplying many species of

commodities that could not be produced without its co-operation, the employment of capital occasions a *saving of labour in the production of many others*; and, by lowering their cost, brings them within reach of a far greater number of consumers. We have been so long accustomed to command the services of the most powerful machines, that it requires a considerable effort of abstraction to become fully aware of the advantages they confer on us. But if we compare the arts practised by highly civilized societies and those in a less advanced state, we can hardly fail of being convinced that we are indebted to the employment of machinery for a very large proportion of our superior comforts and enjoyments. Suppose, that, like the Peruvians, and many other people of the New as well as of the Old World, we were destitute of iron,¹ and unacquainted with the method of domesticating and employing oxen and horses, how prodigious a change for the worse would be made in our condition! It was customary, in some countries, to make cloth by taking up thread after thread of the warp, and passing the woof between them by the unassisted agency of the hand; so that years were consumed in the manufacture of a piece which, with the aid of the loom, may be produced in as many days.² Nothing, perhaps,

¹ Mr. Locke has the following striking observations on the use of iron:—"Of what consequence the discovery of one natural body, and its properties, may be to human life, the whole great continent of America is a convincing instance; whose ignorance in useful arts, and want of the greatest part of the conveniencies of life, in a country that abounded with all sorts of natural plenty, I think may be attributed to their ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary, despicable stone, I mean the mineral of *iron*. And whatever we think of our parts, or improvements, in this part of the world, where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with each other; yet, to any one that will seriously reflect upon it, I suppose it will appear past doubt, that, were the use of iron lost among us, we should in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions came no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations; so that he who first made use of that one contemptible mineral, may be truly styled the father of arts and author of plenty."—*Essay on the Understanding*, book iv. cap. 12.

² Ulloa, "*Voyage de l'Amérique*," tom. i. p. 336. Ed. Amst. 1752.

has contributed so much to accelerate the progress and diffuse the blessings of civilization, as the establishment of a commercial intercourse between different and distant nations. But how could this be effected without the construction of vessels and the discovery of the art of navigation? And if we compare the early navigators, creeping timidly along the shore in canoes, formed out of trees partly hollowed by fire, and partly by the aid of a stone hatchet, or the bone of some animal, with those who now boldly traverse the trackless ocean in noble ships laden with the produce of every climate, we shall have a faint idea of the advance of the arts, and of what we owe to machinery and science. Those who have distinguished themselves in this career, though they have rarely met with that gratitude and applause to which they had a just claim, have been the great benefactors of the human race. By pressing the powers of nature into our service, and subjecting them to our control, they have given man almost omnipotent power, and rendered him equal to the most gigantic undertakings. Without their assistance we should be poor indeed! Such as we now find the naked and half-famished savage of New Holland, such would the Athenian, the Roman, and the Englishman have been, but for the invention of tools and machines, and the employment of natural agents in the great work of production.

The *third* advantage derived from the employment of capital consists in its enabling work to be done better, as well as more expeditiously. Cotton, for example, may be spun by the hand; but while the admirable machines invented by Hargreaves, Arkwright, and others, spin a hundred or a thousand times as much yarn as could be spun by means of a common spindle, they have, at the same time, improved its quality, and given it a degree of fineness and of evenness, or equality, which was not previously attainable. A painter would require months, or it might be years, to paint with a brush the cottons, or printed cloths, used in the hanging of a single room; and it would

be very difficult, if not impossible, for the best artist to give that perfect identity to his figures, which is given to them by the machinery now made use of for that purpose. Not to mention the other and more important advantages resulting from the invention of movable types and printing, the most perfect manuscript—one on which years of patient and irksome labour have been expended—is unable, in point of delicacy and correctness, to match a well-printed work, executed in the hundredth part of the time, and at a hundredth part of the expense. The great foreign demand for English manufactured goods results no less from the superiority of their manufacture than from their greater cheapness; and for both these advantages we are principally indebted to the excellence of our machinery.

There are other considerations which equally illustrate the extreme importance of the accumulation and employment of capital. The food and other accommodations enjoyed by a nation cannot be increased except by an increase in the number of its labourers, or in their productive powers; but without an increase of capital, it is in most cases impossible to employ more workmen with advantage. If the articles applicable to the support of the labourers, and the tools and machines with which they are to operate, be required for the maintenance and efficient employment of those already in existence, there can be no demand for others. Under such circumstances the rate of wages cannot rise; and if the number of inhabitants be increased, they must be worse provided for. Neither is it at all probable that the powers of the labourer should be augmented, unless capital have been previously increased. Without the better education and training of workmen, the greater subdivision of their employments, or the improvement of machinery, their productive energies can never be materially augmented; and in almost all these cases, additional capital is required. It is seldom, unless by its means, that workmen can be better trained, or that the undertaker of any work can either provide them with better machinery, or make a more proper

distribution of labour among them. Should the work to be done consist of a number of parts, to keep a workman constantly employed in one only requires a much larger stock than when he is occasionally employed in every different part. "When," says Dr. Smith, "we compare the state of a nation at two different periods, and find that the annual produce of its land and labour is evidently greater at the latter than at the former, that its lands are better cultivated, its manufactures more numerous and more flourishing, and its trade more extensive, we may be assured that its capital must have increased during the interval between these two periods, and that more must have been added to it, by the good conduct of some, than had been taken from it, either by the private misconduct of others, or by the public extravagance of government."¹ It is therefore apparent, that no country can ever reach the stationary state, so long as she continues to add to her capital. While she does this, she will have an increasing demand for labour, and will be uniformly augmenting the mass of necessaries and conveniencies, and consequently, also, the numbers of her people. But when no additions are made to capital, no more labour will be, or, at least, can be advantageously employed. And should the national capital diminish, the condition of the great body of the people will deteriorate: the wages of labour will be reduced; and pauperism, with its attendant train of vice, misery, and crime, will spread its ravages throughout society.

Having thus endeavoured to show what capital is, the importance of its employment, and the manner in which it assists in facilitating production, we proceed to explain its origin, and the circumstances most favourable for its accumulation.

Had it been a law of nature that the quantity of produce obtained from industrious undertakings should merely suffice

¹ "Wealth of Nations," p. 152.

to replace that which had been expended in carrying them on, society would have made no progress, and man would have continued in the state in which he was originally placed. But the established order of things is widely different. It is constituted so that, in the vast majority of cases, more wealth or produce is obtained through the agency of a given quantity of labour, than is required to carry on that labour. This surplus, or excess of produce, has been denominated *profit*; and it is from it that capital is wholly derived. It is not enough that a man's immediate wants are supplied, he looks forward to the future. Even the savage who kills more game in a day than he can consume, does not throw the surplus away; experience has taught him that he may be less fortunate on another occasion; and he, therefore, either stores it up as a reserve against any future emergency, or barter it with his fellows for something else. Experience, too, would speedily show, that without a stock of provisions no one could engage in any undertaking, however productive in the end, that required any considerable time before it made a return. No doubt, therefore, the principle which prompts to save and amass, which leads man to sacrifice an immediate gratification for the sake of increased security, or of greater enjoyment at some future period, manifested itself in the earliest ages. At first, indeed, its operation must have been comparatively feeble. But it gathered fresh strength and consistency, according as the many advantages of which it is productive gradually disclosed themselves. The dried fish, canoes, and spears of the wretched inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego exhibit the first fruits of that powerful passion, to which we owe all the riches of the world.

Seeing, therefore, that capital is formed out of the excess of the produce realized by those who engage in industrious undertakings, over and above the produce necessarily expended in carrying them on, it plainly follows, that the means of amassing capital will be greatest where this excess is greatest; or, in other words, that they will be greatest

where the rate of profit is greatest. This is so obvious a proposition as hardly to require illustration. The man who produces a bushel of wheat in *two* days, has it evidently in his power to accumulate twice as fast as the man who, either from a deficiency of skill, or from his being obliged to cultivate a bad soil, is forced to labour *four* days to produce the same quantity; and the capitalist who invests stock so as to yield a profit of ten *per cent*, has it equally in his power to accumulate twice as fast as the capitalist who cannot find a mode of investment that will yield more than five *per cent*.¹ It is true that high profits give the means only of amassing capital; and had men always lived up to their incomes, that is, had they always consumed the whole produce of their industry in satisfying their immediate wants or desires, there could have been no such thing as capital in the world. But experience shows, that while high profits afford greater means of saving, they, at the same time, give additional force to the parsimonious principle. Economy is in no respect different from the other virtues; and it would be unreasonable to expect that it should be strongly manifested, where it does not bring along with it a corresponding reward. Before a man can accumulate, he must live: and if the sum that remains, after his necessary expenses are deducted, be but trifling, the probability is, that he will choose rather to consume it immediately, than to hoard it up in the expectation, that, by the addition of farther savings, it may, at some future and very distant period, become the means of making a small addition to his income. But wherever profits are high, that is, wherever there is a great power of accumulation, we deny ourselves immediate gratifications, because we have a certain prospect that, by doing so, we shall speedily attain to comparative affluence; and that our future means of obtaining an increased supply of conveniencies and luxuries will be greatly

¹ This is understated. It is plain, inasmuch as all parties must live on their profits, that those who gain double may accumulate more than twice as fast as the others.

increased by our present forbearance. Give to any people the power of accumulating, and you may depend upon it they will not be disinclined to use it effectively. Those who inquire into the circumstances which have determined the state of the different countries of the world, will find that the power of accumulation, or, which is the same thing, the rate of profit, has uniformly been greatest in those which have made the most rapid advances. In the United States, for example, the rate of profit is commonly twice as high as in Great Britain or Holland ; and it is to its greater magnitude that the comparatively quick progress of the former in wealth and population is wholly to be ascribed. The desire of adding to our fortune, and improving our condition, is inherent in the human constitution, and is, in fact, the fundamental principle, the *causa causans*, of every improvement. It is impossible to specify an instance of any people having missed an opportunity of amassing. Whenever the bulk of the community have the power of adding to their stock, they never fail to make additions. "No measure of fortune, or degree of skill, is found to diminish the supposed necessities of human life ; refinement and plenty foster new desires, while they furnish the means or practise the methods to gratify them."¹

Perhaps it will be said, in opposition to these statements, that the rate of profit is high in Eastern countries, and that they are, notwithstanding, either retrograding or advancing only by imperceptible degrees. It may be questioned, however, whether the rate of profit be really higher in them than in Europe. No doubt the rate of *interest* is higher ; but that is a consequence of the hazard to which the principal is exposed, because of the prejudices against usury, and the vicious and defective nature of Eastern governments. All taking of interest is prohibited by the Koran ; and this is really one of the chief causes of its being so very high in the countries which respect its authority. "L'usure," says

¹ Ferguson's "Essay on Civil Society," p. 360.

Montesquieu, "augmente dans les pays Mahometans à proportion de la sévérité de la défense. Le prêteur s'indemnise du peril de la contravention."¹ It is not meant, however, to affirm, that great productiveness of industry, or a high rate of profit, is necessarily, and in every instance, accompanied by a great degree of prosperity. Countries with every imaginable capacity for the profitable employment of industry and stock may have the misfortune to be subjected to governments which do not respect or uphold the right of property; and the insecurity thence resulting, may suffice to paralyze the exertions of those who are otherwise placed in the most favourable situation for the accumulation of wealth. But we believe it may be laid down as a principle, which hardly admits of exception, that if two or more countries, nearly in the same physical circumstances, have about equally tolerant and liberal governments, and give equal protection to property, their prosperity will be proportioned to the rate of profit in each. Wherever, *ceteris paribus*, profits are high, capital is rapidly augmented, and there is a comparatively rapid increase of wealth and population; but, on the other hand, wherever profits are low, the means of employing additional labour are proportionally limited, and the progress of society rendered so much the slower.

It is not, therefore, by the absolute amount of its capital, but by its power of employing that capital with advantage—a power which, in all ordinary cases, is correctly measured by the common and average rate of profit—that the capacity of a country to increase in wealth and population is to be estimated. Before the laws regulating the rate of profit and the increase of capital were thoroughly investigated, the great wealth and commercial prosperity of Holland, where profits, from 1650 downwards, were comparatively low, were considered by Sir Josiah Child, and many later writers, as the natural result, and were consequently re-

¹ "Esprit des Loix," liv. xxi. chap. 19.

garded by them as a convincing proof of the superior advantages of low profits and interest. But this, as will be afterwards seen, was to mistake the effect of heavy taxation for the cause of wealth ! A country where profits are low, may, notwithstanding, abound in wealth, and be possessed of immense capital ; but it is the height of error to suppose, that the lowness of profits facilitated their accumulation. The truth is, that the low rate of profit in Holland during the eighteenth century was at once a cause and a symptom of her decline. Sir William Temple mentions, in his Observations on the Netherlands, written about 1670, that the trade of Holland had then passed its zenith ; and the vast capitals of the Dutch merchants had been principally amassed previously to the wars in which the republic was successively engaged with Cromwell, Charles II., and Louis XIV., when the rate of profit was higher than at any subsequent period.

But without referring to the example of America, Holland, or any other country, the smallest reflection on the motives to engage in any branch of industry is sufficient to show that the advantages derived from it are always supposed, *cæteris paribus*, to be *directly as the rate of profit*. Why does a man employ himself or his capital in an industrious undertaking ? Is it not because he expects he will thereby realize the greatest reward for his labour, or the greatest rate of profit on his capital ? One branch of industry is said to be peculiarly advantageous, for the single and sufficient reason that it yields a comparatively large profit ; and another is, with equal propriety, said to be peculiarly disadvantageous, because it yields a comparatively small profit. It is always to this standard, to the high or low rate of profit which they respectively yield, that every individual refers in comparing different undertakings ; and it is hardly necessary to add, that what is true of individuals, must be true of states.

No certain conclusion respecting the prosperity of any country can be drawn from the magnitude of its commerce

or revenue, or the state of its agriculture or manufactures. Every branch of industry is liable to be affected by secondary or accidental causes. They are always in a state of flux or reflux; and some of them are frequently seen to flourish when others are very much depressed. The AVERAGE RATE OF PROFIT would seem to be, on the whole, the best barometer—the best criterion of national prosperity. A rise of profits is, speaking generally, occasioned by industry having become *more* productive; and it shows that the power of the society to amass capital, and to add to its wealth and population, has been increased, and its progress accelerated: a fall of profits, on the contrary, is occasioned by industry having become *less* productive, and shows that the power to amass capital has been diminished, and that the progress of the society has been clogged and impeded.¹ However much a particular, and it may be an important, branch of industry is depressed, still, if the average rate of profit be high, we may be assured that the depression cannot continue, and that the condition of the country is really prosperous. On the other hand, though there were no distress in any particular branch—though agriculture, manufactures, and commerce were carried to a greater extent than they have ever been carried before—though a nation have numerous, powerful, and well-appointed armies and fleets, and the style of living among the higher classes be more than ordinarily sumptuous,—still, if the rate of profit have become comparatively low, we may pretty confidently affirm, that the condition of such nation, how prosperous soever in appearance, is bad and unsound at bottom; that the plague of poverty is secretly creeping on the mass of her citizens; that the foundations of her great-

¹ We are here only laying down the leading principles on the subject. In the chapter on the “Circumstances which determine the Rate of Profit,” we shall endeavour to investigate the influence of fluctuations in the value of money, of loans to government, &c., on profits. The doctrine advanced in the text is meant only to apply in cases where these disturbing causes are not in operation.

ness have been shaken; and that her decline may be anticipated, unless measures be devised for relieving the pressure on the national resources, by adding to the productiveness of industry, and, consequently, to the rate of profit.

It has been wisely ordered, that the principle which prompts to save and amass should be as powerful as it is advantageous. "With regard to profusion," says Smith, "the principle which prompts to expense is the passion for present enjoyment; which, though sometimes violent, and very difficult to be restrained, is in general only momentary and occasional. But the principle which prompts to save is the desire of bettering our condition; a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which separates these two moments, there is scarce, perhaps, a single instant in which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their condition. It is the means the most vulgar and the most obvious; and the most likely way of augmenting their fortune is to save and accumulate some part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually, or upon some extraordinary occasion. Though the principle of expense, therefore, prevails in almost all men upon some occasions, and in some men upon almost all occasions, yet in the greater part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly."¹

It is this principle which carries society forward. The spirit of parsimony, and the efforts of the frugal and industrious classes to improve their condition, in most instances balance not only the profusion of individuals, but also the

¹ "Wealth of Nations," p. 151.

more wasteful profusion and extravagance of governments. This spirit has been happily compared by Smith to the unknown principle of animal life—the *vis medicatrix nature*—which frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite both of disease and of the injudicious prescriptions of the physician. So powerful indeed is its influence, that it may well be doubted, supposing the late war, and the enormous expenditure which it occasioned, had not occurred, whether the existing capital of the country would have been really greater than it is !

But, however great the capacity of the principle of accumulation to repair the waste of capital, we must take care not to fall into the error of supposing, as very many have done, that its operations are in *all* cases promoted by a large public expenditure. To a certain extent, indeed, this is true. A moderate increase of taxation has the same effect on the habits and industry of a nation, that an increase of his family, or of his necessary and unavoidable expenses, has upon a private individual. Man is not influenced solely by hope ; he is also powerfully operated upon by fear. Taxation brings the latter principle into the field. To the desire of rising in the world, inherent in the breast of every individual, an increase of taxation superadds the fear of being cast down to a lower station, of being deprived of conveniences and gratifications which habit has rendered almost indispensable ; and the combined influence of the two principles produces efforts that could not be produced by the unassisted agency of either. They stimulate individuals to endeavour, by increased industry and economy, to repair the breach taxation has made in their fortunes ; and it not unfrequently happens that their efforts do more than this, and that, consequently, the national wealth is increased through the increase of taxation. But we must be on our guard against the abuse of this doctrine. To render an increase of taxation productive of greater exertion, economy, and invention, it should be slowly and gradually brought about ; and it should never be carried to such a height as to

incapacitate individuals from meeting the sacrifices it imposes, by such an increase of industry and economy as it may be in their power to make without requiring any very violent change of their habits. The increase of taxation must not be such as to make it impracticable to overcome its influence, or to induce the belief that it is impracticable. Difficulties that are seen to be surmountable sharpen the inventive powers, and are readily grappled with; but an apparently insurmountable difficulty, or such an excessive weight of taxation as it was deemed impossible to meet, would not stimulate but destroy exertion. Instead of producing new efforts of ingenuity and economy, it would produce only despair. Whenever taxation becomes so heavy that the produce it takes from individuals can no longer be replaced by fresh efforts, they uniformly cease to be made; the population becomes dispirited; industry is paralyzed; and the country rapidly declines.

A striking illustration of what has now been stated, may be derived from observing the influence of fair and low rents on the industry of farmers. It might seem, on a superficial view of the matter, that the circumstance of a farm being low-rented would not lessen the enterprise or industry of the tenant, seeing that every thing he could make it produce over and above the rent, by diligence and economy, would belong to himself. Such, however, is not found to be really the case; and it is difficult to say whether the over or under-renting of land be most injurious. If a farm be too high-rented, that is, if no exertion of skill, or reasonable outlay on the part of the tenant, will enable him to pay his rent and obtain a fair return for his trouble, he gets dispirited. The farm is, in consequence, ill-managed; scourging crops are resorted to; and ultimately it is thrown on the landlord's hands, in an impoverished and deteriorated condition. But the disadvantages attending the under-renting of land are hardly less obvious. To make farmers leave those routine practices to which they are very strongly attached, and become really industrious and enterprising,

they must not only have the power of rising in the world, but their rents must be such as to impress them with a conviction, that if they do not exert themselves their ruin will assuredly follow. Estates that are under-rented are, uniformly almost, farmed in an inferior style compared with those that are let at their fair value; and the tenants are not generally in good circumstances. "I have not," says Mr. Young, "seen an instance of rent being very low, and husbandry, at the same time, being good. Innumerable are the instances of farmers living miserably, and even breaking, on farms at very low rents, being succeeded by others, on the same land, at very high rents, who make fortunes. Throughout my journey I have universally observed, that such farms as were the most wretchedly managed were very much under-let."¹

What an increase of rent is to the farmers, an increase of taxation is to the public. If it be carried beyond due bounds, or to such an extent that it cannot be fully balanced by increased efforts to produce and save, it is productive of national poverty and decline; but so long as it is confined within moderate limits, it acts as a powerful stimulus to industry and economy, and most commonly occasions the production of more wealth than it abstracts.

That capital is formed out of profit, and that profit is itself the surplus obtained from industrious undertakings, after the produce expended in carrying them on has been fully replaced, are propositions which, though universally true, are, at least the latter, at variance with the common notions on the subject. Instead of supposing profits to originate in the manner now stated, they are almost uniformly supposed to depend on the sale of produce, and to be made at the expense of the purchaser. Thus, to take a familiar instance, the hat-maker who sells a hat for thirty

¹ Young's "Tour in the North of England," vol. iv. p. 376. See also "Analysis of the Statistical Account of Scotland," part i. p. 258, &c., for proofs of the same principle.

shillings, which cost him twenty-five shillings of outlay, believes he has made the five shillings of profit at the expense of the individual who bought the hat, and this is the universal belief of others. In truth and reality, however, he has done no such thing. He produced, in a given time, a hat equivalent to, or worth, in silver, thirty shillings, while the various expenses necessarily incurred in its manufacture only amounted to twenty-five shillings. But then it must be borne in mind that, speaking generally, the various individuals who deal with the hat-maker are placed in the like situation: the farmer, the clothier, the bootmaker, &c. are all making the same profits in their respective businesses; that is, they are all producing quantities of corn, cloth, boots, &c., equivalent to thirty shillings, by an outlay of twenty-five shillings. It is clear, therefore, that in exchanging the precious metals for commodities, or in exchanging one sort of commodities for another, one party gains nothing at the expense of the other. Profit is, in all cases, the excess of the produce raised in given periods over that which has been consumed in those periods. The introduction of exchanges would not be advantageous, if it merely enabled one set of persons to prey upon some other set. This, however, is not its effect. It enables labour to be divided, and individuals to addict themselves in preference to some one pursuit; and by thus separating and combining their efforts, adds, as already seen, prodigiously to the facilities of production; but it does nothing more.

If the popular opinions with respect to the source of profits were well founded, it would inevitably follow, inasmuch as they take for granted that all producers make their profits at the expense of some one else who buys their commodities, not only that no additions could be made to capital, but that the capital now in the world would be very soon annihilated. Were such a really correct view of the circumstances under which we are placed, our lot would be

any thing but enviable. Happily, however, this is not our situation. The produce of labour, during any given time, is almost always greater than the produce we are obliged to consume during the same time; and the surplus or profit being accumulated, becomes, in its turn, a new instrument of production.

There is really, therefore, no class of industrious individuals which lives at the expense of the other classes. The retail dealer, for example, is in no respect more indebted to his customers than they are to him. It is not his, but their own interest they have in view, when they resort to his shop. Society is, in truth, as M. Destutt Tracy has remarked, nothing but a series of exchanges;¹ but they are exchanges in which full equivalents are always given for whatever is received. Profits are a consequence of the bounty of Nature; and do not in any degree depend on the superior acuteness of those who sell, or on the weakness and simplicity of those who buy. The advantages observed to result from the separation of employments has occasioned the division of society into particular classes, which interchange commodities and services; this intercourse, from its reducing the cost, increasing the number, and improving the quality of all sorts of useful and desirable articles and services, being of the greatest advantage to every individual. This, however, it must always be kept in view, is the whole effect of the division of labour, and of the introduction of exchanges. How far soever that division may be carried, it is still true that profits depend not on it, or on exchanges, but on the excess of the commodities produced in a given period, over those that are consumed in the same period.

However extended the sense previously attached to the term capital may at first sight appear, we are inclined to

¹ "Economie Politique," p. 78.

think that it should be interpreted still more comprehensively. Instead of understanding by capital all that portion of the produce of industry which may be applied to support man, and to facilitate production, there does not seem to be any good reason why man himself should not, and very many why he should, be considered as forming a part of the national capital. Man is as much the produce of previous outlays of wealth expended on his subsistence, education, &c., as any of the instruments constructed by his agency ; and it would seem, that in those inquiries which regard only his mechanical operations, and do not involve the consideration of his higher and nobler powers, he should be regarded in the same point of view. Every individual who has arrived at maturity, though he may not be instructed in any particular art or profession, may yet, with perfect propriety, be viewed, in relation to his natural powers, as a machine which it has cost twenty years of assiduous attention, and the expenditure of a considerable capital, to construct. And if a farther sum be expended in qualifying him for the exercise of a business or profession requiring unusual skill, his value will be proportionally increased, and he will be entitled to a greater reward for his exertions ; as a machine becomes more valuable when it acquires new powers by the expenditure of additional capital or labour in its construction.

Smith has fully admitted the justice of this principle, though he has not reasoned consistently from it. The acquired and useful talents of the inhabitants should, he states, be considered as making part of the national capital. "The acquisition of such talents," he justly observes, "during the education, study, or apprenticeship of the acquirer, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise of that of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same

light as a machine or instrument of trade, which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit."¹

Instead, then, of being entirely overlooked, as is most frequently the case, the dexterity, skill, and intelligence of the mass of its inhabitants should be most particularly attended to in estimating the capital and productive capacities of a country. Much stress is uniformly and justly laid on the efficacy of the machines which man has constructed to assist in his undertakings; but he is himself the most important of all machines, and every addition made to his skill and dexterity is an acquisition of the utmost consequence. The discrepancies that actually obtain in the physical organization of the various races of men, are seldom very considerable; and yet, how vast is the difference, in other points of view, between an Indian of Mexico, and an Englishman or a Frenchman! The former, ignorant and uninstructed, is poor and miserable, though placed in a country blessed with a soil of exhaustless fertility and a genial climate; the latter, intelligent and educated, is wealthy, prosperous, and happy, though placed under comparatively unfavourable circumstances. Lord Bacon's aphorism, that *knowledge is power*, is true in a physical as well as in a moral sense. It gives its possessors an ascendancy over their less instructed neighbours, and makes immeasurable additions to their productive capacities. An ignorant and uneducated people, though possessed of all the materials and powers necessary for the production of wealth, are uniformly sunk in poverty and barbarism: and until their mental powers begin to expand, and they have learned to exercise the empire of mind over matter, the avenues to improvement are shut against them, and they have neither the power nor the wish to emerge from their degraded condition.

It has been said, and perhaps truly, that it was the rapid growth of the cotton manufacture that bore us triumphantly through the contest with revolutionary France, and gave us wealth and power sufficient to overcome the combined force of almost all Europe, though wielded by a chief of consummate talent. But what is the cotton manufacture? Is it not wholly the result of the discoveries and inventions of Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Cartwright, and a few others?¹ It was their sagacity that discovered and explored this mighty channel for the profitable employment of millions upon millions of capital, and of thousands upon thousands of workmen; so that the vast advantages derived from it, are to be ascribed to them as to their original authors and inventors.

To those who are impressed with a conviction of the truth of the principles thus briefly stated, who are duly sensible of the importance of science to the advancement of nations, nothing can be more gratifying than the progress made of late years in diffusing instruction among the great mass of the community. The discoveries of Bell and Lancaster, and the schools founded on their principles, have powerfully contributed to spread a knowledge of the elementary branches of instruction; while the Mechanics' Institutions formed in the metropolis, and other great towns, afford the labouring part of the population an opportunity of perfecting themselves in their respective arts, by making them acquainted with the principles on which they depend, and from the better application of which every new improvement must be derived. It is impossible to form any accurate estimate of the influence of this general instruction over the future fortunes of the empire; but it can hardly fail to be alike great and beneficial. More discoveries will be made, according to the degree in which more individuals are placed

¹ For an account of the rise, progress, and present state of the cotton manufacture, see Commercial Dictionary, art. Cotton, and the authorities there referred to.

in a situation to make them. And it is neither impossible, nor at all improbable, that the lustre which now attaches to the names of Arkwright and Watt may be dimmed, though it can never be wholly effaced, by the more numerous, and, it may be, more important discoveries, that will, at no distant period, be made by those who would have passed from the cradle to the tomb in the same obscure and beaten track that had been trodden by their unambitious ancestors, had not the education now so generally diffused, served to elicit and ripen the seeds of genius implanted in them for the common advantage of mankind.

CHAPTER III.

Definition and Growth of Credit—Contributes to facilitate Production by distributing Capital in the most advantageous manner—Circulation of Bills, &c.

HAVING seen, in the last chapter, the effects resulting from the accumulation and employment of Capital, our attention is next called to the subject of Credit. This is most commonly represented as a very effective agent in the production of wealth; and though its influence has been, in this respect, a good deal exaggerated, it is, notwithstanding, of very considerable importance.

Credit is the term used to express the trust or confidence placed by one individual in another when he assigns him property in loan, or without stipulating for its immediate payment. The party who lends is said to give credit, and the party who borrows to obtain credit.

In the earlier stages of society credit is in a great measure unknown. This arises partly from the circumstance of very little capital being then accumulated, and partly from government not having the means, or not being sufficiently careful to enforce that punctual attention to engagements so indispensable to the existence of confidence or credit. But as society advances, capital is gradually accumulated, and the observance of contracts is enforced by the public authority. Credit then begins to grow up. On the one hand, individuals who have either more capital than they can conveniently employ, or who are desirous of withdrawing from business, are disposed to lend, or to transfer a part or the whole of their capital to others, on condition of their obtaining a certain stipulated premium or interest for its use, and what they consider sufficient security for its repayment; and on the other hand, there are always

individuals to be met with disposed to borrow, partly and principally in order to extend their businesses beyond the limits to which they can be carried by means of their own capital, or to purchase commodities on speculation, and partly to defray debts already contracted. These different classes of individuals mutually accommodate each other. Those desirous of being relieved from the fatigues of business, find it very convenient to lend their capital to others; while those who are anxious to enlarge their businesses, obtain the means of prosecuting them to a greater extent.

It is in the effects resulting from this transference of capital from those who are willing to lend to those who are desirous to borrow, that we must seek for the advantages derivable from credit. All the operations supposed to be carried on by its agency, how extensive and complicated soever they may appear, originate in a change in the actual holders or employers of stock. Nothing, indeed, is more common than to hear it stated, that commodities are produced, and the most expensive operations carried on, by means of credit or confidence; but this is an obvious mistake. Wealth cannot be produced, nor can any sort of industrious undertaking be entered upon or completed, without the aid of labour and capital; and all that credit does, or can do, is, by facilitating the transfer of capital from one individual to another, to bring it into the hands of those who, it is most probable, will employ it to the greatest advantage. A few remarks will render this apparent.

It is plain, that to whatever extent the power of the borrower of a quantity of produce, or of a sum of money, to extend his business, may be increased, that of the lender must be equally diminished. The same portion of capital cannot be employed by two individuals at the same time. If A transfer his capital to B, he necessarily, by so doing, deprives himself of a power or capacity of production which B acquires. It is most probable, indeed, that this capital

will be more productively employed by B than by A ; for the fact of A having lent it, shows that he either had no means of employing it advantageously, or was disinclined to take the trouble ; while the fact of B having borrowed it, shows that he conceives he can advantageously employ it, or that he can invest it so as to make it yield an interest to the lender and a profit for himself. It is obvious, however, that except in so far as credit may thus bring capital into the possession of those who, it may be fairly presumed, will employ it most beneficially, it can contribute nothing to the increase of wealth.

The most common method of making a loan is by selling commodities on credit, or on condition that they shall be paid at some future period. The price is increased proportionally to the length of credit given ; and if any doubt be entertained with respect to the punctuality or solvency of the buyer, a farther sum is added to the price, to cover the risk that the seller or lender runs of not recovering the price, or of not recovering it at the stipulated period. This is the usual method of transacting business where capital is abundant and confidence general ; and there can be no manner of doubt that the amount of property lent in Great Britain, Holland, and other commercial countries, in this way, is decidedly greater than all that is lent in every other way.

When produce is sold in the way now described, it is usual for the buyers to give bills to the sellers for the price, payable at the expiration of the credit ; and it is in the effects growing out of the negotiation of these bills that much of that *magical* influence that has sometimes been ascribed to credit is believed to consist. Suppose, to illustrate this, that a paper-maker, A, sells to a printer, B, a quantity of paper, and that he gets his bill for the sum, payable at twelve months after date : B could not have entered into the transaction had he been obliged to pay ready money ; but A, notwithstanding he has occasion for the money, is enabled, by the facility of negotiating or

discounting bills, to give the requisite credit, without disabling himself from prosecuting his business. In a case like this, both parties are said to be supported by credit ; and as cases of this sort are exceedingly common, it is contended that half the business of the country is really carried on by its means. All, however, that such statements really amount to is, that a large proportion of those engaged in industrious undertakings do not employ their own capital merely, but also that of others. In the case in question, the printer employs the capital of the paper-maker, and the latter employs that of the banker or broker who discounted the bill. This person had, most likely, the amount in spare cash lying beside him, which he might not well know what to make of ; but the individual into whose hands it has now come, will immediately apply it to useful purposes, or to the purchase of the materials, or the payment of the wages of the workmen employed in his establishment. It is next to certain, therefore, that the transaction will be advantageous. But still it is essential to bear in mind that it will be so, not because credit is of itself a means of production, or because it can give birth to capital not already in existence ; but because, through its agency, capital finds its way into those channels in which it has the best chance of being profitably employed.

The real advantage derived from the use of bills and bank-notes as money, consists, as will be afterwards seen, in the substitution of so cheap a medium of exchange as paper, in the place of one so expensive as gold, and in the facilities which they give to the transacting of commercial affairs. If a banker lend A a note for £100 or £1000, he will be able to obtain an equivalent portion of the land or produce of the country in exchange for it ; but that land or produce was already in existence. The issue of the note did not give it birth. It was previously in some one's possession ; and it will depend wholly on the circumstance of A's employing it more or less advantageously than it was previously employed, whether the transaction will, in a public

point of view, be profitable or not. On analyzing any case of this kind, we shall invariably find that all that the highest degree of credit or confidence can do, is merely to change the distribution of capital—to transfer it from one class to another. Occasionally, too, these transfers are productive of injurious results, by bringing capital into the hands of spendthrifts: this, however, is not a very common effect; and there can be no doubt that they are, in the majority of instances, decidedly beneficial.

The following extract from the evidence of Mr. Ricardo before the Committee appointed by the House of Lords in 1819, to inquire into the expediency of the resumption of cash payments by the Bank of England, sets the principles we have been endeavouring to establish in a very clear point of view.

“Do you not know,” Mr. Ricardo was asked, “that when there is a great demand for manufactures, the very credit which that circumstance creates enables the manufacturer to make a more extended use of his capital in the production of manufactures?” To this Mr. Ricardo answered, “I have no notion of credit being at all effectual in the production of commodities; commodities can only be produced by labour, machinery, and raw materials; and if these are to be employed in one place, they must necessarily be withdrawn from another. Credit is the means, which is alternately transferred from one to another, to make use of capital actually existing; it does not create capital; it determines only by whom that capital shall be employed: the removal of capital from one employment to another may often be very advantageous, and it may also be very injurious.”

Mr. Ricardo was then asked, “May not a man get credit from a bank on the security of his capital which is profitably employed, whether vested in stock or land? and may he not, by means of that credit, purchase or create an additional quantity of machinery and raw materials, and pay an additional number of labourers, without dislodging capital

from any existing employment in the country?" To this Mr. Ricardo answered, "Impossible! an individual can purchase machinery, &c. with credit; he can never create them. If he purchase, it is always of some one else; and, consequently, he displaces some other from the employment of capital."¹

¹ "Lords' Report," p. 192.

CHAPTER IV.

*Circumstances which led to the Introduction and Use of Money—
Qualities which a Commodity used as Money should possess—Coinage
—Variations in the Value of Money—Introduction and Use of
Paper Money and Bills of Exchange.*

WHEN the division of labour was first introduced, commodities were directly bartered for each other. Those, for example, who had a surplus of corn, and were in want of wine, endeavoured to find out those who were in the opposite circumstances, or who had a surplus of wine and wanted corn, and then exchanged the one for the other. It is obvious, however, that the power of exchanging, and, consequently, of dividing employments, must have been subjected to perpetual interruptions, so long as it was restricted to mere barter. A carries produce to market, and B is desirous to purchase it; but the produce belonging to B is not suitable for A. C, again, would like to buy B's produce, but B is already fully supplied with the equivalent C has to offer. In such cases, and they must be of constant occurrence wherever money is not introduced, no direct exchange could take place between the parties; and it might be very difficult to bring it about indirectly.¹

The extreme inconvenience attending such situations must early have forced themselves on the attention of every one. Efforts would, in consequence, be made to avoid them; and it would speedily appear that the best, or rather the only way in which this could be effected, was to exchange either the whole or a part of one's surplus produce for some com-

¹ The difficulties that would arise on such occasions, and the devices that would be adopted to overcome them, have been very well illustrated by Colonel Torrens, in his work on the "Production of Wealth," p. 291.

modity of known value, and in general demand ; and which, consequently, few persons would be disinclined to accept as an equivalent for whatever they had to dispose of. After this commodity had begun to be employed as a means of exchanging other commodities, individuals would become willing to purchase a greater quantity of it than might be required to pay for the products they were desirous of immediately obtaining ; knowing that should they, at any future period, want a further supply, either of these or other articles, they would be able readily to procure them in exchange for this universally desirable commodity. Though at first circulating slowly and with difficulty, it would, as the advantages arising from its use were better appreciated, begin to pass freely from hand to hand. Its value, as compared with other things, would thus come to be universally known ; and it would at last be used, not only as the common equivalent for other things, but as a standard by which to measure their value.

Now this commodity, whatever it may be, is *money*.

An infinite variety of commodities have been used as money in different countries and periods. But none can be advantageously used as such, unless it possess several very peculiar qualities. The slightest reflection, on the purposes to which it is applied, must, indeed, be sufficient to convince every one that it is indispensable, or, at least, exceedingly desirable, that the commodity selected to serve as money should (1.) be divisible into the smallest portions ; (2.) that it should admit of being kept for an indefinite period without deteriorating ; (3.) that it should, by possessing great value in small bulk, be capable of being easily transported from place to place ; (4.) that one piece of money of a certain denomination, should always be equal, in magnitude and quality, to every other piece of money of the same denomination ; and (5.) that its value should be comparatively steady, or as little subject to variation as possible. Without the *first* of these qualities, or the capacity of being divided into portions of every different magnitude and value, money,

it is evident, would be of almost no use, and could only be exchanged for the few commodities that might happen to be of the same value as its indivisible portions, or as whole multiples of them : without the *second*, or the capacity of being kept or hoarded without deteriorating, no one would choose to exchange commodities for money, except only when he expected to be able speedily to re-exchange that money for something else : without the *third*, or facility of transportation, money could not be conveniently used in transactions between places at any considerable distance : without the *fourth*, or perfect sameness, it would be extremely difficult to appreciate the value of different pieces of money : and without the *fifth* quality, or comparative steadiness of value, money could not serve as a standard by which to measure the value of other commodities ; and no one would be disposed to exchange the produce of his industry for an article that might shortly decline considerably in its power of purchasing.

The union of the different qualities of comparative steadiness of value, divisibility, durability, facility of transportation, and perfect sameness, in the precious metals, doubtless formed the irresistible reason that has made every civilized community employ them as money. The value of gold and silver is certainly not invariable, but, generally speaking, it changes only by slow degrees : they are divisible into any number of parts, and have the singular property of being easily reunited, by means of fusion, without loss ; they do not deteriorate by being kept ; their firm and compact texture makes them difficult to wear ; their cost of production, especially that of gold, is so considerable, that they possess great value in small bulk, and can, of course, be transported with comparative facility ; and an ounce of pure gold or silver, taken from the mines of Mexico or Peru, is precisely equal, in point of quality, to an ounce dug from the mines in any other part of the world. No wonder, therefore, when the principal qualities necessary to constitute money are possessed in so eminent a degree by the

precious metals, that they have been used as such in civilized societies, from a very remote æra. "They became universal money," as M. Turgot has observed, "not in consequence of any arbitrary agreement among men, or of the intervention of any law, but by the nature and force of things."

When first used as money, the precious metals were in an unfashioned state, in bars or ingots. The parties having agreed about the quantity of metal to be given for a commodity, that quantity was then weighed off. But this, it is plain, must have been a tedious and troublesome process. Undoubtedly, however, the difficulty of determining the degree of their purity with sufficient precision, must have formed, in early ages, the greatest obstacle to the use of gold and silver as money; and the discovery of some means by which their weight and fineness might be readily and correctly ascertained, would be felt to be indispensable to their extensive use as media of exchange. Fortunately, these means were not long in being discovered. The fabrication of coins, or the practice of impressing pieces of the precious metals with a public stamp indicating their weight and purity, belongs to the remotest antiquity.¹ And it may safely be affirmed, that there have been few inventions of greater utility, or that have done more to promote improvement.

It is material, however, to observe, that the introduction and use of coins does not affect the principle on which exchanges were previously conducted. The coinage saves the trouble of weighing and assaying gold and silver, but it does nothing more. It declares the weight and purity of the metal in a coin; but the *value* of that metal or coin depends, in all cases, on the same principles that determine the value of other commodities; and would be as little affected by being recoinced with a new denomination, as the burden of a ship by a change of her name.

Inaccurate notions with respect to the influence of coinage

¹ Goguet, "De l'Origine des Loix," &c. tom. i. p. 269.

seem to have given rise to the opinion, so long entertained, that coins were merely the *signs* of values ! But they have really no more claim to this designation than bars of iron or copper, sacks of wheat, or any other commodity. They exchange for other things, because they are desirable articles, and are possessed of real intrinsic value. A draft, check, or bill, may not improperly, perhaps, be regarded as the sign of the money to be given for it. But that money is itself a commodity ; it is not a sign, it is the thing signified.¹

Money, however, is not merely the universal equivalent, or *marchandise bannale*, used by the society : it is also the *standard* used to compare the values of all sorts of products ; and the stipulations in the great bulk of contracts and deeds, as to the delivery and disposal of property, have all reference to, and are commonly expressed in quantities of money. It is plainly, therefore, of the utmost importance that its value should be as invariable as possible. Owing, however, to improvements in the arts, and to the exhaustion of old and the discovery of new mines, the value of the precious metals is necessarily inconstant ; though, if we except the effects produced in the sixteenth century by the discovery of the American mines, it does not appear to have varied so much at other times as might have been anticipated. Great mischief has, however, been repeatedly occasioned by the changes that have been made in most countries in the weight, and sometimes also in the purity of coins ; and since the impolicy of these changes has been recognised, similar, and still more extensive, disorders have sprung from the improper use of substitutes for coins. It is, indeed, quite obvious, that no change can take place in the value of money, without proportionally affecting the pecuniary conditions in all contracts and agreements. Much, however, of the influence of a change depends on its direction. An

¹ The Count di Verri was one of the first who showed clearly what money is, and what it is not.—See “*Meditazioni sulla Economia Politica*,” § 2.

increase in the value of money is, for reasons that will afterwards be stated, uniformly more prejudicial in a public point of view than its diminution: the latter, though injurious to individuals, may sometimes be productive of national advantage; but such can never be the case with the former.¹

But notwithstanding the precious metals are in many respects admirably fitted to serve as a medium of exchange, they have two very serious drawbacks—their cost, and the difficulty and expense of carrying them from place to place. If the currency of Great Britain consisted of gold only, it would amount to at least sixty millions of sovereigns; and the expense attending such a currency, allowing only $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent for wear and tear and loss of coins, could not be reckoned at less than £3,250,000 a-year. It is obvious, too, were there nothing but coins in circulation, that the conveyance of large sums from place to place to discharge accounts, would be a very laborious process, and that even small sums could not be conveyed without considerable difficulty; and hence it is that most civilized nations have endeavoured to fabricate a portion of their money of less costly materials, and have resorted to various devices for economizing the use of coin. Of the substitutes for coin hitherto suggested, paper is by far the most generally used, and is in all respects the least objectionable. Instead of discharging their debts by a payment of the precious metals, individuals, on whose solvency the public may rely, pay them by giving a bill or draft for the sum, payable in coin at sight, or at so many days after date; and as this bill or draft passes currently from hand to hand as cash, it performs all the functions of coin, while it saves its expense to the public. A sense of the advantages that might be derived from the circulation of such bills or drafts led to the institution of *banks* for their regular issue. A banker, on being applied to for a loan, does not make the advance

¹ See Chapter on Profits.

in gold or silver, but in his own notes; and while these serve equally well as cash to the borrower, the issuer derives the same rate of interest from them that he would have derived from an advance of cash; his profits consisting of the excess of interest derived from the notes he has issued, over the interest of the cash or unproductive stock he is obliged to keep in his coffers to meet the demands of the public for payment of his notes, and the expenses of his establishment. Besides this sort of banks, there are also banks of deposit, or banks for keeping the money of individuals. A merchant using a bank of this sort makes all his considerable payments by drafts upon his bankers, and sends all the bills due to him to them to be presented, and noted if not duly paid. By this means he saves the expense of keeping money at home, while he, also, avoids the risk of receiving coins or notes that are not genuine, and of making mistakes with respect to the presentation of due bills; and in consequence of the saving that is thus effected, a much less quantity of money serves for the demand of the public.

But the great advantage of banks, in a commercial point of view, consists in the facility they afford for making payments at distant places, and for the negotiation of bills of exchange. Many of the banking companies, established in different districts, have a direct intercourse with each other; and they all have correspondents in London. Hence, an individual residing in any part of the country, who may wish to make a payment in any other part, however distant, may effect his object by applying to the bank nearest to him. Thus, suppose A of Penzance, has a payment to make to B of Inverness. To send the money by post would be hazardous; and if there were fractional parts of a pound in the sum, it would hardly be practicable to make use of the post. How then will A manage? He will pay the sum to a banker in Penzance, and his creditor in Inverness will receive it from a banker there. The transaction is very simple: the Penzance banker orders his correspondent in

London to pay to the correspondent of the Inverness banker the sum in question on account of B; and the Inverness banker, being advised in course of post of what has been done, pays B. A small commission, charged by the Penzance banker, and the postages, constitute the whole expense. There is no risk whatever; and the affair is transacted in the most commodious and cheapest manner.

Bills of exchange are most commonly used in the settlement of transactions between merchants residing in different countries; but they are also frequently used among merchants of the same country. They are merely orders addressed by a creditor to a debtor, directing the latter to pay his debt to some specified party in his vicinity. It is generally found, that the debts mutually due by cities or countries trading together, approach, for the most part, near an equality. There are at all times, for example, a considerable number of persons in London indebted to Hamburg; but, speaking generally, there are about an equal number of persons in London to whom Hamburg is indebted; and hence, when A of London has a payment to make to B of Hamburg, he does not remit an equivalent sum of money to the latter; but goes into the market and buys a bill on Hamburg for an equal amount,—that is, he buys an order from C of London, addressed to his debtor D of Hamburg, directing him to pay the amount to A or his order. A having endorsed this bill or order, sends it to B, who receives payment from his neighbour D. The convenience of all parties is consulted by a transaction of this sort. The debts due by A to B, and by D to C, are extinguished without the intervention of any money. A of London pays C of do., and D of Hamburg pays B of do. The debtor in one place is substituted for the debtor in the other; and a postage or two, and the stamp for the bill or order, are the only expenses.¹

¹ For an account of the measures necessary to ensure the ready conversion of paper into the precious metals, see Chapter on the Interference of Government.

CHAPTER V.

Division of Employments among different Countries, or Commerce—Wholesale and Retail Dealers—Influence of improved Means of Communication—Mode in which Commerce contributes to increase Wealth—Restrictions on Commerce, for the Promotion of Domestic Industry and National Security—Influence of these Restrictions—Duties on Imports.

THE division of labour is not necessarily confined to limited societies, but is of universal application; and may be extended so as to enable the inhabitants of entire districts, and even nations, to addict themselves, in preference, to certain branches of industry. On this, which has been appropriately termed by Colonel Torrens, the *territorial division of labour*, is founded the commerce carried on between different districts of the same country, and between different countries. The different soils, climates, and capacities of production, possessed by the different provinces of an extensive country, fit them for being appropriated, in preference, to different species of industry. A district abounding in coal, having an easy access to the ocean, and a considerable command of internal navigation, is the natural seat of manufactures. Wheat and other species of grain are the proper products of rich arable soils; and cattle, after being reared in mountainous districts, may be most advantageously fattened in meadows and low grounds. It is clearly as little for the advantage of the inhabitants of different districts, as it would be for that of an individual, to engage indiscriminately in every possible employment. Who can doubt that vastly more manufactured goods, corn, cattle, and fish, are produced by the people of Lancashire confining their principal attention to manufactures, those of Kent to agriculture, those of Argyle to the raising of

cattle, and those of the Shetland Isles to the catching of fish, than if they had respectively endeavoured directly to supply themselves with these or similar productions, without the intervention of an exchange?

A commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of different countries and districts, and even between those of the same district, is most commodiously carried on by a distinct class of individuals denominated merchants, from that *commutatio mercium* which forms their business. This class is, for the most part, subdivided into two subordinate classes—*wholesale dealers* and *retailers*. The principal business of the first consists in conveying commodities from places where they are cheap to those where they are dear. Generally speaking, they buy at the first hand, or from the producers; but instead of selling directly to the consumers, they most commonly sell to the retailers. The business of the latter is to keep assortments of the goods that are wanted in the places where they reside; serving them out in such quantities, and at such times, as may best suit the convenience of their customers, or of the public. This subdivision is exceedingly beneficial for all parties. It would be next to impossible for a wholesale merchant to retail the goods he has collected in distant markets; but, supposing he were to attempt it, he would, it is clear, have to establish agents in different parts of the country; so that, besides requiring an additional capital, he would be compelled, from inability to give that undivided attention to any single department of business, so indispensable to secure its being conducted with due economy and in the best way, to lay a higher price on his goods. The objections that have sometimes been made to the intervention of retailers between the wholesale dealers, or the producers, and the consumers, are plainly, therefore, without any real foundation. It is essential that goods should be retailed. Of what use would it be to bring to London a cargo of tea from China, of tobacco from Virginia, of salt from Liverpool, of beef from Cork, or of coal from the

Tyne, were it not divided and sold in such portions as may be suited to the wants of the citizens? And it admits of demonstration, that this necessary business will be done best and cheapest by a class distinct from the wholesale dealers.

It is frequently, indeed, alleged, that the number of retailers is in most places unnecessarily great, and that, in order to subsist, they charge an enormous profit. But it is easily seen, that there is no real ground for these statements. A regard to their own interest prevents too many individuals from becoming retailers, in the same way that it prevents too many from engaging in other employments; while the competition of each other, and of the public, hinders them from realizing more than the ordinary rate of profit. That they sometimes appear to realize more than this rate, is, no doubt, true; but this arises from confounding wages and profits. Besides deriving a profit from the capital which he employs, an individual should, in the event of his superintending its employment, obtain, in addition, a remuneration or wages for that superintendence. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a grocer in a small country town employs a capital of £1000, that profits are 10 per cent, and that he could earn, by hiring himself to another, £50 a-year of salary: in this case it is plain the goods must be sold at 15 per cent advance, that being the lowest rate that will yield 10 per cent of profits and £50 of wages. Had the grocer been able to employ a capital of £2000, he would have obtained the same profits and wages by selling his goods at an advance of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Hence the difference in the price of goods when retailed in large and small towns. In the former there is scope for the employment of large capitals in the business of retailing, so that a comparatively small per centage, over and above the customary rate of profit, suffices to defray the wages of those engaged in carrying it on; while, in the latter, owing to the limited field for the employment of capital, a comparatively large per centage is necessary as wages. Profits are, evidently, the same in both cases.

It is plain, from these statements, that the formation of a separate mercantile class adds very materially to the advantages resulting from commerce. It gives, in fact, an uninterrupted motion to the plough and the loom. The intervention of wholesale and retail dealers enables every one to apply himself exclusively to his particular calling. Agents and warehouses being established all over the country for the purchase and sale of commodities, agriculturists and manufacturers know beforehand where they may always find a market for what they have to sell, and procure, at the current prices of the day, what they wish to buy. They are able, in consequence, to devote their whole time and energies to their respective businesses; continuity is given to their operations; and the powers of production are augmented to an extent that could hardly have been conceived possible previously to the rise of the mercantile class.

The formation of roads and canals, or of easy methods of communication between different parts of a country, contributes powerfully to facilitate commercial operations, and is in the highest degree beneficial. A diminution of the expense of conveyance, has, it is evident, the same direct influence over prices as a diminution of the expense of production; though, perhaps, its indirect influence be most advantageous. The great workshops, (for so we may truly call Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, Sheffield, Glasgow, Paisley, Dundee, &c.) with which Great Britain is studded, could not exist without improved roads and canals; but the latter, besides enabling the inhabitants of cities and towns to supply themselves with the bulky products of the soil and the mines almost as cheaply as if they lived in the country, give them the means of carrying on their employments on a large scale; of subdividing, combining, and perfecting their various operations; and of conveying their products to the remotest quarters at an extremely small advance of price. Roads and canals are thus productive of a double benefit—cheapening, at one and the same time, raw produce to the

inhabitants of towns, and manufactures to those of the country. In a moral point of view, their effects are equally salutary. They give the same common interest to every part of a widely extended empire; and, by promoting the intercourse of the citizens, and exciting emulation and competition, impart new life and vigour to society.

Foreign trade, or the territorial division of labour between different and independent countries, contributes to increase their wealth in the same way that internal trade contributes to increase the wealth of the different districts of the same kingdom. It would seem, indeed, from there being a far greater variety in the productive powers with which nature has endowed different and distant countries than there is in those of the provinces of any single country how extensive soever, that a free intercourse between them must be proportionally more advantageous. There are, indeed, myriads of products, some of which are of the greatest utility, that exist only, or can only be raised in particular countries. Were it not for foreign commerce, we should be wholly destitute of gold bullion, tea, coffee, cotton, silk, spices, and many other equally useful and valuable commodities; at the same time that we should have to pay a greatly increased price for a much larger number of other and hardly less important articles. Providence, by giving different soils, climates, and natural products to different countries, has evidently intended that they should be mutually dependent upon and serviceable to each other. If no artificial obstacles were thrown in the way of their intercourse, every people would naturally engage, in preference, in those employments in which they have a superiority, exchanging such parts of their own produce as they could conveniently spare for the productions they could more advantageously bring from others. And thus, by exciting industry, rewarding ingenuity, and using most efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, commerce distributes labour as best suits the genius and

capacities of every people. By making mankind acquainted with numerous products of which they would otherwise be entirely ignorant, it gives them new tastes and new appetites, at the same time that it affords the means, and excites the desire of gratifying them. It enables the inhabitants of each country to profit by the inventions and discoveries of those of all other countries; and, by bringing the home producers into competition with foreigners, it stimulates their industry and invention, and forces routine to give way to emulation. The division of labour is in this way carried to the farthest extent; the mass of necessary and useful products vastly augmented; and opulence generally diffused. Nor is the influence of commerce, in other respects, less powerful and salutary. It is the grand engine by which the blessings of civilization are diffused, and the treasures of knowledge and of science conveyed to the remotest corners of the habitable globe; while, by making every people dependent on others for a large share of their comforts and enjoyments, it forms a powerful principle of union, and binds together the universal society of nations by the common and powerful ties of mutual interest and reciprocal obligation.

“Combien,” to use the words of a late French writer, “le spectacle de tous les travaux concourant à la production de la richesse, sans autre prééminence ni distinction que celle que leur assure l’échange de leurs produits, est encourageant pour les classes laborieuses, stimulant pour les peuples, favorable à la civilisation, honorable pour l’humanité ! Dans ce système tous les hommes suivent leur penchant, développent, perfectionnent leurs facultés, s’encouragent par une noble émulation, sont avertis à chaque instant du besoin qu’ils ont les uns des autres, se lient entre eux par des rapports habituels, s’attachent par leurs intérêts réciproques, et renouent les liens de la grande famille du genre humain que la séparation des familles nationales avoit brisés. Ces familles, éparses sur le globe, ne sont plus étrangères entre elles, travaillent l’un pour l’autre, et correspondent ensemble

malgré les gouffres des mers et l'aspérité des climats, les montagnes inaccessibles, et les déserts inhospitaliers. Grâce au génie du commerce, et aux inépuisables ressources de l'industrie, tous les perils sont bravés, toutes les difficultés sont vaincues, tous les obstacles sont surmontés, et les bienfaits du travail général circulent dans le monde entier."¹

It cannot, indeed, be denied, that mistaken views of commerce, like those so frequently entertained of religion, have been the cause of many wars and of much bloodshed. But the folly of the monopoly system, and the ruinous nature of the contests to which it has given rise, have been made obvious. It has been shown, over and over again, that nothing can be more irrational and absurd, than that dread of the progress of others in wealth and civilization that was once so prevalent; and that the true glory and real interest of every people will be more certainly advanced by endeavouring to outstrip their neighbours in the career of science and civilization, than by engaging in schemes of conquest and aggression.

The direct influence of foreign commerce in giving increased efficacy to labour, and augmenting national wealth, may be easily illustrated. The superiority of British wool, for example, our command of coal, of skilful workmen, improved machinery, and of all the instruments and means of manufacturing industry, enable us to produce cloth at a much cheaper rate than the Portuguese; while, on the other hand, the soil and climate of Portugal being peculiarly favourable for the cultivation and growth of the vine, she can produce wine incomparably cheaper than it could be produced here. Hence it is obvious, on the one hand, that by confining ourselves to the manufacture of cloth, and exchanging it with the Portuguese for wine, we shall obtain a far larger supply of that desirable beverage than if we

¹ Ganilh, "Des Systèmes d'Economie Politique," tom. i. p. 173. Ed. 1821.

attempted to cultivate the vine at home ; while, on the other hand, the Portuguese, by exchanging wine for English cloth, will obtain a much greater quantity of the latter, at a much less price than they would do, were they, in contradiction of the wise arrangements of nature, and the obvious dictates of common sense, to withdraw a portion of their capital and industry from the culture of the vine, in which they have so great an advantage, to employ it in the manufacture of cloth, in which the advantage is wholly on the side of others.

What has been already stated is sufficient to expose the sophism of the Economists, who contended, that as a full equivalent must be always given for commodities brought from abroad, it was impossible foreign commerce could add any thing to national wealth. How, they asked, can the wealth of a country be increased by giving equal values for equal values ? They admitted that commerce made a better distribution of the wealth of the world ; but as it did nothing more than substitute one sort of wealth for another, they denied it could make any addition to its amount. At first sight, this sophistical and delusive statement appears sufficiently conclusive ; but a few words will suffice to demonstrate its fallacy. Those who suppose that commerce cannot be a means of increasing the wealth of both parties engaged in it, and that if one of them gains any thing, it must be at the expense of the other, entirely misconceive its nature and objects. It may cost as much to produce the cloth with which the English purchase the wine of Portugal, as it does to produce the latter ; and it may even cost more. But then it must be observed, that, in making the exchange, the value of the wine is estimated by its cost in Portugal, which has peculiar facilities for its production, and not by what it would cost to produce it in England were the trade put an end to ; while, in like manner, the value of the cloth is estimated by its cost in England, and not by what it would cost were it produced in Portugal. The advantage of the intercourse consists in its

enabling each country to obtain commodities, which it could either not produce at all, or which it would cost a comparatively large sum to produce directly at home, for what it costs to produce them under the most favourable circumstances, and with the least possible expense. In no respect, therefore, can the gain of the one be said to be a loss to the other. Their intercourse is evidently productive of mutual advantage. Through its means each is supplied with produce for which it has a demand, by a less sacrifice of labour and expense than would otherwise be required; so that the wealth of both parties is not only better distributed, but is, at the same time, vastly augmented, by thus judiciously availing themselves of each other's peculiar capacities and powers.

To set this principle in a clearer point of view, let it be supposed that, with a certain outlay, we may either manufacture 10,000 yards of cloth or raise 1000 quarters of wheat, and that with the same outlay the Poles can manufacture 5000 yards of cloth or raise 2000 quarters of wheat. Under these circumstances, it is plain, were a free intercourse established between this country and Poland, that we should, by exporting cloth to the latter, get *twice* the quantity of corn in exchange for any given outlay that we should get by employing the same sum in the culture of land at home; while, on their side, the Poles would get, through this exchange, *twice* as much cloth in return for their expenditure on corn as they would have got had they tried directly to manufacture it. Now, this supposed case being identical, in respect of principle, with every case that really occurs in the practice of commerce, every one must see how ridiculous it is to contend that the latter is not a means of adding to the productiveness of labour, and, consequently, of increasing wealth! Were our intercourse with Portugal and the West Indies put an end to, it would be impossible, perhaps, to produce port wine, sugar, and coffee, directly in this country; and though it were possible, it would, at any rate, cost fifty or a hundred times as much

to produce them here as it costs to produce the equivalents exported to pay for them.

The influence of foreign commerce in stimulating industry by multiplying its rewards, is also of great importance. Were our command of wealth limited to that produced in a particular district or province, we should be less industrious, because we should have fewer motives to prompt our industry. A man might, with comparatively little difficulty, procure sufficient supplies of corn, cloth, and beer; and if the greatest exertions of skill and economy merely procured him additional supplies of these articles, they would soon cease to be made. No sooner, however, is a commercial intercourse established with foreigners, than conveniencies and accommodations of all sorts are prodigiously multiplied. In addition to the products of its immediate vicinity, every considerable market is then abundantly supplied with those of all the countries and climates of the world. And there is no fortune so great that its owner can be without a motive to increase it still more, seeing the immeasurable variety of desirable objects it may be employed to obtain.

To form a faint idea of what we owe to foreign commerce, imagine it prohibited, and then reflect for a moment on the tremendous deduction that would be made from our means of subsistence, comfort, and enjoyment. The cotton and silk manufactures would be annihilated; instead of breakfasting on the products of China and the West Indies, we should have to content ourselves with the pottage of our ancestors; beer would take the place of claret, and gin of champagne; when our crops were redundant, the surplus would be comparatively useless, and when deficient, there would be no foreign supplies with which to stay the ravages of famine. Our maritime preponderance would fall with the fall of our commerce; and from occupying the most prominent place in the first rank among nations, we should speedily sink to the level of the secondary or third-rate powers.

We shall not imitate the example of most writers on

commerce, by entering into a lengthened examination of the question, whether the home or foreign trade be most advantageous. It is indeed quite obvious that it admits of no satisfactory solution. Without some species of home trade, it would be altogether impossible to divide and combine employments, or to emerge from barbarism; and without foreign trade, and the innumerable products, arts, and improvements, which it brings along with it, the progress made by society would be comparatively trifling. The former might, perhaps, have raised us to the condition of our ancestors in the days of Richard II.; but we are mainly indebted to the latter for the almost incredible advances we have since made, as well as for those we are yet destined to make.

It would be superfluous, even were it not inconsistent with the objects and limits of this work, to enter on a detailed investigation of the policy of restrictions on commerce. Those which were intended to increase the importation, or to hinder the exportation of the precious metals, have been admitted, almost universally, to be founded on erroneous principles, and have either fallen into disuse or been repealed. The few observations that follow, will, therefore, be confined to the policy of the restrictions intended to promote the industry and independence of particular countries, by partially or wholly preventing the importation of such articles from abroad as may be produced at home.

If either the whole or any considerable portion of an article in extensive demand be imported from foreign countries, the prevention of its importation will undoubtedly give an immediate advantage to the home producers of the article. It can hardly, however, be necessary to say, that the legislature should have nothing to do with the interests of any one class, unless in the view of rendering them conducive to those of the society. The circumstance of a restriction being advantageous to a greater or smaller number of indi-

viduals, is no proof of its expediency. To establish this, it must also be shown that it is advantageous, or at least not injurious, to the public—that it does not sacrifice the interests of the community to those of a favoured few. No system of commercial policy deserves to be preferred to another, except in so far as it may be better fitted to advance the welfare of the nation. If a restriction will do this more effectually than a free and unfettered trade, it should be restricted; but if otherwise, not. Neither freedom nor prohibition is, in itself, good or bad. The influence which each exercises over the public is the only thing to be attended to. The supply of its wants is the real end and purpose of all sorts of industrious undertakings; and the interests of those engaged in them should occupy the attention of government only, when it is believed that they may be made, through its interference, more subservient to their legitimate object.

We have already seen, that the workmen employed in a country cannot exceed the numbers which its capital can feed and maintain. But it is plain that no regulation can directly add any thing to capital. It most frequently, indeed, diverts a portion of it into channels into which it would not otherwise have flowed. This, however, is its only effect; and the real question for consideration is—Whether the artificial direction which is thus given to a portion of the national capital, renders it more or less productive than it would have been, had it been left at liberty to seek out channels of employment for itself?

In discussing this question it may be observed, in the *first* place, that every individual is constantly endeavouring to find out the most advantageous methods of employing his capital and labour. It is true that it is his own advantage, and not that of the society, which he has in view; but a society being merely a collection of individuals, it is plain that each, in steadily pursuing his own aggrandizement, is following the line of conduct most for the general advantage. Hence, were no particular branches

of industry encouraged more than others, those would be preferred which naturally afforded the greatest facilities for acquiring fortunes, and, consequently, for increasing the riches of the country. Self-interest is the most powerful stimulus that can be applied to excite the industry, and to sharpen the intellect and ingenuity of man; and no proposition is more true, than that each individual can, in his local situation, judge better what is advantageous and useful for himself than any other person. "The statesman," says Smith, "who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it."¹

But, in the *second* place, it is evident, that the prevention of importation has in effect the consequence, so justly censured by Smith, of dictating to individuals how they shall employ their capital and labour. It deprives them of such articles as cannot be raised at home; and it compels them to pay a higher price for such as may be so raised, though with comparative difficulty. But to prohibit an individual from using any article merely because it is the product of another country, or to compel him to pay an unnecessarily enhanced price for it, is at once oppressive and impolitic. Were there no restraints on importation, we should import all those articles which may be bought at a lower price from the foreigner than from the home producers. Our conduct as a nation would then be regulated by the principles that regulate the conduct of individuals in private life; and it is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, not to attempt to make at home what it would cost more to make than to buy. The tailor, as Smith has

¹ "Wealth of Nations," p. 200.

remarked, does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them from a shoemaker; the shoemaker, on his part, does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a tailor; and the farmer makes neither the one nor the other, but obtains them in exchange for corn and cattle. In civilized societies, every individual finds it for his advantage to employ himself in some particular business, and to exchange a part of his peculiar produce for such parts of the produce of others as he may have occasion for. And it has not yet been shown that that conduct which is universally admitted to be wise and proper in individuals, should be unwise or absurd in the case of a state,—that is, in the case of the individuals inhabiting a particular tract of country!

The repeal of restrictions will not enable foreigners to supply any part of those commodities that may be as cheaply produced at home as abroad. And home producers, it should be borne in mind, have great advantages on their side. The price of their commodities is not so much enhanced by the expense of conveyance; and they are intimately acquainted with the language, laws, fashions, and credit of those with whom they deal. A foreigner has none of these circumstances in his favour; and, consequently, comes into the home market under disadvantages with which nothing but the greater cheapness of his goods can enable him to contend. But if a Frenchman, or an American, can supply us with any article cheaper than we can raise it, why should we not buy it of him? Why not extend the same principle to foreigners that is found to be so extremely advantageous in dealing with our immediate neighbours? Though our ports were open for the reception of all the commodities of all the commercial nations of the world, none would be purchased unless the purchasers concluded it to be for their advantage; that is, unless they obtained the article from the foreigners at a less price than they could obtain it for from their own countrymen.

The fact that we are able to import a commodity from a particular foreign market at a lower price than it can be raised for here, or imported from any other place, shows that some of our peculiar productions fetch a higher price in that market than any where else. The price of a commodity is merely the quantity of money, or of some other commodity, given for it. No one doubts that we may buy claret cheaper in Bordeaux than in any other place; but, if so, it necessarily follows that we are able to dispose of the produce given for claret to greater advantage there than elsewhere. There is no test of high or low price, except the quantity of other things for which an article exchanges. And thus it is evident, that when we prohibit buying in the cheapest markets, we, at the same time, and by the same act, prohibit selling in the dearest markets. Suppose that, by sending a certain quantity of cottons or hardware to Brazil, we might get in exchange 150 hogsheads of sugar; and that the same quantity, if sent to Jamaica, will only fetch 100 hogsheads: is it not obvious, that by preventing the importation of the former we force our goods to be sold for *two-thirds* the price they would otherwise have brought? To suppose that a system productive of such results should be a means of increasing national wealth, is to suppose what is evidently contradictory and absurd.

When a restriction is laid on the importation of any description of commodities, their price rises, and the home producers of the same or similar articles get an immediate advantage: but what they gain in this way is of very trifling importance. For, as additional capital is drawn to the business, prices are speedily reduced to the level that barely affords the ordinary rate of profit. This level may be either identical with that at which prices previously stood, or it may be higher. If the former should happen to be the case, little, though something, will have been lost, but nothing whatever will have been gained by the restriction. Capital will have been transferred from one employment to another;

and while a greater quantity of the produce formerly imported from abroad will henceforth be produced at home, there will be a corresponding diminution in the production of that which had been exported to the foreigners in payment of the imports. But, in the vast majority of cases, the price is not the same after a prohibition has been enacted, but is permanently raised ; for, if an article may be as cheaply produced at home as abroad, its prohibition would be unnecessary, and would not be thought of. Suppose that the importation of a foreign article for which we paid a million sterling is prohibited, and that it costs a million and a quarter to raise it at home : it is clear that the prohibition will have precisely the same effect on the consumers of the article, as if, supposing the trade to have continued free, a peculiar tax of £250,000 a-year had been laid on them. But it will be observed, that had such a tax been imposed, its produce would have come into the hands of government, and have formed a portion of the national income ; whereas the increased cost of the article being, under the circumstances supposed, occasioned by an increased difficulty of production, is of no advantage to any one.

It consequently results, that even in those rare cases in which a restrictive regulation has no tendency to raise prices, it is hurtful, by changing the natural distribution of capital, and lessening the foreign demand for the produce of industry to the same extent that it increases the home demand. But in that incomparably more numerous class of cases in which restrictions occasion a rise in the price of the articles which they affect, they are infinitely more injurious. Besides varying the natural distribution of capital, and circumscribing foreign trade, they then impose a burden on the consumers, for no purpose of general or public utility ; they tempt individuals to withdraw from really advantageous businesses, to engage in those that cannot be prosecuted without national loss, and which must be abandoned the moment the prohibition ceases to be enforced ; and are thus, in the end, productive of the most grievous injury, even to

those whose interests they were intended to promote, as well as to those of the public.

It has been said, though perhaps without due consideration, that, but for restrictions on importation, several manufactures that now furnish employment to a considerable population, would most probably never have had any existence amongst us. But, supposing this statement to be admitted, it would not form any valid objection to the principles now laid down. *Non omnia recte possumus*. It is quite as much for the interest of communities as of single families, to respect the principle of the division of labour. Every people will always find it for their advantage to addict themselves, in preference, to those branches of industry in which they are superior to others : for, it is by this means only that they can ever fully avail themselves of their peculiar facilities of production, and employ their capital, husbandmen and artisans, most beneficially.

It is certainly true, that, after an artificial system has been long acted upon, its abolition seldom fails of producing considerable, though temporary, embarrassment and hardship ; and for this reason, no prudent government will ever rashly adopt any measure, how unexceptionable soever in point of principle, that might occasion any serious injury to a considerable class of its subjects. Every change in the public economy of a great nation should be cautiously and gradually effected. Those who have capital employed in businesses, protected by restrictive regulations, should be afforded a reasonable time and every facility, either to withdraw from them or to prepare for withstanding the free competition of foreigners. But this is all they can justly claim. The fact of a departure having been made, on one or more occasions, from the sound principle of the freedom of industry, can never be alleged as a sufficient reason for obstinately persevering in a course of policy which has been ascertained to be inimical to the public interests, or for refusing to embrace the earliest opportunity of reverting to a better system. To act on such a principle would be to

perpetuate the worst errors and absurdities, and would be a proceeding utterly inconsistent with all the ends and objects of government.

It is abundantly certain, too, that the loss and inconvenience which unavoidably follow every change in an established system of commercial policy, have been greatly exaggerated. The fear of being crushed by the competition of the foreigner, calls forth every latent energy, and makes routine processes give way to those that are more efficient and more economical. Notwithstanding all the predictions of ruin that were so confidently made by the silk manufacturers and others, when Mr. Huskisson introduced his commercial reforms in 1825, the various departments to which they applied are now, without a single exception, more flourishing, and employ a greater number of hands than at any former period. Such, also, has been the result of the modifications of the protective system introduced in 1842; and such, also, we have little doubt, will be the case with the still greater and more important changes that were effected in the course of the year 1846. But admitting it were otherwise, and that the total abolition of the protective system were to force a few thousand work-people to withdraw from their present occupations, it would necessarily, at the same time, open equivalent new ones for their reception. Such a measure could not diminish the aggregate demand for labour. Suppose that under a system of low duties, or of perfectly free trade, we imported the whole or a part of the silks and linens now manufactured at home: it is clear, inasmuch as neither the French nor Germans would send us their commodities gratis, that we should have to give them an equal amount of British commodities in exchange; so that such of our artificers as had been engaged in the silk and linen manufactures, and were thrown out of them, would, in future, obtain employment in the production of the articles that must be exported as equivalents to the foreigner. A country in which commerce has been restricted may, by giving it additional freedom, partially change the species of labour in demand,

and make it be employed more productively ; but it cannot lessen its quantity. Should the imports of such country this year amount to five or ten millions more than they did last year, it will have to provide for their payment, either directly or indirectly, by an equal increase in the exports of its peculiar products. And, therefore, if exportation be desirable—and the most ardent admirers of the restrictive system admit it to be such—importation must be so also, for the two are indissolubly connected ; and to separate them, even in imagination, implies a total ignorance of the most obvious principles. All commerce, whether carried on between individuals of the same or of different countries, is founded on a fair principle of reciprocity. Buying and selling are in it what action and reaction are in physics, equal and contrary. Those who will not buy from others, render it impossible for others to buy from them. Every sale infers an equal purchase, and every purchase an equal sale. Hence, to prohibit buying is exactly the same thing, in effect, as to prohibit selling. No merchant ever exports, except in the view of importing products of greater value. But he cannot do this, if foreign commodities be excluded. In whatever degree, therefore, an unfettered trade may lead us to receive supplies from other countries, in the same degree it will render them our customers, will promote our manufactures, and extend our trade. To suppose that commerce may be too free, is to suppose that the channel into which labour is turned may be too productive, that the objects of demand may be too much multiplied, and their price too much reduced : it is like supposing that agriculture may be too much improved and the crops rendered too luxuriant !

The principles now established, demonstrate the groundless nature of the complaints so frequently made, of the prevalence of a taste for foreign commodities. We get nothing from abroad except as an equivalent for something else ; and the individual who uses only Polish wheat, Saxon cloth, and French silks and wine, gives, by occasioning the exportation of an equal amount of British produce, precisely

the same encouragement to industry here, that he would give were he to consume nothing not directly produced amongst us. The Portuguese do not send us a single bottle of port, without our sending to them, or to those to whom they are indebted, its worth in cottons, hard-ware, or some sort of produce; so that whether we use the wine, or its equivalent, is, except as a matter of taste, of no importance whatever.

What has now been stated goes far to settle the disputed question in regard to the influence of absentee expenditure. If an English gentleman, living at home, and using none but foreign articles, gives the same encouragement to industry that he would do were he to use none but British articles, he must, it is obvious, do the same should he go abroad. Whatever he may get from the foreigner, when at Paris or Brussels, must be paid for, directly or indirectly, in British articles, quite in the same way as when he is resident in London. Nor is it easy to imagine any grounds for pronouncing his expenditure in the latter more beneficial to this country than in the former.¹

¹ We do not mean, by any thing now stated, nor did we ever mean, by any thing we have stated on other occasions, to maintain that absenteeism may not be, in several respects, injurious. It would be easy, indeed, to show that England and Scotland have been largely benefited by the residence of the great landed proprietors on their estates. No one can doubt that they have been highly instrumental in introducing the manners, and in diffusing a taste for the conveniences and enjoyments of a more refined society; and that the improved communications between different places, the expensive and commodious farm-buildings, and the plantations with which the country is sheltered and ornamented, are to be, in a great degree, ascribed to their residence. It may be doubted, however, considering the circumstances under which most Irish landlords acquired their estates, the difference between their religious tenets and those of their tenants, the peculiar tenures under which the latter hold their lands, and the political condition of the country, whether their residence would have been of any considerable advantage. But, whatever conclusion may be come to as to this point, cannot affect what has been stated in the text. The question really at issue refers merely to the *spending* of revenue, and has nothing to do with the improvement of estates; and, notwithstanding all the clamour that has been raised on the subject, we have yet to learn that absenteeism is, in this respect, in any degree injurious.

Restrictions on the commercial intercourse between different nations have not, however, always originated in mistaken notions with respect to the superior importance of the precious metals, nor in a desire to advance the interests of the home producers. A considerable number owe their existence to more patriotic, though, as they seem to us, hardly less mistaken views—to the wish to be independent of foreign supplies, to avenge the prohibitions of foreign states by retaliatory measures, and to provide for the public security.

There is something very seductive in the idea of independence; and it is not surprising that a system of policy which promises to place a country in this enviable situation, should enjoy considerable popularity. But national independence rests on far other foundations than the miserable machinery of custom-house regulations. The independence of individuals does not depend exclusively on their being able directly to supply their own wants by the produce of their own labour; but it depends indifferently either on their ability to do this, or to furnish an equivalent for the various necessities and conveniencies they may wish to obtain: and we have already seen that those who, apply themselves to the callings or occupations for which they have any natural or acquired aptitude, will enjoy a greater command over the necessities and conveniencies of life, through the intervention of an exchange with others, or, in other words, will be more opulent, and, consequently, more independent than if they directly produced the various articles for which they have a demand. The same is the case with nations. We import tea from China, cotton from America, timber from the north of Europe, and claret from France; but the fact of our doing this shows that we send commodities to those countries on which they set a higher value. We are not, therefore, in any respect more dependent on them than they are on us; and if we understand by independence the power to supply our wants without being under any obligation to any other people, we are completely independent. The com-

mercial intercourse we carry on with foreigners, like that which we carry on with each other, is bottomed on a principle of mutual convenience : we give and receive equivalents, supply reciprocal wants, and confer reciprocal benefits.

To wish to be wholly unconnected with foreigners, and at the same time to continue as rich and prosperous as ever, is to wish what is contradictory and inconsistent with the nature of things. It is equivalent to wishing that we had the soil and climate of China to produce tea, those of France to produce wine, and those of America to produce cotton. These, and thousands of equally useful and desirable products, can only be obtained through an intercourse with foreigners. We may, no doubt, become independent of this intercourse : but if we do, we must also submit to be independent of the wealth and power to which it has raised us. The individual who prefers swimming across the river, is, of course, independent of the bridges, in the same way that the nation, who should prefer poverty and barbarism to wealth and refinement, would be independent of foreign commerce. But this is the independence of the savage. To be truly independent in the enlarged, and, if we may so speak, civilized sense of the term, that is, to have the greatest command of necessities and conveniencies, a nation must avail itself of the productive energies of every other people, and deal with all the world on fair and liberal principles.

Nations, like individuals, are very apt to be influenced by feelings of animosity. Having experienced the injury arising from the prohibitory enactments of some foreign power, we endeavour, in the irritation of the moment, to retaliate by similar prohibitions directed against her commerce. We seldom take time to reflect upon the probable influence of these measures upon ourselves ; but enact them in the belief that, however they may affect us, they will, at any rate, inflict a much more serious injury on those against whom they are directed.

The commerce between this country and France was, for a lengthened period, all but completely sacrificed to this jealous and vindictive spirit. Louis XIV. having espoused the cause of the exiled family of Stuart, the British government and people took fire at the insult, and, in the irritation of the moment, had recourse to every species of hostility. Without reflecting that the blow aimed at the French would infallibly recoil upon ourselves, we declared the trade with France "a nuisance;" prohibiting, at the same time, the importation of most descriptions of French produce, and imposing high discriminating duties on wine, and on the greater number of the few articles it was still permitted to import. Unhappily the provisions in the Methuen treaty gave permanence to those offensive enactments, which the French were not slow to retaliate. Custom-house regulations were used by both parties as effective warlike engines: a prohibition on the one side was instantly met by a counter prohibition on the other, until the commerce between the two countries—a commerce which, had it not been violently interfered with, would have afforded a profitable field for the employment of millions upon millions of capital, and of thousands upon thousands of individuals—was all but wholly suppressed.

Mr. Pitt endeavoured, by means of the commercial treaty he negotiated with France in 1786, to introduce a more rational system into the trade, between the two countries, and to make them mutually beneficial to each other. But the Revolutionary war, which, unfortunately, broke out soon after, put an end to this improved state of things, and revived and imbibited all the old hostile feelings and prejudices inherited by both parties. Since the peace of 1815 the animosities and prejudices in question have, however, been much mitigated, and the British trade with France has attained to very great importance, though still far inferior to what it might and should be. The abolition of the discriminating duty on French wine in 1831 had a considerable influence in bringing about this improved state of things;

and the late reduction of the high duty on brandy, and still more, the example set by the legislature of this country in renouncing the prohibitive system, will doubtless lead, in the end, to some corresponding relaxation on the side of the French : and if so, the trade between the two countries will be immeasurably increased.

We would not, however, be understood as meaning, by any thing now stated, to lay it down absolutely that restrictions, imposed for the purpose of retaliation, are always injurious to those who have recourse to them. This, certainly, has hitherto been their ordinary effect ; but their policy depends wholly on circumstances. If there be apparently good grounds for thinking that a prohibition will so distress those against whom it is levelled, as to make them withdraw or materially modify the prohibition or high duty it is intended to avenge, it may be prudent to enact it ; for, the recovery of an extensive branch of foreign trade, or the permanent relief of commerce from vexatious restraints, may more than countervail the additional inconvenience which every nation must in the meantime entail upon herself, when she seeks to procure the abolition of a prohibition or restriction by a retaliatory proceeding. But unless there be reasonable grounds for concluding that the repeal or modification of the original prohibition will be brought about by the retaliation, it would be most impolitic to embark in any such hostile course. If a retaliatory prohibition acted only upon others it would be different ; but the benefits of commerce are reciprocal ; and as we neither sell nor buy, except to promote our own interest, when we prohibit or fetter our intercourse with others, we necessarily injure ourselves, it may be even to a greater extent than we injure them. It is clear, therefore, that to enact or maintain a prohibition when there is no prospect of its occasioning the repeal or modification of that enacted by the foreigner, is to inflict an injury on ourselves without securing any corresponding advantage. The government of a foreign country does an injury to its subjects by obstinately excluding some

of our peculiar products ; but is that any reason why our government should do the same ?—that it should exclude desirable products which may be brought from that country cheaper than from any other place, or than they can be produced at home ? To act in this way, is not to retaliate on the foreigner, but on ourselves ! It is erecting the blind and ferocious impulses of revenge into maxims of state policy. It is no part of our business to inquire respecting the markets resorted to by others ; but to find out and resort to those where we may be supplied at the lowest price with the articles for which we have a demand. We rarely hear of foreigners refusing to sell ; and as there can be no selling without an equal buying, by steadily acting on a liberal system ourselves, we shall not only reap an immediate advantage, but through the influence of our example, will, most probably, lead others gradually to abandon their restrictions.

With respect to what may be called political restrictions, or those imposed for the sake of national security, or the annoyance of some hostile power, we may observe, without undervaluing their occasional importance, that their influence has been much exaggerated. If a single nation had a monopoly of any article necessary to her own defence and well-being, or to the defence or well-being of others, she would be able, by prohibiting its exportation, to provide for her own security, and, at the same time, to inflict a serious injury on her enemies. But it is doubtful whether there be any such article. We do not appear to be masters of a single product, the prohibition of the export of which would not be more injurious to ourselves than to any one else. And of the various commodities which we import, there is not one, with perhaps the single exception of tea, which, supposing its exportation were prohibited by a foreign power in one quarter of the globe, might not be obtained from others, either in the same or in some other quarter. It is true, indeed, that the prohibition of the export of tea by the Chinese, or of cotton by the Americans, sup-

posing it could be made effectual, would lay us under considerable temporary difficulties. But it is abundantly certain that no prohibition, affecting any important article, on the sale of which a large population is dependent, could be maintained in any country even for the shortest period: if such an experiment were tried in America, it would, no doubt, occasion an immediate disruption of the union. But, supposing it could be made effectual, the injury done us would not be nearly so great as might at first be supposed. The cessation of the supplies of tea would do some violence to our taste, and oblige us to import larger supplies of coffee, cocoa, and such like articles; and the cessation of the supplies of cotton from the United States, though productive at first of more inconvenience, would so powerfully stimulate its growth in and exportation from India, Egypt, Brazil, and elsewhere, that, at no distant period, we should be able to dispense with the supplies from the United States. In truth and reality, however, the dangers to be apprehended from foreigners refusing to sell are quite imaginary. We never, even during the hottest periods of war, had the least difficulty in procuring ample supplies of flax and hemp; though, had it been possible to intercept them, it would have been a serious blow to our maritime power. The commercial commonwealth is now of too vast an extent, and the political views and biasses of its rulers too various and discordant, to admit of any thing like concert or combination ever obtaining amongst them. If the usual channels of commercial intercourse be choked or obstructed on one side, it will force a passage for itself in some other quarter. The products of art and industry are too widely diffused to be materially affected by the monopoly or hostility of any single state. Though one country should not deal with us, there is no cause for alarm; another will be less scrupulous, and will be glad to have the opportunity of supplying us with whatever we want. Nothing, indeed, can be a greater error than to imagine that, in the present state of the world, the security of any particular

country, or her means of defence or aggression, can be materially increased by prohibitory regulations. The war-like implements made use of, and the character of the contests carried on in modern times, occasion an enormous expense. There is no longer any doubt of the maxim that money is the sinews of war; that the wealthiest nation is, *cæteris paribus*, the most powerful. Those who possess wealth in sufficient quantities will never want for "man and steel, the soldier and his sword;" they have a talisman by which they may cover the land with armies and the ocean with fleets, and against whose powerful influence the purest patriotism and the most unflinching courage will with difficulty struggle. But when such is the case, when it is admitted on all hands that wealth is the main source of power and influence, and when it admits of demonstration, that a free and extended commerce is the most prolific source of wealth, can any thing be more contradictory than to attempt to increase the defence or security of a country by enacting measures that must necessarily fetter and narrow its commerce? The possession of wealth is the best security; and as the freedom of commerce is, of all others, the most efficacious means of increasing wealth, it follows that those who are exerting themselves to give every facility to commerce, are, at the same time, exerting themselves in the most effectual manner to add to the power and independence of the country; and it also follows, that the apologists and defenders of restrictions and prohibitions are, though without knowing it, labouring to sap the foundations of our power, and to cast us down from our high place amongst the nations of the earth.

We may be assured, that if our commercial prosperity be ever endangered, it will not be by foreigners refusing to deal with us, but by our becoming unable to supply them with equivalents so cheaply as others. This may be brought about by a decline of industry at home, occasioned by a want of security or other cause, or by the greater opportunities or more rapid progress made by others. That this is

a possible, and, perhaps, not even an extremely improbable danger, few will deny ; and the vast extent to which our commerce and manufactures have been carried, would make its occurrence a fearfully destructive calamity. It is, therefore, our bounden duty to adopt such measures as may, on the whole, appear best fitted to strengthen the foundations of our commercial fabric, and to guard against its decline ; and of these, none hitherto suggested seems likely to be so effectual as the abolition of restrictive regulations, and the carrying out, in so far as it depends on us, of the principle of free trade.

Before dismissing this part of our subject, it may be worth while, perhaps, to mention, that attempts have sometimes been made to defend or apologize for restrictions on importation, by endeavouring to show, that they oblige foreigners to contribute to the revenue of the nation which has sagacity to profit by them ! But this apology, though farther fetched, is quite as futile as the others. It is obvious, indeed, that if a particular nation successfully adopted a policy of this sort, it would speedily be adopted by every one else ; so that, whatever one party might gain by laying duties on the importation of products from others, would be lost by the duties which the latter would, no doubt, lay on the importation of its produce into their markets. The truth, however, is, that the project is wholly visionary, and that duties on imports are always paid by the importers and never by the exporters. The price of every freely produced commodity is determined here, and every where else, by the competition of the producers. Taking all things into account, the articles disposed of to foreigners and to native buyers, fetch about the same prices. The circumstance of the commodities which we send abroad, being subject in France, the United States, and elsewhere, to certain duties, lessens, of course, the demand for them in those countries ; but otherwise, it is not of the slightest consequence to the producers here. They sell their goods indifferently to the

foreign merchant, and to their nearest neighbour, for a price sufficient to defray the cost of their production, including profits; and the duties imposed on them abroad, whether they be high or low, make a farther addition to their cost, which must obviously be paid by the foreign consumers. It is singular, how a different opinion should ever have been entertained; it is obviously without so much as the shadow of a foundation.

It is true, indeed, that if a country which has a monopoly of their supply, or a peculiar facility of producing any articles in extensive demand abroad, lay a duty on them when exported, such duty will make an equivalent addition to their price, and will fall wholly on the foreigners. There are, however, but few cases in which it would be prudent to attempt to raise any considerable revenue in this way; for the duty, by increasing the cost of the articles on which it is laid, is in so far a discouragement to their exportation, and an encouragement to the exportation of the same or similar articles from other countries. Hence, if duties of this sort be ever resorted to for the sake of revenue, (and they are seldom if ever resorted to in any other view,) they should be cautiously confined to those articles in the production of which the exporting country has a decided advantage, and should not be carried so far as to endanger that advantage. Except in the case of articles of this peculiar description, of which, speaking generally, most countries have very few, duties on exportation are incomparably more hostile to commerce, and the industry to which it gives birth, than moderate duties on importation. The truth is, that when the latter are imposed for the sake of revenue, and are not carried to an oppressive extent, or to such a height as to give any overpowering stimulus to smuggling, or to form any serious obstacle to commercial transactions, they are amongst the best means of raising a revenue. The finance ministers of this and other countries have seldom, indeed, been sufficiently alive to the importance of moderation, in imposing customs duties; and, partly from a wish

to make them subservient to purposes of protection, and partly from mistaken views as to the nature of taxation, have often carried them to an injurious extent. This, however, is not of their essence; and supposing they are kept within reasonable limits, and judiciously assessed, we are not aware that any less exceptionable duties can be imposed. No doubt they tend, whatever be their magnitude, to narrow commercial operations, and consequently to prevent the best distribution of capital and labour. But in taxation we have only a choice of difficulties; and no tax fitted to produce a large amount of revenue has yet been suggested, the assessment and collection of which is not accompanied with many serious inconveniencies. The nett customs revenue of the United Kingdom, which is nearly all derived from duties on imports, amounted in 1845 to no less than £21,706,197; and, notwithstanding the exorbitant duties on tea, tobacco, and a few other articles, (which would be more productive were they reduced a half,) it would be easy to show, were this a proper place for such inquiries, that no equal amount of revenue was ever raised in any country or period of time with so little inconvenience; and that there are no grounds for believing it could be so advantageously collected in any other way.

It is essential, therefore, that the distinction between moderate duties on imports for the sake of revenue, and duties and prohibitions for the sake of protection, should be kept steadily in view. The former supply, in most cases, one of the least exceptionable means of raising a revenue; but oppressive duties, whatever be their object, and all duties and prohibitions imposed for protective purposes, are, speaking generally, subversive of every sound principle, and productive only of national injury.

Reasonings similar to those now laid before the reader, to show the benefits of commercial freedom, and the impolicy of attempting to promote industry at home by laying restraints on importation from abroad, have been repeatedly advanced.

The advantages resulting from the freedom of commerce were exhibited, as already stated, in a very striking point of view, by Sir Dudley North, above one hundred and fifty years ago; and Richardson, Hume, and others, subsequently illustrated and enforced the same doctrines, and showed the mischievous influence of the prohibitive system. But its complete overthrow was reserved for Dr Smith. He examined and refuted the leading arguments in its favour in the most masterly manner, and with an amplitude of illustration that left little to be desired. Such, however, and so powerful, were the prejudices on the side of restrictions, and such the obstacles to the progress of more enlarged and liberal opinions, that notwithstanding the "Wealth of Nations" has been in general circulation since 1776, it is only within these few years that statesmen and merchants have practically assented to its doctrines, and begun to act upon them. But a new era has at length arisen—

"Magnus ab integro sæculorum nascitur ordo."

The principles of free trade are no longer viewed as barren and unprofitable speculations—as the visions of theorists, dreaming in their closets of public happiness never to be realised. They have been sanctioned by the people and parliament of England. Sir Robert Peel has been in practice what Adam Smith was in theory. The former has vindicated in the senate, and embodied in acts of parliament, those great principles which the latter established in his study. To the glory of being the first to promulgate and demonstrate the wisdom and beneficent influence of commercial freedom, we are now entitled to the higher praise of being the first by whom it has been carried into effect, and made a part of the national policy. The few remains of the protective system still to be found in the statute-book will, no doubt, be speedily weeded out; at the same time that our example will progressively, though perhaps slowly, liberalise the commer-

cial legislation of every other country. The time will assuredly come,

“ When, free as seas or wind,
Unbounded Thames shall flow for all mankind ;
Whole nations enter with each swelling tide,
And seas but join the regions they divide.”¹

¹ Pope, “ Windsor Forest,” line 397.

CHAPTER VI.

Different Employments of Capital and Labour—Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce, equally advantageous—The investment of Capital in different Businesses determined by the Rate of Profit which they respectively yield—Manufactures not productive of increased Mortality, nor unfavourable to the Intelligence of the Work-people—Dangers incident to the excessive growth of Manufactures—Influence of Commerce on Public Spirit.

IN treating of the accumulation of capital, it was shown, that the ratio of its increase is the circumstance which chiefly determines national prosperity; that an augmentation of capital is equivalent to an augmentation of the means of supporting and employing additional labourers; and that its diminution equally diminishes the comforts and enjoyments, and perhaps also the necessities, of the labouring classes, and diffuses poverty and misery over a country: and it was also shown, that the increase or diminution of the rate of profit is the great cause of the increase or diminution of capital. Now, such being the case, it seems impossible to resist coming to the conclusion, that the employments which yield the greatest profit, or in which industry is most productive, are at the same time most advantageous. But Dr. Smith, Mr. Malthus, and others, have objected to this standard. They admit, that if two capitals yield equal profits, the employments in which they are engaged are equally beneficial for those who carry them on; but they contend, that if one of these capitals be employed in agriculture, it will be productive of greater public advantage. It is not difficult, however, to discover that this opinion rests on no good foundation; and to show that the *average rate of profit* is, under all circumstances, the test by which we are best able to judge which employment is most and which is least advantageous.

A capital may be employed in four different ways ; viz. *first*, in the production of raw produce ; or, *second*, in manufacturing and preparing raw produce for use and consumption ; or, *third*, in transporting raw and manufactured products from one place to another according to the demand ; or, *fourth*, in dividing particular portions of either into such small parcels as may suit the convenience of those who want them. The capital of those who undertake the improvement or cultivation of lands, mines, or fisheries, is employed in the first of these ways ; that of master-manufacturers in the second ; that of wholesale merchants in the third ; and that of retailers in the fourth. It is difficult to conceive that a capital can be employed in any way which may not be classed under one or other of these heads.

It is unnecessary to enlarge on the importance of employing capital in the acquisition of raw produce, and especially in the cultivation of the soil. It is from the latter, including therein mines and fisheries, that the matter of all commodities that minister to our necessities, comforts, and enjoyments, is originally derived. The industry which appropriates the raw products of the earth, as they are offered to man by nature, preceded every other. But these are always extremely limited. And it is by agriculture only, or by the application of labour and capital to the cultivation of the ground, that large supplies of those raw products, which form the principal part of the food of man, can be obtained. It is not quite certain that any species of grain, as wheat, barley, rye, oats, &c. has ever been discovered growing spontaneously ; and, although this must originally have been the case, the extreme scarcity of such spontaneous productions in every country with which we are acquainted, and the labour required to raise them in considerable quantities, prove, beyond all question, that it is to agriculture that we are almost exclusively indebted for them. The transition from the pastoral to the agricultural mode of life is decidedly the most

important step in the progress of society. Whenever, indeed, we compare the quantity of food, and of other raw products, obtained from a given surface of a well-cultivated country, with those obtained from an equal surface of an equally fertile country occupied by hunters or shepherds, the powers of agricultural industry in increasing useful productions appear so extraordinary, that we cease to feel surprise at the preference so early and generally given to agriculture over manufactures and commerce; and are disposed to subscribe, without hesitation, to the panegyric of Cicero, when he says, "*Omnium autem rerum ex quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agriculturâ melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius.*"

But are there any just grounds for this preference? Are manufactures and commerce really less advantageous than agriculture? Without the latter we could have no considerable supply of the materials out of which food and clothes are made; but were we unacquainted with the arts by which these materials, when procured, may be converted into food and clothes, the largest supply of them would be of little or no service. The labour of the miller who grinds the corn, and of the baker who bakes it, is as necessary to the production of bread, as that of the husbandman who tills the ground. It is the business of the agriculturist to raise flax and wool; but did not the spinner and weaver give them utility, and fit them for being made into a comfortable dress, they would be nearly, if not entirely worthless. But for the miner who digs the mineral from the bowels of the earth, we should not be supplied with the matter out of which many of our most useful implements and splendid articles of furniture are made: those, however, who compare the ore when dug from the mine with the finished articles, will, most likely, be convinced that the services of the purifiers and refiners of the ore, and of the artisans who have converted the metal to useful purposes, have been as indispensable as those of the miners.

Not only, however, is manufacturing industry, or that species of industry which fits and adapts the raw products of nature to our use, requisite to render their acquisition of any considerable value; but it is farther evident, that without its assistance these could not be obtained in any considerable quantity. The mechanic who fabricates the plough contributes as efficaciously to the production of corn as the husbandman who guides it. But the ploughwright, the mill-wright, the smith, and all those artisans who prepare tools and machines for the husbandman, are really manufacturers, and differ in no respect from those employed to give utility to wool and cotton, except that they work on harder materials. Tools and machines are the result of the labour and ingenuity of the tool and engine manufacturer; and without their aid, it is impossible that any sort of labour should ever become considerably productive.

“Distinguer,” says the Marquis Garnier, “le travail des ouvriers de l’agriculture d’avec celui des autres ouvriers, est une abstraction presque toujours oiseuse. Toute richesse, dans le sens dans lequel nous la concevons, est nécessairement le résultat de ces deux genres de travail, et la consommation ne peut pas plus se passer de l’un que de l’autre. Sans leur concours simultanée il ne peut y avoir de chose consommable, et par conséquent point de richesse. Comment pourrait-on donc comparer leurs produits respectifs, puisque, en séparant ces deux espèces de travail, on ne peut plus concevoir de véritable produit, de produit consommable et ayant une valeur réelle? La valeur du blé sur pied résulte de l’industrie du moissonneur qui recueillera, du batteur qui le séparera de la paille, de meunier et du boulanger qui le convertiront successivement en farine et en pain, tout comme elle résulte du travail du labourer et du semeur. Sans le travail du tisserand, le lin n’aurait pas plus le droit d’être compté au nombre des richesses, que l’ortie ou tout autre végétal inutile. A quoi pourrait-il donc servir de rechercher lequel de ces deux

genres de travail contribue le plus à l'avancement de la richesse nationale? N'est-ce pas comme si l'on disputait pour savoir lequel, du pied droit ou du pied gauche, est plus utile dans l'action de marcher?"¹

In fact, there is not at bottom any real distinction between agricultural and manufacturing industry. It is, as has been already seen, a vulgar error to suppose that the operations of husbandry add any thing to the stock of matter in existence. All that man can do, and all that he ever does, is merely to give to matter that particular form which fits it for his use. But it was contended by M. Quesnay and the *Economists*, and their opinions have in this instance been espoused by Smith, that the husbandman is powerfully assisted, in adapting matter to our use, by the vegetative powers of nature, whereas the manufacturer has to perform every thing himself without any such co-operation.—“No equal quantity of productive labour or capital employed in manufactures,” says Dr. Smith, “can ever occasion so great a reproduction as if it were employed in agriculture. *In them nature does NOTHING, man does ALL;* and the reproduction must always be proportioned to the strength of the agents that occasion it. The capital employed in agriculture, therefore, not only puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour than any equal capital employed in manufactures, but in proportion, too, to the quantity of productive labour which it employs, it adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways in which a capital can be employed it is by far the most advantageous to the society.”²

This is perhaps the most objectionable passage in the “Wealth of Nations;” and it is really astonishing that so acute and sagacious a reasoner as Smith should have main-

¹ See page 58 of the “Discours Préliminaire” to the second edition of the translation of the “Wealth of Nations,” by the Marquis Garnier.

² “Wealth of Nations,” p. 162.

tained a doctrine so manifestly erroneous. It is, indeed, true, that nature powerfully assists the labour of man in agriculture. The husbandman prepares the ground for the seed and deposits it there ; but nature unfolds the germ, feeds and ripens the growing plant, and brings it to a state of maturity. In point of fact, however, we are not less indebted to nature in every department of industry. The powers of water and of wind which move our machinery, support our ships, and impel them over the deep, the pressure of the atmosphere, and the elasticity of steam, which enable us to work the most stupendous engines, are they not spontaneous gifts of nature ? Machinery is advantageous only because by its means we press some of the powers of nature into our service, and make them perform the principal part of what we must otherwise have wholly performed ourselves. In navigation, is it possible to doubt that the powers of nature — the buoyancy of the water, the impulse of the wind, and the polarity of the magnet, contribute fully as much as the labour of the sailor to waft ships from one hemisphere to another ? In bleaching and fermentation, the whole processes are carried on by natural agents. And it is to the influence of heat in softening and melting metals, preparing food, and warming houses, that we owe many of our most powerful and convenient instruments, and that these northern climates have been made to afford a comfortable habitation. So far, indeed, is it from being true that nature does much for man in agriculture, and nothing in manufactures, that the fact is more nearly the reverse. There are no limits to the bounty of nature in manufactures : but there are limits, and those not very remote, to her bounty in agriculture. The greatest amount of capital might be expended in the construction of steam-engines, or of any other sort of machinery ; and after they had been multiplied indefinitely, the last would be as powerful and efficient in producing commodities and saving labour as the first. Such, however, is not the case with the soil. Lands of the first quality are speedily exhausted ; and, not-

withstanding the powerful influence of improvements, it is found to be impossible to apply capital indefinitely even to the best soils, without, in the long run, obtaining from it a diminished return. The rent of the landlord is not, as Smith conceived it to be, the recompense of the work of nature remaining, after all that part of the product is deducted which can be regarded as the recompense of the work of man. It is, as will be afterwards shown, the excess of produce obtained from the best soils in cultivation, over that which is obtained from the worst : it is, in fact, a consequence not of the increase, but of the diminution of the productive powers of the land.

If, however, the giving of utility to matter be, as it really is, the object of every species of industry, it is plain that the capital and labour employed in carrying commodities from where they are produced to where they are to be consumed, and in dividing them into minute portions, so as to suit the wants of the consumers, are really as productive as if they were employed in agriculture or manufactures. The miner gives value to matter—to coal for example—by bringing it from the bowels of the earth to its surface ; and the merchant or carrier who transports this coal from the mine whence it has been dug to the city, or place, where it is to be burned, gives it a further and perhaps a more considerable value. We do not owe our fires exclusively to the miner, or exclusively to the coal-merchant. They are the result of the conjoined operations of both, as well as of those of the various parties who furnished them with the tools and implements used in their respective employments.

It is probably unnecessary to do more than refer to what has been previously stated with respect to the utility of retail dealers. But the following extract from the “*Wealth of Nations*” sets it in a somewhat different point of view :—“ If there was no such trade as a butcher, every man would be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole sheep at a time. This would generally be inconvenient to the rich, and much more so to the poor. If a poor workman

was obliged to purchase a month's or six months' provisions at a time, a great part of the stock which he employs as a capital in the instruments of his trade, or in the furniture of his shop, and which yields him a revenue, he would be forced to place in that part of his stock which is reserved for immediate consumption, and which yields him no revenue. Nothing can be more convenient for such a person than to be able to purchase his subsistence from day to day, or even from hour to hour, as he wants it. He is thereby enabled to employ almost his whole stock as a capital. He is thus enabled to furnish work to a greater value; and the profit which he makes by it in this way much more than compensates the additional price which the profit of the retailer imposes upon the goods. The prejudices of some political writers against shopkeepers and tradesmen are altogether without foundation. So far is it from being necessary either to tax them, or to restrict their numbers, that they can never be multiplied so as to hurt the public interests, though they may so as to hurt one another. The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can be sold in a particular town, is limited by the demand of that town and its neighbourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the grocery trade, cannot exceed what is sufficient to purchase that quantity. If this capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will tend to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one only; and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together in order to raise the price just so much the less. Their competition might, perhaps, ruin some of themselves; but to take care of this is the business of the parties concerned, and it may safely be trusted to their discretion. It can never hurt either the consumer or the producer; on the contrary, it must tend to make the retailers both sell cheaper and buy dearer, than if the whole trade was monopolized by one or two persons. Some of them, perhaps, may occasionally decoy a weak cus-

to buy what he has no occasion for. This evil is, however, of too little importance to deserve the public attention, nor would it necessarily be prevented by restricting their number.”¹

It appears, therefore, that the various modes in which capital is employed in productive industry, or, in other words, that the raising of raw produce, the fashioning of that produce into useful and desirable articles, the carrying of the raw and manufactured products from place to place, and their distribution in such portions as may suit the public demand, are equally advantageous: that is, the industry employed in any one of these departments contributes, equally with that employed in the others, to increase the mass of necessities, conveniencies, and luxuries. Without supplies of raw produce, we could have no manufactures; and without manufactures and commercial industry, the greater part of these supplies would be entirely worthless. Manufacturers and merchants are to the body politic what the digestive powers are to the human body. We could not exist without food; but the largest supplies of food cannot lengthen our days, should the machinery by which it is adapted to our use, and incorporated with our body, become vitiated and deranged. Nothing, therefore, can be more silly and childish than the estimates, so frequently put forth, of the comparative advantageousness of agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial industry. They are inseparably connected, and depend upon, and grow out of each other. The agriculturists raise raw produce for the manufacturers and merchants, while the latter manufacture and import necessary, convenient, and ornamental articles for the use of the former. Whatever, consequently, contributes to promote or depress the industry and enterprise of one class, must have a beneficial or injurious influence over the others. “Land and trade,” to borrow the just and forcible expressions of Sir Josiah Child, “are TWINS, and

¹ “Wealth of Nations,” p. 160.

have always, and ever will, *wax and wane together*. It cannot be ill with trade but land will fall, nor ill with land but trade will feel it.”¹ Hence the absurdity of attempting to exalt one species of industry, by giving it factitious advantages, at the expense of the rest. Every preference given to agriculturists over manufacturers and merchants, or to the latter over the former, is sure to occasion mischievous consequences. Individuals should always be left to be guided by their inclinations in the employment of their stock and industry. Wherever this is the case their interests are identified with those of the public; and those who succeed best in increasing their own wealth, must then necessarily also contribute most effectually to increase the wealth of the state to which they belong.

This mutual dependence of the different branches of industry on each other, and the necessity of their co-operation to the progress of civilization, have been ably illustrated in one of the early numbers of the “Edinburgh Review.” “It may safely be concluded, that all those occupations which tend to supply the necessary wants, or to multiply the comforts and pleasures of human life, are equally productive in the strict sense of the word, and tend to augment the mass of human riches; meaning, by riches, all those things which are necessary, or convenient, or delightful to man. The progress of society has been productive of a complete separation of employments originally united. At first, every man provided, as well as he could, for his necessities as well as his pleasures, and for *all* his wants, as well as *all* his enjoyments. By degrees, a division of these cares was introduced; the subsistence of the community became the province of one class, its comforts of another, and its gratifications of a third. The different operations subservient to the attainment of each of these objects were then intrusted to different hands; and the universal establishment of barter connected the whole of

¹ “New Discourse of Trade.” Glasg. ed. p. 15.

these divisions and subdivisions together—enabled one man to manufacture for all, without danger of starving by not ploughing or hunting, and another to plough or hunt for all, without the risk of wanting tools or clothes by not manufacturing. It has thus become as impossible to say exactly who feeds, clothes, or entertains the community, as it would be to say which of the many workmen employed in the manufacture of pins is the actual pin-maker, or which of the farm-servants produces the crop. All the branches of useful industry work together to the common end, as all the parts of each branch co-operate to its particular object. If you say that the farmer feeds the community, and produces all the raw materials which the other classes work upon, we answer, that unless those other classes worked up the raw materials, and supplied the farmer's necessities, he would be forced to allot part of his labour to his employment, whilst he forced others to assist in raising raw produce. In such a complicated system, it is clear that all labour has the same effect, and equally increases the whole mass of wealth. Nor can any attempt be more vain than theirs who would define the particular parts of the machine that produce the motion, which is necessarily the result of the whole powers combined, and depends on each particular one of the mutually connected members.”¹

Besides underrating the importance of manufactures in promoting the increase of national wealth, it has been said that they are most unfavourable to the health of the people. But this statement, though in accordance with popular prejudice, does not appear to have any good foundation. That some peculiar processes, in a few branches of manufacture, are unhealthy, is no doubt true; but that such is not the general character of manufacturing industry is evinced by the fact, that the period during which manufactures have made the most astonishing progress, has been

¹ Vol. iv. p. 362.

marked by an extraordinary diminution of the rate of mortality. The number of burials estimated by averages of five years, did not differ considerably during the entire period from 1780 to 1815, though the population increased about 3,300,000 in the interval.¹ Neither was this increase occasioned by any increase in the number of births as compared with the bearing women, but by the increased number of children that were reared, and passed through the different stages of life. "About 100 years back," says Mr. Griffith Davies, "if any dependence can be placed on the registers, the number of annual births did not exceed the number of annual burials, so that the population could not then have been on the increase. The increase since that period must, therefore, be attributed to an increased fruitfulness of the female sex, to immigration, to a diminution in the rate of mortality, or to two or more of these causes combined. But it does not appear that the first of these causes has had any sensible operation, and the second can have had none, otherwise the number of burials must have increased in comparison with the number of births, which is contrary to the fact: the increase of population must, therefore, be entirely attributed to a diminution in the rate of mortality."² The improvement began about the middle of last century, and has, doubtless, been owing partly to the greater prevalence of habits of cleanliness and sobriety amongst the poor, and to meliorations of their diet, dress, and houses; partly to the improvement of the climate, resulting from the drainage of bogs and marshes; and partly, and since 1800 chiefly, perhaps, to discoveries in medical science, and the extirpation of the small-pox. But to whatever causes this increased healthiness may be ascribed, there is conclusive evidence to show that they have not been counteracted by the extension of manufactures. Had such been the case, the improvement would have been

¹ "Preliminary Discourse to Census of 1831," p. 35.

² "Report of 1827 on Friendly Societies," p. 38.

greater in the country than in the towns, whereas it has, speaking generally, been decidedly less. The mortality in London, during the first half of last century, is supposed to have been as high as 5 per cent. ; while, notwithstanding its extraordinary increase, it does not at present (1846) exceed 2·6 or 2·7 per cent. The rate of mortality in Manchester in 1770, as deduced from the careful observations made by Dr. Percival, was 1 in 28 ; whereas, notwithstanding the prodigious increase of manufacturing establishments that has taken place in the interval, the mortality does not exceed, at this moment, 1 in 33. According to Dr. Enfield, the population of Liverpool, in 1773, was found, by actual enumeration, to be 32,450 ; and dividing this number by 1,191, the annual burials at that period, we have the proportion of deaths to the whole population as 1 to 27 $\frac{1}{4}$. But, at present, the mortality is not supposed to exceed 1 in 33 or 34 ; and in Glasgow, Birmingham, and other great towns, there has been a corresponding improvement.

It must, however, be admitted, that the mortality in Lancashire, which is at the rate of 1 in 37, over the whole population, very considerably exceeds its ratio in any other county of England, and that generally the mortality is greatest in the manufacturing counties. This excess cannot, however, be fairly ascribed to the nature of the employments carried on in them, but to other circumstances ; such, for example, as the influx of swarms of Irish and other labourers, many of whom are in a state of all but utter destitution, and the bad and overcrowded state of the lodgings occupied by the poor. Every where, indeed, the greatest carelessness has been evinced in devising and enforcing police and statutory regulations with regard to the construction of the inferior buildings in large towns, and the mortality in them is in consequence comparatively great. In Manchester and Liverpool, for example, a large portion of the work-people reside in under-ground cellars, which are at once damp, dark, and ill ventilated ; and, in

all the great manufacturing towns, the lodging-houses are crammed with occupants, many of whom are afflicted with contagious diseases ; and entire streets of cottages are built without any provision being made for their drainage, or for furnishing them with adequate supplies of water. These abuses, which have mostly originated in the culpable inattention of the authorities, should, in as far as possible, be obviated ; and regulations should, at the same time, be adopted to prevent their recurrence in future. And, were this done, there can be no manner of doubt that the mortality in the manufacturing districts would be very materially reduced.¹

But, notwithstanding these statements be more than sufficient to show the groundless nature of the allegations respecting the general unhealthiness of manufacturing employments, it is not to be denied that some very serious abuses formerly existed in many factories. Owing to the lightness of the labour to be performed in various departments of the cotton, woollen, silk, and linen trades, but especially the first, children have been largely employed in them ; and there can be no doubt that they have not unfrequently been employed at too early an age, and that their powers have sometimes been tasked beyond what their strength could fairly bear. It was, however, objected to any interference in such matters, that the parents of the children knew best what was for their advantage, and that it would be oppressive and inexpedient to interfere with the arrangements they had sanctioned. But though parental affection may, speaking generally, be trusted to for the kindly treatment of children, it is not always, nor under all circumstances, to be depended on. In this particular case the parents, whose wages were frequently very low, were sometimes tempted, or driven by necessity, to endeavour to eke out their scanty means by employing their children in subordi-

¹ See the able Reports of Edwin Chadwick, Esq., on "The Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Classes;" and see also the articles on Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, &c., in the "Geographical Dictionary."

nate departments ; and after the practice had once begun, it was alike easy to extend it, and difficult (notwithstanding the interference of the legislature on one or two occasions) to guard against its abuse. It has, indeed, been shown, over and over again, that many of the statements embodied in the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, in 1832, in regard to the mischievous consequences resulting from the employment of children in factories, were either false or very much exaggerated ; but still enough was established, in that Report, and in the Report of the Commission subsequently appointed to inquire into the same subject, to show that very great inattention to cleanliness, and some revolting abuses, prevailed in various factories, especially those belonging to the smaller class of manufacturers. And in order to obviate these, and other abuses, an act was passed (3 & 4 William IV., cap. 103) which, among other regulations, prohibited the employment of children under nine years of age in factories ; limited the hours of labour of young persons between nine and eighteen years of age ; and prohibited their employment at night. This act also authorized the appointment of Inspectors, under whose superintendence its provisions have been carried into effect ; and though, perhaps, it may not, in some respects, have gone far enough, its operation has been, on the whole, highly beneficial.

It was attempted to ingraft on the above act some sort of provision for the education of the children employed in factories ; but it is admitted that its provisions, in this respect, have had but little success. It were, however, much to be wished, that this important matter should not be neglected. Most girls brought up in factories are singularly ill-fitted for becoming mistresses of families ; being, for the most part, extremely ignorant of most matters connected with domestic economy. This defect might be partially, at least, obviated, by giving them instruction in the arts fitted to make them useful housewives. The acquisition of some such knowledge, though

hitherto strangely neglected, would be of the greatest importance to themselves and their families.

Besides, supposing that the health of the population is injured by the extension of manufactures, it has been supposed that the extreme subdivision of labour in manufacturing establishments, and the undivided attention which every one employed in them must give to the single operation in which he is engaged, have a most pernicious influence over the mental faculties. The genius of the master is said to be cultivated, while that of the workman is condemned to perpetual neglect. "Many mechanical arts," says Ferguson, "require no capacity; they succeed best under a total suppression of sentiment and reason; and ignorance is the mother of industry as well as of superstition. Reflection and fancy are subject to err; but a habit of moving the hand or the foot is independent of either. Manufactures, accordingly, prosper most where the head is least consulted, and where the workshop may, without any great effort of imagination, be considered as an engine, the parts of which are men."¹ Similar statements have been made by others. Even Dr. Smith, who has given so beautiful an exposition of the benefits derived from the division and combination of employments, has, in this instance, concurred with the popular opinion, and has not hesitated to affirm, that constant application to a particular occupation in a large manufactory, "necessarily renders the workman as *stupid and ignorant as it is possible to make a human being*." Nothing, however, can be more marvelously incorrect than these representations. Instead of its being true that the work-people in manufacturing establishments are less intelligent and acute than those employed in agriculture, the fact is distinctly the reverse. The spinners, weavers, and other mechanics of Glasgow, Manchester, and Birmingham, are cleverer and better informed than the agricultural labourers of any part of the

empire. And this is really what a less prejudiced consideration of the subject would have led us to anticipate. The various occupations in which the husbandman successively engages, their constant liability to be affected by so variable a power as the weather, and the perpetual change in the appearance of the objects which daily meet his eyes, and with which he is conversant, occupy his attention, and render him a stranger to that ennui and desire for adventitious excitement which must ever be felt by those who are constantly engaged in burnishing the point of a pin, or in performing the same endless routine of precisely similar operations. This want of excitement cannot, however, be so cheaply or effectually gratified in any way as it may be by cultivating or stimulating the mental powers. Most workmen have no time for dissipation; and though they had, the wages of labour are too low, and the propensity to save and accumulate too powerful, to allow of their generally seeking to divert themselves by indulging in riot and excess. The majority are in this way compelled, as it were, to resort for recreation to mental excitement; for the enjoyment of which their situation affords every facility. Agricultural labourers, spread over a wide extent of country, are without the means of assembling, except on rare occasions, either for amusement or instruction; but, by working together, those employed in manufacturing establishments have constant opportunities of discussing all topics of interest and importance. They are thus gradually trained to habits of thinking and reflection; their intellects are sharpened by the collision of conflicting opinions; and a small contribution from each individual enables them to establish lectureships and libraries, and to obtain ample supplies of newspapers and periodical publications. But whatever doubt may exist respecting the cause, whether it be ascribed to the better elementary instruction of the lower classes in towns and villages, or to the circumstances under which they are placed in after life, there can be none of the fact, that the intelligence of manufacturing workmen has increased

according as their numbers have increased, and as their employments have been more and more subdivided. There is not, we apprehend, any real ground for supposing that they were ever less intelligent than the agriculturists; though, whatever may have been the case formerly, none will now venture to affirm that they are inferior to them in intellectual acquirements, or that they are mere machines without sentiment or reason.

But assuming, what, indeed, can no longer be denied, the superior intelligence of the manufacturing population, we are not thence to conclude that it will be in general orderly, and disposed to respect and support the right of property and the established institutions of the country. The acquisition of information is valuable for the direct gratification it brings along with it, and for the assistance it affords to those who are improving their condition; but it is by no means clear that it is at all fitted to reconcile the labouring classes to their lot. A stupid or an ignorant individual most commonly regards the privations incident to his situation as the effect of circumstances beyond human control, and submits to them as to the dispensations of Providence, without reflection or murmur; but he who is instructed, who is acquainted with the constitution of society, and with the privileges and advantages enjoyed by other classes, will not be so apathetic, nor, probably, so resigned to his fate. We are not, we confess, of the number of those who can contemplate the condition and prospects of the labourers in our great manufacturing towns without serious apprehensions. Owing to the greater scale on which employments are now mostly carried on, workmen have less chance than formerly of advancing themselves or their families to any higher situation, or of exchanging the character of labourers for that of masters. But, under these circumstances, can any thing be more natural, than that instructed workmen, who are thus condemned as it were to perpetual helotism, to continued poverty and hard

labour, should become discontented? It would, in fact, be extraordinary were such not the case. It is all very well for those who are at ease in their possessions, or who can by industry and exertion raise themselves to an improved situation, to profess their attachment to the existing order of things, and their determination to support it at all hazards. But, if called upon, such persons would, perhaps, be not a little puzzled to show that a poor collier, cotton-spinner, or hand-loom weaver, has any very palpable interest in its support; or that he would be seriously injured by its overthrow. Something, perhaps, may be done to strengthen the existing institutions of the country, by improving the education of the poor, and showing them how closely their interests are identified with those of their employers, and with the preservation of tranquillity and good order. But, after all, we incline to think that but little stress can be safely laid on education. A man must have a lively and grateful sense of the advantages he derives from established institutions before any species of training will make him anxious for their preservation. But a poor manufacturing workman, who contrasts his abject and hopeless condition, and that of his family and class, with the boundless wealth, luxury, and varied enjoyments of other portions of the community, will be very apt to conclude that there is something radically wrong in a system productive of such results, and will be disposed to lend a willing ear to those dangerous counsellors, who tell him that he is the victim of vicious political and social arrangements, and that he must look to a change in them for an improvement of his situation. No one acquainted with the history of the country since the Peace, or with its present state, can doubt that there is much deep-seated, and, we believe, growing discontent among the manufacturing work-people. Radicalism, Chartism, and so forth, are merely the modes in which this discontent manifests itself, and seeks to appease its irritation.

The observations we have now ventured to make on the

state of the manufacturing population, seem to be warranted by what may be called their ordinary condition, without taking into account the extent to which they may be affected by the vicissitudes of trade. These, however, are far too important to be left out of view. A population dependent, in so great a degree as that of Great Britain, on the wages of manufacturing labour, is especially liable to be seriously influenced and to have its interests deeply compromised, not merely by the occurrence of scarcities and pecuniary derangements at home, but also by whatever may affect the sale of its products in those foreign countries to which they are largely exported. It is not to be denied that a large population so situated is in a very perilous position. So long as the population dependent on manufacturing industry is not very large as compared with the rest of the population, the occurrence of the vicissitudes alluded to is of comparatively little importance. But when the manufacturing work-people become so very numerous as in Great Britain, and increase with such extraordinary, not to say frightful rapidity, as they have done here during the last forty years, the occurrence of any circumstance that tends to reduce the wages of labour, to raise the prices of provisions, or to throw any considerable number of persons out of employment, becomes an evil of the greatest magnitude, and is not only productive of great immediate distress to those directly affected by it, but is very likely seriously to endanger the public tranquillity. Demagogues, and the workshop agitators so frequently met with in the manufacturing districts, never fail to take advantage of the excitement produced by the occurrence of distress, to instil their poisonous nostrums into the public mind ; to vilify the institutions of the country ; and to represent the privations of the work-people, which, in the vast majority of cases, spring from accidental and uncontrollable causes, as the necessary consequence of a defective system of domestic economy, having regard alone to the interests of the higher classes.

It would be useless to refer to particular instances, in

confirmation of what is now stated. These, unhappily, are too numerous and too recent not to have forced themselves on the attention of every one. And yet, critical as is the condition of society from the vast increase of manufacturing labourers, it would really seem as if we had done little more than enter on this new and hazardous career. At present, notwithstanding the vicissitudes and revulsions that occasionally recur, manufactures are extending themselves on all sides, and it may be estimated, that an addition of about 250,000 individuals is annually made to the population of Great Britain.

In such a novel and unprecedented state of things the rules and inferences drawn from the contemplation of society in antiquity, or in more modern times, are wholly inapplicable; and we are left with little or no light from experience to speculate on the probable course and results of this new state of society. The prospect, we fear, is not very flattering, either as regards the tranquillity of the country, or the comfort and well-being of the bulk of the people. There may, however, be principles at work, which have not yet developed themselves, capable of educing good out of seeming evil, and of counteracting those sources of distress and turbulence which are so obviously prolific of mischief. We may be permitted to hope, that a system which at its outset was productive of so great an increase of wealth, prosperity, and enjoyment, may not end in national ruin and disgrace.

Perhaps it may, in the end, be found that it was unwise to allow the manufacturing system to gain so great an ascendancy as it has done in this country, and that measures should have been early adopted to check and moderate its growth. At present, however, nothing of this sort can be thought of. Whether for good or for evil, we are now too far advanced to think of retreating. We have no resource but to give it full scope, taking care, however, at the same time, to do all that is possible by judicious legislation to give stability to industry, and to avert or modify

the influence of revulsions. In this respect, the measures introduced and carried into effect by Sir Robert Peel, for giving full freedom to our commercial intercourse with foreigners, and for improving our defective monetary system, are of the greatest importance. And if, in addition to these wise and salutary measures, tranquillity should be maintained at home and abroad, oppressive imposts be modified or abolished, and such a scheme of public charity be organized as may fully relieve the distresses without insulting the feelings or lessening the industry of the labouring classes, or bringing them into collision with government, all, perhaps, will be done to give stability to industry and good order of which legislation is capable. But that these things will be done, or that, if done, they will be adequate to meet the exigencies of the case, is more than any man of sense would choose to affirm. They, however, are things which government may endeavour to accomplish; and provided it succeed in its efforts, the event may be, or rather must be, left to time and Providence.

In estimating the influence of manufactures over the prosperity and happiness of nations, it would seem that they are, if at all, injurious or hazardous only in their excess, or when a very large proportion of the population has been, through their agency, rendered dependent on foreign demand and on the caprices and mutations of fashion. Down to a certain point, the progress of manufactures is productive, if not of unalloyed advantage, at all events of a great preponderance thereof. It is to their progress and that of commerce that we owe the growth of cities; and mankind are mainly indebted to the latter, not only for the rapid advances they have made in civilization, but also for the diffusion of just notions of government and of liberal principles. Men seldom entertain a just sense of their own importance, or acquire a knowledge of their rights, or are able to defend them with courage and success, till they have been congregated into cities. An agricultural popu-

lation, thinly distributed over an extensive country, and without any point of reunion, rarely opposes any very vigorous resistance to the most arbitrary and oppressive measures. But such is not the case with the inhabitants of towns; they are actuated by the same spirit, and derive courage from their numbers and union; the bold animate the timid; the resolute confirm the wavering; the redress of an injury done to one citizen becomes the business of all; they take their measures in common, and prosecute them with a vigour and resolution, that generally makes the boldest minister pause in an unpopular career. The most superficial, as well as the most profound reader of history must acknowledge the truth of this statement; the establishment of extensive manufactures and commerce having every where been consentaneous with the rise of public freedom, and with the introduction of an improved system of government.¹

But, if we be right in the previous statements, it will appear that the beneficial influence of manufactures depends, in a great degree, on their being subordinate, in point of extent, to agriculture and other more stable businesses; and there is much reason to fear that their influence is of a decidedly less salutary description, when they constitute the paramount interest. We have noticed the tendency, so apparent in the progress of manufactures, to the increase of great establishments, where a few individuals superintend great numbers of work-people. But we doubt whether any country, how wealthy soever, should be looked upon as in a healthy, sound state, where the leading interest consists of a small number of great capitalists, and of vast numbers of work-people in their employment, but unconnected with them by any ties of gratitude, sympathy, or affection. This estrangement is occasioned by the great scale on which labour is now carried on in most businesses; and by the consequent impossibility of the masters becom-

¹ For some farther illustrations of this last-mentioned topic, see Miller's "Historical View of the English Government," vol. iv. pp. 102-137.

ing acquainted, even if they desired it, with the great bulk of their work-people. Generally, indeed, they do not so much as know their names; they look only to their conduct when in the mill or factory; and are wholly ignorant of their mode of life when out of it, and of the condition of their families. The kindlier feelings have no share in an intercourse of this sort; speaking generally, every thing is regulated on both sides by the narrowest and most selfish views and considerations; a man and a machine being treated with about the same sympathy and regard. It is mere drivelling to suppose that a population of this sort should not be at all times extremely prone to discontent. The work-people having little or nothing to lose, and caring extremely little for, or, it may be, hating those who have, will be easily misled, and be exceedingly apt, in periods of distress, to adopt violent resolutions, destructive of the interests of others, and probably, also, of their own.

We have not made these statements because we entertain any doubts of the continued advantages resulting from the progressive improvement of the arts. What we have stated has reference only to the excessive growth of manufactures in particular countries, and not to improvements of any kind. The facilities for the production of cottons, woollens, and hardware, for example, cannot assuredly be too much increased; but it does not, therefore, follow that the cotton, woollen, and hardware manufactures of England may not be disproportionally extended, or rather that they may not be so increased as to place a large proportion of our people, and with them the best interests of the country, in a very hazardous situation; in the same way that the safety of the largest and best built ship may be endangered by crowding too much sail. Supposing, however, that this were admitted, it might be asked, would you then propose, when a business is rapidly increasing, and when that very circumstance shows that it is, at the time, the

best suited to the country, that its progress should be checked by artificial means? Practically, it is abundantly certain that all questions of this sort, supposing them to be put, will, for a lengthened period, be decided in the negative. But looking at it in a scientific point of view, every thing, it is plain, would depend on our being able to form a correct estimate of the character and contingent circumstances connected with the business referred to. Certainly, however, our experience is at present far too limited to enable any one to cast the horoscope of any great department of industry; and, notwithstanding its vast importance, the solution of this class of questions must be left to the economists of some future age.

That hostility to commercial pursuits so generally entertained by the philosophers of antiquity, and which has been inherited by many of their successors in more modern times, seems to have originated principally in the idea that commerce is unfavourable to the patriotic virtues, and that those who are familiar with foreign countries cease to entertain any very peculiar regard for their own. That there is some foundation for this statement is true; but it is not true that commerce tends to weaken that love of country which is founded upon just grounds. It merely moderates that excessive preference of ourselves to every other people, which is the surest proof of ignorance and barbarism: and in this respect it differs nothing from the acquaintance with foreigners obtained through the medium of books. The merchant who visits a foreign country, and the individual who reads an account of it, naturally compares its institutions with those of his own country. Certainly, however, there is no reason for supposing that this will make him unjustly depreciate the latter, though it may satisfy him that they are not quite so super-excellent as he previously imagined; and if it should appear, on a careful comparison, that any of our laws or practices are not so well suited as those of some foreign states to promote the public interests, what can be

more desirable than to have the means of rectifying and amending them, not upon speculative or doubtful grounds, but according to the experience of other nations? A Turk, or a Spaniard, may be as intensely patriotic as an Englishman; but the patriotism of the former is a blind indiscriminating passion, which prompts him to admire and support the very abuses that depress and degrade himself and his country; whereas the patriotism of the latter is of a comparatively sober and rational description. He prefers his country, not merely because it is the place of his birth, but because of the many ennobling recollections connected with its history, and because, upon contrasting it with others, he sees, that though not faultless, its institutions are comparatively excellent.

The idea that the patriotism of those engaged in commercial pursuits is less ardent than that of agriculturists, never could have been entertained by any one acquainted with history, unless he were, at the same time, blinded by prejudice. Were the Athenians or Corinthians less patriotic than the Spartans or Thebans? Alexander the Great had more difficulty in conquering Tyre than in subduing the whole Persian empire; and Carthage had nearly arrested the Romans in their progress to universal dominion. But it is needless to go back to antiquity for examples to prove the beneficial influence of commerce on the patriotic virtues. The Hollanders and the English have been less distinguished among the nations of Europe for their vast commerce and wealth, than for the extraordinary sacrifices and exertions they have made for the sake of private freedom and national independence.

CHAPTER VII.

Improvements in Machinery similar in their Effects to Improvements in the Skill and Dexterity of the Labourer—Do not occasion a Glut of Commodities—Sometimes force Workmen to change their Employments—Have no Tendency to lessen, but most commonly increase the Demand for Labour—Case supposed by Mr. Ricardo—Causes of Gluts—Not occasioned by a deficiency of Money, but are frequently occasioned by sudden changes in its Quantity and Value—Circumstances which occasion Miscalculations on the Part of the Producers.

VARIOUS bad consequences have been supposed to result from the continued extension and improvement of machinery. But a presumption arises at the outset, that they must be in a great degree fallacious, inasmuch as they would equally follow from the continued improvement of the skill and industry of the labourer. If the construction of a machine that would manufacture two pairs of stockings for the same expense that was previously required to manufacture one pair, be in any respect injurious, the injury would, obviously, be equal were the same thing accomplished by increased dexterity and skill on the part of the knitters; were the females, for example, who knitted two or three pairs in the week, able in future to knit four or six pairs. There is really no difference in the cases. And supposing the demand for stockings were already supplied, M. Sismondi could not, consistently with the principles he has advanced,¹ hesitate about condemning such an improvement as a very great evil—as a means of throwing *half* the people engaged in the stocking manufacture out of employment. The question respecting the improvement of machinery is, therefore, at bottom, the same with the question respecting the improvement of the skill and industry of

¹ "Nouveaux Principes," tom. ii. p. 318.

the labourer. The principles which regulate our decision in the one case, must regulate it in the other. If it be advantageous that the manual dexterity of the labourer should be indefinitely extended—that he should be able to produce greater quantities of commodities with the same, or a less quantity of labour, it surely must be advantageous that he should avail himself of such aids as may be most effectual in enabling him to bring about that result.

In order the better to appreciate the effect of increased skill and dexterity on the part of the labourer, or of an improvement in tools and machines, let us suppose that the powers of production are universally augmented, and that the workmen engaged in different employments can, with the same exertion, produce twice the former quantity of commodities: is it not evident that this increased facility of production would double the wealth and enjoyments of all individuals? The shoemaker who had previously manufactured only *one* pair of shoes a-day, would now be able to manufacture *two* pairs; and as an equal improvement is supposed to have taken place in all employments, he would obtain twice the quantity of every other thing in exchange for shoes. In a country thus circumstanced, every workman would have a great quantity of the produce of his own work to dispose of, beyond what he had occasion for; and as every one else would be in the same situation, each would be able to exchange his own goods for a great quantity, or, what comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity of those of others. The condition of such a society would be vastly improved. All the necessaries, luxuries, and conveniencies of life, would be comparatively abundant.

It may, however, be asked, would the *demand* be sufficient to take off this increased quantity of commodities? Would their extraordinary multiplication not cause such a glut of the market, as to force their sale at a lower price than would suffice to repay even the diminished cost of their production? But it is not necessary, in order to render an increase in the powers of production advantageous, that they should

always be fully exerted. Were the labourer's command over necessaries and comforts suddenly doubled, his consumption as well as his savings would doubtless be very greatly increased: but it is not at all likely that he should continue to exert his full powers. He would then be able, without endangering his means of subsistence, to give a greater portion of his time to relaxation and amusement. It is only where the powers of industry are feeble or very much loaded, where supplies of food have to be drawn from soils of inferior fertility, or where population is in excess, that workmen are compelled to make every possible exertion. High wages are advantageous only because of the increased comforts they bring along with them; and of these, an addition to the time which may be devoted to amusement is certainly not one of the least. Wherever wages are high, and little subject to fluctuation, labourers are found to be active, intelligent, and industrious. But they rarely prosecute their employments with the same intensity as those who are obliged, by the pressure of necessity, to strain every nerve to the utmost. They are enabled to enjoy their intervals of ease and relaxation; and they would be censurable if they did not enjoy them.

Suppose, however, that the productive powers of industry are doubled; nay, suppose they are increased in any greater proportion, and that they are exerted to the utmost, it would not occasion any lasting glut of the market. It is true, that those individuals who are most industrious may produce commodities which those who are less industrious — who prefer indolence to exertion — may not have the means of purchasing, or for which they may not be able to furnish an equivalent. But the glut arising from such a contingency must speedily disappear. In exerting his productive powers, every man intends either to consume the entire produce of his labour himself, or to exchange it, or portions of it, for such commodities or services as he wishes to obtain from others. Suppose, now, that he directly consumes every thing he produces: it is obvious that, in

such a case, there can be no glut or excess ; for, to suppose that commodities, intended for direct consumption by the producers, may be in excess, is equivalent to supposing that production may be carried on without a motive, that there may be an effect without a cause ! When individuals, instead of directly consuming the produce of their industry, offer it in exchange to others, their miscalculation may occasion a glut. Should A, for example, produce commodities which are not wanted, he will not be able to exchange them for those he wished to obtain, and his miscalculation will occasion a glut : he should, it is obvious, have produced such commodities as would have been taken off his hands by others, or have applied himself to the production of those which he wanted. This, however, is an error that will speedily be rectified ; for, if A find that he cannot attain his object by prosecuting his present employment, he will not fail to abandon it, producing, in time to come, such commodities only as he may find a merchant for, or as he means to consume. It is clear, therefore, that a *universally* increased facility of production cannot give rise to a permanent overloading of the market. Suppose that the capital and labour, engaged in different employments, are adjusted according to the effectual demand, and that they all yield the same nett profit : if the productive powers of labour were universally increased, the commodities produced would all preserve the same relation to each other. Double or treble the quantity of one commodity would be given for double or treble the quantity of every other commodity. There would be a general augmentation of the wealth of the society, but there would be no excess of commodities in the market ; the increased equivalents on the one side being balanced by a corresponding increase on the other. But if, while one class of producers were industrious, another chose to be idle, there would be a temporary excess. It is clear, however, that this excess would be occasioned by the deficient production of the idle class. It would not be

a consequence of production being too much, but of its being too little increased. Increase it more—make the idle class equally productive with the others, and then it will be able to furnish them with equivalents for their commodities, and the surplus will immediately disappear. It was in vain that Mr. Malthus attempted to defeat this reasoning by supposing the existence of an *indisposition to consume!* There is no such indisposition in any country in the world; not even in Mexico, to which Mr. Malthus referred.¹ The indisposition is not to consume, but to produce. In Mexico, as elsewhere, no one can command the products or services of others unless he furnish them with an equivalent; and the Mexican prefers indolence to the gratification derivable from the commodities or services he might procure by means of labour. Malthus mistook this indisposition to produce for an indisposition to consume; and, in consequence, denied the proposition, that effective demand depends upon production.

Mr. Malthus has justly stated, that the demand for a commodity depends “on the *will* combined with the *power* to purchase it;” that is, on the power to furnish an equivalent for it. But did any one ever hear of a want of *will* to purchase? If it alone could procure the necessities and luxuries of life, every beggar would be as rich as Cræsus, and the market would constantly be understocked. The *power* to purchase is the real desideratum. It is the inability to furnish equivalents for the products necessary to supply our wants, that “makes calamity of so long life.” The more, then, that this inability is diminished, or, which is the same thing, the more industrious every individual becomes, and the more the facility of production is increased, the more will the condition of society be improved.

It is visionary to suppose that a decline in the foreign demand for any species of produce is ever occasioned by

¹ “Principles of Political Economy,” p. 382.

an increase of productive power. Such decline, when it does occur, is invariably occasioned by the too high price of our commodities, or by restrictions on the importation of British goods into foreign countries, and of foreign goods into Britain. Now it is obvious, that if the falling off in the foreign demand proceed from the former of these causes, it would have been proportionally greater had the cost of production not been diminished. If, notwithstanding all the contrivances of our Arkwrights and Watts for reducing the cost of commodities, we are still in any danger of being undersold by foreigners, it is certain that, without them, we should not be able to withstand their competition for a moment. It would be not a little inconsequential, first to complain that our goods were too high-priced for the foreign market, and then to declaim against the only means by which their prices may be reduced and the demand increased !

It is not to increased facilities of production, but to the derangements that have been occasioned by changes in the quantity and value of money, and by the restraints imposed on the freedom of trade, that the difficulty, so frequently experienced, of disposing of commodities in the foreign market, is, in most cases, to be ascribed. The people of Poland, Russia, France, China, Brazil, &c., are desirous to exchange their corn, timber, wine, silks, tea, sugar, &c., for our products. These commodities, too, are particularly well-fitted for our markets, and form, indeed, the very articles we are most anxious to import. It is plain, therefore, that the decline that has sometimes taken place in the foreign demand for our products, and the revulsions thereby occasioned, have not been owing to their excessive supply, but to the pernicious influence of sudden changes in the value of money, and to those impolitic and injurious regulations which fetter the commercial intercourse of different countries. But it may be confidently expected that the frequency and violence of these revulsions will be diminished in future. We have not, it is true, any right

or power to interfere in such matters with the policy of other countries. But our example will, probably, have a good deal of influence; and, at all events, the many improvements made during the administration of Sir Robert Peel in our commercial legislation, more especially the increased stability given to our monetary system by the measures of 1844, and the abolition of the sliding scale and the introduction of a free trade in corn, in 1846, cannot fail to give additional security to industrial undertakings, and to deepen and enlarge the channels of commerce.

It is said, indeed, that whatever relief we may derive from the adoption of a more enlarged commercial system will only be temporary; that our powers of production are so vast, that we shall speedily glut even the market of the world! This, it must be confessed, looking to the extraordinary progress of America and Australia, and the new and all but boundless markets that are daily opening in them, as well as in many parts of Asia and Europe, is rather an improbable supposition; but, assuming that we could, by means of our improved machinery, manufacture a sufficient supply of cottons to serve every country, and even to sink their price below the cost of production, it could have no permanently bad consequence. Were such the case, the manufacturers would gradually begin to narrow their business, and would, perhaps, withdraw part of their capital, and employ it in some other way. Now that we are about to revert to the sound principle of free trade, the demand for commodities will be comparatively steady. It will not, in time to come, be so seriously affected by the circumstance of our harvests being more or less productive than ordinary; or by sundry other contingencies which have hitherto exerted a very great influence over our trade. And if it should be found that, at an average of two or three years, we have not been able to dispose of our cottons, woollens, &c., with a sufficient profit, it will be a proof that their production has been carried too far; and as there will be no rational prospect of the demand being speedily

increased, manufacturers will not be tempted, as they have been, to linger on in a disadvantageous employment, but will transfer a portion of their capitals to other businesses ; and the supply of goods being thus diminished, their price will rise to its proper level.

Still, however, it may be urged, that, under a free commercial system, we may not only manufacture too much of one, but of all commodities demanded by foreigners. But, admitting that such were the case, still there would be no ground whatever for doubting, that an increase of the powers of production would even then be attended with unmixed advantage. If foreigners are unable or unwilling to furnish equivalents for the products sent abroad, we must relinquish their production, and produce, in their stead, those we intended to import, or substitutes for them. Now, the real question comes to be — if a question can be raised on such a subject — Whether it be advantageous that we should have the means of producing these commodities cheaply, or not? Foreign trade is beneficial, because a country, by exporting the produce of those branches of industry in which it has some peculiar advantage, is able to import the produce of those branches in which the advantage is on the side of the foreigner. But, to ensure this benefit, it is not necessary that the whole capital of the country should be vested in those particular branches. England furnishes better and cheaper cottons than any other country ; but it is not, therefore, contended that she should produce nothing else. Were she able to furnish the same supply of cottons as at present with half the capital and labour, would not her means of producing all other commodities be prodigiously augmented ?

But it is contended, that these means would not be put in requisition ; and that it is impossible so great a saving of labour could take place in a branch of industry employing nearly a million of people, with any rational prospect of such an increase in the demand for labour in other employments, as would take up the hands that would be thrown

idle. As this is an objection which has been reproduced in a thousand different shapes, and on which much stress has been laid, it may be proper to examine it somewhat in detail.

In the *first* place, it may be observed, that an improvement which reduced the price of cottons a half, that is, which enabled half the capital and labour engaged in their manufacture to furnish the same quantity of goods that is now furnished, would not throw the other half wholly out of employment. The demand for cottons, instead of remaining stationary, would, under such circumstances, be very greatly increased. Those who subsist by their labour, and whose command over necessities and luxuries is always comparatively limited, form an immense majority of the population of every country. And any considerable reduction in the price of an article in general use, has uniformly almost been found to extend the demand for it in a still greater proportion. This has been strikingly evinced in the case of the cotton manufacture. It is impossible, perhaps, to name another branch of industry in which the powers of production have been so much increased; and yet the extension of the market consequent on every new invention, has always occasioned the employment of an additional number of hands. Such a farther reduction of price as has been supposed would give a prodigious stimulus to the manufacture. Our cottons would obtain a still more incontestable superiority in every market than they now enjoy, and would be brought within the command of an immensely increased number of consumers. Foreign governments would in vain attempt to prohibit their introduction. Cheap goods never fail of making their way through every barrier, *per medios ire satellites amanti*. In the words of Sir Josiah Child, "They that can give the best price for a commodity, shall never fail to have it by one means or other, notwithstanding the opposition of any laws, or interposition of any power by sea or land; of

such force, subtilty, and violence, is the general course of trade.”¹

But, in the *second* place, it is easy to show that the advantages attending the introduction of machinery do not, as many suppose, depend on the circumstance of the market extending proportionally to the reduction in the price of commodities. They are nearly as great when no such extension can take place. Suppose the price of cottons were reduced a half; if the demand for them were not at the same time extended, half the individuals engaged in their manufacture would, no doubt, be thrown out of that employment; but it is demonstrable that there would, under such circumstances, be a corresponding increase in the demand for the products of other employments. The wealth of the buyers of cottons would not be impaired by their production being facilitated and their price reduced. They would still have the same capitals, and the same revenue. The only difference would be, that they would now purchase with one sovereign, as large a supply of cottons as they previously purchased with two, and that the surplus sovereign would be applied to the purchase of other things. That it would be so applied is certain; for, though we may have enough of one commodity, we can never have what we reckon enough of *all* sorts of commodities. There are no limits to the passion for accumulation:

Nec Cæsi fortuna unquam nec Persica regna
Sufficient animo—

The revenue set free by the fall in cottons would not be permitted to lie idle in our pockets. It would be applied to purchase, either directly by the parties themselves, or indirectly by those to whom they might lend it, an additional quantity of something else. The total effective demand for labour, or the produce of labour, would not, therefore, be in the least degree impaired. Employment would be found for the capital and workmen disengaged

¹ “Discourse about Trade,” p. 129. Ed. 1690.

from the cotton manufacture in the production of the articles for which an equivalent increase of demand had taken place ; so that, after the lapse of such a period as would permit of their transfer to new businesses, labour would be in as great demand as before, at the same time that every individual would get twice the former quantity of cottons for the same quantity of labour, or of any other commodity whose cost had remained constant.

It has, however, been contended,¹ that when machinery is employed to perform work that was previously performed by work-people, the price of the produce is seldom or never diminished to such an extent as to render the reduction of price equivalent to the wages of the labourers thrown out of employment. The invention of machinery, says M. Sismondi, by which cottons could be supplied five per cent below their present prices, would occasion the dismissal of every cotton spinner and weaver in England ; while the increased demand for other commodities, occasioned by this trifling saving, would barely afford employment for five per cent, or *one-twentieth* part of the disengaged hands ; so that were an improvement of this kind to take place, the vast majority of these persons must either be starved outright, or provided for in the workhouse. But, in making this statement, M. Sismondi has neglected one most important element—he has not told us how his machines are produced. If, as he has tacitly assumed, they cost nothing ; if, like atmospheric air, they were the free gift of Providence, and required no labour to procure them—then, instead of prices falling five per cent., they would fall to *nothing* ; and every farthing formerly applied to purchase cottons would be set at liberty, and made available for the purchase of other things. But if, by stating that the introduction of new machinery has reduced the price of cottons five per cent., M. Sismondi meant, as he must have done, that £20,000 vested in an improved machine will produce

¹ Sismondi "Nouveaux Principes," tom. ii. p. 325.

the same supply of cottons as £21,000 employed in the payment of wages, or in the machinery now in use, it is plain, that twenty out of every twenty-one parts of the capital and labour formerly employed in the cotton manufacture will henceforth be employed in the manufacture of machinery, and that the other part will be employed in producing the commodities for which, owing to the fall of five per cent in the price of cottons, a proportionally greater demand will be experienced. In this case, therefore, it is plain that, instead of twenty out of every twenty-one labourers engaged in the cotton manufacture being thrown out of employment, there would not be a single individual in that situation. But as this reasoning proceeds on the supposition that the machines would last only *one* year, M. Sismondi might have contended, that supposing them to be fitted to last *ten* or *twenty* years, there would be a deficiency of employment. The truth, however, is, that the reverse holds; and that, instead of being diminished, the demand for labour would be increased, according to the greater durability of the machines. Suppose profits are ten per cent: when a capital of £20,000 is vested in a machine fitted to last *one* year, the goods produced by it must sell for £22,000, viz. £2000 as profits, and £20,000 to replace the machine itself. But were the machine fitted to last *ten* years, then the goods produced by it, instead of selling for £22,000 would only sell for £3254, viz. £2000 as profits, and £1254 to accumulate as an annuity for ten years, to replace the original capital of £20,000. Hence it appears, that by introducing a machine, constructed with an equal capital, which should last *ten* years instead of *one* year, the price of the commodities produced by it would be sunk to about *one-seventh* part of their former price. Hence the consumers of cottons would, by means of their equally increased demand for other articles, afford, in future, employment for *six-sevenths* of the disengaged labourers. Nor is this the only effect that would be produced. The proprietor of the machine would have, exclu-

sive of the ordinary profit on his capital, at the end of the first year, an additional stock of £1,254, or one-sixteenth part of the value of his machine, which he must necessarily expend in some way or other in the payment of wages ; at the end of the second year, this additional revenue or stock would be increased to about one-eighth part of the value of the machine ; and, in the latter years of its existence, it is plain that, instead of having declined, the demand for labour would have very nearly *doubled*.

But there is another circumstance which must not be lost sight of in treating this question. A fall in the price of commodities effected by the introduction of improved machinery, while it invariably occasions an increase of consumption, occasions also an increase of capital. A diminution in the cost of an article in extensive demand, is really equivalent to an increase in the revenue of all classes ; and it is difficult to believe that the means of saving should be increased without a greater accumulation taking place. Persons in the middle and upper classes, who have been pretty fully supplied with a high-priced article, do not, when its price is reduced, materially extend their purchases of it. Neither do they, generally speaking, lay out the whole saving on other articles required for immediate use. Many, no doubt, do this ; but many, also, accumulate a portion of the saving, and form out of it a fresh capital. In this way all considerable inventions and discoveries contribute to augment the stock of the country ; and their advantage consists as much, perhaps, in this as in any other circumstance.

It is plain, therefore, that every improvement in machinery increases the aggregate demand for labour ; at the same time that, by reducing their cost, it gives the labouring class, in common with others, a greater command over necessaries and conveniences. It sometimes, no doubt, though rarely, happens, that the introduction of improved machinery is immediately injurious to the labourers in particular departments, and that it sometimes obliges a

greater or smaller number of them to change their employments. In the majority of businesses, this is not, perhaps, so great a hardship as might at first be supposed; for, as they have, for the most part, many things in common, an individual who has attained to any considerable proficiency in one, has seldom much difficulty in employing himself in another. A weaver of woollens easily becomes a weaver of cottons or silks, and conversely; and a worker in brass may, with a little training, become a worker in iron, and so on. But there are instances in which a change of employments may be productive of serious hardship. The case of the hand-loom weavers is, unluckily, one of this description. The facility with which the art of weaving is learned, the lightness of the work, and the freedom from *surveillance* of those engaged in it, make it, notwithstanding the lowness of wages, be followed by a very large class of persons, many of whom are of weakly constitutions, and singularly ill-fitted, from the nature of their employment, for engaging in any thing else. But the probability is, that the spread of power-looms will, in the end, effect the all but total destruction of the weaving business; and there can be no question that society in general, including the labourers, will be materially benefited by the change. No doubt, however, the weavers have, in the meantime, strong claims on the public sympathy; and every practicable means should be tried that may seem most likely to abridge and facilitate the painful state of transition in which they are involved, by introducing their children to other businesses, and by facilitating their emigration, or otherwise.

But, how severe soever, cases of this sort cannot be of permanent duration. In the instance under consideration, it is plain that the means of those who buy the products of the power-looms are not affected by the change; and whatever, therefore, they may save through the reduction of their price will be laid out on other things, the production of which will, in the end, fully absorb the unemployed

hand-loom weavers, at the same time that the cheaper products being brought within the command of new classes of purchasers, the demand for them will be proportionally increased; and this, as already seen, will open a new field for the employment of additional hands in the construction of machinery, and in the subordinate departments connected with the manufacture. It is not, in fact, possible that the improvement of machinery should be in the end otherwise than beneficial to all classes.¹

Mr. Malthus, however, was not satisfied with this reasoning. "In withdrawing capital," he says, "from one employment, and placing it in another, there is almost always a considerable loss. Even if the whole of the remainder were directly employed, it would be less in amount. Though it might yield a greater produce, it would not command the same quantity of labour as before; and, unless more menial servants were used, many persons would be thrown out of employment; and thus the power of the whole capital to command the same quantity of labour would evidently depend upon the contingency of the vacant capitals being withdrawn, *undiminished, from their old occupations*, and finding immediately equivalent employment in others."² This statement implies, that, though the effective demand of the Society would not be diminished by an increased facility of production, (for it is admitted that no such diminution would take place,) yet, unless the fixed capital, which had been rendered useless by the improvement, could be wholly withdrawn, and vested in some other branch, there would be no means of supplying this demand, or of employing the same quantity of labour as before. But this view of the matter proceeds on a mistake, into which it is rather surprising Mr. Malthus should have fallen. A manufacturer's power to employ labour is not measured by the total amount of his capital, but by the amount of that portion only

¹ See Note B, at the end of the Volume.

² "Principles of Political Economy," p. 404.

which is circulating. A capitalist possessed of a hundred steam-engines and of £50,000 of circulating capital, has no greater demand for labour, and does not, in fact, employ a single workman more, than the capitalist who has no machinery, and only £50,000 devoted exclusively to the payment of wages. All this portion could, however, be withdrawn; and as it determines the power to employ labour, it is not necessarily true, that, when capitals are transferred from one business to another, "many persons are thrown out of employment."

An individual who is obliged to move his capital from one business to another, necessarily loses whatever profit he may have derived from such portions of it as cannot be transferred. But the introduction of improved machinery is not to be prevented because the old clumsy machinery previously in use may be superseded, and in part destroyed. Individuals may lose; but society always derives an accession of wealth from the adoption of every device for saving labour. It has been already seen, that neither the power nor the will to purchase commodities is affected by the introduction of improved machines; and as the employment of workmen depends on the amount of circulating capital which may, in all cases, be withdrawn without loss, it would not be diminished by their introduction. Wages would, therefore, continue as high as before, while the fall of prices effected by the saving of labour in production, would make them exchange for a greater share of necessaries and comforts, at the same time that it occasioned a more rapid accumulation. Hence it appears, how much soever it may be at variance with popular opinion, that improvements in machinery are always more advantageous to the labourers, regarded as a class, than to the capitalists. In particular cases they may reduce the profits of the latter, and destroy a portion of their capital; but they cannot, in any case, diminish the average wages of labour, while they must lower the value of commodities, and improve the condition of the labourers.

It is true that, were the foreign demand for cottons and hardware to cease or be greatly reduced, it would be very difficult, or rather, perhaps, impossible, to find equally advantageous employments for the capital and labour that would consequently be disengaged. But though this be a good reason for being cautious about the adoption of any measures that may tend to make our foreign customers try to manufacture for themselves, or to exclude us from their markets, it is not easy to see why it should have led Mr. Malthus to question the advantage of improvements of machinery. An increased facility of production would seem to be quite as advantageous in a country surrounded by Bishop Berkeley's wall of brass, as in one that maintains an extensive intercourse with others. Suppose (which is possible) that foreigners should decline sending us the articles we get from abroad in exchange for cottons, woollens, hardware, and so forth; it is plain that, in such a case, we must either offer them other things, which they may be disposed to accept, or, if that be impossible, we must endeavour to supply ourselves directly with the commodities we have been accustomed to import, or with substitutes for them. Now, should we have to resort to this alternative, and, instead of importing the wines of Portugal, the sugars of the West Indies, and the corn of Poland, be obliged to produce these or equivalent articles at home, is it possible to doubt the vast advantage of the discovery of processes by which we might obtain them, or their substitutes, as cheap or cheaper than before? It has indeed been said, that there are no grounds for supposing that any such discoveries could be made; and we are not disposed to dissent from this opinion. But the question is not, whether they can be made; but whether, if made, they would not be signally beneficial?—and whether every such discovery be not advantageous?

In arguing this question, it has been supposed throughout that the object in constructing a machine is to lower the cost or to increase the quantity of the commodities to

be produced by its agency. But Mr. Ricardo has supposed¹ that a machine might be introduced, not to reduce the cost of commodities, but that it might yield the same, or, at all events, only a very little more nett profit, than was derived from laying out the capital vested in it on labour; and in such a case, its introduction would, no doubt, be injurious to the labourer. To render this more intelligible, let us suppose that profits are 10 per cent, and that a capitalist has £10,000 employed in paying the wages of workmen, who produce as much cloth as sells at the end of the year for £11,000, that is £10,000 to replace the capital, and £1000 as profits. Mr. Ricardo says, that this individual may, with equal advantage to himself, vest his capital in a very durable machine, that will produce only *one-eleventh* part of the cloth, or as much as will yield the £1000 of profits; though, if he do this, it is obvious that all the workmen he employed will be turned adrift, and there will no longer be either a demand for their services, or a fund for their maintenance. But though a case of this sort may be supposed, it may, at the same time, be safely affirmed, that it has never actually occurred, and that it is extremely unlikely it ever should occur. Capitalists resort to machines only when they expect to produce, by their means, the usual supply of commodities with less outlay. Were they to act in the way supposed by Mr. Ricardo, those who had brought 110,000 yards of cloth to market, of which 10,000 were profits, would, in future, bring only these 10,000: so that, under such circumstances, every fresh introduction of machinery would inevitably be followed by a diminished supply of commodities, and a rise of prices! But hitherto, as every one knows, the opposite effects have uniformly followed, and, it may be confidently predicted, will continue to follow, the extension of machinery. No man would choose to vest capital in an engine from which it could not be withdrawn, were it only to yield the

¹ "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation," 3d ed. p. 466.

same, or but a little more profit, than it did when employed in supporting labourers; for this would expose his fortune to very considerable hazard from the caprices of fashion, at the same time that it would greatly lessen his influence and consideration in the country. The case under review is barely possible. In the actual business of the world, machines never lessen, but always augment *gross produce*; for, they are introduced only when it is believed that the demand for the products, in the manufacture of which they are to be employed, may be supplied by their agency at a cheaper rate; and it has been sufficiently proved that while they do this, their introduction cannot inflict any serious injury on the labouring class, but that, on the contrary, it will certainly contribute to their lasting advantage.

It appears, therefore, allowing for the temporary inconveniences resulting, in rare cases, from changes of employments, that the greatest improvements, and the utmost facility of production, can never be injurious, but must always be of the greatest advantage to all classes. “*Augmenter la reproduction annuelle, la porter aussi loin qu'elle peut aller, en débarrassant de toutes entraves, et en animant l'activité des hommes, voilà le grand but que doit se proposer le gouvernement.*”¹ An excess of a particular commodity, or of a few commodities, may be occasionally produced; but it is quite impossible that there should be an excess of every commodity. Setting apart for the moment the influence of sudden changes in the quantity and value of money, and of political regulations, if the market be encumbered and a difficulty be experienced in effecting the sale of commodities, we may be assured that the fault is not in producing too much, but in producing commodities which either do not suit the tastes of the buyers, or which we cannot ourselves consume. If we attend to these two grand requisites, if we produce only such commodities as may be taken off by those to whom

¹ Dignan, “*Essai sur l'Economie Politique*,” p. 134.

they are offered, or such as may be directly available to our own use, we may increase the power of production ten or twenty times, and be as free of all excess as if we diminished it in the same proportion. A glut never originates in an increase of production; but is, in every case, a consequence of the misapplication of productive power, or of the producers not properly adapting their means to their ends. They wished, for example, to obtain silks, and offered cottons in exchange: the holders of silks did not, however, want cottons but woollens. Hence the origin of the glut, which is not occasioned by over-production, but by the production of cottons which were not wanted, instead of woollens which were. Let this error be rectified, and the glut will disappear. Even though the holders of silks should be supplied with cottons, cloth, and every other commodity in the power of the demanders to offer, the principle for which we are contending would not be invalidated; for, if those who want silks cannot obtain them in exchange for woollens, or for such other commodities as they either have or can produce, they will abandon the production of the things which they do not want, and apply themselves to the production of those which they do want, or of substitutes for them. In no case, therefore, can an increased facility of production be attended with inconvenience. We might with equal truth pretend, that we should be inconvenienced by an increased fertility of soil, and an increased salubrity of climate. Such commodities as are carried to market, are produced only that they may be exchanged for others; and the fact of their being in excess, affords a conclusive proof that there is a corresponding deficiency in the supply of those they were intended to buy, or to be exchanged for. A universal glut of all sorts of commodities is impossible: every excess in one class must be countervailed by an equal deficiency in some other class. "To suppose that there may be a production of commodities without a demand, provided these commodities be of the right species, is as absurd as to suppose that the

revenues of the several individuals composing the society may be too great for their consumption.”¹

Before dismissing this subject, it may be observed, that gluts are not unfrequently ascribed to a deficiency of money. But though the quantity of money in circulation determines the *price* of commodities, or their value estimated in money, it does not exercise the smallest influence over the quantity of other commodities for which any one in particular will exchange. It is, however, the acquisition of those others, and not of money, that is the end which every man has in view who carries any thing to market. The money that individuals receive for what they sell, is immediately laid out, either directly by themselves, or indirectly by those to whom they lend it, on purchases: and if it should happen that the produce which one has to dispose of is redundant, while that which he wishes to procure is deficient, he will experience loss and inconvenience. But these, it is obvious, are circumstances that are wholly independent of the value of money. It is, no doubt, true, that sudden changes in its value exert, in consequence of their affecting and varying the terms of existing contracts, a powerful temporary influence over every class of persons, and may occasion the greatest distress; but whether money bear a permanently high or low value, is, in as far as the occurrence of gluts is concerned, of no importance.

It may further be observed, that though no complaint be more common, than that of a scarcity of money, there is hardly one so uniformly ill-founded. Like other valuable products in universal demand, money will always be scarce

¹ “Sketch of the Advance and Decline of Nations,” p. 82. M. Say was the first who showed, in a full and satisfactory manner, that effective demand depends upon production (see his chapter *de Débouchés*;) and that gluts are the result of the misapplication, and not of the increase, of productive power. But the same principle had been noticed by many previous writers: by Dean Tucker, in his “Queries on the Naturalization Bill,” p. 13, published in 1752; by Mengotti, in his “Dissertazione sul Colbertismo,” p. 31, published in 1792; and still more distinctly in the tract just quoted, published in 1795.

to those who cannot afford to buy it, and who are destitute of credit. But when any one who has really valuable produce is unable to get it disposed of, he will, in the vast majority of instances, find the cause in something else than a scarcity of money,—in its having been thrown in too great quantities upon the market, or in an actual, or apprehended falling off in the demand; none of which circumstances would be affected by an increase of currency. However rich, individuals purchase no more of any article than is required to supply their wants; and if more be produced, the surplus must either lie on the hands of the producers, or be sold at a reduced price. It is plainly, therefore, to no purpose to ascribe gluts and revulsions of the market to a permanent deficiency of money. A whist-player might as well ascribe his losses to a deficiency of counters. The miscalculation of producers is, in the absence of fluctuations in the value of money, their real cause; if they produce such articles as others are able and willing to buy, or such as they can themselves make use of, there will be no glut; and if they do not, there will be a glut, though a Potosi were discovered in every county.

It must, however, be borne in mind, that in the previous statements we have taken for granted that the value of money in the countries or districts whose producers have dealings with each other, has been invariable, or that, at all events, it has not been sensibly affected by sudden changes in its quantity and value. These changes may, as already stated, exert a powerful influence; and have frequently, indeed, occasioned the most extensive derangement in the ordinary channels of commercial intercourse. An increase of money occasions a corresponding increase in the prices of commodities, at the same time that it affords additional facilities for obtaining credit, and for indulging in speculation. But the influence of any sudden diminution of the quantity, and consequent rise in the value of money, is usually of a more decided character, and leads sometimes to the most extensive revulsions. Such changes cannot, it is plain,

take place without entailing the most serious losses on all who have on hand considerable stocks of produce ; it is also very apt to involve those who have been carrying on their business by the aid of borrowed money in the most serious difficulties ; and if the rise be very considerable, the influence of the shock given to industry, and the consequent disturbance in the ordinary channels of commercial intercourse, may be such as materially to abridge the power of the society to make their accustomed purchases, and thus to occasion a glut of the market, not only in the country which is the seat of the revulsion, but also in those countries whence she has been accustomed to draw any considerable portion of her supplies. It is almost unnecessary to lay any examples of what is, unfortunately, so common before the reader. Revulsions in the value of money in this country have, over and over again, been productive of wide-spread misery and distress. Probably, however, they have been most injurious in the United States, where indeed they recently, (in 1842,) went far to destroy all public and all private credit. Owing to the vicious nature of the American banking system, the Union is sometimes gorged, as it were, with money ; whereas, at other times, it is reduced almost to a state of barter ! Perhaps no instance is to be found in the history of commerce, of such a wanton over-issue of paper-money, as took place in the United States in 1835 and 1836, when all individuals, how bankrupt soever in fortune and character, had no difficulty in obtaining loans with which to embark in the most gigantic projects. The revulsion which necessarily grew out of this state of things was on an equally extensive scale ; and, besides compelling every bank in the Union to stop payments, it produced a universality of bankruptcy and distress, that has had no parallel, except perhaps in the *denouement* of the Mississippi and Assignat schemes in France. To show its powerful influence in a public point of view, we may state, that the sales of public lands, which in 1836 produced 25,167,833 dollars, produced in 1841, only 2,252,202 dollars ! And

the exports from this country to the United States, which in 1836 amounted to £12,425,605, were reduced in 1840 to £5,283,020 ! This shows, in the most striking manner, the powerful influence that sudden changes in the quantity and value of money exert over commercial transactions, and the wide-spread disorder they seldom fail to occasion. Indeed, the whole of the commercial distress with which the United States has lately been visited, and a very large portion of that which was experienced in this country previously to 1844, is to be ascribed to the sudden diminution of the money afloat in the Union in 1837, and the consequent rise in its value.

This, we may observe by the way, is what Lord Bacon would call an *instantia crucis*, and strikingly exemplifies the vast importance to the well-being of commercial nations of having their monetary systems established on a solid basis ; or on such a basis that the value of bank-notes and other legalized substitutes for specie, shall be always identical with that of the specie they profess to represent ; and it, consequently, shows the value of the measures adopted in this country in this view in 1844.

But, apart from fluctuations in the value of money, it is clear, from what has been previously stated, that the miscalculation of producers, or the misapplication of productive power, is in every case the specific cause of gluts ; and such being the case, we shall now shortly inquire into the circumstances which most commonly occasion this miscalculation or misapplication. In a practical point of view this is an inquiry of much importance.

Miscalculations seem generally to originate in some previous change in the usual proportion between the supply and demand of commodities. Every exertion of industry involves a certain degree of speculation. The individual who buys raw cotton or raw silk, in the intention of manufacturing it into articles of dress or furniture, supposes that the articles, when manufactured, will sell for a price suffi-

cient to indemnify him for his expenses, and to leave the customary profit on his capital. There is, however, a good deal of risk in an adventure of this sort: were the fashion to change while the articles are in preparation, it might be impossible to get them disposed of, except at a considerable loss; or, were new facilities given in the interim to the commerce with countries whence similar articles might be procured, or any discovery made by others which diminished the cost of their production, their price would certainly fall, and the speculation be unprofitable. But, how singular soever, it will be found that miscalculations and gluts are more frequently produced by an increase than by a decline in the demand for produce. Suppose that, owing to the opening of new markets, to a change of fashion, or to any other cause, the demand for hardware were suddenly increased: the consequences of such increased demand would be, that its price would immediately rise, and that the manufacturers, and those having stocks on hand, would realize comparatively high profits. But, unless monopolies prevent or counteract the influence of competition, the rate of profits cannot continue for any considerable period higher or lower in one employment than in others. As soon, therefore, as this rise in the price of hardware had taken place, additional capital would be employed in its production. Those engaged in the trade would endeavour to extend their business by borrowing fresh capital; while some of those engaged in other businesses would withdraw from them, and enter into it. Unluckily, however, it is next to certain that this transfer of capital would not stop at the point when it would suffice to produce the additional supply of hardware at the old prices, but that it would be carried so much farther as to produce a glut, and a consequent revulsion. A variety of causes conspire to produce this effect: the advantages which any class of producers derive from an increased demand for their peculiar produce, are uniformly exaggerated, as well by that portion of themselves who are anxious, in order to improve their credit, to magnify their

gains, as by those engaged in other employments. The adventurous and sanguine, who are particularly disposed to take *omne ignotum pro magifico*, crowd into a business which they readily believe presents the shortest and safest road to wealth and consideration ; at the same time that many of that generally numerous class who have their capitals lent to others, and are waiting until a favourable opportunity occurs for vesting them in some industrious undertaking, are tempted to follow the same course. It occurs to few, that the same causes which impel one or two to enter into a department that is yielding comparatively high profits, are most probably impelling thousands. Confident in his own good fortune, the adventurer leaves a business to which he had been bred, and with which he was well acquainted, to enter as a competitor on a new and untried arena ; while those already engaged in the advantageous business stretch their credit to the utmost, to acquire the means of extending their concerns, and of increasing the supply of the commodity in unusual demand. The result, that every unprejudiced observer would anticipate, almost invariably takes place. A disproportionate quantity of capital being attracted to the lucrative business, a glut of the market, and a ruinous depression of prices, unavoidably follow.

Those who investigate the history of industry, in this or any other country, will find, that a period of *peculiar* prosperity in any one branch is the almost uniform harbinger of mischief. If we turn, for example, to the history of agriculture, the alternation between periods of high prices and great agricultural prosperity, and of low prices and great agricultural distress, is so striking, that it cannot fail to arrest the attention of every one. The high prices of 1800 and 1801 gave an extraordinary stimulus to agricultural industry. Nearly *double* the number of acts of parliament were passed in 1802 for the enclosure and drainage of land that had been passed in any previous year ; and a considerable extent of old land was at the same time subjected to the plough. This extension of cultivation, co-operating

with the improvements that were then entered upon and completed, and with favourable harvests, increased the supply of corn so much, that, in 1804, prices sunk considerably below their previous level ; and an act was then passed, in consequence of the representations made by the agriculturists of their distressed condition, granting them additional protection against foreign competition. The high prices of 1810, 1811, 1812, and 1813, had a precisely similar result. They attracted so much additional capital to the land, and occasioned such an extension of tillage, that we grew, in 1812 and 1813, an adequate supply of corn for our consumption. And, under such circumstances, it is certain that the price of corn must inevitably have fallen, in consequence of the unusually abundant harvest of 1814, though the ports had been entirely shut against importation from abroad.

The history of the West India trade may also be referred to for convincing proofs of the truth of this principle. The devastation of St. Domingo by the Negro insurrection, which broke out in 1792, by first diminishing, and in a very few years entirely annihilating, the supply of about 115,000 hhds. of sugar, which France and the Continent had previously drawn from that island, occasioned an extraordinary rise of prices, and gave a proportional encouragement to its cultivation in other parts. So powerful was its influence in this respect, that Jamaica, which, at an average of the six years preceding 1799, had exported only 83,000 hhds., exported in 1801 and 1802 upwards of 286,000, or 143,000 a-year ! But the duration of this prosperity was as brief as it was signal. The rise of price which produced such effects in the British islands, occasioned a similar, though less rapid, extension of cultivation in the colonies of the continental powers. The increased supplies of sugar and coffee that were in consequence obtained from Cuba, Porto-Rico, Martinique, Guadaloupe, Brazil, &c., became, in no very long time, not only sufficient to fill up the vacuum caused by the cessation of the supplies from St. Domingo, but actually to overload the continental market. The great

foreign demand for British plantation sugar, which had been experienced after the destruction of the St. Domingo trade, gradually diminished until 1805 or 1806, when it almost entirely ceased; and the whole extra quantity, raised in consequence of that demand, being thrown upon the home market, its price, which had been 66s. a cwt. in 1798, exclusive of duty, fell, in 1806, to 34s; a price which the Committee that was then appointed by the House of Commons to inquire into the distresses of the planters, states, was not only insufficient to yield them any profit, but even to indemnify them for their actual outlay. And we may add, that, owing to the ill-advised measures which were soon after adopted for creating a forced demand for sugar, by substituting it instead of barley in the distillery, its supply was prevented from being diminished in proportion to the diminution of the effective demand; so that, some short intervals only excepted, the planters were long after involved in difficulties.¹

The history of the silk-trade, of distillation, and, indeed, of every branch of industry, furnishes but too many proofs of the constant operation of this principle. The greater and more signal the peculiar prosperity of any one department, the greater, invariably, is the subsequent recoil. Such an increased demand for any commodity as would raise its price 10 per cent above the common level, would certainly make it be produced in excess, and would in consequence occasion a revulsion. But were the price to rise 30 or 40 per cent above the common level, the temptation to employ additional capital in its production would be so very great, that the revulsion would both take place sooner, and be incomparably more severe.

Revolutions of the sort now described will necessarily occur, to a greater or less extent, under all systems of public economy. Perhaps, however, there is nothing that would tend so much to lessen their frequency and violence as a

¹ Spence on the "Distresses of the West India Planters," p. 7-26.

determination on the part of government to withhold all relief, except in extreme cases, from those who have the misfortune to be involved in them. It must, indeed, be acknowledged that this seems, at first sight, a harsh doctrine; but, on examination, it will be found to be the only safe and really practicable line of conduct that government can follow. Some most objectionable restrictions and prohibitions originated in government stepping out of its proper province and interfering to relieve those who had got themselves entangled in difficulties. Much of the industry of this and other countries was consequently placed on an insecure foundation; and, notwithstanding the reforms that have been effected, a good deal is still in that situation. The natural responsibility under which every man should act, was weakened in the case of large classes of producers, who became less considerate because of their trusting to the support usually afforded by government in the event of their speculations giving way. Were it possible, indeed, to grant such assistance without injury to the rest of the community, none would object to it; but as this cannot be done, it would appear, not only that sound policy, but also that real humanity, would dictate the propriety of its being systematically withheld.

The establishment of a free commercial system would be the next best thing that could be done to prevent improvident speculations. Under such a system, nations would engage only in those branches of industry for the prosecution of which they had some natural or acquired advantage, and which would, in consequence, be comparatively secure against those unfavourable contingencies that are always affecting businesses fenced round with restrictions. In illustration of this statement, we may observe, that foreign silk goods, that were formerly either prohibited, or charged with an oppressive duty, are at present admitted under a moderate duty of 15 per cent *ad valorem*; and we now export supplies of all those mixed fabrics of wool and silk, and of gloves and hosiery, in the production of which

we have an advantage; at the same time that the greater part of our demand for fancy and other descriptions of light silk goods is supplied by the foreigner. If, on the one hand, therefore, the demand for silks should, through a change of fashion, or any other cause, suddenly increase, the competition of the foreign manufacturers will prevent prices attaining any very extravagant height, and will thereby prevent the inordinate extension of the manufacture, in the first place, and its subsequent recoil; and if, on the other hand, the demand for silks in this country happen to decline, the various foreign markets resorted to by our manufacturers will give them the means of disposing of their surplus goods at a small reduction of price compared to what would take place were they confined to the home market.

This reasoning is consistent with the most comprehensive experience. Restrictions and prohibitions are uniformly productive of uncertainty and fluctuation. Every artificial stimulus, whatever may be its momentary effect on the department of industry to which it is applied, is immediately disadvantageous to others, and ultimately injurious even to that which it was intended to promote. No arbitrary regulation, no act of the legislature, can add any thing to the capital of the country; it can only force it into artificial channels. And, after a sufficient supply has flowed into them, a *reaction* must commence. There can be no foreign vent for their surplus produce; so that, whenever changes of fashion occasion a falling off in the demand, the warehouses are filled with commodities which, in a state of freedom, would not be produced. The ignorant and the interested always ascribe such gluts to the employment of machinery, or to the want of sufficient protection against foreign competition. The truth is, however, that they are most frequently the results of an artificial and exclusive system, by which the natural and healthy state of the public economy is vitiated and deranged.

CHAPTER VIII.

Population proportioned to the Means of Subsistence—Moral Restraint—Capacity of the Principle of Population to repair the Ravages of Plagues and Famines—Comparative Increase of Population in New and Old-settled Countries—Law of Increase a powerful Incentive to Industry—Promotes the Civilisation and Happiness of Mankind—Practice of Infanticide—Foundling Hospitals.

THE circumstances most favourable for the production of wealth being thus traced and exhibited, we shall now shortly investigate those that appear to determine the increase and diminution of man himself.

From the remotest period down to our own times, it was the policy of legislators to give an artificial stimulus to population, by encouraging early marriages, and bestowing rewards on those who brought up the greatest number of children.¹ But the mischievous nature of such interferences has been shown by Mr Malthus; who, though without any claim to the discovery of the tendency of population to keep up with or to outrun the means of subsistence, was certainly the first to establish it by an extensive induction of facts, and to point out some of its more important effects. His researches have made it manifest, that every increase in the numbers of a people, occasioned by artificial expe-

¹ By a singular contradiction, at the very moment that the Roman laws authorised the exposure of infants, and vested fathers with the power to decide whether they should bring up their children, the censors were instructed to impose a tax (*æs uxorium*) on bachelors; and different laws were passed, bestowing various privileges upon those who reared the greatest number of children. The famous *Lex Papia Poppæa*, (so called from the consuls M. Papius Mutilus and Q. Poppæus Secundus, by whom it was introduced,) enacted during the reign of Augustus, exempted such Roman citizens as had three children from all public charges and contributions.—TERASSON, "*Histoire de la Jurisprudence Romaine*," p. 56.

dients, and which is not either preceded or accompanied by a corresponding increase of the means of subsistence, can be productive only of misery, or of increased mortality; that the difficulty never is to bring human beings into the world, but to feed, clothe, and educate them when there; that mankind *do* every where increase their numbers, till their multiplication is restrained by the difficulty of providing subsistence, and the poverty of some part of the society; and that, consequently, instead of attempting to strengthen the principle of increase, we should rather endeavour to strengthen the principles by which it is controlled and regulated.

If the efforts most governments have made to increase population were not positively pernicious, it is pretty evident that they were, at least, uncalled-for and unnecessary. Man does not require any adventitious inducement to enter into matrimonial connexions. He is impelled to engage in them by one of the most powerful instincts implanted in his nature. Still, however, this instinct or passion is, in civilised communities, controlled in a greater or less degree by prudential considerations. To occasion a marriage, it is not always enough that the parties should be attached to each other. The obligation to provide for the children that may be expected to spring from it, is one that cannot fail to awaken the forethought, and to influence the conduct, of all but the most improvident and thoughtless. If the situation of those who might be disposed to enter into a matrimonial alliance be such as to preclude all reasonable expectation of their being able to bring up and educate their children, without exposing themselves to privations, or to the risk of being cast down to a lower place in society, they may, not improbably, either relinquish all thoughts of forming a union, or postpone it till a more convenient opportunity. No doubt, there are very many individuals in every country unaffected by such considerations, and who, seeing the future through the deceitful medium of the passions, are not deterred from gratifying their inclinations by any fear

of the consequences. Others, however, are more prudent ; and it is abundantly certain, that the greater number of persons in the more elevated stations of life, as well as of those who are peculiarly ambitious of rising in the world, and those of all ranks who have learned to look to the consequences of their actions, are invariably influenced, to some extent or other, by the circumstances alluded to. Hence, in civilised countries, the proportion of marriages to the population may fairly be expected, on general grounds, to depend, in a considerable degree, on the facility of acquiring subsistence, or of bringing up a family : and experience shows that such is the case ; for it is found, that where food and other accommodations are abundant, marriages are at once early and numerous, and conversely. “Partout,” says Montesquieu, “où il se trouve une place où deux personnes peuvent vivre commodément, il se fait un mariage. La nature y porte assez lorsqu’elle n’est point arrêtée par la difficulté de la subsistance.”¹ The same principle has been laid down by Smith :—“The demand for men,” says he, “like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men, quickens it when it goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances too fast. It is this demand which regulates and determines the state of population in all the different countries of the world—in North America, in Europe, and in China ; which renders it rapidly progressive in the first, slow and gradual in the second, and altogether stationary in the last.”² The most comprehensive observation confirms the truth of this statement. Those who inquire into the past and present state of the world, will find that the population of all countries has been principally determined by their means of subsistence. Whenever these have been increased, population has also been increased, or been better provided for ; and when they have been diminished, the population has been

¹ “Esprit de Loix,” liv. xxiii. cap. 10.

² “Wealth of Nations,” p. 36.

worse provided for, or has sustained an actual diminution of numbers, or both effects have followed.

But notwithstanding the influence of prudential considerations, or of the checks to marriage from the fear of not being able to provide for a family, the principle of increase is so very strong, as not only to keep the population of the most favoured countries, or of those in which industry is most productive, on a level with the means of subsistence, but to give it a tendency to exceed them. This arises partly and principally from the little attention paid by most individuals to whatever does not begin to be felt till some future and undefined period—a circumstance which leads them to engage in improvident unions, at the same time that it hinders them from making adequate provision, even when they have the means, against sickness and old age; partly from the violence of passion, occasionally subverting the resolutions of those who are most considerate; and partly from accident or misfortune, disappointing the expectations of those who married with a reasonable prospect of being able to support themselves and their families. The number of the poor may be diminished, but it were vain to expect that they should ever entirely “cease out of the land.” Even in those countries that are making the most rapid advances, not a few of the inhabitants have to maintain a constant struggle with poverty, and are but insufficiently supplied with the articles indispensable for the support of a family. But when the natural tendency to increase is so very powerful, it is not easy to believe that the attempts to promote it by artificial stimuli can be otherwise than pernicious. Subsistence is the grand desideratum. If it be supplied in sufficient abundance, population may safely be left to take care of itself. Instead of there being the least risk of its falling below the means of subsistence, the danger is all on the other side. There are no limits to the prolific power of plants and animals. They are endued with a principle which impels them to increase their numbers beyond the nourishment prepared for them. The whole

surface of the earth might be gradually covered with shoots derived from a single plant ; and though it were destitute of all other inhabitants, it might, in a few ages, be replenished from a single nation, or even from a single pair.

“ Throughout the animal and vegetable kingdoms,” says Mr Malthus, “ nature has scattered the seeds of life with a most profuse and liberal hand : but has been comparatively sparing in the room and nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained in this earth, if they could freely develop themselves, would fill millions of worlds in the course of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious, all-pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds. The race of plants and the race of animals shrink under this great restrictive law, and man cannot by any efforts of reason escape from it.”¹

Wars, plagues, and epidemics, those “ terrible correctives,” as Dr Short justly terms them, of the redundancy of mankind, set the operation of the principle of population in the most striking point of view. They lessen the number of the inhabitants, without, in most cases, proportionally lessening the capital that feeds and maintains them. And the increased power over subsistence that is thus acquired by the survivors, accelerates the period of marriage and the rate of increase. The Netherlands, which has been so often the seat of the most destructive wars, has, after a respite of a few years, always appeared as rich and populous as ever. Notwithstanding the massacres of the Revolution, and the sanguinary wars in which France was incessantly engaged for more than twenty years, her population was considerably augmented in the interval between the expulsion and the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. The abolition of the restraints previously laid on internal commerce, of the feudal privileges of the nobles, and of several oppressive and unequal burdens, improved the condition and stimulated the industry of the people. The means of sub-

¹ “ Essay on Population,” vol. i. p. 3. 5th ed.

sistence were thus considerably increased ; at the same time that the continued drafts for the military service, by lessening the supply of labour in the market, and raising the rate of wages, gave such a stimulus to the principle of increase, that at the close of the war the population was supposed to be about three millions greater than in 1789. The establishment of a tyrannical or vicious system of government, by paralyzing industry and diminishing the supplies of food and other accommodations, necessarily occasions a corresponding diminution in the number of inhabitants. But an accidental calamity, such as a war or a pestilence, how afflicting soever to humanity, does not appear to exercise any lasting influence over population ; though the void, occasioned by its occurrence, be not so rapidly filled up as some have imagined. The bigotry and oppressiveness of the government, and the want of security and freedom, and not the plague, are the real causes of the depopulation of Turkey, Persia, and other Mohammedan countries.

The progress of population in countries with different capacities for providing food and other accommodations, illustrates, at once, the operation of the law of increase, and the degree in which it is modified by a change of circumstances. In newly-settled countries, and especially in those which have a large extent of fertile and unoccupied land, population invariably increases with extraordinary rapidity. The settlers in such countries bring with them the arts practised in others in a comparatively advanced state of civilisation ; and as they apply them to the culture of the best soils, they necessarily obtain a very large return. Each cultivator in such societies has not only a great deal more corn and other raw produce than he can consume ; but, as this produce is raised at a much less cost than in old settled countries, where inferior soils are under cultivation, he is able to exchange part of it, with the greatest advantage, for the manufactured goods of the latter ; so that the society rapidly increases in wealth, and has a proportionally great demand for labour. There is, consequently,

in such countries, every motive to form early marriages ; while the comfortable situation of the parents enables them to bestow due attention on the rearing of their children, and lessens the mortality so destructive in the early period of life.

The truth of what has now been stated is proved by the rapid progress made by the Greek colonies in antiquity, which, in no long time, equalled, and in some cases far surpassed, their mother cities in population, power, and importance ; and it is still more convincingly proved by the extraordinary progress of the colonies founded in modern times in America and Australia. The population of some of the states of North America has, after making every reasonable allowance for immigrants, continued for upwards of a century to double in every twenty, or, at most, five-and-twenty years ! And there seems little reason to doubt, had the supplies of food and other articles necessary for the accommodation of man been increased in a more rapid proportion, that population would have kept pace with their progress. But without entering upon any hypothetical reasonings as to what might have been the progress of population in the United States under other circumstances, its actual increase shows that when the means of subsistence are supplied in sufficient abundance, the principle of increase is powerful enough to make population increase in a geometrical proportion, or in the ratio of the numbers 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, &c., the term of doubling being five-and-twenty years.

But the principle, whose operation under favourable circumstances has thus developed itself, is, in the language of geometers, a *constant* quantity. The same power that doubles the population of Kentucky, Illinois, and New South Wales every five-and-twenty years, exists every where, and is equally energetic in England, France, and Holland. Man, however, is not the mere unreasoning slave of instinct. The facility with which he can command supplies of food and other accommodations in the countries now

referred to is widely different; and this difference has a corresponding influence over the conduct of the bulk of their inhabitants. In densely-peopled countries, such as Britain, France, and Holland, the more fertile lands having been, long since, brought under tillage, recourse must now be had to those of inferior quality, requiring greater outlays of capital and labour to make them yield the same quantity of produce. This decrease in the fertility of the land may, no doubt, be, and indeed very frequently is, countervailed to a greater or less extent by the influence of improvements. But this influence is, uniformly, overcome in the end; bad or inferior lands are taken into cultivation; and the ability to increase supplies of food, after population becomes pretty dense, as rapidly as when it is comparatively thin, being diminished, a corresponding check is given to the increase of population; so that, instead of being doubled in five-and-twenty years, it may not be doubled in less than fifty or a hundred, or upwards. Such, however, is the wise arrangement of Providence, that this change in the circumstances under which they are placed, never fails to bring along with it a corresponding change in the habits of the people, so that their numbers are proportioned to the greater difficulty experienced in procuring supplies of food, not by an increase of mortality, but by a diminution of births. The prudential considerations, previously alluded to, gain new strength, and exhibit their powerful influence in a still more striking manner, according as the circumstances under which a people is placed become less favourable for their multiplication. In the United States every industrious individual who has attained a marriageable age may enter into the matrimonial contract without fear of the consequences; the largest family being there an advantage rather than otherwise. But such is not the case here; nor will it be the case in America after she has become comparatively populous. And hence the different habits of our people; and the fact that marriages in England, and generally throughout Europe, are mostly deferred to a later period than in newly-settled

countries, and that a much larger proportion of the population find it expedient to pass their lives in a state of celibacy. And it is fortunate that such is the case, and that the good sense of the people, and their laudable desire to preserve their place in society, have made them control the violence of their passions. Man cannot increase beyond the means of subsistence provided for his support : and it is obvious, that if the tendency to multiplication, in countries advanced in the career of civilisation, and where there is, in consequence, an increased difficulty of providing additional supplies of food, were not checked by the prevalence of moral restraint, or of prudence and forethought, it would be checked by the prevalence of vice, misery, and famine. There is no alternative. The population of every country has the power, supposing food to be adequately supplied, to go on doubling every five-and-twenty years. But as the limited extent and limited fertility of the soil render it impossible to go on permanently producing food in this ratio, it is obvious, unless the passions were moderated, and a check given to the increase of population, that the standard of human subsistence would be reduced to the lowest assignable limit ; and that famine and pestilence would be perpetually at work to relieve the population of wretches born only to be starved.

The only criterion, then, of a beneficial increase in the population of a country, is an increase in the means of its subsistence. If these means be not increased, an increase in the number of births can be productive only of increased misery and mortality. " Other circumstances being the same," says Malthus, " it may be affirmed, that countries are *populous* according to the quantity of food they can produce or acquire ; and *happy*, according to the liberality with which this food is divided, or the quantity which a day's labour will purchase. Corn countries are more populous than pasture countries, and rice countries more populous than corn countries. But their happiness does not depend either upon their being more or less densely peopled, upon

their poverty or their riches, their youth or their age, but on the proportion which the population and the food bear to each other.”¹

Mr Malthus did not lay sufficient stress on the influence of the circumstances under which population is placed, and of the prudential considerations which they invariably bring along with them, in determining the rate of increase; and they have been all but overlooked by several of his followers. Hence the theory of population gave rise for a while to the most unreasonable fears and unfounded conclusions. It was said to be at variance with the best-established doctrines as to the goodness of the Deity, and to oppose an insuperable barrier to any lasting improvement in the condition of the bulk of society. Population, it was affirmed, invariably rises to the highest level of subsistence, so that in the end the greatest improvements merely leave a greater instead of a smaller number of wretched families. But the principle of increase is not the bugbear, the invincible obstacle to all real improvement, supposed by those who put forth such statements.

It is always a difficult matter suddenly to change the habits of a people with respect to marriage; and though they are, no doubt, influenced by every change in their condition, a *vis inertiae* has to be overcome, that usually prevents them from changing to the extent that circumstances change. Suppose that, in consequence of the introduction of some new species of vegetable, some new or more powerful manure, or some other cause, the average annual produce of our agriculture were doubled, this would certainly increase the number of marriages; but there is no reason to think they would be doubled; and though they were for a year or two immediately following the increase, they could hardly be so for more. But whatever might be the influence of the change on marriages, the population could not be doubled for very many years; and a period of at least eighteen or

¹ “Essay on Population,” vol. ii. p. 214.

twenty years would have to elapse before the stimulus given by the improved condition of the population could bring a single fresh labourer into the field. It is clear, therefore, that during all this lengthened period, the labouring class would enjoy an increased command over necessities and conveniences; their notions of what is required for their comfortable and decent subsistence would consequently be raised; and they would acquire those improved tastes and habits that are not the hasty product of a day, a month, or a year, but the late result of a long series of continuous impressions. There would, in consequence, be a greater prevalence of moral restraint; and the increase of population would be adjusted, so as permanently to maintain the bulk of the people in possession of their augmented comforts.

A fact mentioned by Sussmilch, and referred to in the former editions of this work, has been much relied on by those who contend that population is always sure not merely to increase, but to increase exactly in the same proportion that the means of subsistence are augmented. Sussmilch states, that the marriages in a district of Prussia amounted, during the six years ending with 1708, to 6,082 a-year. In 1709 and 1710 this district was visited by a severe plague, which is said to have swept off about a third part of the population; and yet, notwithstanding this excessive mortality, in 1711, the first year after it had subsided, the marriages amounted to 12,028, or to nearly double their amount previously to the pestilence! This is a greater immediate increase than we should have anticipated; and, perhaps, were we acquainted with all the facts, there might be circumstances to explain it. But the number of marriages immediately fell off; and they did not again rise to their amount previously to the plague, till about 1750, or forty years after it had laid waste the district.¹ It is really, therefore, the greatest imaginable error to suppose that any sudden and considerable diminution of the population can be rapidly

¹ See Sussmilch's table in Malthus on Population, 5th ed., vol. ii. p. 170.

filled up. This can only be effected in a long course of years ; and during that period, the comforts of the inhabitants being increased, they acquire improved tastes and habits, so that the population does not again approach so near the level of subsistence.

That the tendency to increase is not inconsistent with the improvement of society, is a fact as to which there can be no dispute. Without going back to antiquity, let any one compare the state of this or of any other European country 500 or 100 years ago, with its present state, and he will be satisfied that prodigious advances have been made ; that the means of subsistence have increased more rapidly than the population ; and that the labouring classes are now generally in the possession of a great variety of conveniences and luxuries that were formerly not enjoyed even by the richest lords : and it would be unphilosophical to suppose that the case should be different in time to come ; that those circumstances which have hitherto confined the increase of population within proper limits, and occasioned the improvement of society, should lose their influence, or that society should cease to advance.

In point of fact, however, the principle of increase is not merely consistent with the continued improvement of the bulk of society, but is itself the great cause of this improvement, and of the wonderful progress made in the arts. Not only are industry and forethought natural to man, but his advancement depends on their culture and improvement. We should infallibly die of hunger and cold, did we not exert ourselves to provide food and clothes. But could any thing be more absurd than to object to those who simply state a fact of this sort, that they are impeaching the order of Providence ? The powers and capacities implanted in man seem capable of an almost indefinite improvement ; but instinct did not direct him in their use. The more remote the epoch to which we carry our researches, the more barbarous and uncomfortable do we find his condition. Pressed,

on the one side, by the strong hand of necessity, and stimulated, on the other, by a desire to rise in the world, our powers have been gradually developed according as observation or accident taught us the best method of effecting our ends. *Want* and *ambition* are the powerful springs that gave the first impulse to industry and invention, and which continually prompt to new undertakings. It is idle to suppose that men will be industrious without a motive; and though the desire of bettering our condition be a very powerful one, it is less so than the pressure of want, or the fear of falling to an inferior station. Were this not the case, invention and industry would be exhibited in the same degree by the heirs of ample fortunes, as by those educated in humbler circumstances and compelled to exert themselves. But every one knows that the fact is not so. The peerage cannot boast of having given birth to an Arkwright, a Watt, or a Wedgwood. Extraordinary exertions, whether of mind or body, are rarely made by those who are able, without their assistance, to live comfortably. The principle of increase has, however, prevented this from ever becoming the condition of a large portion of mankind, and unceasingly applies the most powerful stimulus—the *duris urgens in rebus egestas*—to industry and invention. Much, indeed, of the effect usually ascribed to the desire of rising in the world, may be traced to the operation of this principle. It is not solely on the lower classes, nor by the actual pressure of necessity, that it exerts its beneficial influence. At that period of life when habits are formed, and man is best fitted for active pursuits, a prospect is presented to every one, whatever his rank or station, who is either married, or intends to marry, of an indefinite increase of his necessary expenses; and unless his fortune be very large indeed, he finds that economy and industry are virtues which he must not admire merely, but practise. With the lower classes the existence of present, and with the middle and upper classes the fear of future want, are the principal motives that stimulate intelligence and activity. The desire to maintain

a family in respectability and comfort, or to advance their interests, makes the spring and summer of life be spent, even by the moderately wealthy, in laborious enterprises. And thus it is that, either for ourselves, or for those with whose welfare our own is inseparably connected, the principle of increase is perpetually urging individuals to new efforts of skill and economy. Had this principle not existed, or been comparatively feeble, activity would have been superseded by indolence, and men, from being enterprising and ambitious, would have sunk into a state of torpor; for in that case, every additional acquisition, whether of skill or wealth, would, by lessening the necessity for fresh acquisitions, have infallibly occasioned a decline in the spirit of improvement; so that, instead of proceeding, as it became older, with accelerated steps in the career of discovery, the fair inference is, that society would either have been entirely arrested in its progress, or its advance rendered next to imperceptible. But it is so ordered that, whatever may at any time occasion a decline of the inventive powers, must be of an accidental and ephemeral character, and cannot originate in a diminution of the advantages resulting from their exercise. Even in the most improved societies, the principle of increase inspires by far the largest class—those who depend on their labour for the means of support—with all those powerful motives to contrive, produce, and accumulate, that actuated the whole community in more early ages. No people can rest satisfied with acquisitions already made. The increase of population, though generally subordinate to the increase of food, is always sufficiently powerful to keep invention on the stretch, rendering the demand for fresh inventions and discoveries as great at one time as at another, and securing the forward progress of the species. A deficiency of subsistence at home leads to migrations to distant countries; and thus not only provides for the gradual occupation of the earth, but carries the languages, arts, and sciences of those who have made the farthest advances in civilisation to those that are comparatively bar-

barous. It may perhaps, happen, though we doubt whether it be possible to specify any instance of the kind, that population should continue, for a while, so far to outrun production, that the condition of society is changed for the worse. But, if so, the evils thence arising will bring with them a provision for their cure: they will make all classes better acquainted with the circumstances which determine their situation; and while they call forth fresh displays of invention and economy, they will, at the same time, dignify and exalt the character, by teaching us to exercise the prudential virtues, and to subject the passions to the control of reason.

It does, therefore, seem reasonable to conclude, that the law of increase, as previously explained, is in every respect consistent with the beneficent arrangements of Providence; and that, instead of being subversive of human happiness, it has increased it in no ordinary degree. Happiness is not to be found in apathy and idleness, but in zeal and activity. It depends far more on the intensity of the pursuit than on the attainment of the end. The "progressive state" is justly characterised by Smith "as being in reality the cheerful and hearty state to all the different orders of society; the stationary is dull, the declining melancholy." But had the principle of increase been less strong, the progress of society would have been less rapid. While, however, its energy is, on the one hand, sufficient to bring every faculty of the mind and body into action, it is, on the other, so far subject to control, that, speaking generally, its beneficial far outweigh its pernicious consequences.

To suppose, as some have done, that the astonishing improvements in the arts, and the all but immeasurable additions that have in consequence been made to the comforts and enjoyments of man, would have been equal or greater had the principle of increase been less powerful, is, in truth, equivalent to supposing, that industry and invention would not be affected by weakening the motives to their exercise, and lessening the advantages of which they are productive! There might, perhaps, though that be very doubtful, have

been less squalid poverty amongst the dregs of the population, had there been no principle of increase; but it is a contradiction to pretend, had such really been the case, that the powers and resources of industry would have been so astonishingly developed, that scientific investigations would have been prosecuted with equal perseverance and zeal, that so much wealth would have been accumulated by the upper and middle classes, or that the same circumstances which impelled society forward in its infancy, should have continued, in every subsequent age, to preserve their energy unimpaired: and it may well be doubted whether an exemption from the evils incident to poverty would not be dearly purchased, even by the lowest classes, by the sacrifice of the hopes and fears attached to their present condition, and the gratification they now reap from successful industry, economy, and forbearance.

If these conclusions be well founded, it follows that the schemes proposed in the ancient and modern world for directly repressing population, besides being, for the most part, atrocious and disgusting, have really been opposed to the ultimate objects their projectors had in view. Could we subject the rate of increase to any easily applied physical control, few, comparatively, among the poorer classes, would be inclined to burden themselves with the task of providing for a family; ¹ and the most effective stimulus to exertion being destroyed, society would gradually sink into apathy and languor. It is, therefore, to the principle of moral restraint, or to the exercise of the prudential virtues, that we should exclusively trust for the regulation of the increase of population. In an instructed society, where there are no institutions favourable to improvidence, this check is sufficiently powerful to confine the progress of population within due limits, at the same time that it is not so powerful as to hinder it from uniformly operating as the strongest incentive to industry and economy.

¹ The readiness with which the lower classes send their children to foundling hospitals seems a sufficient proof of this.

Those who wish to enter more at large into the discussion of the interesting topics now briefly touched upon, would do well to consult the second volume of the valuable work of Dr Sumner, Archbishop of Canterbury, on the "Records of the Creation." This learned prelate has not endeavoured "to show that the human race is in the best conceivable condition, or that no evils accompany the law which regulates their increase; but that this law makes, upon the whole, an effectual provision for their general welfare, and that the prospective wisdom of the Creator is distinguishable in the establishment of an ordinance which is no less beneficial in its collateral effects, than it is efficacious in accomplishing the first and principal design of its enactment."¹

"If then," says the Archbishop in another place, "the wisdom is to be estimated by the fitness of the design to its purpose, and the habitual exercise of the energies of mankind is allowed to be that purpose, enough has been said to confirm the original proposition. The Deity has provided, that by the operation of an instinctive principle in our nature, the human race should be uniformly brought into a state in which they are forced to exert and improve their powers: the lowest rank to obtain support; the one next in order to escape from the difficulties immediately beneath it; and all the classes upwards, either to keep their level, while they are pressed on each side by rival industry, or to raise themselves above the standard of their birth by useful exertions of their activity, or by successful cultivation of their natural powers. If, indeed, it were possible that the stimulus arising from this principle should be suddenly removed, it is not easy to determine what life would be except a dreary blank, or the world except an uncultivated waste. Every exertion to which civilisation can be traced, proceeds, directly or indirectly, from its effects; either from the actual desire of having a family, or the pressing obligation of providing for

¹ "Records of the Creation," vol. ii. p. 160. 4th ed.

one, or from the necessity of rivalling the efforts produced by the operation of these motives in others.”¹

However inexplicable it may now seem, it is a fact no less true than melancholy, that the practice of infanticide has prevailed to a very great extent even in some highly civilised countries. It may, indeed, be said to have been general throughout the ancient world. The laws of Sparta ordered that every child that was either weakly or deformed should be put to death.² And this practice was not merely legalised by the savage enactments of a barbarous code, but was vindicated by the ablest Greek philosophers. Aristotle, in his work on government, does not so much as insinuate a doubt of the propriety of destroying such children as are maimed or deformed, and carries still farther his “stern decisions,” as they are gently termed by Dr Gillies.³ Even the “divine” Plato did not scruple to recommend the same monstrous practices. Thebes alone, of all the Grecian cities, seems to have been free from this infamy.⁴ The existence of infanticide in Athens is established beyond a doubt, by the allusions of the poets, and their descriptions of the prevailing manners.⁵

Every one is aware that a Roman citizen had the unrestrained power of life and death over his children, whatever might be their age. And there are abundant examples to prove that this right was not suffered to fall into disuse, but was frequently exercised with the most unrelenting severity.⁶

¹ “Records of the Creation,” vol. ii. p. 152. 4th ed.

² Cragius “de Republicâ Lacedæmoniorum,” lib. iii. cap. 2.

³ Aristotle’s “Ethics and Politics,” by Dr Gillies, vol. ii. p. 287. 3d edition.

⁴ “Travels of Anacharsis,” vol. iii. p. 277. Eng. ed.

⁵ Gouroff, “Essai sur l’Histoire des Enfans Trouvés,” p. 19.

⁶ “Les Romains ne mirent point des bornes à l’empire des pères sur leurs enfans ; quelque âge qu’ils eussent, et à quelque dignité qu’ils fussent élevés, ils étoient toujours soumis à la correction de leurs pères. Ceux-ci avoient droit de les frapper, de les envoyer enchainés cultiver la terre, de les déshériter, de les vendre comme des esclaves, et même de leur donner la mort.”—TERASSON, *Histoire de la Jurisprudence Romaine*, p. 54.

At the birth of a child the father decided whether he should bring it up (*tollere*) or expose it. But it did not always happen that exposed children lost their lives. It was common to expose them in public places, where there was a chance of their attracting the notice of the benevolent, who might be incited to undertake the task of bringing them up. The greater number of these unhappy creatures were not, however, so fortunate as to fall into the hands of persons of this sort. They were declared by law to be the slaves, or absolute property, of those by whom they were reared. And several were saved from death, not from humane motives, but that their foster-fathers might, by mutilating their persons, and exhibiting them in the streets, derive an infamous livelihood from the alms given them by the passers. This detestable practice seems to have been carried on pretty extensively; and if any thing could, more strikingly than the practice itself, display the sanguinary manners of the Romans, it would be the fact, that there is in Seneca a lengthened discussion of the question, Whether the mutilation of exposed children can be deemed an offence against the state? which is conducted with the greatest imaginable coolness, and decided in the negative, upon the ground of their being slaves! "*Gallio fecit illam questionem. An in expositis lædi possit respublica? Non potest, inquit. An lædi possit in aliquâ suâ parte? Hæc nulla reipublicæ pars est; non in censu illos invenies, non in testamentis.*"¹

The period when the practice of infanticide was prohibited at Rome is not well ascertained; but the more probable opinion seems to be, that it continued till the 374th year of the Christian era. The exposure of children was, however, practised long afterwards. Constantine made some ineffectual efforts to provide for these unfortunates; but their slavery continued till the year 530, when it was abolished by an edict of Justinian.

Infanticide has, most properly, been made a capital crime

¹ "Senecæ Controversæ," lib. v. cap. 33.

in all modern states; and to take away the motives to its perpetration, and at the same time to provide an asylum for such poor children as might be exposed through the inhumanity or poverty of their parents, foundling hospitals have been very generally established. But there are the best reasons for thinking that the influence of these establishments has been incomparably more pernicious than beneficial. That they have prevented a few cases of infanticide is, perhaps, true; but the facility for the disposal of children which they afford, weakens the principle of moral restraint, and increases the number of illegitimate unions and births, at the same time that it occasions a prodigious sacrifice of infant life. The mortality in foundling hospitals is quite excessive. They open wide their doors for the reception of deserted and illegitimate children, but there are *pauca vestigia retrorsum*. In the Foundling Hospital at Dublin, of 12,786 children admitted during the six years ending with 1797, there were no fewer than 12,561 deaths! It appears, says M. de Chateauneuf, from the official reports, that the mortality amongst foundlings at Madrid, in 1817, was at the rate of 67 per cent; at Vienna, in 1811, it amounted to 92 per cent; at Brussels, at an average of the period from 1802 to 1817, it amounted to 79 per cent; but in consequence of improvements subsequently adopted, it had been reduced in 1824 to 56 per cent. M. de Chateauneuf adds, that in France, in 1824, about *three-fifths*, or 60 per cent, of the foundlings perished in the *first* year of their life!¹ and the proportion is not now very materially different. In Moscow, of 37,607 children admitted in the course of twenty years, only 1,020 were sent out!²

Such is the appalling mortality in these establishments, the total suppression of which would be a signal benefit to society. It does not even appear that they lessen the practice of infanticide—a result which could not, indeed, be

¹ "Considérations sur les Enfants Trouvés," p. 66.

² Beck's "Medical Jurisprudence," p. 193. Lond. ed.

reasonably expected by any one who reflects upon their operation on the lower class of females. Beckmann mentions that, subsequently to the establishment of an hospital for foundlings at Cassel, hardly a year elapsed without some children being found murdered, either in that city or its vicinity.¹

The establishment of a foundling hospital in London was recommended, no doubt from the most benevolent motives, by Addison, in the reign of Queen Anne.² It was not, however, established till 1739. Experience was not long in developing its pernicious effects; and in 1760 a total change was effected in its constitution by authority of the legislature. It then ceased to be a receptacle for foundlings. No child whose mother does not personally appear, and who cannot satisfactorily answer the questions put to her, is received: if, however, the mother can show that she had previously borne a good character, and that, owing to the desertion of the father, she is unable to maintain the child, it is admitted, but not otherwise. As now conducted, there does not seem to be much reason for thinking that this establishment is productive of any but beneficial effects.

In London, during the five years ending with 1823, there were 151 children exposed; and the number of illegitimate children received into the different workhouses in various parts of the city, during the same period, amounted to 4,668, about a fifth part of whom were maintained by their parents. But in Paris, whose population does not amount to two-thirds of that of London, there were, in the five years now referred to, no fewer than 25,277 children carried to the foundling hospitals! And even this profligacy, and consequent waste of human life, is not greater, in proportion to the population, than is found to prevail at Madrid, Vienna, and other large cities where such establishments are permitted to exist.

¹ Beckmann "on Inventions," vol. iv. p. 456. Eng. ed.

² "Guardian," No. 105.

It is stated by M. Gouroff, that at Mentz, where there was no foundling hospital, 30 children were exposed in the interval between 1799 and 1811. Napoleon, who imagined that, by multiplying these establishments, he was increasing population, and providing for the future supply of his armies, ordered that one should be opened in Mentz, which was done accordingly in November 1811. It subsisted till the month of March 1815, when it was suppressed by the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt. During the three years and four months it had been open, it received 516 children. But as time had not been given for the complete formation of the vicious habits which such institutions are certain to engender, as soon as the hospital had been suppressed, the previous order of things was restored, only *seven* children being exposed in the nine following years!¹

It is plain, therefore, that these establishments utterly fail of accomplishing their object. They do not preserve, but destroy myriads of children. Instead of preventing crime, they scatter its seeds and spread its roots on all sides. There is, however, reason to think that more correct opinions are beginning to be entertained on the Continent with respect to their real operation. It is difficult, indeed, to suppose that they can be allowed to exist much longer. And, perhaps, no measure could be suggested that would do so much to improve the morals of those among whom they are established, and to lessen the frequency of crime and the destruction of infant life, as their abolition.

¹ “Essai sur l'Histoire des Enfants Trouvés,” p. 153.

CHAPTER IX.

Object of Insurance—Calculation of Chances—Advantages of Insurance—Amount of Property Insured—Life Insurance, Objections to, and Advantages of.

IT is the duty of government to assist, by every means in its power, the efforts of individuals to protect their property. Losses do not always arise from accidental circumstances, but are frequently occasioned by the crimes and misconduct of individuals; and there are no means so effectual for their prevention, when they arise from this source, as the establishment of a vigilant system of police, and of such an administration of the law as may afford those who are injured a ready and cheap method of obtaining every practicable redress; and, as far as possible, of insuring the punishment of culprits. But in despite of all that may be done by government, and of the utmost vigilance on the part of individuals, property is always exposed to a variety of casualties from fire, shipwreck, and other unforeseen disasters. And hence the importance of inquiring how such unavoidable losses, when they do occur, may be rendered least injurious.

The loss of a ship, or the conflagration of a cotton-mill, is a calamity that would press heavily even on the richest individual. But were it distributed among several individuals, each would feel it proportionally less; and provided the number of those among whom it was distributed were very considerable, it would hardly occasion any sensible inconvenience to any one in particular. Hence the advantage of combining to lessen the injury arising from the accidental destruction of property; and it is the diffusion of the risk of loss over a wide surface, and its valuation, that forms the employment of those engaged in insurance.

Though it be impossible to trace the circumstances which occasion those events that are, on that account, termed accidental, they are, notwithstanding, found to obey certain laws. The number of births, marriages, and deaths; the proportions of male to female, and of legitimate to illegitimate births; the ships cast away; the houses burned; and a great variety of other apparently accidental events, are yet, when our experience embraces a sufficiently wide field, found to be nearly equal in equal periods of time; and it is easy, from observations made upon them, to estimate the sum which an individual should pay, either to guarantee his property from risk, or to secure a certain sum for his heirs at his death.

It must, however, be carefully observed, that no confidence can be placed in such estimates, unless they are deduced from a very wide induction. Suppose, for example, that it is found, that during the present year one house is accidentally burned, in a town containing a thousand houses, this would afford very little ground for presuming that the *average* probability of fire in that town was as one to one thousand; for it might be found that not a single house had been burned during the previous ten years, or that ten were burned during each of these years. But supposing it were ascertained, that at an average of ten years one house had been annually burned, the presumption that one to one thousand was the true ratio of the probability of fire would be very much strengthened; and if it were found to obtain for twenty or thirty years together, it might be held, for all practical purposes at least, as indicating the precise degree of probability.

Besides its being necessary, in order to obtain the true measure of the probability of any event, that the series of events, of which it is one, should be observed for a rather lengthened period, it is necessary, also, that the events should be numerous, or of pretty frequent occurrence. Suppose it were found, by observing the births and deaths of a million of individuals taken indiscriminately from among

the whole population, that the mean duration of human life was forty years, we should have but very slender grounds for concluding that this ratio would hold in the case of the next ten, twenty, or fifty individuals that are born. Such a number is so small as hardly to admit of the operation of what is called the *law of average*. When a large number of lives is taken, those that exceed the medium term are balanced by those that fall short of it; but when the number is small, there is comparatively little room for the principle of compensation, and the result cannot, therefore, be depended upon.

It is found, by the experience of all countries in which censuses of the population have been taken with considerable accuracy, that the number of male children born is to that of female children in the proportion nearly of twenty-two to twenty-one. But unless the observations be made on a very large scale, this result will not be obtained. If we look at particular families, they sometimes consist wholly of boys, and sometimes wholly of girls; and it is not possible that the boys can be to the girls of a single family in the ratio of twenty-two to twenty-one. But when, instead of confining our observations to particular families, or even parishes, we extend them so as to embrace a population of half a million or upwards, these discrepancies disappear, and we find that there is, invariably, a small excess in the number of male over female births.

The false inferences that have been drawn from the doctrine of chances, have uniformly almost proceeded from generalising too rapidly, or from deducing a rate of probability from such a number of instances as do not give a fair average. But when the instances on which we found our conclusions are sufficiently numerous, it is seen that the most anomalous events, such as suicides, deaths by accident, the number of letters put into the post-office without any address, &c., form pretty regular series, and, consequently, admit of being estimated *à priori*.

The business of insurance is founded upon the principles

thus briefly stated. Suppose it has been remarked that of *forty* ships of the ordinary degree of sea-worthiness, employed in a given trade, one is annually cast away, the probability of loss will plainly be equal to *one-fortieth*. And if an individual wish to insure a ship, or the cargo on board a ship, engaged in this trade, he ought to pay a *premium* equal to the one-fortieth part of the sum he insures, exclusive of such additional sum as may be required to indemnify the insurer for his trouble, and to leave him a fair profit. If the premium exceed this sum, the insurer is overpaid: and he is underpaid if it fall below it.

Insurances are effected sometimes by societies and sometimes by individuals, the risk being in either case diffused amongst a number of persons. Companies formed for carrying on the business have generally a large subscribed capital, or such a number of proprietors as enables them to raise, without difficulty, whatever sums may at any time be required to make good losses. Societies of this sort do not limit their risks to small sums; that is, they do not often refuse to insure a large sum upon a ship, a house, a life, &c. The magnitude of their capitals affords them the means of easily defraying a heavy loss; and their premiums being proportioned to their risks, their profit is, at an average, independent of such contingencies.

Individuals, it is plain, could not act in this way unless they were possessed of very large capitals; and besides, the taking of large risks would render the business so hazardous that few would be disposed to engage in it. Instead, therefore, of insuring a large sum, as £20,000 upon a single ship, a private underwriter or insurer may not probably, in ordinary cases, take a greater risk than £200 or £500; so that, though his engagements may, when added together, amount to £20,000, they will be diffused over from forty to a hundred ships; and supposing one or two ships to be lost, the loss would not impair his capital, and would only lessen his profits. Hence it is, that while one transaction only may be required in getting a ship insured by a com-

pany, ten or twenty separate transactions may be required in getting the same thing done at Lloyd's, or by private individuals. When conducted in this cautious manner, the business of insurance is as safe a line of speculation as any in which individuals can engage.

To establish a policy of insurance on a fair foundation, or in such a way that the premiums paid by the insured shall exactly balance the risks incurred by the insurers, and the various necessary expenses to which they are put, including, of course, their profit, it is necessary, as previously remarked, that the experience of the risks should be pretty extensive. It is not, however, at all necessary, that either party should inquire into the circumstances that lead to those events that are most commonly made the subject of insurance. Such research would indeed be entirely fruitless: we are, and must necessarily continue to be, wholly ignorant of the causes of their occurrence.

It appears, from the accounts given by Mr Scoresby, in his work on the Arctic Regions, that of 586 ships which sailed from the various ports of Great Britain for the northern whale fishery, during the four years ending with 1817, eight were lost,¹ being at the rate of about one ship out of every *seventy-three* of those employed. Now, supposing this to be about the average loss, it follows that the premium required to insure against it should be £1, 7s. 4d. per cent, exclusive, as already observed, of the expenses and profits of the insurer.² Both the insurer and the insured would gain by entering into a transaction founded on this fair principle. When the operations of the insurer are extensive, and his risks spread over a considerable number of ships, his profit does not depend upon chance, but is as steady, and may be as fairly calculated upon, as that of a manufacturer or a merchant; while, on the other hand, the individuals who have insured their property have exempted it from any chance of

¹ Vol. ii. p. 131.

² In point of fact, the average loss in the northern whale fishery is much greater than this. See *art. Whale Fishery* in "Commercial Dictionary."

loss, and placed it, as it were, in a state of absolute security.

It is easy, from the brief statement now made, to perceive the immense advantages resulting to navigation and commerce from the practice of marine insurance. Without the aid that it affords, comparatively few individuals would be found disposed to expose their property to the risk of long and hazardous voyages; but by its means insecurity is changed for security, and the capital of the merchant, whose ships are dispersed over every sea, and exposed to all the perils of the ocean, is as secure as that of the agriculturist. He may combine his measures and arrange his plans as if they could no longer be affected by accident. The chances of shipwreck, or of loss by unforeseen occurrences, enter not into his calculations. He has purchased an exemption from the effects of such casualties; and applies himself to the prosecution of his business with that confidence and energy which a feeling of security can alone inspire.¹

Besides insuring against the perils of the sea, and losses arising from accidents caused by the operation of natural causes, it is common to insure against enemies, pirates, thieves, and even the fraud, or, as it is technically termed, *barratry* of the master. The risk arising from these sources of casualty being extremely fluctuating and various, it is not easy to estimate it with any considerable degree of accuracy; and nothing more than a rough average can, in most cases, be looked for. In time of war, the fluctuations

¹ “Les chances de la navigation entravaient le commerce. Le système des assurances a paru; il a consulté les saisons; il a porté ses regards sur la mer; il a interrogé ce terrible élément; il en a jugé l'inconstance; il en a pressenti les orages; il a épié la politique; il a reconnu les ports et les côtes des deux mondes; il a tout soumis à des calculs savans, à des théories approximatives; et il a dit au commerçant habile, au navigateur intrépide—Certes, il y a des désastres sur lesquels l'humanité ne peut que gémir; mais quant à votre fortune, allez, franchissez les mers, déployez votre activité et votre industrie; je me charge de vos risques. Alors, Messieurs, s'il est permis de le dire, les quatre parties du monde se sont rapprochées.”—*Code de Commerce, Exposé des Motifs*, liv. ii.

in the rates of insurance are particularly great ; and the intelligence that an enemy's squadron, or even that a single privateer, is cruising in the course which the ships bound to, or returning from any given port, usually follow, causes an instantaneous rise of premium. The appointment of convoys for the protection of trade during war, necessarily tends, by lessening the chances of capture, to lessen the premium on insurance. Still, however, the risk in such periods is, in most cases, very considerable ; and as it is liable to change very suddenly, great caution is required on the part of the underwriters.

Provision may be made, by means of insurance, against almost all the casualties to which property on land is subject. Fire insurance has been carried, in this country, to a very great extent ; and might, but for the duty with which it is burdened, be carried much farther. It appears, from the accounts printed by order of the House of Commons, that the nett duty received on policies of insurance against fire, amounted, for the United Kingdom, in 1845, to £1,032,188 ; which, if the duty were universally 3s. per cent on the property insured, would show that the latter amounted to the prodigious sum of £688,125,333—a sum which, vast as it is, would very probably be doubled in a few years were the duty only 1s. per cent. At present, if a person wish to insure £1000 on a dwelling-house, shop, warehouse, or other commonly hazardous property, he pays 15s. to an insurance office as an indemnity for the risk, and 30s. to government for leave to enter into the transaction ! So exorbitant a duty cannot be too severely condemned. It is the cause of much property not being insured, and of what is insured not being sufficiently covered. Were the duty reduced to a half, or a third part of its present amount, it is all but certain that the business of insurance would be very much extended ; and as it could not be extended without an increase of security, and a diminution of the injurious consequences arising from the casualties to which property is exposed, the reduction

would be productive of the best consequences in a public point of view; while the increase of business would prevent the revenue from being diminished, and would, most probably, indeed, occasion its increase. Insurances on farm stock, barn-yards, &c., are exempted from the duty, and do not, therefore, appear in the above estimate of insured property.

The tax upon policies of marine insurance varies according to the amount of the premium and the length of the voyage. It produced, in the United Kingdom, in 1847, the sum of £162,739.

But notwithstanding what has now been stated, it must be admitted, that the advantages derived from the practice of insuring against losses by sea and land are not altogether unmingled with evil. The security which it affords tends to relax that vigilant attention to the protection of property which the fear of its loss is sure otherwise to excite. This, however, is not its worst effect. The records of our courts, and the experience of all who are largely engaged in the business of insurance, too clearly prove that ships have been repeatedly sunk, and houses burned, in order to defraud the insurers. In despite, however, of the temptation to inattention and fraud which is thus created, there can be no doubt that, on the whole, the practice is, in a public as well as a private point of view, decidedly beneficial. The frauds which are occasionally committed raise, in some degree, the rate of insurance. But it is, notwithstanding, exceedingly moderate; and the precautions adopted by the insurance offices for the prevention of fire, especially in great towns, where it is most destructive, countervail, to a considerable extent, if they do not wholly outweigh, the chances of increased conflagration arising from the greater tendency to carelessness and crime.

The business of life insurance has been carried to a far greater extent in Great Britain than in any other country, and has been productive of the most beneficial effects. Life

insurances are of various kinds. Individuals without any very near connexions, and possessing only a limited fortune, are sometimes desirous, or are sometimes, from the necessity of their situation, obliged, annually to encroach on their capitals. But should the life of such persons be extended beyond the ordinary term of existence, they might be totally unprovided for in old age; and to secure themselves against this contingency, they make over to an insurance company the whole or a part of their capital, on condition of its guaranteeing them, as long as they live, a certain annuity, proportioned partly, of course, to the sum made over, and partly to their age when the transaction takes place. But though sometimes serviceable to individuals, it may be questioned whether insurances of this sort are, in a public point of view, really advantageous. So far as their influence extends, it obviously tends to weaken the principle of accumulation; and tempts individuals to consume their capitals during their own life, without thinking or caring about the interest of their successors. Were such a practice to become general, it would have the most mischievous consequences. The interest which most men take in the welfare of their families and friends affords, indeed, a pretty strong security against its becoming injuriously prevalent. There can, however, be little doubt that this selfish practice may be strengthened by adventitious means; such, for example, as the opening of government loans in the shape of life annuities, or in the still more objectionable form of tontines. But when no extrinsic stimulus of this sort is given to it, there do not seem to be any very good grounds for thinking that the sale of annuities by private individuals or associations can materially weaken the principle of accumulation.

Such, at all events, is the case in this country, the species of insurance now referred to being practised amongst us to an inconsiderable extent compared with that which has accumulation for its object. All professional persons, or persons living on salaries or wages—such as lawyers, physicians, military and naval officers, clerks in public and private

offices, &c., whose incomes must, of course, terminate with their lives, and a host of others, who are either without capital, or, though they possess it, cannot dispose of it at pleasure—must naturally be desirous of providing, in as far as they may be able, for the comfortable subsistence of their families in the event of their death. Take, for example, a physician or lawyer, without fortune, but making, perhaps, £1000 or £2000 a-year by his business; and suppose that he marries and has a family: if this individual attain to the average duration of human life, he may accumulate such a fortune as will provide for the adequate support of his family at his death. But who can presume to say that such will be the case?—that he will not be one of the many exceptions to the general rule? And suppose he were hurried into an untimely grave, his family would necessarily be destitute. Now, it is against such calamitous contingencies that life insurance is intended chiefly to provide. An individual possessed of an income terminating at his death, agrees to pay a certain sum annually to an insurance office; and this office binds itself to pay to his family, at his death, a sum equivalent, under deduction of the expenses of management and the profits of the insurers, to what these annual contributions, accumulated at compound interest, would amount to, supposing the insured to reach the common and average term of human life. Though he were to die the day after the insurance has been effected, his family would be as amply provided for as it is likely they would be by his accumulations, were his life of the ordinary duration. In all cases, indeed, in which those insured die before attaining to an average age, their gain is obvious. But even in those cases in which their lives are prolonged beyond the ordinary term, they are not losers—they then merely pay for a security which they must otherwise have been without. During the whole period, from the time when they effect their insurances down to the time when they arrive at the mean duration of human life subsequently to that term, they are protected against the risk of dying without leaving their families sufficiently

provided for; and the sum which they pay after having passed this mean term is nothing more than a fair compensation for the security they previously enjoyed. Of those who insure houses against fire, a very small proportion only have occasion to claim an indemnity for losses actually sustained; but the possession of a security against loss in the event of accident, is a sufficient motive to induce every prudent individual to insure his property. The case of life insurance is in no respect different. When established on a proper footing, the extra sums which those pay whose lives exceed the estimated duration is but the value of the previous security.

In order to adjust the terms of an insurance so that the party insuring may neither pay too much nor too little, it is necessary that the probable duration of human life, at every different age, should be ascertained with as much accuracy as possible.

This probable duration, or, as it is frequently termed, expectation of life, means the period when the chances that a person of a given age will be alive, are precisely equal to those that he will be dead. The results deduced from the observations made to determine this period in different countries and places, have been published in the form of tables; and insurances are calculated by referring to them. Thus, in the table of the expectation of life at Carlisle, framed by Mr Milne, of the Sun Life office,¹ and which is believed to represent the average law of mortality in England with considerable accuracy, the probable future life of a person of thirty years of age is thirty-four years and four months; or, in other words, it has been found by observations carefully made at Carlisle, that at an average, *half* the individuals of *thirty* years of age attain to the age of sixty-four years and four months. If, therefore, an individual of thirty years of age were to insure a sum payable at his death, the insurers who adopt the Carlisle table would

¹ See his very valuable work on Annuities, vol. ii. p. 565.

assume that he would live for thirty-four years and a third, and would make their calculations on that footing. If he did not live so long, the insurers would lose by the transaction; and if he lived longer, they would gain proportionally. But if their business be so extensive as to enable the law of average fully to apply, what they lose by premature deaths will be balanced by the payments received from those whose lives are prolonged beyond the ordinary degree of probability; so that the profits of the society will be wholly independent of chance.

Besides the vast advantage of that security against disastrous contingencies afforded by the practice of life insurance, it has an obvious tendency to strengthen habits of accumulation. An individual who has insured a sum on his life, would forfeit all the advantages of the insurance did he not continue regularly to make his annual payments. It is not, therefore, optional with him to save a sum from his ordinary expenditure adequate for this purpose. He is compelled, under a heavy penalty, to do so; and having thus been led to contract a habit of saving to a certain extent, it is most probable that the habit will acquire additional strength, and that he will either insure an additional sum or privately accumulate.

England is, perhaps, the only state in which the insurance of lives has never been prohibited. Notwithstanding the sagacity of the Dutch, insurances of this sort were not legalised in Holland till a comparatively recent period. In France they were long deemed illegal;¹ and though now

¹ It is said, in article 334 of the "Code de Commerce," that an insurance may be effected upon any thing *estimable à prix d'argent*. Count Corvetto, in his speech on laying this part of the "Code" before the legislative body, stated, that the above expressions had been introduced in order to make the article harmonise with the 9th and 10th articles of the ordinance of 1681, *qui permettent*, he says, *d'assurer la liberté des hommes, et qui défendent de faire des assurances sur leur vie. La liberté est estimable à prix d'argent; la vie de l'homme ne l'est pas.*

It is singular that such an article should be found in the Code de Commerce, more especially as the prohibition in the ordinance of 1681 had been

effected to a certain extent, we are not sure whether they are authorised by any positive law. They were forbidden by the famous ordinance of 1681, (arts. 9 and 10,) because, says its commentator, Valin, "it is an offence against public decency to set a price upon the life of a man, particularly the life of a freeman, which is above all valuation." Probably, however, the fear lest individuals might be tempted to destroy themselves, to enrich their families at the expense of those with whom they had insured their lives, has had most influence in dictating the attempts to prevent life insurance.¹ It is needless, however, to say, that this apprehension is the most futile imaginable. Attempts are, indeed, frequently made to get insurances effected upon lives by false representations as to the health of the parties; but it is doubtful whether the insurance offices have ever lost any thing from the cause previously alluded to. To prevent the possibility of its occurrence, most English offices stipulate, that death by suicide or in a duel shall cancel the insurance.

virtually repealed by an *arrêt* of the Council of State, dated the 3d November 1787, in which the advantages of life insurance are ably pointed out. Practically, however, the interpretation of Count Corvetto has been overruled; the legality of life insurance being now admitted, and the business practised to some, though but a small, extent in France.

¹ "Forbonnais, *Elémens du Commerce*," tom. ii. p. 51.

CHAPTER X.

Interference of Government with the Pursuits and Property of Individuals—Cases in, and Objects for which such interference is necessary—Limits within which it should be confined.

THE discussions in which we have been engaged in the previous chapters, sufficiently evince the vast importance of the administration being powerful, and at the same time liberal and intelligent—that is, of its having power to carry its laws and regulations into effect, and wisdom to render them consistent with sound principles. Far more, indeed, of the prosperity of a country depends on the nature of its government than on any thing else. If it be feeble, and unable to enforce obedience to the laws, the insecurity thence arising cannot fail of being most pernicious; while, on the other hand, if its laws, though carried into effect, be founded on erroneous principles, their operation cannot be otherwise than injurious; and though they may not actually arrest, they must, at all events, retard the progress of the society. An idea seems, however, to have been recently gaining ground, that the duty of government in regard to the domestic policy of the country is almost entirely of a negative kind, and that it has merely to maintain the security of property and the freedom of industry. But its duty is by no means so simple and easily defined as those who support this opinion would have us to believe. It is certainly true, that its interference with the pursuits of individuals has been, in very many instances, exerted in a wrong direction, and carried to a ruinous excess. Still, however, it is easy to see that we should fall into a very great error if we supposed that it might be entirely dispensed with. Freedom is not, as some appear to think, the end of government: the advancement of the public prosperity and

happiness is its end ; and freedom is valuable in so far only as it contributes to bring it about. In laying it down, for example, that individuals should be permitted, without let or hindrance, to engage in any business or profession they may prefer, the condition that it is not injurious to others is always understood. No one doubts the propriety of government interfering to suppress what is, or might otherwise become, a public nuisance ; nor does any one doubt that it may advantageously interfere to give facilities to commerce by negotiating treaties with foreign powers, and by removing such obstacles as cannot be removed by individuals. But the interference of government cannot be limited to cases of this sort. However disinclined, it is obliged to interfere, in an infinite variety of ways, and for an infinite variety of purposes. It must, to notice only one or two of the *classes* of objects requiring its interference, decide as to the species of contracts to which it will lend its sanction, and the means to be adopted to enforce their performance ; it must decide in regard to the distribution of the property of those who die intestate, and the effect to be given to the directions in wills and testaments ; and it must frequently engage itself, or authorise individuals or associations to engage, in various sorts of undertakings deeply affecting the rights and interests of others, and of society. The furnishing of elementary instruction in the ordinary branches of education for all classes of persons, and the establishment of a compulsory provision for the support of the destitute poor, are generally, also, included, and apparently with the greatest propriety, among the duties incumbent on administration. And, in addition to these duties and obligations, government has to undertake the onerous task of imposing and collecting the taxes required to defray the public expenditure, and of providing for the independence and the security of the nation. It is not easy to exaggerate the difficulty and importance of properly discharging such duties, and the powerful influence which the policy pursued in regard to them must necessarily

exercise over the public wellbeing. But without further insisting on these considerations, it is at all events obvious, when the subjects requiring, or supposed to require, its interference are so very numerous, and when we also take into view the necessity of accommodating the measures of administration to the changes which are perpetually occurring in the internal condition of nations, and in their external relations in respect of others—that it is impracticable to draw any thing like a distinct line of demarcation between what may be called the positive and negative duties of government; or to resolve what Mr Burke has truly termed “one of the finest problems in legislation, namely, to determine what the state ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion.”

It is, indeed, obvious, that no solution of this problem can be applicable at all times, and under all circumstances. But dismissing for the present all reference to the subject of taxation, which we have endeavoured to treat in another work,¹ we may observe generally, that though it may not be possible previously to devise the measures proper to be adopted in particular emergencies, we may, notwithstanding, decide on pretty good grounds in regard to the description of objects which require the interference of government upon ordinary occasions, and give some idea of the extent to which it should be carried. The discussion of this interesting, though comparatively neglected department of the science, involves many difficult and delicate questions; and to enter fully into their examination would require a lengthened treatise. We shall merely, therefore, endeavour to lay down a few leading principles, touching very briefly upon such topics only as seem most interesting.

The principles already established show, that without security of property, and freedom to engage in every

¹ A “Treatise on the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the Funding System,” 8vo, London, 1845.

employment not hurtful to others, society can make no considerable advances. Government is, therefore, bound to take such measures as may be effectual to secure these objects. But we have just seen that it must not rest satisfied when this is accomplished. It will fail of its duty if it do not exert itself to prevent that confusion and disorder in the distribution of property, and in the prosecution of industrious employments, that could either not be prevented without its interference, or not so easily and completely. It is also bound to give every due facility to individuals about to engage in such useful undertakings as cannot be carried on without its sanction; and it should not only endeavour to protect its peaceable and industrious subjects from the machinations of the idle and profligate, but also against those accidents arising from the operation of natural causes to which their persons or properties may otherwise be exposed. The expediency of interfering to accomplish the objects thus briefly enumerated, is so very obvious, that it may be said to constitute a perfect obligation on government. But the expediency of a compulsory provision for the support of the poor, and of a national system of education, not being so obvious, we shall refer their consideration to a subsequent chapter.

At present, therefore, we have, *first*, to consider the means of obtaining security and protection.

Second, the species of contracts and of testamentary dispositions to which government ought to give legal effect.

Third, the means of adjusting such disputes as may arise among the citizens, and of enforcing the observance of contracts.

Fourth, the means of obviating confusion and fraud in the dealings of individuals.

Fifth, the species of industrious undertakings in which government may engage, or to which it should lend some peculiar sanction.

Sixth, the means proper to be adopted to secure the property and persons of the citizens from such casualties as

they would be subject to without the interference of government.

I. With respect to the first of these heads, or the provision of a force adequate to afford security and protection, its necessity is too obvious to require illustration. The best laws can be of little use if they may be insulted with impunity. All governments ought, therefore, to have a force at their command sufficient to carry their orders into effect at home, as well as to defend their territories from hostile attack. The question how this force may be most advantageously raised is one of deep importance. Perhaps, however, its investigation belongs rather to politics, properly so called, than to political economy ; and, at any rate, our narrow limits forbid our engaging in it here. It may, however, be remarked, that in nothing, perhaps, has the beneficial influence of the division of labour been more perceptible than in the employment of a distinct class of individuals to maintain national tranquillity and security. To be a good soldier, or a good police-officer, a man should be nothing else. It is hardly possible for an individual taken, to serve as a militia-man, from one of the ordinary employments of industry, to which after a short time he is to be restored, to acquire those habits of discipline, and of prompt and willing obedience, so indispensable in a soldier. It is now very generally, if not universally admitted, that when a military force must be employed to suppress any disturbance, it is always best to employ troops of the line, and to abstain as much as possible from the employment of yeomanry or local militia. The former have neither partialities nor antipathies; they do what they are ordered, and they do nothing more: but the latter are more than half citizens; and being so, are inflamed with all the passions and prejudices incident to the peculiar description of persons from among whom they are taken. When they act, they necessarily act under a strong bias, and can with difficulty be kept to the strict line of their duty.

II. The discussion of the *second* of the previously mentioned heads may be conveniently divided into two branches : the *first* having reference to the description of contracts between individuals to which government should give a legal sanction ; and the *second*, how far it should legalise the instructions in wills and testaments.

1. It may be laid down in general, that government is bound to assist in enforcing all contracts fairly entered into between individuals, unless they are made in opposition to some existing law, or are clearly such as cannot fail of being prejudicial to the public interests.

Contracts or obligations arising out of purely gambling transactions, have been supposed to be of this latter description, and it has been customary to refuse giving them a legal sanction. The wisdom of this custom seems abundantly obvious. No one doubts that gambling, by withdrawing the attention of those engaged in it from industrious pursuits, and making them trust to chance, instead of exertion and economy, for the means of rising in the world, is, both in a public and private point of view, exceedingly pernicious. And we are not aware that any means have been suggested for checking the growth of this destructive habit, so easy of adoption, and, at the same time, so effectual, as the placing of gambling engagements without the pale of the law, and depriving the parties of any guarantee other than their own honour. To interfere further than this, might perhaps be inexpedient ; but there appears no good reason for thinking that the interference of government is not beneficially carried to this extent.

We shall afterwards endeavour to show the impolicy of the restraints imposed on the rate of interest, and the injury which they occasion. And it is now pretty generally admitted, that the laws formerly enforced in this country, and still acted upon in various quarters, for restricting the freedom of those engaged in the internal corn-trade, by the prevention of forestalling, engrossing, and regrating, are both oppressive and inexpedient. It has been shown, over

and over again, that the interest of the corn-dealer is in all cases identical with that of the public; and that, instead of being injurious, his speculations are uniformly productive of advantage.¹

It is unnecessary, perhaps, to say any thing about the attempts that have occasionally been made to fix the price of commodities by law. Every one must see that it is not in the nature of things that such attempts should have any but pernicious results. The price of commodities is continually varying, from innumerable causes, the operation of which can neither be foreseen nor prevented. If, therefore, an attempt were made to fix prices, it would follow, that when the natural price of commodities sunk below their legal price, the buyers would have to pay more than their fair value; and, on the other hand, when their natural price happened to rise above their legal price, the producers, to avoid the loss they would incur by carrying on their business, would withdraw from it, so that the market would no longer be supplied. Nothing, consequently, can be more obvious than that the interference of government in the regulation of prices is productive only of mischief. It will be shown, in a subsequent chapter, that wherever industry is free, the competition of the producers makes commodities be uniformly sold at their natural and proper price.

It was usual in this country, until recently, to punish workmen for combining to raise the rate of wages, or to diminish the hours of working. The inexpediency of such a law is so very obvious as hardly to require being pointed out. The individual is nothing but a slave who may not fix, in concert with others, the conditions on which he will sell his labour. No bad consequences can result from the exercise of this power on the part of the workmen. If the price they demand for their labour be unreasonable, the masters may, and always *do*, refuse to employ them; and as they cannot afford to live for any considerable period

¹ For some illustrations of what is now stated, see the Chapter on the "Influence of Speculation on Prices."

without employment, it is plain that all combinations to obtain an undue rise of wages, or to effect an improper purpose, carry in their bosom a principle of dissolution, and must speedily fall to pieces. But when workmen may refuse to work except upon such conditions as they choose to prescribe, they have, in this respect, obtained *all* which they can justly claim; and when they go farther, and attempt, as they too frequently do, to carry their point by violence,—by threatening the property of their employers, or obstructing such of their fellow-labourers as have refused to join the combination, or have seceded from it,—they are guilty of an offence which deeply affects the security of property and freedom of industry, and which should be instantly repressed by prompt and suitable punishment.

2. Various questions, some of which are of the greatest interest, arise in deciding how far government should go in giving effect to instructions in wills and testaments. There is no doubt, indeed, of the reasonableness and advantage of allowing individuals to bequeath their property to their children and nearest surviving relatives. And, without stopping to make any observations on what is so very clear, we shall proceed to inquire—*first*, whether individuals should be permitted to leave their fortune to strangers, to the exclusion of their children and relatives; *second*, whether, in distributing a fortune amongst children, the testator should be left to follow his own inclination, or be obliged to abide by any fixed rule; and *third*, whether an individual should be authorised to fix the conditions under which his property shall in future be enjoyed, or the purposes to which it is to be always applied.

(1.) The power freely to bequeath property by will or testament (the *libera testamenti factio*) is not recognised in the earlier stages of society. A man's property is then usually divided in equal shares among his children, who succeed to it as matter of right; and in their default, it is inherited by his surviving relations or nearest of kin. But experience gradually discloses the inconveniences resulting

from the enforcement of this strict rule of succession, and power is, in consequence, given to persons possessed of property to make testaments, or to dispose by will of a part, at least, of their personal or real estate. At first, however, this power is usually confined within very narrow limits, being in general restricted to the making of alterations in the shares falling to the children or kinsmen of the testator; that is, to the increasing of the portion of some, and the diminution of that of others. In Athens there was no power to devise property from the natural heirs previously to the age of Solon; and that legislator confined the privilege to those who died without leaving issue. In Rome, three centuries elapsed before a citizen could dispose of his property by a deed *mortis causa*, except in an assembly of the people; and in that case his will, as Montesquieu has remarked, was not really the act of a private individual, but of the legislature. "With us in England, till modern times, a man could only dispose of one-third of his moveables from his wife and children; and in general, no will was permitted of lands till the reign of Henry VIII., and then only of a certain portion: for it was not till after the Restoration that the power of devising real property became so universal as at present."¹ In Scotland, down to a comparatively recent period, almost all landed property was inalienable from the lineal heir.

Not only, however, is the power of testators usually augmented as society advances, but in some countries they are permitted to exercise a nearly absolute control over the disposal of their property, and even to bequeath the whole, or the greater part of it, to strangers, to the exclusion of their children and relations, as is substantially the case at this moment in England. A great diversity of opinion is, however, entertained in regard to the expediency of giving this power to testators. It is contended, that, independently altogether of their merit or demerit, every one is under the most sacred obligations to the beings he has been

¹ Blackstone, book ii. c. 1.

the means of bringing into the world ; and that no one who has any property should be permitted to throw his children destitute upon society, but should be obliged to make some provision for their support. But, though the question be not free from difficulty, we are inclined to think that they are right who argue in favour of the uncontrolled power of bequeathing. A legal provision for children cannot be enforced without weakening that parental authority which, though sometimes abused, is yet, in the vast majority of instances, exerted in the best manner and with the best effect. The relations of private life should as seldom as possible be made the subject of legislative enactments. If children be ordinarily well-behaved, we have, in the feeling of parental affection, a sufficient security that they will rarely be disinherited. The interference of the legislator in their behalf seems, therefore, quite unnecessary. In countries where the greatest extension is given to the power of the testator, nothing is more uncommon than to hear of the disinherison of a really dutiful family ; and it would surely be most inexpedient to attempt to remedy an evil of such rare occurrence, by exempting children from the influence of a salutary check over their vicious propensities ; and forcing individuals to bestow that property on profligacy and idleness, which is usually the fruit, and should always be the reward, of virtue and industry.

(2.) The same reasons which show that it is inexpedient to prevent individuals from leaving their fortunes to strangers, show that it is inexpedient to compel them to adopt any fixed rule in the division of their fortunes amongst their children.

It has long been customary in this, as well as in many other countries, when estates consist of land, to leave them either wholly or principally to the eldest son, and to give the younger sons and daughters smaller portions in money. Many objections have been made to this custom ; but mostly, as it would appear, without due consideration. That it has its inconveniences is, no doubt, true ; but they seem to be

trifling compared with the advantages which it exclusively possesses. It forces the younger sons to quit the home of their father, and makes them depend for success in life on the exercise of their talents ; it helps to prevent the splitting of landed property into too small portions ; and stimulates the holders of estates to endeavour to save a moneyed fortune adequate for the outfit of the younger children, without rendering them a burden on their senior. Its influence in these and other respects is equally powerful and salutary. The sense of inferiority as compared with others, is, next to the pressure of want, one of the most powerful motives to exertion. It is not always because a man is absolutely poor that he is industrious, economical, and inventive ; in many cases he is already wealthy, and is merely wishing to place himself in the same rank as others who have still larger fortunes. The younger sons of our great landed proprietors are particularly sensible to this stimulus. Their inferiority in point of wealth, and their desire to escape from this lower situation, and to place themselves upon a level with their elder brothers, inspires them with an energy and vigour they could not otherwise feel. But the advantage of preserving large estates from being frittered down by a scheme of equal division, is not limited to its influence over the younger children of their owners. It raises universally the standard of competence, and gives new force to the springs which set industry in motion. The manner of living among the great landlords is that in which every one is ambitious of being able to indulge ; and their habits of expense, though sometimes injurious to themselves, act as powerful incentives to the ingenuity and enterprise of the other classes, who never think their fortunes sufficiently ample, unless they will enable them to emulate the splendour of the richest landlords ; so that the custom of primogeniture seems to render all classes more industrious, and to augment, at the same time, the mass of wealth and the scale of enjoyment.

It is said, indeed, that this eager pursuit of wealth, and

the engrossing interest which it inspires, occasion every thing to be undervalued that does not directly conspire to its advancement, and make the possession of money be regarded as the only thing desirable. But this is plainly a very exaggerated and fallacious representation. It is not meant to say, that a desire to outstrip our neighbours in the accumulation of wealth is the best motive to exertion, or that it might not be preferable, could the same spirit of emulation be excited by a desire to excel in learning, benevolence, or integrity. After all, however, it usually happens that the game itself is of far less value than the stimulus afforded by the chase. But though it were otherwise, there seems very little reason to think that the love of superiority in mental acquirements will ever be able to create that deep, lasting, and universal interest, that is created by a desire to mount in the scale of society, and to attain the same elevation in point of fortune that has been attained by the richest individuals, or by those at the summit of society. It is false, however, to affirm that the prevalence of this spirit makes the virtues of industry and frugality be cultivated to the exclusion of the rest. Every one, indeed, who is acquainted with what is going on around him, must know that such is not the fact. The business of those who inherit large fortunes is rather to spend than to accumulate: and while, on the one hand, the desire to attain to an equality of riches with them is a powerful spur to industry; the manner of living, which they render fashionable, prevents, on the other hand, the growth of those sordid and miserly habits that are subversive of every generous impulse. Many holders of large fortunes, and many who are still striving to attain that distinction, influenced partly, no doubt, by vanity and ostentation, but in a far greater degree by worthier motives, are the liberal patrons of the arts, and are eminently distinguished by their benevolence. The example thus set by the higher ranks reacts on those below them; being communicated from one class to another, until it pervades the whole society. And hence, though the spirit of

emulation, industry, and invention, be stronger here, perhaps, than in any other country, it has not obliterated, but seems, on the contrary, rather to have strengthened, the social and generous sympathies.

But, to whatever cause it may be owing, we may safely affirm, that an interest in the welfare of others has never been more strongly manifested in any age or country than in our own. Those who contrast the benevolent institutions of England and Holland, (the country which has the nearest resemblance to England,) and the efforts made by the middle and upper classes in them to relieve the distresses and to improve the condition of those in inferior circumstances, with the institutions and the efforts of the same classes in France and Austria, will pause before affirming that the strong spirit of emulation, inspired by our peculiar laws and customs, has rendered us comparatively indifferent to the happiness of our fellowmen. In the United States, properties, whether consisting of land or moveables, are almost invariably divided in equal portions amongst the children, and there are no very large estates. But notwithstanding these apparently favourable circumstances, has any one ever alleged that generosity is a prominent feature in the character of the Americans? or that they are in this respect superior to the English?

In France, previously to the Revolution, different provinces had different customs as to the division of landed property by will; but soon after the Revolution one uniform system was established. According to this new system, individuals having families, who make wills, are obliged to divide their fortunes, whether they consist of land or moveables, in nearly equal portions among their children; and in the event of their dying intestate, they are equally distributed amongst their descendants without respect of sex or seniority.

The principles already established show that this law is radically bad. It necessarily weakens the desire to accumulate a fortune, over the disposal of which it allows so

very little influence ; it goes far to emancipate the children of persons possessed of property from any efficient control ; it gives them the certainty of getting a provision, whatever be their conduct ; and it is difficult to see how it should do this without paralysing their exertions and checking their enterprise. But its worst effect consists, perhaps, in the influence it has had, and will most likely continue to have, in occasioning the too great subdivision of landed property. In this respect its operation has been most pernicious ; and if it be not repealed, some method of evading it discovered, or some countervailing principle be called into operation, it bids fair, in no very lengthened period, to reduce the agriculturists of France to a condition little, if at all, better than those of Ireland.

In distributing the property of those who die intestate, it seems natural to conclude that the same rule should be adopted which experience has shown is most advantageous in the making of wills. When, therefore, there is a landed estate, it should go to the eldest son ; being, however, burdened with a reasonable provision for the other children. If the fortune consist of money or moveables, it may be equally divided.

(3.) We have now to inquire whether an individual, in leaving a fortune by will, should be allowed to fix by whom, and under what conditions, it shall always be held, and the purposes to which it shall always be applied.

Every man should have such a reasonable degree of power over the disposal of his property as may be necessary to excite his industry, and to inspire him with the desire of accumulating. But if, in order to carry this principle to the farthest extent, individuals be allowed to chalk out an endless series of heirs, and to prescribe the conditions under which they shall successively hold the property, it might be prevented from ever coming into the hands of those who would turn it to the best account ; and it could neither be farmed nor managed in any way, however advantageous, that happened to be inconsistent with the directions in the

will. To establish such a system would evidently be most impolitic; and hence, in regulating the transfer of property by will, a term should be fixed beyond which the instructions of the testator should have no effect. It is, of course, impossible to lay down any general rule for determining this period. According to the law of England, a man is allowed to fix the destination of his property until the first unborn heir be twenty-one years of age, when his will ceases to have any farther control over it. This is, perhaps, as judicious a term as could be devised. It appears to give every necessary inducement to accumulation, at the same time that it hinders the tying-up of property for too long a period.

In Scotland it has been lawful, since 1685, to settle or entail estates upon an endless series of heirs; but a bill is now before parliament (June 1848) which, if passed into a law, as seems most probable, will place the Scotch law of entail nearly on the same footing as the English.

The bequeathing of property by charitable individuals for the endowment of hospitals, libraries, schools, and other purposes of public utility, is of the greatest importance in a national point of view; and it would be easy to show that England has derived, and is at present deriving, the greatest advantages from bequests for such objects. Still, however, it is abundantly obvious that these should be subjected to the control of government. It is difficult, indeed, or rather, perhaps, impossible, to define *à priori* how far interference should be carried in respect to them; but that, speaking generally, it is indispensable even to the proper carrying out of the views of the testator is sufficiently evident.

To regard the instructions in the wills of those who have established foundations as immutable laws, which are in no case to be altered, is, in truth, to permit the ignorance, folly, presumption, or dotage of an individual to become a standard for all future ages; and to regulate the studies and the institutions of a more advanced and enlightened period

by his crude conceptions and views. Surely, however, it is needless to say, that no select number of men, and still less individuals, should be allowed to erect themselves into infallible legislators for every succeeding generation. The regulations of the great Alfred, and of the various benevolent parties who founded and endowed the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, may have been excellent at the time when they were framed; but had they been strictly adhered to, the chairs in these institutions must now have been filled with Aristotelian doctors, and lecturers on the Ptolemaic system of the world, and the infallibility of the Pope!

It is impossible to doubt the piety and generosity of many of those who, in the middle ages, left their property to monastic institutions; but still less is it possible to hesitate applauding the conduct of the Reformers, who diverted this property to other purposes; and who justly considered that the terms of wills dictated in a comparatively barbarous age, should not be permitted to consecrate and uphold a system which had been discovered to be most inimical to the interests of true religion, and to be productive only of mischief.

The establishment of foundling hospitals is another instance of the same kind. They were projected and have been kept up with the best intentions; but, as already seen, (*ante*, pp. 246-8,) it admits of demonstration, and is now indeed generally conceded, that they have been productive of a greater amount of crime and of mortality than they have obviated.

Even as respects the educational foundations established in London and most parts of England, none can doubt that their utility is in many instances greatly narrowed, and in not a few all but wholly nullified, by the injudicious rules laid down for their government, and the jobbing and corruption by which their revenues are frequently wasted. Every unprejudiced person acquainted with the circumstances will readily admit, that there are no institutions that stand more in need of a careful revision and remodel-

ling than the foundations in question. The sphere of their utility might be very greatly extended, at the same time that the education which the greater number of them afford, might be greatly improved. And it will not, surely, be contended, that more regard is due to the whims, caprices, or mistaken though benevolent views of the founders, than to the interests and wellbeing of the successive generations, to whom they might be made to furnish an education suited to the varying exigencies and demands of the periods in which they live.¹

III. The *third* duty of government is, to provide the means of adjusting such disputes as may arise among its subjects, and of enforcing the observance of contracts.

To do this, it is necessary to establish convenient and proper tribunals, accessible at all times, at a moderate expense, to all who have occasion to appeal to them.

Every practicable effort should also be made to simplify the law, and to render it as clear and precise as possible.

Nothing tends more to paralyse the spirit of commercial enterprise than the existence of any doubt in the minds of parties with respect to the nature and effect of the laws bearing on the transactions in which they happen to be engaged. "The property and daily negotiations of merchants ought not to depend upon subtleties and niceties, but upon rules easily learned and easily retained."² It is mentioned, in a report by a Committee of the House of Commons on the foreign trade of the country, printed in 1820, that no fewer than TWO THOUSAND laws with respect to commerce had been passed at different periods; that many of these had originated in temporary circumstances; and that *eleven hundred* were actually in force in the year 1815, exclusive

¹ We have discussed the various questions incident to the devising of property by will, including those respecting primogeniture, entails, compulsory distribution, foundations, &c., in a separate treatise on "The Succession to Property vacant by Death," published in 1848. And we beg to refer the reader to it for more ample information with respect to those topics which we have here been merely able to glance at.

² Speech of Lord Mansfield in an insurance case.

of the additions made in the subsequent five years ! The committee justly and strongly condemned this excessive multiplication. They stated, that the difficulty of deciding between legal and illegal transactions was so very great, that the most experienced merchants could seldom venture to act without consulting a lawyer ; and that it was quite impossible for them to proceed in their speculations with that promptitude and confidence so necessary to their success. And they declared that, in their opinion, no more valuable service could be rendered to the trade of the empire than an accurate revision of this vast and confused mass of legislation, and the establishment of some certain, simple, and constant principles, to which all commercial regulations might be referred, and under which all transactions might be conducted with facility, safety, and confidence.

Since this report was compiled, a great deal has been done in the way of simplifying and consolidating our commercial law. A good deal, however, still remains to be accomplished ; and as it is an object of the highest importance, it is to be hoped that it may be kept steadily in view, and that nothing may be left undone to give precision, clearness, and simplicity, to every branch of the law, but especially to that affecting industrious undertakings.

Government is bound to lend every reasonable facility towards enforcing the fulfilment of contracts. Were it to evince any backwardness in this respect, there would be an immediate diminution of confidence, and comparatively few engagements would be entered into. But when an individual is either unable or unwilling to abide by the stipulations into which he has entered, there is often great difficulty in determining the extent to which government should go in its attempts to enforce performance. The questions that occur with respect to bankruptcy exemplify this.

All classes of individuals, even those who have least to do with industrious undertakings, are exposed to vicissitudes and misfortunes, the occurrence of which may render them

incapable of making good the engagements into which they have entered. Individuals in this situation are said to be bankrupt or insolvent. But though bankruptcy be most frequently, perhaps, occasioned by uncontrollable causes, it is still more frequently occasioned by the recklessness and extravagance of individuals, and by their repugnance to make those retrenchments which the state of their affairs demands; and sometimes, also, by fraud or bad faith. Hence the laws with respect to bankruptcy occupy a prominent place in the judicial system of every state in which commerce has made any progress, and credit been introduced. They differ exceedingly in different countries and stages of society; and it must be acknowledged that they present very many difficulties, and that it is not possible, perhaps, to suggest any system against which some pretty plausible objections may not be made.

The execrable atrocity of the early Roman laws as to bankruptcy is well known. According to the usual interpretation of the law of the Twelve Tables, which Cicero has so much eulogised,¹ the creditors of an insolvent debtor might, after some preliminary formalities, cut his body to pieces, each of them taking a share proportioned to the amount of his debt; and those who did not choose to resort to this horrible extremity, were authorised to subject the debtor to chains, stripes, and hard labour; or to sell him, his wife, and children, to perpetual slavery, *trans Tyberim*! This law, and the law giving fathers the power of inflicting capital punishments on their children, strikingly illustrate the ferocious sanguinary character of the early Romans.

There is reason to think, from the silence of historians, that no unfortunate debtor ever actually felt the utmost severity of this barbarous statute; but the history of the republic is full of accounts of popular commotions, some of

¹ "Fremant omnes, licet! dicam quod sentio: bibliothecas, meherculè, omnium philosophorum unus mihi videtur Duodecim Tabularum libellus; si quis legum fontes et capita viderit, et autoritatis pondere et utilitatis ubertate superare."—*De Oratore*, lib. i.

which led to very important changes, occasioned by the exercise of the power given to creditors of enslaving their debtors, and subjecting them to corporal punishments. The law, however, continued in this state till the year of Rome 427, 120 years after the promulgation of the Twelve Tables, when it was repealed. It was then enacted, that the persons of debtors should cease to be at the disposal of their creditors, and that the latter should merely be authorised to seize upon the debtor's goods, and to sell them by auction in satisfaction of their claims. In the subsequent stages of Roman jurisprudence, further changes were made, which seem generally to have leaned to the side of the debtor; and it was ultimately ruled, that an individual who had become insolvent, without having committed any fraud, should, upon making a *cessio bonorum*, or a surrender of his entire property to his creditors, be exempted from all personal penalties.¹

The law of England distinguishes between the insolvency of persons engaged in trade, and that of others. The former can alone be made bankrupts, and are dealt with in a comparatively lenient manner. "The law," says Blackstone, "is cautious of encouraging prodigality and extravagance by indulgence to debtors; and, therefore, it allows the benefit of the laws of bankruptcy to none but actual traders, since that set of men are, generally speaking, the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability of paying their debts, without any fault of their own. If persons in other situations of life run in debt without the power of payment, they must take the consequences of their own indiscretion, even though they meet with sudden accidents that may reduce their fortunes; for the law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice for any person but a trader to encumber himself with debts of any considerable value. If a gentleman, or one in a liberal profession, at the time of contracting his debts has a sufficient fund to pay them, the

delay of payment is a species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice to his creditor; and if at such time he has no sufficient fund, the dishonesty and injustice is the greater. He cannot, therefore, murmur if he suffer the punishment he has voluntarily drawn upon himself. But in mercantile transactions the case is far otherwise: trade cannot be carried on without mutual credit on both sides: the contracting of debts is here, therefore, not only justifiable, but necessary; and if, by accidental calamities, as by the loss of a ship in a tempest, the failure of brother traders, or by the non-payment of persons out of trade, a merchant or trader becomes incapable of discharging his own debts, it is his misfortune and not his fault.¹ To the misfortunes, therefore, of debtors, the law has given a compassionate remedy, but denied it to their faults; since, at the same time that it provides for the security of commerce, by enacting that every considerable trader may be declared a bankrupt, for the benefit of his creditors as well as himself, it has also, to discourage extravagance, declared that no one shall be capable of being made a bankrupt but only a trader, nor capable of receiving the full benefit of the statutes but only an *industrious* trader.”²

The objects the legislature have endeavoured to attain by the bankruptcy laws have been threefold: viz., 1st, To make a seizure of all the debtor's property; 2d, To distribute this property, rateably, among all the creditors;

¹ The opinion of Puffendorff upon this point is opposed to that of Blackstone; and being entitled to considerable respect, we subjoin it:—“ Il faut encore considérer ici la raison ou la nécessité qui a obligé un homme à s'endetter; car, selon qu'elle est plus ou moins grande, on doit avoir plus ou moins de support et de compassion pour un débiteur réduit à la pauvreté. Ainsi, ce n'est pas sans sujet que l'on traite les marchands avec plus de rigueur, lors même qu'un cas fortuit les a rendus insolubles, que d'autres qu'un besoin pressant a mis dans la nécessité d'emprunter; car il n'y a que le désir du gain qui porte les premiers à s'endetter: et comme ils font profession de l'art de s'enrichir, ils ne sont guères excusables lorsqu'ils n'ont pas bien pris leurs précautions même contre les accidens fortuits.”—*Droit de la Nature et des Gens*, par BARBEYRAC, liv. iii. cap. 7, § 3.

² “Commentaries,” book ii. cap. 31.

and, 3d, To discharge the debtor, provided nothing be found to impeach his honesty, from all future liability for the debts owing by him when the bankruptcy took place. Practically, however, it has been found very difficult to carry these views into effect.

After the various proceedings, with respect to a bankruptcy case, have been gone through, if the conduct of the bankrupt has been such as to satisfy the court in which they have taken place, they will grant him a certificate,¹ or discharge, which may be confirmed or disallowed by the Court of Review. In the event of its being confirmed, the bankrupt is entitled to a reasonable allowance out of his effects; which is, however, made to depend partly on his former good behaviour, and partly on the magnitude of his dividend. Thus if his effects will not pay half his debts, or 10s. in the pound, he is left to the discretion of the commissioners and assignees, to have a competent sum allowed him, not exceeding 3 per cent on his estate, or £300 in all; but if his estate pays 10s. in the pound, he is to be allowed 5 per cent, provided such allowance do not exceed £400; if 12s. 6d., then 7½ per cent, under a limitation, as before of its not exceeding £500; and if 15s. in a pound, then the bankrupt shall be allowed 10 per cent upon his estate, provided it do not exceed £600.

According to our present law, when a person not a trader becomes insolvent, he may, after being actually imprisoned, at the suit of some of his creditors, for fourteen days, present a petition to the court to be relieved; and upon his surrendering his entire property, he is, unless something fraudulent be established against him, entitled to a discharge. While, however, the certificate given to a bankrupt relieves him from all future claims on account of debts contracted previously to his bankruptcy, the discharge given to an insolvent only relieves him from imprisonment: in the event

¹ Formerly, it was necessary that the certificate should be signed by a certain proportion of the creditors; but this is no longer required. See 5 & 6 Vict., c. 122.

of his afterwards accumulating any property, it may be seized in payment of the debts contracted anterior to his insolvency. This principle was recognised in the *cessio bonorum* of the Romans, of which the insolvent act is nearly a copy.

It may be questioned, however, notwithstanding what Blackstone has stated, whether there be any good ground for making a distinction between the insolvency of traders and other individuals. There are very few trades so hazardous as that of a farmer; and yet, should he become insolvent, he is not entitled to the same privileges he would have enjoyed had he been the keeper of an inn or a commission agent! The injustice of this distinction is obvious; but, without dwelling upon it, it seems pretty clear, that certificates should be granted indiscriminately to all honest debtors. Being relieved from all concern as to his previous encumbrances, an insolvent who has obtained a certificate is prompted to exert himself vigorously in future, at the same time that his friends are not deterred from coming forward to his assistance. But when an insolvent continues liable for his previous debts, no one, however favourably disposed, can venture to aid him with a loan, and he is discouraged, even if he had the means, from attempting to earn more than a bare livelihood; so that, while the creditors do not in one case out of a hundred gain the smallest sum by this constant liability of the insolvent, his energies and usefulness are for ever paralysed.

The policy of imprisoning for debts, honestly contracted, seems also exceedingly questionable, and is now, indeed, all but abandoned. Notwithstanding the deference due to the great authorities who have endeavoured to vindicate this practice, we confess ourselves unable to discover any thing very cogent in the reasonings advanced in its favour. Provided a person in insolvent circumstances intimate his situation to his creditors, and make a voluntary surrender of his property, he has, as it appears to us, done all that should be required of him, and should not undergo any

imprisonment. If he have deceived his creditors by false representations, or if he conceal or fraudently convey away any part of his property, he should, of course, be subjected to the pains and penalties attached to swindling; but when such practices are not alleged, or cannot be proved, sound policy, we apprehend, would dictate that creditors should have no power over the persons of their debtors, and that they should be entitled only to their effects. The maxim *carcer non solvit*, is not more trite than true. It is said, indeed, that the fear of imprisonment operates to prevent persons from getting into debt; and this, no doubt, is the case. But then it must, on the other hand, be borne in mind, that the power to imprison tempts individuals to trust to its influence to enforce payment of their claims, and makes them less cautious in their inquiries as to the condition and circumstances of those to whom they give credit. The carelessness of tradesmen, and their extreme earnestness to obtain custom, are, more than any thing else, the great causes of insolvency; and the power of imprisoning merely tends to foster and encourage these habits. If a tradesman trust an individual with money or goods which he is unable to repay, he has made a bad speculation. But why should he, because he has done so, be allowed to arrest the debtor's person? If he wished to have perfect security, he either should not have dealt with him at all, or dealt only for ready money: such transactions are, on the part of tradesmen, perfectly voluntary; and if they place undue confidence in a debtor who has not misled them by erroneous representations of his affairs, they have themselves only to blame.

It would really, therefore, as it appears to us, be for the advantage of creditors, were all penal proceedings against the persons of honest debtors abolished. The dependence placed on their efficacy is deceitful. A tradesman should rather trust to his own prudence and sagacity to keep him out of scrapes than to the law for redress: he may deal upon credit with those whom he knows, but he should deal for

ready money only with those of whose circumstances and character he is either ignorant or suspicious. By bringing penal statutes to his aid, he is rendered remiss and negligent. He has the only effectual means of security in his own hand; and it seems highly inexpedient that he should be taught to neglect them and to put his trust in prisons.

It is pretty evident, too, that the efficacy of imprisonment in deterring individuals from running into debt, has been greatly overrated. Honest insolvents must have suffered from misfortune, or been disappointed in the hopes they entertained of being able, in one way or other, to discharge their debts. The fear of imprisonment does not greatly influence such persons; for when they contract debts they have no doubt of their ability to pay them. And the abolition of the imprisonment of *bonâ fide* insolvents could not, under a reasonably well contrived system, give any encouragement to the practices of those who endeavour to raise money by false representations, or who conceal or convey away their property to the prejudice of their creditors; for these are to be regarded as swindlers, and should, as such, be subjected to adequate punishment. At present, indeed, the law is much too indulgent to this description of persons. Traders or others who endeavour, by concealing or misrepresenting the real state of their affairs, to obtain goods or loans of money; or who, having obtained such goods or loans, pervert them to spendthrift or dishonest purposes, are about the very worst species of cheats; and the temptation to resort to such practices, and the facility with which they may be carried into effect, should make them, when detected, be visited with a proportionally increased severity of punishment, on the principle laid down by Cicero, that *ea sunt animadvertenda peccata maxime, quæ difficillime præcaventur*.¹ But honesty and dishonesty are not to be treated alike; and unless fraud of some sort or other be established, the imprisonment or penal pursuit of

¹ *Oratio pro Sexto Roscio*, § 40.

debtors appears to be alike oppressive and inexpedient. The legislature appears, indeed, to have come round to this way of thinking; for, under the act 5 & 6 Victoria, cap. 116, all persons not liable to the bankrupt laws, and those liable to them, whose debts are under £300, may, on giving certain notices, and making over all their property, present and future, for the benefit of their creditors, obtain from the Bankruptcy Court, a protection against all process whatever, unless fraud or other offence of that kind be proved against them; and a still later act, the 7 & 8 Victoria, cap. 96, takes from creditors the power to incarcerate debtors for debts under £20.

The regulations with respect to bankruptcy and insolvency differ materially in other respects. Until the act 1 & 2 Victoria, cap. 110, an individual could not be subjected to the insolvent law except by his own act, that is, by his petitioning for relief from actual imprisonment for debt. But under that act, any creditor who may have taken a debtor in execution, may, unless his debt be satisfied within twenty-one days from the date of the debtor's imprisonment, get the latter subjected to the insolvent laws, and procure the vesting of his property in an assignee for the benefit of his creditors, in the same way as if the debtor had himself petitioned for relief. An individual cannot, however, in any case, be made a bankrupt, and subjected to the bankrupt law, except by the act of another, that is, of a petitioning creditor,¹ as he is called, swearing that the individual in question is indebted to him, and that he believes he has committed what is termed an act of bankruptcy.

While, however, the law of England has always given the creditor an unnecessary degree of power over the debtor's person, it did not, till very recently, give him sufficient power over his property. In this respect, indeed, it was so very defective, that one is almost tempted to think it had

¹ One creditor whose debt is to the amount of £50 or upwards, or two whose debts amount to £70, or three whose debts amount to £100.

been intended to promote the practices of fraudulent debtors. The property of persons subject to the bankrupt and insolvent laws, was, it is true, nominally placed at the disposal of assignees or trustees, for the benefit of their creditors ; but when a person possessed of property, but not subject to the bankrupt laws, contracted debt, if he went abroad, or lived within the rules of the King's Bench or the Fleet, or remained in prison without petitioning for relief, he continued, most probably, to enjoy the income arising from that property without molestation.

The law, no doubt, said, that creditors should be authorised to seize the debtor's *lands and goods*, a description which an unlearned person would be apt to conclude was abundantly comprehensive ; but the law used to be so interpreted, that funded property, money, and securities for money, were not considered goods : if the debtor had a copyhold estate, it could not be touched in any way whatever ; if his estate were freehold, the creditor might, after a tedious process, receive the rents and profits, but no more, during the lifetime of his debtor. If the debtor died before judgment against him in a court had been obtained, then, unless the debt were on bond, the creditor had no recourse upon the land left by the debtor, whatever might be its tenure ; " nay, though his money, borrowed on note or bill, had been laid out in buying land, the debtor's heir took that land wholly discharged of the debt ! " ¹

In consequence of the facilities thus afforded for swindling, an individual known to have a large income, and enjoying a proportionally extensive credit, was able, if he went to Paris or Brussels, or confined himself within the rules of the King's Bench or the Fleet, to defraud his creditors of every farthing he owed them, without their being entitled to touch any part of his fortune. All owners of funded, moneyed, and copyhold property, had thus, in fact, a license given them to cheat with impunity ; and the only wonder

¹ Brougham's " Speech on the State of the Law," p. 103.

is, not that some did, but that a vast number more did not avail themselves of this singular privilege.

But we are glad to have to state that this preposterous system has been materially changed within the last few years. The acts 3 & 4 William IV., cap. 104, and the 1 & 2 Victoria, cap. 110, have made the copyhold as well as the freehold estates, with the moneyed, funded, and other property of deceased and living debtors, against whom judgment has been obtained, available for the satisfaction of their just debts. Hence it is no longer in the power of any knave, who chooses to reside abroad or in prison, to preserve his property from the grasp of those to whom he is really indebted. Indeed there is now little to object to in this department of the law, unless it be the expensive machinery (Court of Chancery) under which the administration of a deceased debtor's effects is conducted in litigated cases. Speaking generally, however, the various proceedings with respect to bankruptcy and insolvency are still, perhaps from their extreme difficulty, in an unsatisfactory state; and it is probable they will, at no distant date, be materially changed.

Too much lenity in questions of bankruptcy is generally shown to extravagant speculators, and to parties, whether engaged in business or not, who continue for considerable periods to live beyond their means. A party who embarks in speculative transactions to three, five, or ten times the amount of his capital, is a gambler, and not a merchant, and should be dealt with as such. And, though their evidence was not necessary to establish the fact, the disgraceful disclosures that were made in the bankruptcies which took place in 1846-47, show conclusively that such parties are by no means rare; and that some stringent measures are required to obviate the abuse of the existing facilities for obtaining credit. The same disclosures have also shown that the partners of various establishments, which had been for years substantially insolvent, continued, down to the period of their final explosion, to live in the most expensive style,

with town and country houses, horses, carriages, and so forth. Such conduct, though admitting of no apology, is extremely prevalent—the fact being, that more than four-fifths of all the bankruptcy and insolvency that takes place has its source in excessive expenditure. And while the necessity of providing means to carry it on, tempts those engaged in business to embark in the most hazardous adventures, it makes all parties less scrupulous than they would otherwise be about the means they resort to in order to obtain credit. The wide-spread mischief that has been, and may be, occasioned by indulging in such practices, requires that they should, as much as possible, be discouraged. They exhibit a decided want of honesty and of sound principle. And it is but fair and reasonable that those who, to the grievous injury of others, engage in them, should be treated with the severity they deserve.

IV. The fourth duty of government is to adopt such means as may be most effectual for the prevention of confusion and fraud in the dealings of individuals.

In furtherance of this object, the government of every civilised country has endeavoured to enforce the equality of all weights and measures of the same denomination. By its attention in this respect, additional facilities are given to commercial transactions: and that confusion and difficulty are obviated that could not fail to arise in the making of bargains and the adjustment of contracts, were the standards to which reference is usually made not legally and clearly defined.

For the same reasons, governments have every where reserved to themselves the privilege of issuing coined money; and it is obvious, were individuals allowed to exercise this privilege, that the confusion that would be occasioned by the issue of coins of different denominations, and of the same denomination, but of different degrees of purity and weight, would go far to deprive society of the advantage it has derived from the introduction and use of money. Government should not, however, confine its attention

wholly to the issue of coined money ; it is equally bound to extend it to the issue of paper money.

The signal advantages derivable from the substitution of notes or paper to serve as money instead of gold, depend, in a very great degree, on the fact of such notes being issued by parties of unquestionable solvency, and of their being readily exchangeable for the gold they profess to represent. We have already noticed the mischiefs occasioned by the vicious banking system established in the United States ; but, unluckily, it is not necessary to travel across the Atlantic for illustrations of this grievance. The permission, so long granted in this country, to individuals and associations, to issue notes to be used as money, without requiring any guarantee for their payment, has been productive of the most disastrous results ; the destruction of country bank paper having, on different occasions, within the course of the last sixty years—in 1793, in 1814, 1815, and 1816, in 1826, and to a considerable extent, also, in 1836—overspread the empire with bankruptcy and ruin. That the recurrence of such calamities should, if possible, be prevented, is a proposition that will hardly be disputed, and the simplest and most effectual way of doing this, would be to prohibit the issue of all notes payable on demand, except by those who give security for their payment. There are, however, great practical difficulties in the way of such a project ; and the objects to be effected by it, with others of hardly less importance, were to a great extent secured, by the measures for the improvement of the currency, carried through parliament in 1844. These effected a separation between the issue and banking departments of the Bank of England. The former is permitted to issue notes of the value of £14,000,000 upon securities ; but whatever she may issue more than this, must be in exchange for an equivalent amount of coin or bullion. The issues of the country banks were at the same time limited ; so that they are no longer able to increase their amount, as was their former practice, in periods of speculation and excite-

ment, to any improper extent. The establishment of new banks for the issue of notes without the assent of government, was then also prohibited; and as the number of existing banks will be gradually diminished, provision will ultimately be made, if this regulation be maintained, for confining, as would be most desirable, the issue of notes to a single bank or department. These important measures, notwithstanding they deeply affected many powerful private interests, were passed with little difficulty, and were very generally approved of.

In this respect, however, the public opinion has to some extent changed; and the act of 1844 has been charged with having aggravated the pressure of the crisis of 1847. That, however, was almost wholly a consequence of the railway mania, and of the failure of the potato crop of the previous year. This failure deprived more than two-thirds of the people of Ireland, and a considerable portion, also, of those of Great Britain, of their accustomed supplies of food. In consequence of this deficiency, and of government having come forward to provide the means for its relief, there was an unprecedented importation of all sorts of corn; and the demand for bullion for exportation to meet this importation, occurring simultaneously with a vast railway expenditure, pecuniary accommodations were obtained with the greatest difficulty, and the rate of interest rose to an extravagant height. Instead, however, of being increased by the act of 1844, it is pretty certain that the operation of the latter contributed to alleviate the severity of the crisis. The restraints it imposed on the issues of the country banks hindered them from embarking to any great extent in railway adventures, so that they were better able to assist their customers; and it also prevented the Bank of England from attempting to meet the exigencies of the case, otherwise than by raising the rate of interest and restricting her issues. And besides being the natural and proper, these were, in fact, the only means by which the drain for bullion for foreign remittance could

be checked, and the exchange turned in our favour. A great many mercantile houses that had been trading upon very insufficient capitals, or which had previously been virtually insolvent, were, of course, swept off during the crisis; and the alarm that was thereby occasioned, though, for the most part, without any good foundation, gave rise to a species of panic. During the prevalence of the latter, government consented to a temporary suspension of the act of 1844; but there is now, we believe, little doubt that this was an unwise proceeding. When it took place, the violence of the crisis had abated. The drain for gold for the Continent had not only ceased, but had begun to set in our favour; and the probability is, that in a very few days all alarm would have passed off, without the dangerous precedent which was then set by the interference of ministers. Hence, in our view of the matter, the experience afforded by the crisis of 1847 tells in favour of the act of 1844. And should it be subjected to any modifications, it is to be hoped that they may be such as may tend to carry out and strengthen the principles on which it is founded.

The prevention of the sale of all articles of gold or silver not marked with a public stamp, seems a judicious regulation. It is very difficult to ascertain when these metals are really pure; and to prevent the frauds that might in consequence happen, government performs this difficult operation for its subjects, and gives them a guarantee on which they may rely.

The enactments against the adulteration of articles of food with deleterious ingredients, seem to be highly proper. Those who are detected in carrying on such nefarious practices, besides being exposed to the loss of employment, should be made to feel the vengeance of the law.

It was formerly customary to regulate the mode of preparing or manufacturing various articles; but such attempts at regulation are now admitted, by all competent judges, to be injurious. They contribute to check invention and

discovery, to render the arts stationary, and to occasion the decline of every branch of industry subject to their operation.¹

The registration of deeds and contracts affecting fixed property, give additional facilities to its transfer, and to the negotiation of loans upon it.

Persons possessed of landed property, who wish to borrow, most commonly endeavour to attain their end by granting a bond for the sum, or a mortgage over their estates. When the title under which the granter of the bond holds the estate is perfectly clear, this forms a very unexceptionable species of security; and in Scotland money can be raised upon such bonds at a comparatively low rate of interest. But in this part of the island there are several circumstances which tend very much to limit the practice, and to render it less advantageous than it might be. The main defect lies in the want of any means of readily ascertaining what the estate, and the title to it, really are, upon which

¹ The influence of corporations, statutory apprenticeships, regulations as to the mode of manufacturing articles, &c., has been ably investigated in a Report presented by M. Vital Roux to the Chamber of Commerce of Paris in 1805. We subjoin the following extract :—" Il y a très peu d'objets manufacturés qui puissent être soumis à la censure ou à l'examen d'un inspecteur ; par la grande raison que cette censure n'aurait aucun effet, et que l'inspecteur le plus sûr et le plus impartial, c'est le consommateur. Toutes vos inspections, toutes vos règles, toutes les précautions de vos syndics, ne pourront pas faire que j'emploie de l'étoffe qui ne me conviendra pas, quand elle aurait les attestations les plus authentiques qui m'en garantiraient la bonté. Le consommateur est le juge souverain en ces matières ; c'est le seul tribunal compétent, et dont il n'y a point d'appel. Il est donc inutile de créer moyens de conciliation ; car on ne peut faire changer la volonté de celui qui consomme, on ne peut être plus habile que son expérience. C'est au manufacturier à la rendre profitable à ses intérêts, s'il veut avoir du débit. Nous croyons donc, que l'intérêt même du manufacturier est le meilleur moyen de police pour les manufactures, et que les inspecteurs, les surveillans les plus sûrs, ce sont les consommateurs. Il ne faut pas chercher des chemins détournés, quand la route est connue de tout le monde : laissons donc aller les choses, puisqu'elles marchent sans secours, qu'elles arrivent par la force même de leurs courans au but que chacun se propose, et ne donnons pas des guides à ceux qui savent se conduire."

it is proposed to borrow. With the exception of York and Middlesex, no register is kept in England of the settlements, mortgages, conveyances, and bonds, by which property may be affected; so that it becomes impossible, as Mr Justice Blackstone has observed, for either the purchaser or the lender of money upon an estate to know the burdens that may attach to it. This is necessarily a great obstacle to the lending of money upon land, as well as to the conveyance of estates from one individual to another. Blackstone has stated, that in the previously mentioned counties, where registers are kept, as many disputes arise, from the inattention and omissions of parties, as would most probably have arisen had they wanted registers.¹ But this must be occasioned by some defect in the plan of registration, which no doubt might be easily repaired. Were it, for example, declared that no deed or bond, affecting landed property, should be good against a third party unless it were entered in a public register, the rights of those who either purchased an estate, or advanced money upon it, would cease to be influenced by the circumstance of any previous but unregistered bond or conveyance being subsequently brought to light. A regulation of this sort would speedily teach parties the necessity of registering every deed or instrument affecting landed property, and would give that security to its purchasers, and to the lenders upon it, that is in all respects so desirable.

This system, which was adopted in Scotland at a very early period, has been productive of the best effects. There all deeds touching landed property are regularly registered, a special register being kept for the entry of deeds of entail. These registers are open to the inspection of the public; and the first thing that is done by the bidder for an estate, or by a lender of money on bond upon it, is to desire his agent to inspect the register, to ascertain whether there are any burdens affecting it, and their nature and extent. In

¹ "Commentaries," book ii. chap. 20.

this way every man is made exactly aware of what he is doing ; and if he either buy an estate with a vitiated title, or lend money upon one that is already encumbered up to its value, he has himself only to blame. A degree of security is thus given, both to purchasers and lenders, that is at once highly advantageous, and is not otherwise attainable.

The practice, called the *truck system*, under which some masters either directly supply their work-people with certain descriptions of goods to account of wages, or open or have an interest in shops to which they compel them to resort, has given rise to a great deal of controversy. Occasionally, no doubt, the practice has been adopted by the masters from a sincere desire to benefit those engaged in their service, by furnishing them, at a reduced price, with some of the principal articles of subsistence. But a system of this sort may be easily perverted to fraudulent purposes ; and there cannot, we apprehend, be a question that it has been, in very many instances, employed to cheat the work-people out of a portion of their just claims ; and also, by allowing them to become indebted to the accommodation shops, to deprive them, in some degree, of their free agency. The legislature took this view of the practice, which was forbidden, in most trades, by the act 1 & 2 William IV., cap. 32. It is still, however, extensively practised ; and, notwithstanding its injurious influence, and the advantage it gives to the dishonest manufacturer, it is no easy matter, especially when trade is depressed, to prevent its being acted upon.

V. We have, in the *fifth* place, to consider the species of industrious undertakings which government may engage in or control, or to which it may lend some peculiar sanction.

Perhaps, with the single exception of the conveyance of letters, there is no branch of industry which government had not better leave to be conducted by individuals. It does not, however, appear, that the post-office could be so well conducted by any other party as by government : the

latter can alone enforce perfect regularity in all its subordinate departments; can carry it to the smallest villages, and even beyond the frontier; and can combine all its separate parts into one uniform system, on which the public may rely for security and despatch. Besides providing for the speedy and safe communication of intelligence, the post-office has every where almost been rendered subservient to fiscal purposes, and made a source of revenue; and provided the duty on letters be not so heavy as to oppose any very serious obstacle to the frequency and facility of correspondence, it seems to be a most unobjectionable tax, and is paid and collected with little trouble and inconvenience.

The construction and police of roads, harbours, &c., are among the most important objects to which the attention of government should be directed. In some countries, as France, the administration of roads is placed in the hands of government; while in others, as England, it is placed in the hands of the gentry of the different counties, acting under authority of the legislature. Each plan has its peculiar advantages and defects; but the balance on the side of advantage seems, on the whole, to preponderate in favour of the English system. The French system is perhaps preferable, were it applied only to the great lines of road; but these bear a very small proportion to the cross and other roads with which every extensive kingdom either is or should be intersected. And it seems reasonable to suppose that, when the gentry, and those most directly interested in having good roads, and on whom the expense of their construction and maintenance principally falls, have to superintend their execution and repair, they will be made and maintained better, and at a cheaper rate, than if their management were left wholly to the care of engineers employed by government, and responsible to it only.

It is the duty of government to take care that the tolls be not oppressive; and to assist, by making grants, in enabling roads to be carried through districts, and bridges to

be constructed, where the necessary funds could not otherwise be raised. The money advanced on account of the Menai bridge is of this description, and has been judiciously expended.

Generally, however, government should be exceedingly shy about advancing funds for the prosecution of undertakings that have failed in the hands of private individuals, or that will not be engaged in by them. Grants for such purposes are frequently, indeed, little better than bonuses to political partisans; and are almost always unprofitably expended. The money laid out on the Caledonian Canal, on Leith harbour, and on several canals and river works in Ireland, executed by government, has been, in so far as the public interests are concerned, all but thrown away.

There are some branches of industry which must be carried on in some degree in common, but with respect to the prosecution of which the views and interests of individuals are so very various, that government is obliged to interfere to regulate their respective pretensions. The salmon fishery is an instance of this sort. Government has not only to fix when the fishery shall begin and terminate, but it has also to decide how far the proprietors, near the mouths of rivers, shall be entitled to carry weirs and other fishing machinery into their channels.

Undertakings in which the hazard is considerable, or that require, in order to their successful prosecution, a larger amount of capital than can be conveniently furnished by individuals, are usually carried on by companies, which frequently require the sanction of the legislature to their formation. And when these bodies claim no peculiar privileges, but are formed on the principle of coming into fair and open competition with each other and with individuals, there does not seem, in ordinary cases, to be any good reason for opposing their incorporation. But in the event of their claiming any peculiar privileges, or if the purpose for which they seek to be incorporated would necessarily give them such privileges, the fair presumption being that

they will employ them to promote their own private interests, in preference to those of the public, they should not be incorporated without the maturest deliberation. Still, however, there are many cases in which it is for the public advantage that companies with such privileges should be established, under proper regulations. A city is ill supplied with water; there is a copious spring ten or twenty miles distant, and a company offer to bring this water into the city, on their getting an act authorising them to appropriate the spring, and to lay pipes or to construct an aqueduct for the conveyance of the water. In this case the object in view is most desirable; but it is plain that, were the authority they require given unconditionally to the company, it would be in their power to raise the price of water to the highest level, and perhaps to make an enormous profit, to the great injury of the inhabitants. The same is the case with railways and canals. It is of the greatest importance that the best means of communication should be established between all great towns; and every facility should be given for the formation of companies for their construction. But then it is to be borne in mind, that there is always some one line between any two places decidedly better fitted for a railway or canal than any other line; and if a company get an act of parliament, authorising them to appropriate this line, they get, in fact, a substantial monopoly of the traffic between the places connected by the railway or canal, and may, in consequence, supply the public with inferior accommodation, and add proportionally to their charges. And hence, in authorising the establishment of companies for such purposes, such conditions should be inserted in the acts as may be adequate for the protection of the public interests. This important consideration has, however, been far too little attended to. In this country, we have in most cases contented ourselves with endeavouring to provide against overcharges, by fixing maximum rates of profit on the company's stock, and maximum rates of charge for the services

to be performed by them. But overcharges are not the only evils to be guarded against; and if they were, experience has shown that the restrictions referred to are ill fitted to attain their object. A limitation of the rate of dividend tempts a prosperous company to engage in subsidiary undertakings, though of doubtful utility and profit; and it farther tempts them to countenance an extravagant system of management; to give, by underhand methods, unfair advantages to their proprietors; and, in short, to adopt every device by which they may retain the highest (or unnecessarily high) rates of charge, without apparently raising their revenue above the sum required to defray the maximum rate of dividend. A limitation of the rates of charge is equally ineffectual. The rates are uniformly such as it is supposed will yield, when the railway or other public work is about to be constructed, an adequate remuneration for the capital to be vested in it. But the fair presumption is, that the country will continue to increase in wealth and population, for an indefinite period, with the same rapidity that she has increased since the close of the American War; and if so, these rates will, in a few years, yield a profit or interest far beyond any that was in the contemplation of the parties when the work was entered upon. Now, it is plain that in such cases there will be no way of abating the company's profits, or, which is the same thing, its charges against the public, except by the formation, at a vast expense, of a new, and otherwise, perhaps, a perfectly unnecessary road! Hence the obvious expediency, in passing acts for the formation of railways, canals, docks, water and gas companies, and other public works, of reserving power to government to make periodical revisions of the tolls or rates of charge for the services to be performed; to control their management, in the view of providing for the greater security and convenience of the public; and, if needs be, to purchase up the works on reasonable terms.

The French (under the late régime) adopted the plan, in

legislating for railways, of fixing upon lines and rates of toll, with plans for their construction, &c.; and of submitting these lines to public competition, and assigning them to those who offered to construct them and work them for the shortest lease or term of years, at the expiration of which they were to become the property of the public. This plan is preferable, perhaps, in some respects, to that previously mentioned. But we have neither adopted the one system nor the other; and it is all but universally admitted that our legislation, with regard to railways and other public works, has evinced a highly culpable inattention to the public interests, and been discreditable to the intelligence of the country. Latterly, however, the extraordinary extension of railway projects has forcibly attracted attention to the subject: and though very many important lines have been, others still remain to be conceded, while the older companies are frequently obliged to come to parliament for new acts; so that, by adopting a well-devised system, we may check abuse, and provide for the public interests in the lines that remain to be granted; and may probably, also, be able to repair, in part at least, the errors already committed in the cession of the others.¹

It is sometimes necessary, in order to encourage the formation of a company for some desirable object—such as the lighting of a middling-sized town with gas—that it should get an exclusive privilege for a given number of years. But this should in no case be ceded without due examination, and without the insertion of conditions, to protect the public from any extortion on the part of the company.

No exclusive company should ever be established for carrying on any sort of manufacture, or for conducting any branch either of internal or external commerce. No such institution, formed for such an object, has ever been any thing else than a public nuisance. If it be necessary that

¹ The subjects now alluded to have been treated with great ability in different tracts, by James Morrison, Esq., of which a collected edition was published in the course of the present year.

those engaged in any particular trade should contribute to defray some public expenses required for its prosecution, they may be formed into a *regulated* company ; that is, a company into which every one may enter on paying a moderate fine, or annual premium, being then at liberty to trade on his own account, and to act in all respects according to his own judgment and discretion. The necessity of providing for the expense of the armaments, without which it was alleged the trade with India could not be conducted, formed, during a lengthened period, the only circumstance urged in defence of the exclusive privileges granted to the East India Company. But admitting that these armaments were necessary, and that government declined to provide them, their cost might have been defrayed by a peculiar duty on Indian exports and imports appropriated to that object, or by forming the traders into a *regulated* company. The latter, indeed, was the mode in which the Levant and Russian trades were long conducted, and the expenses of a public nature attached to them provided for. And had either of these plans been adopted in conducting the East India trade, it is abundantly certain that it would have proved more extensive and beneficial than it has done.

The businesses of insurance and banking are those which are most commonly prosecuted in this country by companies. With the exception of the Bank of England, none of these companies enjoy any peculiar privilege. But the monopoly granted to the Bank is one which may, under certain conditions, be advantageously continued to that establishment.

No authority should ever be granted to companies or individuals to undertake any work, however useful, by which the private property of others may be affected, without providing for their full indemnity. To act on any other principle would be to shake the security of property ; it would be injuring one set of individuals for the benefit of some other set.

The law with respect to patents for new inventions and discoveries in the arts, is encumbered with several difficulties.

The expediency of granting patents has been disputed, though, as it would seem, without sufficient reason. Were they refused, the inducement to make discoveries would, in many cases, be very much weakened; at the same time that it would plainly be for the interest of every one who makes a discovery to endeavour, if possible, to conceal it. And, notwithstanding the difficulties in the way of concealment, they are not insuperable; and it is believed that several important inventions have been lost, from the secret dying with their authors. On the other hand, it is not easy to decide upon the term for which the patent or exclusive privilege should be granted. Some have proposed that it should be made perpetual; but this would be a serious obstacle to the progress of improvement, and would lead to injurious results. Perhaps the term of fourteen years, to which the duration of a patent is limited in England, is as proper a one as could be suggested. It may be too short for some inventions, and too long for others, but, on the whole, it seems a pretty fair average.

Previously to the reign of Queen Anne, it was common to grant patents without any condition, except that they should be for really new inventions. But it was then ordered, that those who obtained patents should deliver a minute and accurate description or *specification* of the invention for which the patent is granted, into the Court of Chancery. This is a judicious regulation. It secures the invention from being lost, and the moment the patent expires every one is in a condition to profit by it.¹

VI. We have now, in the *sixth* and last place, to consider the means proper to be adopted for securing the property and persons of the citizens from such casualties as they might be subject to without the interference of government.

Of the measures of a public character, devised for the

¹ For farther information on this subject the reader is referred to Godson's work on the "Law of Copyrights and Patents;" and to the "Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Patents," particularly the evidence of Mr Farey.

protection of property from casualties, a principal class is intended to give security to navigation. Without the co-operation or sanction of government, light-houses could not be erected or managed on any general system, nor safe and convenient harbours be constructed. To defray the expense of such works, a revenue of some sort or other must be provided ; and as it belongs to the legislature to say how this revenue shall be raised, it must also belong to it to decide upon the propriety of their construction. No doubt can be entertained that great additional facility and security has been given to navigation by the erection of light-houses, and by the formation and improvement of docks and harbours, during the last half century. At the same time, however, it is highly expedient, with a view to the encouragement of commerce, that the charges laid on shipping, on account of these works, should be kept as low as possible. Where they are heavy, the navigator is tempted to resort to less expensive though less secure channels.

Except in so far as they may be obviated by the establishment of a good system of police, government can do but little to protect property on land from casualties. It may, indeed, enact regulations to guard against fire, respecting the thickness of party-walls in cities, the materials to be used in roofing, &c. ; but farther than this it had better not interfere, but leave the care of property to the vigilance of its owners.

The measures of a public character, contrived to protect the persons of the citizens against casualties, are principally intended to prevent the spread of contagious diseases, and to secure the proper education of medical men.

From a belief that the plague is contagious, and that the infection may be conveyed to a great distance, it has long been usual, in all civilised countries, to adopt precautions to hinder its importation. For this purpose, ships coming from places where the plague is prevalent, are usually obliged to anchor for forty days in some particular port or road : and the individuals coming from them are obliged

to resort, for the same period, to a public building prepared for their reception, denominated a *lazaretto*, where they are placed under surveillance, and are not allowed to have any intercourse with any one except the officers of health. The ships and individuals so confined are said to be performing *quarantine*. If at the end of forty days no symptoms of disease appear, they are set at liberty.

It should, however, be stated, that the fact of the plague being contagious has been denied, and that the precautions referred to have been said to be useless, and to have no other effect than the imposition of some very vexatious and burdensome restraints on commerce. Perhaps, indeed, these precautions may, in some instances, have been carried too far; but in a matter of this sort, innovations should not be rashly adopted: and better evidence than any hitherto laid before the public would seem to be necessary to warrant the abolition of all restraints on the intercourse with infected countries.

When a virulent contagious disease breaks out in any particular district, it is the duty of government, by surrounding it with a cordon of troops, to prevent, if possible, its further progress. Such a measure may, indeed, occasion a greater intensity of mortality within the infected district; but the safety of a few individuals is not to be purchased by seriously endangering the lives of many more.

Much difference of opinion has existed in regard to the extent to which government should go in recommending or enforcing the adoption of any efficient remedy against a mortal disease; such, for example, as vaccination. In such cases it had better, perhaps, confine its attention to the institution of experiments and examinations as to the facts, laying the result before the public, and leaving individuals to use their own discretion with respect to them.

It has been argued, that government is only imposing on itself a needless task when it interferes to regulate and ascertain the qualifications of those engaged in the medical

profession ; inasmuch as the desire of promoting their own interest will, in that as in all other businesses, ensure proficiency. But there is a wide difference between the employment of those who exercise their art on the bodies of men, and those who exercise it on some sort of raw or manufactured produce. If an individual employ a tailor to make him a coat, he will not employ him again unless it be made to his mind ; nor, though the cloth were spoiled, would the loss be considerable : but if an individual employ a physician, surgeon, or apothecary, to prescribe for him, he may, in the event of the person so employed being ignorant of his art, lose his life ; while, owing to the difficulty of ascertaining when death is occasioned by the natural progress of disease, or by the unskilfulness of the practitioner, the business of the latter may not be materially diminished ; and he may continue, for an indefinite period, to prosecute his destructive career. It does, therefore, seem that government is bound to take such measures as may be effectual to secure the proper education of medical men ; and that none should be permitted to practise who have not been properly educated, and have not been examined and obtained a certificate of their capacity from some public board constituted for that purpose. All individuals, though very many are nowise fitted to judge of their qualifications, must occasionally resort to medical men ; and it is the duty of government to provide that the lives of its subjects be not sacrificed to ignorance, cupidity, or quackery.

In some countries it is usual to prohibit the sale of poisons, except under certain regulations ; and the many crimes that are perpetrated by means of arsenic, seem to evince the propriety of making its sale illegal, except when the buyer brings a note from a physician, specifying the quantity required, and the purpose for which it is sought.

It has been usual, in order to guard against accidents, to limit the number of passengers to be carried by stage-

coaches, and to subject packet-boats and other public conveyances to examination.

Notwithstanding the introduction of Sir Humphry Davy's safety-lamp into mines, explosions still frequently take place in them, which occasion the most frightful disasters; while, owing to the recklessness and apathy of the workmen, there is but little prospect of these calamities being abated by greater care or attention on their part. But what will not be done by the miners might, perhaps, be done by making the masters responsible for the injuries inflicted on the former by explosions and suchlike accidents. By throwing the support of the families and others dependent on workmen killed or injured in the mines on the masters, the latter would be compelled to enforce those regulations by which alone accidents may be averted. And though the measure might, perhaps, make some addition to the cost of mineral produce, it would be too trifling to have any very sensible effect.

For the same reasons we are, also, disposed to think that the proprietors of mills and factories should be made responsible for the accidents that occur in them.

We have alluded, in a previous part of this work, to the serious injury done to the public health by the bad state of the dwellings of the poor. (*Ante*, p. 183.) This is especially the case in the great manufacturing towns; and it is not easy to imagine that there can be any subject with stronger claims on the public attention. It is in vain to trust, in a matter of this sort, to the judgment of individuals. If private parties be left to construct houses at discretion, we shall no doubt have, in time to come, as we have had hitherto, thousands upon thousands of cottages erected without any provision for their drainage, for furnishing them with adequate supplies of water, or even for their ventilation; and such cottages, being cheap, are always sure to find occupiers. Nothing, however, can be more obvious than that it is the duty of government to take measures for the prevention and repair of an abuse of this

sort. Its injurious influence is not confined to the occupiers of the houses referred to, though, if it were, that would be no good reason for declining to introduce a better system. But the diseases engendered in these unhealthy abodes frequently extend their ravages through all classes of the community; so that the best interests of the middle and higher orders, as well as those of the lowest, are involved in this question. And on the same principle that we adopt measures to guard against the plague, we should endeavour to secure ourselves against typhus, and against the brutalising influence, over any considerable portion of the population, of a residence amid filth and disease.

There cannot, one should think, be much difficulty in devising measures fitted to prevent the farther extension of the evils complained of. There seems, however, to be no good reasons for being satisfied with the mere prevention of their progress; but very many why we should also endeavour to effect their eradication.

As already stated, we shall briefly touch, in another part of this work, on the interference of government with respect to public education, and the support of the poor. It belongs to the politician and moral philosopher to discuss how far, and in what way, it should interfere to strengthen and promote moral and religious habits.

The previous observations may, perhaps, suffice to give a general idea of the sort of objects with respect to which the interference of government is required, in conducting the ordinary business of society, and the extent to which it should be carried. It cannot, however, be too strongly impressed upon those in authority, that non-interference should be the leading principle of their policy, and interference the exception only; that in all ordinary cases individuals should be left to shape their conduct according to their own judgment and discretion; and that no interference should ever be made on any speculative or doubtful

grounds, but only when its necessity is apparent, or when it can be clearly made out that it will be productive of *public* advantage. The maxim, *pas trop gouverner*, should never be absent from the recollection of legislators and ministers. Whenever they set about regulating, they are treading a path encompassed with difficulties; and while they advance with caution, they should be ready to stop the moment they do not see the way clearly before them, and are not impelled, by a strong sense of public duty, to go forward. But, so long as this is the case, they should never hesitate in their course. There are many cases in which government must, and many more in which it should interfere. And it is the duty of the legislature, having once fully satisfied itself, by a careful inquiry, of the expediency, all things considered, of any measure, resolutely to carry it into effect.

PRINCIPLES

OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PART II.

VALUE AND PRICE.

THE various methods by which labour may be rendered most productive, and the relation and dependence of the different kinds of industry being previously traced and exhibited, we now proceed to the *second division* of our subject, or to an investigation of the laws which regulate the value and price of the products of industry.

In treating of the production of wealth, it was not necessary to inquire whether the labour required to appropriate and produce commodities, was the sole source and measure of their value; or whether it was not partly derived from other causes, and partly only from labour. But an acquaintance with the circumstances which determine the value of commodities, in the different stages of society, is necessary to enable us to ascertain, with due precision, the principles which regulate their distribution.

CHAPTER I.

Exchangeable Value—How it is determined—Conditions required to render a Commodity invariable in its Exchangeable Value—Cost or Real Value—How it is determined—Conditions required to render a Commodity invariable in its Cost—Quantity of Labour required to produce a Commodity different from the Quantity for which it will exchange—Corn not invariable in its Value—Changes in the Value of Money.

WE endeavoured to show, at the commencement of this work, that the value and the utility of commodities are totally distinct qualities, and cannot be confounded, or regarded in the same point of view, without leading to the most erroneous conclusions. An article is useful, or possessed of utility, when it has the power or capacity of exciting, satisfying, or gratifying one or more of the various wants and desires of man. But an article is not valuable, or possessed of value, unless it may be exchanged for some quantity of voluntary labour, or of some other article or product, obtainable only through the exertion of such labour.

Without utility of some sort or other, no article will ever be desired. But the most useful article, if it be a spontaneous production of nature, and may be freely enjoyed by every individual, is wholly destitute of value; for none will either labour, or give the produce of labour, for that which Providence gratuitously supplies. That an article may have value, it is indispensable that some expenditure of labour, or, which is the same thing, some sacrifice of toil and trouble, should be required for its acquisition. The maximum of utility, if it be obtained independently of this sacrifice, can give no value to any thing. What can

be more useful than atmospheric air and the rays of the sun? and what can be more completely destitute of value?

An article or product possessed of utility and value must derive the latter from one of two sources, or from both. Labour must have been required for the production or appropriation of a valuable article, or it must exist in a limited quantity, or under such circumstances that the supply is inferior to the demand. All those articles and products of which the supply may be indefinitely increased, and which are not subject to any artificial restraints, derive their value either wholly from the labour expended upon them, or partly from that cause, and partly from the accidental circumstance of their supply being inferior to the demand; but the value of such articles and products as exist only in limited quantities, and the supply of which, not admitting of an indefinite extension, is really subjected to a natural or an artificial monopoly, is altogether independent of the labour required to produce them; and is derived partly, as in the case of waterfalls, from the labour they are fitted to save, and partly, as in the case of antique gems, statues, &c., from the mere competition of those who wish to obtain them.

We must, therefore, carefully distinguish between the exchangeable value of an article, or the quantity of produce or labour for which it will exchange, and its *cost*, or, as it is sometimes termed, its real value; meaning, by cost or real value, the quantity of labour originally required to produce or acquire an article.

I. EXCHANGEABLE OR MARKETABLE VALUE.—The capacity of exchanging for or buying other things is inherent in all commodities, which are not spontaneous productions, when they happen to be in demand; but it can neither be manifested nor appreciated except when they are compared with each other, or with labour. It is, indeed, quite impossible to speak of the value of a commodity without referring to some other commodity, or to labour, as a standard.

No article or product can have exchangeable value, except in relation to something else that is or may be exchanged for it. We might as well talk about absolute height or absolute depth, as about absolute value. A is said to possess value, because it exchanges for some quantity of B or C; and it is evident, that the quantity of B or C for which A exchanges, forms the only attainable measure of, or expression for, the value of A; just as the quantity of A forms the only attainable measure of, or expression for, the value of B or C.

Exchangeable value being the power which a commodity has of exchanging for other commodities, or for labour, it follows that the exchangeable value of no single commodity can vary without occasioning a simultaneous variation in the exchangeable value of those with which it is compared. Suppose a bushel of wheat exchanged, in 1750, for an ounce of silver, and that it now exchanges for two ounces: on this hypothesis, it is evident that wheat has doubled in value as compared with silver; or, which is the same thing, that silver has lost half its value as compared with wheat. This case is, *mutatis mutandis*, the case of all commodities or products exchanged for each other. If A rise, it must be in relation to something else, as B; and if B fall, it must be in relation to something else, as A; so that it is obviously impossible to change the relation of A to B, without, at the same time, changing that of B to A.

It appears, therefore, that no commodity can be constant or invariable in its exchangeable value, unless it will at all times exchange for, or purchase, the same quantity of all other commodities and of labour. Suppose A exchanges for 1 B, 2 C, 3 D, &c., its exchangeable value will be constant, provided it always preserves its present relation to them, but not otherwise. And it is obvious, that to communicate this constancy of value to A, it is indispensable that those circumstances, whatever they may be, that now determine its relation to, or power of exchanging for or purchasing B, C, D, &c., should, in all time to come, continue

to exert precisely the same influence over it and them.¹ Experience, by exhibiting the values of commodities, as compared with each other, in a state of constant fluctuation, sufficiently proves that the circumstances under which they are respectively produced, are perpetually varying. Perhaps, however, it may be worth while to observe, that had different commodities been always produced under the same circumstances or conditions, not A only, but every other commodity, would have been an invariable standard; as any given commodity in a market may be used as a standard to which to refer the value of every one else. It is evident, too, that the possession of such an invariable standard would be of no use whatever; all that it would teach us would be, that the circumstances which first made A exchange for B, C, &c., continued equally to affect them all; but of the nature of those circumstances, and the intensity of their operation, it would leave us wholly in the dark.

II. COST OR REAL VALUE.—Having thus seen that the exchangeable value of any given commodity is expressed by the relation it bears to some other commodity or to labour, the next subject claiming our attention is, the investigation of the circumstances which determine this relation, or of the source and regulating principle of value.

A person destitute of an article, and wishing to acquire it, has only two ways of effecting his object; he may set about producing the article, or he may exchange a quantity of labour, or the produce or equivalent of a quantity of labour for it. In either case, the *cost* of the article is to be estimated by the quantity of labour directly or indirectly expended on its acquisition. Demand may, therefore, be considered as the ultimate source or origin of both exchangeable and real value; for the desire of individuals to possess themselves of articles, or rather the demand for them

¹ The conditions essential to an invariable measure of exchangeable value were first clearly pointed out in the "Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, and Causes of Value," p. 17.

originating in that desire, is the sole cause of their being produced or appropriated; and the quantity of labour, or of sweat and toil, required to render a demand effectual—that is, to produce or obtain articles or products—forms the single principle by which their cost or real value is, in all cases, regulated and determined.

It has been already stated, that some commodities exist only in limited quantities, and are, consequently, subject to a natural monopoly; while the production of others, the supply of which might be indefinitely increased, is sometimes subject to artificial restraints. The marketable or exchangeable value of such commodities bears no definite proportion to their cost or real value, but varies in every different degree, according to the closeness of the monopoly, and the competition for them. They may, however, be always readily discriminated from those that may be freely produced in unlimited quantities; and are but few and unimportant compared with the latter.

If the demand and supply of freely produced commodities were always exactly proportioned to each other—that is, if the supply brought to market were uniformly such as could be taken off by those who were desirous of obtaining them, and willing to pay the cost of their production, their exchangeable value would always bear the same proportion to their real value, or cost. That this would be so is obvious; for, under the circumstances supposed, there is nothing that could affect the value of commodities, except the labour expended upon them.

Practically speaking, the supply of commodities is, owing to an infinity of causes—such as changes of fashions, of seasons, and of the usual channels of commercial intercourse, the miscalculations of producers, the speculations of merchants, &c.—seldom or never adjusted precisely in proportion to the effectual demand, or the demand of those who are able and willing to buy them. But it will be shown in the next chapter, that fluctuations of value, arising from these causes, are confined within certain limits; that the

producers always exert themselves to reduce the value of those that yield more than the fair average rate of profit, and to elevate those that do not; and that the *common* level of value and price which is thus attained, may be considered as identical with the cost of production, being, generally speaking, determined by the quantity of labour required to produce commodities. But as we are only endeavouring at present to establish the leading or constant principles with respect to value, we shall suppose that these accidental causes of variation do not exist, or that allowance has been made for them, and confine ourselves to an investigation of the circumstances which determine the value of freely produced commodities, when their supply is about commensurate with the demand.

Suppose that a commodity, A, the supply of which is neither in excess nor defect, varies in relation to some other commodity, B, supplied in a similar way; the cause of this variation will be found in the fact of the labour required to produce them having varied in the same proportion. Thus, suppose A and B are now equal: if, twelve months hence, A should be worth 2 B, this change must be occasioned by the quantity of labour required to produce A having doubled, while that required to produce B has remained stationary; or by that required to produce B having diminished a half, while that required to produce A has been constant; or the labour required to produce them both may have varied in the same or in opposite directions, but so that the quantity required to produce A has doubled as compared with the quantity required to produce B. There cannot, however, be, in most cases, much practical difficulty in deciding in which of these modes the variation has been really brought about. An improvement is made in the manufacture of cotton, for example, and its value immediately declines as compared with other things in which no improvement has been made, or in which the improvement has been less; and it will obviously do this, not because these others have increased in cost or real value,

but because it has sunk. Thus, if we suppose that a still greater improvement had been, at the same time, made in the woollen manufacture, cottons would rise as compared with woollens, not because they had risen in real value, but because they had not fallen so much as woollens.¹

The products obtained by equal quantities of sweat and toil are not always equal: but their cost depends on the labour expended, and not on the mode on which it is expended, or on the degree of its productiveness. The inventions and discoveries which augment the productiveness of labour, add nothing either to its value, or to that of the commodities produced by its means. A day's labour in a rude state of society, when the arts are in their infancy, and machinery unknown or inefficient, yields a very different quantity of produce from a day's labour in an advanced period, when the arts are highly improved, and the most powerful machinery universally introduced. Nothing, however, can be more obvious than that the sacrifice made by the labourer is as great in the former case as in the latter. The variation is not in the amount of physical force, or of labour, exerted by the agent that produces, but merely in the mode in which that force is applied. But, however the same amount of labour may be laid out, and

¹ The acute and ingenious author of the "Templars' Dialogues" ("London Magazine," May 1824, p. 551) has stated, that "It is possible for A continually to increase in value—in *real* value observe—and yet command a continually decreasing quantity of B." This statement has been disputed by the author of the "Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, and Causes of Value;" but without any just ground, for nothing can be more perfectly correct. A and B have been produced by certain quantities of labour; but more labour is now required to produce A, and a still greater proportional quantity to produce B: under these circumstances, A must obviously have increased in real value, for it has cost its producers a greater sacrifice of toil and trouble; but as the cost of A has not increased so much as that of B, it will now exchange for, or purchase a less quantity of the latter. Had the author of the "Dissertation" perceived this distinction, he would, most probably, have spared not a few of his remarks on the statements advanced by Mr Ricardo, as well as by the author of the "Dialogues."—*Dissertation on the Nature, &c.* p. 41.

whatever may be its produce, it unavoidably occasions the same sacrifice to those by whom it is performed ; and hence it follows, that the products of equal quantities of labour or of toil and trouble, how great soever the differences amongst them, are identical in their cost, and consequently, also, in their real value. Nothing that is valuable can be obtained except by the exertion of labour, or physical force. This is the price that man must pay for all things with which he is not spontaneously furnished ; and it is by the magnitude of the price so paid, and not by the magnitude, shape, or quality of the things themselves, that their cost or real value is to be estimated.

A given quantity of labour is not, therefore, to be considered in the same light as a given quantity of its produce, or of commodities : for, whether the quantity of commodities produced by a fixed quantity of labour does or does not vary, the value of that quantity, in the estimation of the producer, is necessarily constant ; and he will always be disposed to exchange it for an equal quantity, or for the produce of an equal quantity, of other men's labour. Suppose an individual could produce *two* pecks of wheat by a day's labour in 1830 ; but that, owing to his being obliged to cultivate a comparatively poor soil, he can now produce only *one* peck by the same expenditure of labour ; this single peck will be deemed by him, and by every one else, of exactly the same value that the two pecks were before ; for it has cost the same amount of sweat and toil to raise it ; and it will, consequently, exchange for, or buy the same quantity of those commodities that continue to require the same labour for their production, that the two pecks did in 1830.

In an open market, when the supply of freely produced commodities is nearly proportioned to the effectual demand, the labour required for their production determines the proportions in which they exchange for each other, and for labour. It is material, however, to observe, that, speaking generally, commodities uniformly exchange for or buy more labour, or the produce of more labour, than was required

for their production. And unless such were the case, a capitalist would have no motive to lay out stock on the employment of labour ; for his profit depends on his getting back the produce of a greater quantity of labour than he advances. When he buys labour, he gives the produce of that which has been performed for that which is *to be* performed. It is obvious, too, inasmuch as there is no fund except capital, or the commodities already produced and actually existing in a country, to feed and support labourers, that the quantity of produce they receive in exchange for their labour, or their wages, must vary with the variations in the amount of that capital, and in their number. At one period, they may be so numerous, compared with capital, that a labourer may be willing to offer a future day's work for the produce of five or six hours' work already performed ; while, at another period, their number, as compared with capital, may be so much reduced, that they may be able to obtain the produce of *ten* hours' performed labour for *twelve* hours' future labour. But the cost, and, in all ordinary states of the market, the exchangeable value, of commodities is not affected by these variations. The change is not in the principle that regulates and determines value—that is, in the physical exertion, or sweat and toil of the labourer—but in what he obtains for it. What he produces, or acquires by equal quantities of labour, always costs him the same sacrifice, and, has, therefore, the same real value, whether it be large or small. He gives a constant, but receives a variable quantity in its stead.

The statements now made show the error of the opinion held by Smith, that the quantity of labour required to produce any article, might be taken as the measure of the quantity for which it would exchange. Owing to variations in the efficacy of the labour required in production, or rather in the efficacy of the modes in which it is applied, to changes of fashion, and other causes, it may happen, that an article that required a day's labour for its production no very long time ago, would not now exchange for one whose production

cost an hour's labour. "It is," says Mr Ricardo, "the comparative quantities of commodities which labour will produce, that determines their present or past relative value, and not the comparative quantities of commodities given to the labourer in exchange for his labour."¹

In stating that the quantity of labour required to produce commodities is the only determining principle and measure of their cost, and generally, also, of their exchangeable value, it is, of course, taken for granted, that all sorts of labour are reduced to the same common standard of intensity. The inequalities in the physical force of those individuals who have attained to their full growth, and are perfectly formed, are in themselves not very material, and when considered in a general point of view entirely disappear, inasmuch as any superiority that may obtain among a few on the one hand, is sure to be balanced by a corresponding deficiency amongst as many on the other.

It will be shown, in a subsequent chapter, that the circumstance of certain sorts of labour being of the description called skilled, and of their being paid at a higher rate than those common sorts that all may perform, does not affect the correctness of the principles we have been endeavouring to establish with respect to the value of commodities.

The result of these investigations may be thus briefly recapitulated :—

1st, That nothing can possess exchangeable value, unless it be in demand, and unless some portion of voluntary human labour be required for its production or appropriation, or both.

2d, That the cost, or, as it is sometimes called, the real value of a commodity, is dependent on, and exactly proportioned to, the quantity of labour required for its production or appropriation.

3d, That the exchangeable value of a commodity is dependent partly and principally on its cost, and partly on

¹ "Principles of Economy and Taxation," p. 9.

accidental variations of supply and demand; and is measured by the quantity of any other commodity, or of labour, for which it will exchange.

The amount of labour expended on the production of commodities being the sole measure of their cost, it follows that, if any commodity required at all times the same quantity of labour for its production, its cost would be invariable. It is obvious, however, that there can be no such commodity. The varying fertility of the soils, mines, &c., to which recourse must successively be had, and the improvements that are constantly being made in the application of labour, occasion perpetual variations in the quantities thereof required for the production of commodities. And, therefore, it is not to any one commodity, or set of commodities, but to some given quantity of labour, that we must refer for an unvarying standard of cost or real value.

It has sometimes been said, that if any commodity were invariable in its value, it might be appealed to on all occasions as an unerring standard by which to ascertain the exchangeable value of other things. But it is obvious that it could not be so appealed to, unless the value of commodities and their cost were always identical. This, however, as will be more fully shown in the next chapter, is but occasionally and rarely the case. The value of commodities may be raised above their cost, either by a sudden increase of the usual demand, or by a sudden deficiency of the usual supply, and may be depressed below it by the opposite circumstances. And though it be true that any given fluctuation is seldom of considerable duration, yet, as the causes of fluctuation are perpetually recurring, a special inquiry must be made in each particular instance, to ascertain whether they are really in operation, and the extent of their disturbing influence. We should, therefore, draw a most inaccurate conclusion, were we to assume that the mere equality of the labour required for the production of a commodity, rendered it, in all cases, an accurate measure or standard of marketable value; for the value of that com-

modity might vary from the influence of causes affecting itself, though extrinsic to, and independent on, the quantity of labour required for its production ; or it might vary from similar causes operating on the commodities with which it was compared. If A were always produced by the same quantity of labour, and if B and C were produced by varying quantities of labour, then, if value in exchange depended on nothing but quantities of labour, or if it always bore the same proportion to these quantities, we should be able, by comparing B and C with A, to say at once whether their value had remained constant, or to point out the precise extent to which it had varied. But when there are other causes which may affect the value of A itself, as well as the values of B and C, it is obvious we should not be able, by merely comparing A with the others, to say when a variation took place in the relation that previously obtained amongst them, whether it had been occasioned by causes exclusively affecting A, or exclusively affecting B and C, or whether they had all been affected, though in different degrees.

But, notwithstanding what has now been stated, Smith, and, more recently, Say, Garnier, and others, have contended that corn may be assumed as an invariable standard of value ; and that, taking the prices of corn for a few years together, to get rid of the disturbing effects of variable harvests, whatever fluctuation may take place in them must be in the value of the money or commodity in which the price of corn is estimated, and not in the value of corn itself, which they regard as constant. Founding upon this hypothesis, attempts have been made, by comparing the prices of corn with the prices of other things mentioned in history, to determine the fluctuations of their value. It is, however, to be regretted that the learning and ingenuity displayed in this research have not been more profitably employed. It is hardly necessary, after what has been previously stated, to make any observations to show that

the hypothesis referred to is altogether visionary. Smith says, that the value of corn is invariable, because the demand is always proportioned to the supply; increasing when it increases, and diminishing when it diminishes. Now, admitting that such is the case, what has this constancy of demand to do with the value of corn? It will not, it is true, be produced if it be not demanded; but its value, when produced, depends not on the demand, but on the quantity of labour required for its production. The growers of corn in Kentucky, Gallicia, Holland, and England, have all an effectual demand for their produce; but owing to the different fertility of the soils which they cultivate, or the different quantities of labour required to make them yield the same quantities of corn, its cost, and consequently, also, its marketable value and price, is hardly half so great in some of those countries as in others.

If we knew the quantity of labour required, in any period of antiquity, to produce a quantity of wheat in Italy or Greece, and what is now required for its production in England, we should be able readily to determine its value, as compared with other things the relation of which to corn was known at both periods. It is plain, however, that if we knew the quantity of labour required to produce any other commodity at the periods in question, it would serve for a standard quite as well as corn. There is nothing about the latter to render it invariable more than there is about most other things. M. Say, indeed, *supposes* that the influence of improvements in agriculture in reducing the price of corn is about equal to the influence which the necessity of resorting to poorer soils has in raising it!¹ But if this were really the case, agricultural industry would be always about equally productive; and capital, and consequently population, would increase with nearly the same rapidity, whatever might be the quality of the soils under tillage. We shall afterwards endeavour to trace and exhibit the real influence

¹ "Cours d'Economie Politique," tom. iii. p. 7.

of improvements ; at present it is enough to remark, that the supposition that they are in all cases capable of neutralizing the influence of increasing sterility, is inconsistent with the best established principles, and contradicted by the experience of every nation.

Although, however, the mere comparison of corn and silver be incapable of communicating any information with respect to the variations that have taken place in the value of either or both of them, still it is, on several accounts, desirable to know the proportion which the one has borne to the other. According to Say,¹ or rather to Garnier,² the hectolitre of wheat exchanged, at an average, in antiquity, for 289 grains of pure silver ; and for

245	grains,	under Charlemagne,
219	„	under Charles VII. of France, to- wards 1450,
333	„	in 1514 — (America was discovered in 1492,)
731	„	in 1536,
1130	„	in 1610,
1280	„	in 1640,
1342	„	in 1789,
1610	„	in 1820.

There is, however, reason to think that Garnier has undervalued the price of wheat in antiquity. The learned M. Létronne³ has endeavoured to show, that the price of the hectolitre of wheat in Greece, in the age of Socrates, should not be reckoned at less than 468 grains of pure silver ; and that its price at Rome, in the reign of Augustus, was about 550 grains. The statements of Létronne seem to be fully established ; and if so, it will follow that the

¹ "Cours d'Economie Politique," vol. iii. p. 24.

² "Richesse des Nations," vol. v. p. 152-184.

³ "Considérations Générales sur l'Evaluation des Monnoies Grecques et Romaines," p. 113-124.

value of silver, as compared with corn, instead of having, as M. Say supposes, fallen to *a sixth* part of its value in antiquity, has not fallen to quite *a fourth* part of its value in Greece, about 400 years before the Christian era, and to about *a third* part only of its value in Rome, at its commencement.

We are, also, inclined to think that the difference between the values of corn, as compared with silver, in 1789 and 1820, in the foregoing statement, is a good deal overrated. The latter, indeed, was hardly a fair term to be taken for a comparison; for agriculture had not then fully recovered from the disturbance occasioned by the previous war, commerce had not resumed its old channels, and the paper money issued during the contest had not been wholly withdrawn from circulation. But at present, (1848,) and for some years past, the value of corn, as compared with silver, has not differed materially, in most European markets, from its value in 1789: certainly it is not more than from 10 to 12 per cent higher.

The influence caused by the discovery of the American mines over prices in Europe, appears to have ceased by the middle of the seventeenth century; and we doubt whether the value of money, compared with the mass of commodities usually brought to market, has fallen in the interval. It is commonly, indeed, supposed that £100 or £1000 was worth as much in the reigns of William III., Anne, and George I., as £200 or £2000 at present. There is really, however, no such difference in the value of money at these epochs. Corn is not materially higher at this moment than it was a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago; and though the prices of butchers' meat, beer, leather, and a few other articles have risen in the interval, that rise has been nearly if not wholly counterbalanced by the extraordinary fall that has taken place in the price of almost all sorts of manufactured goods, colonial products, &c. We admit, indeed, that £100 or £1000 will not go nearly so far in housekeeping at present as it would have done in the first

half of last century. That, however, is not a consequence of the enhanced cost of commodities, but of the vastly improved and more expensive mode of living; the better quality of houses, the superiority of their furniture and other accommodations, the better tables that are now kept, the improved and more costly education of children, the greater number and cost of servants, &c. Those who should now live as our forefathers did in the reigns of Anne and the first George, would, we apprehend, find that £100 would go about as far as it did then.

The wages of household servants have risen most materially during the last century and a half; but it is questionable whether the services of agricultural labourers, artisans, &c., cost more now than in 1700 or 1750. These parties receive, it is true, a far higher rate of wages, if estimated by the day; but when compared with the services rendered, or the work done, it is doubtful whether their wages have increased. We are well satisfied that, speaking generally, the Scotch labourers of the present day execute in a given time from three to four times the work that was executed by their predecessors previously to the peace of Paris in 1763; and during the same period a great, though not an equal, increase has also taken place in the labour performed in England.

CHAPTER II.

Cost of Production the grand regulating Principle of Exchangeable Value and Price—Influence of Variations in the Demand for and Supply of Commodities over Prices—Influence of Monopolies—Average Price coincident with Cost of Production.

WE endeavoured, in the foregoing chapter, to elucidate the leading and fundamental principles with respect to value, by investigating the circumstances which determine the value of commodities, when their supply is adjusted according to the effective demand. In the present chapter we shall endeavour to appreciate the influence of variations in the demand and supply of commodities on their value and price, whatever may be the source of these variations.

To render what has to be stated on these subjects, and those that will be discussed in the following chapter, perfectly intelligible, we shall anticipate so far on what will hereafter be more fully proved, as to assume that the wages earned by the labourers engaged in the different branches of industry are, all things considered, nearly equal, or differ only by an amount so small, that it may be neglected without occasioning any material error; and that the profits realised by those who undertake different businesses are in the same predicament. It is obvious, indeed, that such must be the case: if, on the one hand, the profits or wages of those who undertake or employ themselves in difficult, hazardous, dirty, unhealthy, or disagreeable businesses, were materially to exceed what was necessary to afford them a reasonable compensation for the greater skill required, or the peculiar inconveniences to which they are exposed, they would be in a better situation than others; and there would, consequently, be an influx of capital and labourers into those businesses, until the natural equilibrium that, at an

average, always subsists amongst the different branches of industry had been restored : and if, on the other hand, the inconveniences attending any particular business be not sufficiently compensated, some of those who carry it on will gradually withdraw from it, till, by the diminution of the supply, the price of the article is raised, so as to yield the necessary indemnification. The law of competition, or the attention paid by every individual to his own interest, will not allow this principle to be infringed upon for any considerable period ; and, speaking generally, will insure the near equality, all things taken into account, of wages and profits in different occupations.

The cost, or real value, of commodities—denominated by Smith and Garnier *natural* or *necessary* price—is, as already seen, identical with the quantity of labour required to produce them and bring them to market. Now, it is quite obvious that this cost is the permanent and ultimate regulator of the exchangeable value or price of all commodities not subjected to monopolies, or of which the supply may be indefinitely increased with the increase of demand. That the market price of such commodities and their cost do not always coincide, is certain ; but they cannot, for any considerable period, be far separated, and have a constant tendency to equality. If, owing to any single circumstance or combination of circumstances, a commodity be brought to market and exchanged for a greater amount, either of other commodities or of money, than is required to defray the cost of its production, including the common and average rate of nett profit at the time, its producers will obviously be placed in a relatively advantageous situation ; and there will, in consequence, be an influx of capital into that particular department, until competition has sunk the value or price of the article to the level that will yield only the customary rate of profit on the capital employed in its production. And, on the other hand, were a commodity brought to market which did not exchange for so great an amount of other commodities, or of money, as was required

to cover the cost of its production, its producers would be placed in a relatively disadvantageous situation ; and would, consequently, withdraw from its production, until its value or price had risen so as to place them in the same situation as their neighbours, or to yield them the same rate of profit. No man will continue to produce commodities that sell for less than they cost ; that is, for less than will indemnify him for his outlay, including therein the common and average rate of profit on his capital. This is a limit below which prices cannot be permanently reduced ; and if they were, for any considerable period, to rise above it, additional capital would be attracted to the advantageous business, and the competition of the producers would lower prices.

A demand, to be effectual, must be such as will cover the expense of production. If it be insufficient to do this, it will not occasion the production of commodities or make them be brought to market. But it is of importance to bear in mind, that whether the effectual demand, or the demand of those who have the *power* and the *will* to purchase, become ten or twenty times more extensive, or decline in the same proportion, still, if the cost of producing the commodities in demand continue the same, no permanent variation will be occasioned in their price. Were the ordinary demand for hats suddenly doubled, their price would be very greatly increased, and the hatters would, of course, make large profits ; but these would immediately attract additional capital to the hat manufacture ; an increased supply of hats would, consequently, be brought to market, and if no variation took place in their cost, their price would infallibly sink, in a very short time, to its former level. Suppose, on the other hand, that the demand for hats is increased ten-fold, and that the cost of their production is diminished in the same proportion—we should, notwithstanding the increased demand, be able, before any very lengthened period had elapsed, to buy a hat for a tenth part of what it now costs. Again, suppose the demand for hats to decline, and

the cost of their production to increase—the price would, notwithstanding the diminished demand, gradually rise, till it reached the point at which it would yield the hatters the customary rate of profit on the capital employed in their business. It is admitted that variations of demand and supply occasion corresponding variations of price; but it is essential to remark that these variations are temporary only. The *cost of production* is the grand regulator of price—the centre of all those transitory and evanescent oscillations on the one side and the other. Wherever industry is free, the competition of the producers is always directed to elevate or sink prices to this level.

In certain branches of industry, such, for example, as agriculture, which are liable to be seriously affected by changes of the seasons, and from which capital cannot be easily withdrawn, there is a longer interval than in others, before the market price of produce, and the cost of its production, are equalised; but that this equalisation must take place in the end, is sufficiently plain. Neither farmers, nor any other class of producers, will continue to bring produce to market, unless it sell for a price sufficient to remunerate them for the expense of its production, including the average rate of profit on their outlays. *Nemo enim sanus debet velle impensam ac sumptum facere in culturam, si videt non posse refici.*¹ The cost of production is a limit below which prices cannot permanently sink, and above which they cannot permanently rise. When, on the one hand, an excess of supply depresses the price of corn below this limit, the occupiers of poor land are involved in the greatest difficulties; some of them are, in consequence, driven from their employment, and a smaller supply of corn being brought to market, prices are again elevated so as to yield the customary rate of profit to the cultivators of the poorest soils that are still kept under tillage. And when, on the other hand, prices rise above this natural limit, the cultivators gain more than the

¹ Varro “de Re Rusticâ,” lib. i. § 2.

average rate of profit, which necessarily attracts more individuals and more capital to agriculture, until the supply is so far increased, and the price so far depressed, that the cultivators obtain only ordinary profits. This is the point at which *average* prices continue stationary, and about which market prices oscillate. If any great discovery were made in agriculture—such, for instance, as should reduce the cost of cultivation a half—the price of agricultural produce would fall in the same proportion; and it would continue to sell at that reduced rate until the increase of population forced recourse to soils of a less degree of fertility. Whenever this took place, prices would again rise. Why is the price of corn almost invariably higher in this country than in Poland? Is it not because of the greater cost of its production?

A pound weight of gold is at present worth about fifteen pounds of silver. It cannot, however, be said, that this is a consequence of the demand for gold being greater than the demand for silver; for the reverse is the fact. Neither can it be said to be occasioned by an absolute scarcity of gold; for those who choose to pay a sufficient price for it may obtain it in any quantity they please. The cause of the difference in the price of the two metals consists entirely in the circumstance of its costing about fifteen times as much to produce a pound of gold as to produce a pound of silver. That this is really the case, is plain from the admitted fact, that the producers of gold do not gain any greater profit than those of silver, iron, lead, or any other metal. They have no monopoly of its production. All individuals may send capital to Russia and Brazil, and become producers of gold; and wherever this is the case, the principle of competition never fails of forcing the product to be sold at such a price as will merely pay the expenses of its production. Were a gold mine discovered of equal productiveness with the silver mines, the production of gold would immediately become an exceedingly advantageous business; an immense supply would, in consequence, be thrown upon the market,

and its price would, in no very long time, be reduced to the same level as silver.

Were a set of men brought together from various countries, ignorant of each other's wants, and of the labour and expense required to produce the commodities we may suppose each of them to possess, these would be bought and sold according to the wants and fancies of the parties. Under such circumstances, a pound of gold might be given for a pound of iron, and a gallon of wine for a gallon of small beer. As soon, however, as a system of commercial intercourse is established, and the wants of society and the powers of production come to be generally known, an end is put to this capricious method of bartering. Thousands of sellers then enter the market ; and when such is the case, it is no longer possible to sell a pound of iron for a pound of gold ; for the producers of iron will undersell each other, until, by their competition, they reduce its exchangeable value, or price, to the level of the cost of its production. This, in every civilised society, is the pivot on which exchangeable value always turns. It is usual for voyagers who touch at countries occupied by savages, to obtain valuable products in exchange for toys or trinkets, which it cost infinitely less to produce ; but in all civilised and commercial countries, the proportion in which, generally speaking, commodities exchange for each other, depends on the comparative cost of their production.

Thus, then, it appears, that no variation of demand, unaccompanied by a variation in the cost or real value of commodities, has any lasting influence over prices. If the cost of commodities be diminished, their price will be equally diminished, though the demand should be increased to any conceivable extent ; while, if their cost be increased, their price will be equally increased, though the demand should sink to the lowest assignable limit.

It must always be remembered, that this reasoning applies to those commodities only which may be freely produced, and the quantity of which may, at the same time, be

increased to any extent by fresh outlays of capital and labour. But there are circumstances under which the supply of commodities is strictly limited; and when such is the case, their price is no longer determined by their cost, but by the degree of their real or supposed *utility*, compared with the means and necessities of the buyers. In a desert, or a besieged city, a barrèl of water or a pound of bread may be more valuable than a pipe of Burgundy or a pound of gold.¹ And though artificial monopolies be rarely carried to so oppressive a height, the same principle holds with respect to the value of all commodities produced under them. When an individual, or company, obtains the exclusive privilege of furnishing any species of goods, the principle of competition is suspended with respect to them, and their price depends, in consequence, on the proportion in which they are brought to market, compared with the demand, and is not affected by any thing else. If monopolists supplied the market liberally, or kept it as fully stocked as it would be were there no monopoly, commodities would sell at their natural price, and the monopoly would have no disadvantage further than the exclusion of the public from an employment which every one should have leave to carry on. In point of fact, however, the market is seldom or never fully supplied with monopolised commodities. All classes endeavour to get the highest price for their products; and, in this view, those who are protected by a monopoly against the risk of being undersold by others, uniformly keep the market understocked, or supply it with inferior articles, or both. Under such circumstances, the price of commodities, if they cannot be easily smuggled from abroad, or clandestinely produced

¹ Pliny ("Hist. Nat." lib. viii. cap. 57) and Valerius Maximus (lib. vii. cap. 6) relate that, during the siege of Casilinum by Hannibal, the scarcity of provisions became so extreme, that a rat was sold for 200 denarii! They add, that the seller had the worst of the bargain, having died of hunger, while the rat was the means of preserving the life of the buyer. "Avaro enim," says Valerius, "fame consumpto, manubiis sordium suarum frui non licuit; æqui animi vir, ad salutarem impensam faciendam; carè quidem, verùm necessariè, comparato cibo vixit."

at home, may be elevated to the highest point to which the competition of the buyers can raise it; and may, consequently, amount to five, ten, or twenty times the sum it would amount to, were competition permitted to operate on their production and sale. The will and the power of the purchasers to offer a high price forms the only limit to the rapacity of monopolists.

Besides the commodities produced under artificial monopolies, there is another class, the supply of which cannot be increased by means of human industry, and whose price is not, therefore, dependent on the cost of their production. Ancient statues, vases, and gems, the pictures of the great masters, some varieties of wine produced in limited quantities on soils of a particular quality and exposure, and a few other commodities, belong to this class. As their supply cannot be increased, their price varies as the demand, and is independent on any other circumstance.

But with these exceptions, which, when compared to the mass of commodities, are of no great importance, wherever industry is unrestricted, and competition allowed to operate, the *average* price of the various products of art and industry always coincides with the cost of their production. When a fall takes place in the market price of a commodity, we cannot say whether it is really advantageous, or whether a part of the wealth of the producers be not gratuitously transferred to the consumers, until we learn whether the cost of production be equally diminished. If this be the case, the fall of price will not be disadvantageous to the producers, and will be permanent; but if this be not the case—if the cost of production continue the same, the fall must be injurious to the producers, and prices will, in consequence, speedily regain their former level. In like manner, no rise of prices can be permanent, unless the cost of production be proportionally increased. If that cost has remained stationary, or has not increased in a corresponding ratio, prices will decline as soon as the ephemeral causes of enhancement have disappeared.

CHAPTER III.

Influence of Mercantile Speculations on Price—Difference between Speculation and Gambling—Speculations in Corn beneficial to the Public, but dangerous to the Dealers—Imitative Speculation—Influence of Knowledge on Speculation.

THE proposition so universally assented to, that market prices depend upon the proportion which the supply of commodities bears to the demand, would be more accurate were it expressed with some modifications. It rarely happens that either the actual supply of any species of produce in extensive demand, or the intensity of that demand, can be exactly measured. Every transaction in which produce is bought that it may be afterwards sold, is, in fact, a speculation. The buyer anticipates that the demand for the article he has purchased will be such, at some future period, either more or less distant, that he will be able to dispose of it with a profit; and the success of the speculation depends, it is evident, on the skill with which he has estimated the circumstances that will determine the future price of the commodity. It follows, therefore, that in all highly commercial countries, where merchants are possessed of large capitals, and where they are left to be guided in the use of them by their own discretion and foresight, the prices of commodities will frequently be very much influenced, not merely by the actual occurrence of changes in the accustomed relation of the supply and demand, but by the anticipation of such changes. It is the business of the merchant to acquaint himself with every circumstance affecting the particular description of commodities in which he deals. He endeavours to obtain, by means of an extensive correspondence, the earliest and most authentic information with respect to every thing that may affect their supply or

demand, or the cost of their production : and if he learned that the supply of an article had failed, or that, owing to changes of fashion, or to the opening of new channels of commerce, the demand for it had been increased, he would most likely be disposed to become a buyer, in anticipation of profiting by the rise of price, which, under the circumstances, could hardly fail of taking place ; or if he were a holder of the article, he would refuse to part with it unless for a higher price than he would previously have accepted. If the intelligence received by the merchant were of a contrary description — if, for example, he learned that the article was now produced with greater facility, or that there was a falling off in the demand for it, caused by a change of fashion, or by the shutting up of some of the markets to which it had previously been admitted—he would act differently : in this case he would anticipate a fall of prices, and would either decline purchasing the article, except at a reduced rate, or endeavour to get rid of it, supposing him to be a holder, by offering it at a lower price. In consequence of these operations, the prices of commodities, in different places and periods, are brought comparatively near to equality. All abrupt transitions, from scarcity to abundance, and from abundance to scarcity, are avoided : an excess in one case is made to balance a deficiency in another, and the supply is distributed with a degree of steadiness and regularity that could hardly have been deemed attainable.

It is obvious, from these statements, that those who indiscriminately condemn all sorts of speculative engagements, have never reflected on the circumstances incident to the prosecution of every undertaking. In truth and reality, they are all speculations. Their undertakers must look forward to periods more or less distant, and their success depends entirely on the sagacity with which they have estimated the probability of certain events occurring, and the influence which they have ascribed to them. Speculation is, therefore, really only another name for foresight ;

and though fortunes have sometimes been made by a lucky hit, the character of a successful speculator is, in the vast majority of instances, due to him only who has skilfully devised the means of effecting the end he had in view, and who has outstripped his competitors in the judgment with which he has looked into futurity, and appreciated the operation of causes producing distant effects. Even in those businesses, such as agriculture and manufactures, that are apparently the most secure, there is, and must be, a great deal of speculation. Those engaged in the former have to encounter variations of seasons, while those engaged in the latter have to encounter variations of fashion; and each is, besides, liable to be affected by legislative enactments, by discoveries in the arts, and by an endless variety of circumstances which it is always very difficult, and sometimes quite impossible, to foresee. On the whole, indeed, the gains of the undertakers are so adjusted, that they obtain, at an average, the common and ordinary rate of profit. But the inequality in the gains of individuals is most commonly very great; and while the superior tact, industry, or good fortune of some enable them to realise large fortunes, the want of discernment, the less vigilant attention, or the bad fortune of others, frequently reduce them from the situation of capitalists to that of labourers.¹

It is by no means an easy task to draw a distinct line of

¹ The necessity of speculation in the ordinary affairs of life has been well illustrated by Seneca: "Huic respondebimus, nunquam expectare nos certissimam rerum comprehensionem: quoniam in arduo est veri exploratio; sed eâ ire quâ ducit veri similitudo. Omne hâc viâ procedit officium. Sic serimus, sic navigamus, sic militamus, sic uxores ducimus, sic liberos tollimus; quanquam omnium horum incertus sit eventus. Ad ea accedimus, de quibus benè sperandum esse credimus. Quis enim pollicetur serenti proventum, naviganti portum, militanti victoriam, marito pudicam uxorem, patri pios liberos? Sequimur quâ ratio, non quâ veritas trahit. Expecta, ut nisi benè cessurâ non facias, et nisi compertâ veritate nihil moveris, relicto omni actu, vita consistit. Dum verisimilia me in hoc aut illud impellant, non verebor beneficium, dare ei, quem verisimile erit gratum esse."—*De Benefic.*, lib. iv. cap. 33.

demarcation between speculation and gambling. The truth is, that they run into one another by almost imperceptible degrees. Practically, however, that may be termed a safe, and, therefore, a legitimate speculation, in which, on a fair and careful estimate of the favourable and unfavourable contingencies, the former preponderate; while that may be termed a gambling adventure in which the contingencies are unknown, or in which they are nearly equal. Suppose a race-horse and a dray-horse were matched to run against each other; an individual who betted that the race-horse would win, could not be deemed a gambler; for he, it is plain, would encounter little or no risk. But if two race-horses, each in high estimation, were matched against each other, the risk would become very great; and the success of either would, most likely, depend on so many accidental and almost inappreciable circumstances, that those who betted on the event might fairly be denominated gamblers.

Among the various speculations carried on by merchants, there are few that have exposed them more to the public odium, while, at the same time, there are few more really beneficial, than those of the dealers in corn. Not only do they distribute the produce of the harvest equally throughout the country, according to the wants of different districts, but they manage their operations so as to reserve a portion of the surplus produce of plentiful years as a resource against future emergencies; and when a scarcity occurs, they distribute its pressure equally over the year, and prevent society from ever actually feeling the extremity of want. We shall briefly endeavour to show how speculation produces these effects.

Were the harvests always equally productive, nothing would be gained by storing up supplies of corn; and all that would be necessary would be to distribute the crop equally throughout the country, and throughout the year. But such is not the order of nature. The variations in the aggregate produce of a country in different seasons, though

not, perhaps, so great as are commonly supposed, are still very considerable; and experience has shown, that two or three unusually luxuriant harvests seldom take place in succession; or that when they do, they are invariably followed by those that are deficient. The speculators in corn anticipate this result. Whenever prices begin to give way, in consequence of an unusually luxuriant harvest, speculation is at work. The more opulent farmers withhold either the whole or a part of their produce from market; and the more opulent dealers purchase largely of the corn brought to market, and store it up in expectation of a future advance. And thus, without intending to promote any one's interest but their own, speculators in corn become benefactors of the public. They provide a reserve stock against those years of scarcity which are sure, at no distant period, to recur; while, by withdrawing a portion of the redundant supply from immediate consumption, prices are prevented from falling so low as to be injurious to the farmers, or at least are maintained at a higher level than they would otherwise have reached; provident habits are maintained amongst the people; and that waste and extravagance are checked which always take place in plentiful years, but which would be carried to a much greater extent were the whole produce of an abundant crop consumed within the season.

It is, however, in scarce years that the speculations of the corn-merchants are principally advantageous. Even in the richest countries, a very large proportion of the individuals engaged in agriculture are comparatively poor, and are totally without the means of withholding their produce from market, in order to speculate upon any future advance. In consequence, the markets are always most abundantly supplied with produce immediately after harvest; and in countries where the merchants engaged in the corn-trade are not possessed of large capitals, or where their proceedings are restricted, or regarded with suspicion, there is then, almost invariably, a heavy fall of prices. But as the vast majority

of the people buy their food in small quantities, or from day to day as they want it, their consumption is necessarily extended or contracted according to its price at the time. Their views do not extend to the future; they have no means of judging whether the crop is or is not deficient; they live, as the phrase is, from hand to mouth, and are satisfied if, in the meantime, they obtain abundant supplies at a cheap rate. But it is obvious that, were there nothing to control or counteract this improvidence, the consequences would, very often, be fatal in the extreme. The crop of one harvest must support the population till the crop of the succeeding harvest has been gathered in; and if that crop should be deficient—if, for instance, it should only be adequate to afford, at the usual rate of consumption, a supply of nine or ten months' provision instead of twelve—it is plain, that unless the price were so raised immediately after harvest as to enforce economy, and put, as it were, the whole nation upon short allowance, the most dreadful famine would be experienced previously to the ensuing harvest. Those who examine the accounts of the prices of wheat and other grain in England, from the Conquest downwards, collected by Bishop Fleetwood, Sir F. M. Eden, and others, will meet with abundant proofs of what has now been stated. In those remote periods, when the farmers were generally without the means of withholding their crops from market, and when the trade of a corn-dealer was proscribed, the utmost improvidence was exhibited in the consumption of grain. There were then, indeed, but few years in which a considerable scarcity was not experienced immediately before harvest, and many in which there was an absolute famine. The fluctuations of price exceeded every thing of which we can now form an idea; the price of wheat and other grain being often four and five times as high in June and July as in September and October. Thanks, however, to the increase of capital in the hands of the large farmers and dealers, and to the freedom given to the operations of the corn-merchants, we are no longer exposed to such ruinous

vicissitudes. Whenever the dealers, who, in consequence of their superior means of information, are better acquainted with the real state of the crops than any other class of persons, find the harvest likely to be deficient, they raise the price of the corn they have warehoused, and bid against each other for the corn which the farmers are bringing to market. In consequence of this rise of prices, all ranks and orders, but especially the lower, who are the principal consumers of corn, are obliged to use greater economy, and to check all improvident and wasteful consumption. Every class being thus immediately put upon short allowance, the pressure of the scarcity is distributed equally over the year; and instead of indulging, as was formerly the case, in the same scale of consumption as in seasons of plenty, until the supply became altogether deficient, and then being exposed without resource to the attacks of famine and pestilence, the speculations of the corn-merchants warn us of our danger, and compel us to provide against it.

It is not easy to suppose that these proceedings of the corn-merchants should ever be injurious to the public. It has been said, that in scarce years they are not disposed to bring the corn they have purchased to market until it has attained an exorbitant price, and that the pressure of the scarcity is thus often very much aggravated: but there is no real ground for any such statement. The immense amount of capital required to store up any considerable quantity of corn, and the waste to which it is liable, render most holders disposed to sell as soon as they can realise a fair profit. In every extensive country in which the corn trade is free, there are infinitely too many persons engaged in it to enable any sort of combination or concert to be formed amongst them; and though it were formed, it could not be maintained for an instant. A large proportion of the farmers and other small holders of corn are always in straitened circumstances, more particularly if a scarce year has not occurred so soon as they expected; and they are, consequently, anxious to relieve themselves, as soon as prices

rise, of a portion of the stock on their hands. Occasionally, indeed, individuals are found who retain their stocks for too long a period, or until a reaction takes place, and prices begin to decline. But, instead of joining in the popular cry against such persons, every one who takes a dispassionate view of the matter will immediately perceive that, inasmuch as their miscalculation must, under the circumstances supposed, be exceedingly injurious to themselves, we have the best security against its being carried to such an extent as to be productive of any material injury, or even inconvenience, to the public. It should also be borne in mind, that it is rarely, if ever, possible to determine beforehand when a scarcity is to abate in consequence of new supplies being brought to market; and had it continued a little longer, there would have been no miscalculation on the part of the holders. At all events, it is plain that, by declining to bring their corn to market, they preserved a resource on which, in the event of the harvest being longer delayed than usual, or of any unfavourable contingency taking place, the public could have fallen back; so that, instead of deserving abuse, these speculators are justly entitled to every fair encouragement and protection. A country in which there is no considerable stock of grain in the barn-yards of the farmers, and the warehouses of the merchants, is in a most perilous situation, and may be exposed to the severest privations, or even famine. But so long as the sagacity, the miscalculation, or the avarice, of merchants and dealers, retain a stock of grain in the warehouses, this last extremity cannot take place. By refusing to sell till it has reached a very high price, they put an effectual stop to all sorts of waste, and husband for the public those supplies which they could not have so frugally husbanded for themselves.

The advantage of the speculative purchases of corn made by merchants in plentiful years, and of the immediate rise of price which their operations occasion in years when a scarcity is apprehended, have been very clearly stated in

a Report by the Lords of the Privy Council, in 1790, on the Corn Laws.—“ In other countries,” say their lordships, “magazines of corn are formed by their respective governments, or by the principal magistrates of great cities, as a resource in times of scarcity. This country has no such institution. The stores of corn are here deposited in the barns and stacks of wealthy farmers, and in magazines of merchants and dealers in corn, who ought by no means to be restrained, but rather encouraged in laying up stores of this nature ; as, after a deficient crop, they are thereby enabled to divide the inconvenience arising from it as equally as possible through every part of the year ; and by checking improvident consumption in the beginning of scarcity, prevent famine, which might otherwise happen before the next harvest. The inland trade of corn ought, therefore, to be perfectly free. This freedom can never be abused. To suppose that there can be a monopoly of so bulky and perishable an article, dispersed through so many hands, over every part of the country, is an idle and vain apprehension.”

The regulations once so prevalent with respect to the assize of bread, were originally devised and intended as measures of security, lest, owing to the small number of bakers in most towns, they should combine together, and artificially raise the price of bread. According, however, as sounder notions upon these subjects were diffused throughout the country, these regulations fell gradually into disuse ; and we are not aware that any ill effects have, in any instance, been found to result from their neglect. The assize of bread in London was abolished by an act of the legislature in 1815 ; and it is well known, that no such thing as a combination amongst the bakers has ever since been thought of, and that the public have always had an ample supply of bread, at the lowest prices, all things considered, that the state of the corn-market would admit. And when such has been the case, when no combination has ever been even so much as attempted amongst the bakers of a single town, can any thing be more perfectly visionary, than to suppose

that it should be attempted among the vast multitudes of farmers and corn-dealers dispersed over an extensive country! "The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade," says Adam Smith, "as it is the only effectual preventive of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best palliative of the inconveniences of a dearth. No trade deserves more the full protection of the law, and none requires it so much, because none is so much exposed to undeserved popular odium."¹

But though the speculations of the corn-merchants be in every case beneficial to the public, they are very often injurious to themselves. The corn trade is, indeed, one of the most hazardous businesses in which it is possible to engage. This arises partly and principally from the extreme difficulty of procuring correct information with respect to the productiveness of the harvests in different countries and districts, and of the supplies of corn that may be made available in case of deficiency; partly from the difficulty of estimating the effect of weather on the crops; and partly from the difficulty of estimating how much any given rise of price may affect consumption. When the elements of speculation are so very uncertain, or when, at least, they are so difficult to disentangle and appreciate, it requires no ordinary prudence for a merchant to avoid very heavy losses; and how cautious soever, he can never be secure against unfavourable chances. A few days' rain, immediately before or during harvest, have often, by exciting what were apparently the best-founded apprehensions with respect to the safety of the crop, occasioned a sudden rise of prices, which have again as suddenly fallen back to their former level when the weather improved. It is idle to suppose that these causes of risk and uncertainty should ever be completely obviated; but it is pretty evident that nothing will tend so much to weaken their frequency and force, as the establishment of a free corn trade with other

¹ "Wealth of Nations," p. 234.

countries. Such is the wise arrangement of Providence, that the seasons most unfavourable to the crops in one country or district, are generally the most favourable to those in countries or districts having a different soil or climate.¹ There is no reason, indeed, for supposing that the harvests throughout the commercial world differ materially in different years; and when, after 1849, the external corn trade will be freed from restrictions, the facility of importing additional supplies from foreign countries when the home supply happens to be unusually deficient, or of exporting to them in unusually abundant years, will probably give greater steadiness to prices;² and if so, the hazard to which the dealers have hitherto been exposed will be proportionally lessened.

The great risk to which all classes of merchants are exposed, who offer an unusually high price for any description of commodities, in anticipation of a future advance of price, is a consequence, principally, of the difficulty of truly appreciating the grounds on which a deficient supply or an

¹ The admirable paragraph which follows is from the "Commercio di Grani" of the Count di Verri—"La terra che abitiamo riproduce ogni anno una quantità corrispondente alla universale consumazione; il commercio supplisce col superfluo di una terra al bisogno dell'altra e colla legge de continuità si equilibrano, dopo alcune oscillazioni, periodicamente bisogno ed abbondanza. Quei che suggeriscono i vincoli risguardano gli uomini sulla terra come ridotti a gettar il dado a chi debba morir di fame; risguardiamoli con occhio tranquillo e riceveremo idee più consolanti e vere, conoscendoci fratelli di una vasta famiglia sparza sul globo, spinti a darci vicendevolmente soccorso, e provveduti largamente dal gran motore della vegetazione a quanto fa d'uopo per sostenere i bisogni della vita. I soli vincoli artificiali, immaginati dalla timida ignoranza o dall'astuta ambizione, hanno ridotti gli stati ai timori della fame ed a soffrirli."—P. 33, ed. 1818.

² We do not mean by this to state that the measures, with regard to the corn trade, carried through parliament in 1846, were the best that might have been adopted. Probably, indeed, they were the only measures that could be carried; but it may easily be shown that the interests of all classes would have been better promoted by imposing a moderate fixed duty on importation, accompanied with a corresponding drawback—See *Post and Commercial Dictionary*, art. Corn Trade and Corn Laws.

increased demand is expected.¹ This, however, is entirely a practical question, for the solution of the merchant, whose success depends on the skill and sagacity which he evinces in conducting his speculations under such circumstances. The great cotton speculation of 1825 took its rise partly and chiefly from a supposed decrease in the supply of cotton, originating in the previous low prices, and partly from an idea that there was a greatly increased demand for raw cotton in this country and the Continent, and that the stocks on hand were unusually low. Now it is obvious, that the success of those who embarked in this speculation depended entirely on two circumstances: viz. *first*, that they were right in the fundamental supposition on which the speculation rested, that the supply of cotton was no longer commensurate with the demand; and *second*, that their competition did not raise the price so high as to diminish the consumption by the manufacturers in too great a degree to enable them to take off the quantity actually brought to market. If the merchants had been well-founded in their suppositions, and if their competition had not raised the price of cotton too high, the speculation would have been successful. But, instead of being well-founded, the hypothesis on which they proceeded was all but visionary. There was no decrease in the supply of cotton, but, on the contrary, a considerable increase; and

¹ The famous philosopher Thales, of Miletus, who flourished about 550 years before the Christian era, is reported to have engaged in at least one successful speculation. "His poverty," says Aristotle, "was thought to upbraid his studies as serving no gainful, and therefore no useful purpose. But Thales, by his skill in meteorology, contrived to wipe off the reproach; for as his science enabled him to foresee that next season there would be an extraordinary crop of olives, he hired in the winter all the oil-presses in Chios and Miletus, employing his little fortune in giving earnest to their respective proprietors. When the gathering season approached, and the olives were seen loading the branches, all men wished to provide oil-presses at the same time, and suddenly: but Thales, being master of the whole number, let them separately at a high price; and thereby accumulating vast wealth, proved that philosophers might be rich if they pleased, but that riches were not the object of their pursuit."—GILLIES' *Aristotle*, vol. ii. p. 54.

though there had been a decrease, the excess to which the price was carried must have checked consumption so as to occasion a serious revulsion.¹

When a few leading merchants purchase, in anticipation of an advance, or sell, in anticipation of a fall, the speculation is often pushed beyond all reasonable limits, by the operations of those who are influenced by imitation only, and who have never, perhaps, reflected for a moment on the grounds on which a variation of price is anticipated. In speculation, as in most other things, one individual derives confidence from another. Such a one purchases or sells, not because he has any peculiar or accurate information in regard to the state of the demand and supply, but because some one else has done so before him. The original impulse is thus rapidly extended; and even those who are satisfied that a speculation, in anticipation of a rise of prices, is unsafe, and that there will be a recoil, not unfrequently adventure, in the expectation that they will be able to withdraw before the recoil has begun.

The only guarantee against the spread of imitative speculations, if we may so term them, must be sought for in the diffusion of sounder information, and, consequently, of a more searching spirit of analysis, amongst the mercantile class. The crowd who engage in speculative adventures, once set on foot, consist partly of determined gamblers, who

¹ Several well-informed merchants embarked in this speculation, and suffered by it. The falling off in the imports of cotton from America, in 1824, seems to have been the source of the delusion. It was supposed that this falling off was not accidental, but that it was a consequence of the price of cotton having been for a series of years so low as to be inadequate to defray the expenses of its cultivation. The result showed that this calculation was most erroneous, the imports, in 1825, from the United States, having exceeded those in any previous year. And besides, in entering on the speculation, no attention was paid to Egypt and Italy, countries from which only about 1,400,000 lbs. of cotton were obtained in 1824, but from which 23,800,000 lbs. were obtained in 1825! This unlooked-for importation was of itself almost enough to overturn the combinations of the speculators; and, coupled with the increased importation from the United States and other countries, actually occasioned a heavy glut.

having, for the most part, nothing of their own to lose, are at all times ready to embark in any adventure, however hazardous, by which they imagine they have a chance of rapidly making a fortune; but the far greater number of those who quit their ordinary employments to enter into such speculations, though partly, no doubt, actuated by a spirit of gambling, are mainly influenced by the principle of imitation: and it is difficult to see how this dangerous tendency can be lessened otherwise than by the better education of merchants, and by impressing on every one who may be tempted to speculate either on a rise or fall of prices, the necessity, if he would provide any security against extreme risk, of carefully investigating the causes of any anticipated variation, and estimating for himself the probability of success in the adventure, instead of embarking in it in imitation of others.

It may, we believe, speaking generally, be laid down as a sound practical rule, to avoid having any thing to do with speculations in which many have already engaged. The competition of the speculators seldom fails speedily to render an adventure that might have been originally safe, extremely hazardous. If a commodity happen to be at an unusually reduced price in any particular market, it will rise the moment that different buyers appear in the field; and supposing, on the other hand, that it is fetching an unusually high price, it will fall, perhaps far below the cost of production, as soon as supplies begin to be poured in by different merchants. Whatever, therefore, may be the success of those who originate a speculation, those who enter into it at an advanced period are almost sure to lose. To have been preceded by others should not, in such matters, inspire confidence; on the contrary, it should, unless there be something special in the case, induce every considerate person to decline interfering with it.

The pernicious effects of miscalculation and ignorance are strikingly exhibited in the overstocking of such new markets as are occasionally opened, and in filling them with

articles wholly unsuited to the wants and habits of the people. When the continental markets were opened in 1814 and 1815, the first shippers of colonial and other produce made large profits; but in consequence of the crowding of fresh speculators, many of whom were strangers to commercial affairs, into the field, the markets were quite overloaded; and such a recoil took place, that Leith, and some other towns, did not for some years recover from the bankruptcy and ruin of which it was productive. But the exportations consequent upon the first opening of the trade to Buenos Ayres, Brazil, and the Caraccas, were, in this respect, still more extraordinary. Speculation was then carried beyond the boundaries within which even gambling is usually confined; and was pushed to an extent and into channels that could hardly have been deemed practicable. We are informed by Mr Mawe, an intelligent traveller, resident in Rio Janeiro at the period in question, that more Manchester goods were sent out in the course of a few weeks than had been consumed in the twenty years preceding; and the quantity of English goods of all sorts poured into the city was so very great, that warehouses could not be found to contain them, and that the most valuable merchandise was actually exposed for weeks, on the beach, to the weather, and to every sort of depredation! But the folly and ignorance of those who crowded into this speculation was still more strikingly evinced in the selection of the articles sent to South America. Elegant services of cut-glass and china-ware were offered to persons whose most splendid drinking-vessels consisted of a horn or the shell of a cocoa-nut; tools were sent out having a hammer on the one side and a hatchet on the other, as if the inhabitants had had nothing more to do than to break the first stone they met with, and then cut the gold and diamonds from it; and some speculators actually went so far as to send *skates* to Rio Janeiro!¹

The distress and ruin which followed these exportations

¹ Mawe's "Travels in Brazil," p. 453-458.

is plainly to be ascribed to the almost inconceivable folly of those by whom they were made. If there be one species of knowledge more essential to those who embark in mercantile speculations than another, it is that they should be acquainted with the various products of the different commercial countries of the world, and with those which are in demand in them. And when ships are freighted and commodities sent abroad by persons so entirely destitute of this elementary instruction as to send skates to Rio, the wonder is, not that they should sometimes calculate wrong, but that they ever calculate right.

But, as has been before observed, the maintenance of a free intercourse amongst different countries, and the more general diffusion of sound instruction, seem to be the only means by which these miscalculations can be either obviated or mitigated. The effects consequent on improvident speculations being always far more injurious to the parties engaged in them than to any other class, the presumption is, that they will diminish both in frequency and force, according as the true principles of commerce come to be better understood. But whatever inconvenience may occasionally flow from them, it is abundantly plain, that instead of being lessened, it would be very much increased, were any restraints imposed on the freedom of adventure. When the attention of many individuals is directed to the same line of speculation; when they prosecute it as a business, and are responsible in their own private fortunes for any errors they may commit, they acquire a knowledge of the various circumstances influencing prices, and give them, by their combinations, a steadiness not attainable by any other means. It is material, too, to bear in mind, as was previously stated, that many, perhaps it might be said *most*, of those who press so eagerly into the market, when any new channel of commerce is opened, or when any considerable rise of price is anticipated, are not merchants, but persons engaged in other businesses, or living, perhaps, on fixed incomes, who speculate in the hope of suddenly increasing

their fortune. This tendency to gambling seldom fails to break out upon such occasions; but fortunately, these are only of comparatively rare occurrence; and in the ordinary course of affairs, mercantile speculations are left to be conducted by those who are familiar with business, and who, in exerting themselves to equalise the variations of price caused by variations of climate and of seasons, and to distribute the supply of produce proportionally to the effective demand, and with so much providence that it may not at any time be wholly exhausted, perform functions that are in the highest degree important and beneficial. They are, it is true, actuated only by a desire to advance their own interests; but the results of their operations are not less advantageous than those of the agriculturists who give greater fertility to the soil, or of the mechanists who invent new and more powerful machines.¹

In the first chapter of this Part, we endeavoured to show that the quantity of labour required for the production of commodities forms the grand principle which determines their exchangeable worth, or the proportion in which any one commodity exchanges for others; and in the second chapter, and the present, we have endeavoured to trace the influence of variations of demand and supply, and of speculation, on prices. These seem to exhaust all the really important practical questions involved in this part of the science. But as it is necessary, in order fully to understand the various questions involved in the *theory* of value, that the precise influence of variations in the rates of wages and profits, and in the species of capitals employed, should be appreciated, we shall devote the following chapter to an investigation of these matters. Being principally, however, intended for the use of the scientific reader, it may, without impropriety, be passed over by others.

¹ The reader will find a great deal of valuable information, with respect to most of the points touched upon in this and the previous chapter, in Mr Tooke's excellent work on the "History of Prices."

CHAPTER IV.

Effect of the Employment of Capital in Production, and of Variations in the Rates of Wages and Profits on Value—(1) When the Capitals employed in Production are of the same Degree of Durability ; and (2) when they are of different Degrees of Durability—A High Rate of Wages does not lay the Commerce of a Country under any Disadvantage.

IT is admitted on all hands, that in the earlier stages of society, before capital is accumulated, the quantity of labour required to produce a commodity and bring it to market determines its value in exchange. But capital is only another name for that portion of the produce of industry which may be directly employed to support man, or to facilitate production. It is the result of *anterior labour* ; and when it is employed in the production of commodities, their value is determined, not by the immediate labour only, but by the total quantity, as well of immediate as of prior labour, the latter being embodied in the capital, necessarily laid out upon them. Suppose an individual can, in a day, without the help of weapons, kill a deer ; but that it requires a day's labour to construct the weapons necessary to kill a beaver, and another day's labour to kill it : it is evident, supposing the weapons are worn out or rendered useless in killing the beaver, that the labour required to kill it would suffice to kill two deer, and that it is, therefore, worth twice as much. The durability of the implements, or of the capital employed in any undertaking, is, consequently, an element of the greatest importance in estimating the value of its produce. Had the weapons employed by the beaver hunter been more durable than has been supposed — had they served, for example, to kill twenty beavers instead of one — then, the labour

required to kill a beaver being only one-twentieth part greater than that required to kill a deer, the value of the animals would have been regulated accordingly ; and it is plain that, with every extension of the durability of the weapons, their values would be brought still nearer to equality.

It appears, therefore, inasmuch as capital is the result of anterior labour, that its employment does not affect the principle that the value of commodities depends on the quantities of labour required for their production. A commodity may be altogether produced by capital, without the co-operation of any immediate labour : inasmuch, however, as the value of capital is determined by the labour required for its production, it is obvious that the value of the commodities produced by its means is also, at bottom, determined by this same labour : or a commodity may be partly produced by capital, and partly by immediate labour, and then its exchangeable value will be proportioned to the sum of the two ; or, which is still the same thing, to the total quantity of labour bestowed upon it. These principles are almost self-evident, and it is not easy to see how they can be made the subject of dispute or controversy ; but considerable differences of opinion are entertained respecting the influence over value, of the employment of workmen by capitalists, and of fluctuations in the rate of wages.

It does not, however, seem that there is really much room for these differences. Suppose that some quantity of goods, a pair of stockings for example, freely exchanges for a pair of gloves, both articles being manufactured by independent workmen ; it is easy to see that they would continue to preserve this relation, or to exchange for each other, provided the labour required for their production continued stationary, though the workmen were to be employed by a master-manufacturer. In the first case, it is true, as Dr Smith has observed, that the whole goods produced by the workmen belong to themselves, and that, in the second case, they have to share them with their employers. But it must be recollected, that in the first

case the capital made use of in the production of the commodities belongs also to the workmen, and that, in the latter case, it is furnished to them by other parties. The question then comes to be, Does the fact of labourers voluntarily agreeing to relinquish a portion of the produce raised by them, as an equivalent for the use of the capital lent them by others, afford any ground for raising the value of such produce? It is evident it does not. The profits of capital are only another name for the wages of prior labour, and make a part of the price of every article in the production of which capital has been usefully expended. But whether this capital belong to the labourer, or is supplied by another, is obviously of no consequence. If the capital do not belong to him, the commodities which he produces will be divided into two portions, one representing the produce of his own labour, and the other of the capital, or prior labour, laid out upon them. But provided the same amount of labour be required for the production of commodities, their value will continue constant, whether that labour be supplied by one individual or by fifty. A shoemaker who makes shoes on his own account, obtains the same rate of profit on their sale that would accrue to a master shoemaker were he employed by the latter; for, besides possessing a capital adequate to maintain himself and his family until the shoes be disposed of, he must further be able to furnish himself with a workshop and tools, to advance money to the tanner for leather, and to provide for other outgoings. If, then, he did not, exclusive of the ordinary wages of labour, realise a profit, or compensation for the employment of his capital, equal to the profit obtained by the master shoemaker, it would obviously be for his advantage to lend it to him, and to work on his account; and it is plain, inasmuch as his shoes would not sell for a higher price than those of the capitalist, that he could not realise a greater profit.

Hence it follows, that the circumstance of the accumu-

lated labour or capital, and of the manual labour, required in production, being supplied by different parties, has no influence over the value of commodities. This depends on the total *quantity* of every sort of labour laid out, and not on those by whom it is laid out. It now only remains to trace the influence of fluctuations in wages and profits on value. When this has been done, this subject will be exhausted.

To simplify this inquiry, it had best be divided into two branches: we shall therefore inquire, *first*, whether fluctuations in the rate of wages have any, and, if any, what influence over the value of commodities produced by the aid of capitals of equal degrees of durability, or returnable in equal periods; and, *second*, whether these fluctuations have any, and, if any, what influence when the capitals employed are of unequal degrees of durability, or are returnable in unequal periods.

The better to understand what follows, it may be necessary to premise that the term durability is applied to those capitals that are denominated fixed, or that consist of machines, houses, &c. It means the period required for their consumption, or during which they may be expected to last; and this, of course, varies according to the nature of the article. One machine may be capable of lasting twenty years, another fifteen, a third ten, and so on; while a granite dock or bridge may last for five hundred or a thousand years.

Circulating capital, or capital employed in the payment of wages, is said to be returnable in given periods, which are estimated from the time when the wages are advanced by the capitalist, to the time when he receives payment of the produce.

When it is said that capitalists are placed under the same circumstances, it is meant that they employ fixed capitals of the same degree of durability, or circulating capitals returnable in equal periods.

I. Supposing, now, that they are in this situation, they will be equally affected by a rise or fall of wages. This proposition is self-evident, and must be assented to by every one. But were such the case, it is impossible that a variation of wages should occasion any variation in the value or price of commodities. Suppose, for example, that a hat, produced when wages are 2s. a-day, freely exchanges for a pair of boots; and let us suppose that, from some cause or other, wages rise to 3s.: the question is, will this rise of wages affect the value or price of hats and boots? It is obvious that it will not. The relation of A to B cannot vary, unless one of them be operated upon by some cause which does not extend its influence, or the same degree of influence, to the other. But fluctuations in the rate of wages are not of this description. They cannot be confined to one department. Competition never fails to elevate or depress their rate in different trades to what is really, when all things are taken into account, the common level. If wages rise 1s. a-day in the hat trade, they must, and certainly will, in the end, unless restrictive regulations interpose, rise 1s. in every other business. It is, consequently, plain, that the hatter could not urge the circumstance of his paying higher wages to his workmen as a reason why the bootmaker should give him more boots than formerly in exchange for hats; for the bootmaker would have it in his power to reply, that the same rise of wages affected him to precisely the same extent. If, therefore, a hat were previously worth, or exchanged for a pair of boots, the one will continue to preserve this relation to the other, until some variation takes place in the quantities of labour required to produce them and bring them to market. So long as these quantities continue the same, wages may rise from 5s. to 10s., or they may fall from 1s. to sixpence a-day, without either the rise or the fall having the slightest influence over their value.

But it may perhaps be thought, that though the exchangeable value of commodities produced by the aid of

capitals of equal degrees of durability, may not be affected by fluctuations in the rate of wages, these fluctuations may, notwithstanding, affect their *price*, or value estimated in money. But if the variation in the rate of wages be real, and not nominal—that is, if the labourer get either a greater or less proportion of the produce raised by his exertions, or a greater or less quantity of money of the same value—this will not happen. Money is itself a commodity, whose value depends on the same principles that determine the value of other commodities. If the mine which supplies the gold and silver, of which money is made, be situated in the country, then it is clear, that the rise of wages which affects other producers will affect those engaged in the production of gold and silver; and if gold and silver be imported from abroad, it is clear that no more of them will be obtained, in exchange for commodities produced by the dearer labour, than was previously obtained for those produced by the cheaper labour; for, if those who export commodities to foreign countries, and exchange them for the precious metals, were to obtain more of these metals after wages rose than previously, they would be, in so far, in a better situation than their neighbours at home, whose competition would speedily compel them to give the same quantity of goods produced by the dear labour, for that quantity of the precious metals they had obtained previously to the rise in the rate of wages.

But if the value of money fluctuate, if it become more or less difficult of production, or if its supply be suddenly increased or diminished, then, undoubtedly, the rate of wages and the price of commodities will vary. But they will do so, not because the labourer gets a greater or less amount of wages, but because the value of the commodity, or standard, in which wages and prices are estimated, has varied. The wages of the work-people engaged in agriculture and manufactures, though commonly paid and rated in money, really consist of a portion of the produce raised by their labour; consequently they bear a high

proportional, or *cost* value, when workmen get a comparatively large share of such produce, and a low *proportional* value when they get a comparatively small share. Instead of being identical with wages estimated in money or commodities, proportional wages sometimes rise when money wages fall, and *vice versâ*. And hence, to avoid falling into endless mistakes, it is best, in theoretical investigations with respect to value, to consider wages as forming a certain proportion of the produce raised by labour,—as being invariable, so long as this proportion continues unchanged—and as having really risen when it is increased, and really fallen when it is diminished.

The mistaking of fluctuations in the rate of money wages for fluctuations in the rate of real or proportional wages, has been the source of much error and misapprehension. A man whose wages are 1s. a-day, must get 2s. to keep them at the same level, when the value of money declines a half; and the hat which sold for 10s. must then, for the same reason, sell for 20s. It is obviously false to call this a real rise, either of wages or prices; though this be generally done. The manufacturer who gives sixpence a-day more to his men, and who sells his goods at a proportionally higher price because of a fall in the value of money, rarely suspects there has been any such fall, and almost invariably concludes that the rise of wages has been the cause of the rise of prices, overlooking entirely the real cause of the rise of both—the decline in the value of the money or article in which wages and prices are estimated.

Even if it were true, which most certainly it is not, that when money is constant in its value, a rise of wages occasions an equal rise in the money price of commodities, it would be no advantage to the producers. Commodities are always bought either by other commodities or by labour, and it is almost superfluous to add, that it is impossible they can be bought by any thing else. Of what benefit, then, would it be to a capitalist, a cotton-manufacturer, for example, to sell his cottons for an advance of 10 per

cent when wages rise 10 per cent, he being, at the same time, obliged to give so much more for every other article? When wages really rise, it is indifferent to the producers whether they sell the commodities they have to spare, and purchase those they have occasion for, at their former price, or whether they are all raised proportionally to the rise of wages.

This principle may be further illustrated by supposing an equal proportional increase to take place in the labour required for the production of all sorts of commodities: under such circumstances, their marketable values would clearly remain unaltered. A bushel of corn would not then exchange for a greater quantity of muslin or of broadcloth than it did before its increased expense of production; but each would *cost* more, because each would be the produce of a greater quantity of labour. Under these circumstances, the prices of commodities would remain stationary, while the wealth and comforts of society would be materially diminished. Every person would have to make greater exertions to obtain a given quantity of any single commodity; but as the expense of producing *all* commodities is, by the supposition, equally increased, it would not be necessary to make any greater exertions to obtain one than another, and their values, as compared with each other, would be totally unaffected.

But if an equal increase of the labour required for the production of commodities cannot alter their relation to each other, how can this relation be altered by an equal increase of the wages paid for that labour? A real rise of wages affects the *proportion* in which the produce of industry (under deduction of rent) is divided between capitalists and labourers—diminishing the proportion belonging to the capitalists when they rise, and increasing it when they fall. But as these changes in the distribution of commodities neither add to nor take from the labour required to produce them and bring them to market, they do not affect either their cost or exchangeable value.

II. The arguments now brought forward, to show that fluctuations in the rate of wages do not affect the value of commodities produced by capitals of the same durability, were first advanced by Mr Ricardo. He, too, was the first who endeavoured to discover and analyse the influence of fluctuations in the rate of wages over the value of commodities, when the capitals employed in their production are *not* of the same durability. The results of his researches in this more difficult inquiry were still more important, and more at variance with received opinions: for Mr Ricardo not only showed that it is impossible for any rise of wages to raise the price of *all* commodities, but he also showed that in most cases a rise of wages leads to a *fall* in the price of some descriptions of commodities, and a fall of wages to a *rise* in the price of others.

It must be admitted, that this proposition appears, when first stated, not a little paradoxical; but the paradox is only in appearance. On adverting to the means by which different classes of commodities are produced, it is immediately seen that no proposition can, apparently, be more reasonable, or consistent with probability; and it may be easily shown that there is none more certain.

Some commodities are almost exclusively produced by the expenditure of accumulated labour, or capital, and others by that of the immediate labour of man. Nearly the whole of the first class must consequently belong to capitalists, and the latter to labourers. Suppose a manufacturer has a highly durable machine worth £20,000, which manufactures commodities without any, or with but little manual labour: in this case the goods produced by the machine form the profits of the capital vested in it; and their value in exchange, or their price rated in money, must, therefore, vary with every variation in the rate of profit. If profits were at ten per cent, the goods annually produced by the machine must sell for £2000, with a small additional sum to cover its wear and tear; should profits rise to fifteen per cent, the price of the goods must rise to

£3000, for otherwise the manufacturer would not obtain the common average rate of profit; and if, on the other hand, profits should fall to five per cent, the price of the goods must, for the same reason, fall to £1000. If, therefore, it can be shown that a rise of wages reduces the rate of profits, it necessarily follows that it must also reduce the value and price of such commodities as are chiefly produced by machinery, or fixed capital of a considerable degree of durability, or by circulating capitals returnable at distant periods, and *vice versâ*.

Now it is easy to show that, supposing no variation takes place in the labour required for the production of commodities,¹ every rise of wages must reduce profits, and must, therefore, reduce the value of those commodities which are chiefly produced by the aid of fixed capital or machinery. It is plain, from what has been previously stated, that to whatever extent wages rise, no set of producers, whether their capitals be returnable in a day, a week, a year, or a hundred years, can obtain a larger share of the commodities produced by others belonging to the *same class*, that is, who have capitals returnable in the same periods as their own. This is evidently as impossible as it is to change the relation of numbers by multiplying or dividing them by the same number; and, therefore, it is certain, that a rise of wages cannot raise the value of any single commodity as compared with every other commodity. But, if it cannot do this, it must universally lower profits. Suppose, to illustrate this principle, that wages really rise 5 or 10 per cent, and that two manufacturers of the class who employ the least portion of capital in the payment of wages have each £10,000, of which they respectively lay out £9000 on durable machinery, and £1000 on the payment of wages: it is obvious, inasmuch as these manufacturers are affected by the rise of wages to precisely the same extent, that their products will continue to exchange for each other exactly as they did be-

¹ The reason for this limitation will be subsequently explained.

fore it took place; and that, in fact, it will make an equivalent deduction from their profits. But if this rise of wages will not enable the manufacturers in question to obtain any larger share than formerly of the products belonging to others of their own class, still less, it is clear, can it enable them to obtain any larger share of the produce of any other class of manufacturers, who are all assumed to employ more labour in proportion to their machinery; and who, consequently, must be more affected by the rise of wages. There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt that, under the circumstances supposed, the profits of the manufacturers, and consequently of all other producers, will be reduced by this rise of wages; and whenever this reduction takes place, the value of the commodities, chiefly produced by the aid of fixed capital or machinery, will be diminished as compared with those chiefly produced by the hand.

Suppose that the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, &c., represent the various descriptions of capitals, classed according to the respective degrees of their average durability; that No. 1 represents that class of capitals which are wholly employed in the payment of wages, and which are most speedily consumed and reproduced; No. 2, that class which is next in durability; and so on until we come to No. 11, which represents that class of capitals which chiefly consist of highly durable machinery, and are longest in being consumed and reproduced. Let us further suppose that the commodities produced by the agency of these capitals are all yielding the same common and average rate of profit; and let us endeavour to discover what would, under these circumstances, be the influence of fluctuations in the rate of wages on the value of commodities. If wages rise, it is plain that the holders of the least durable capitals, (No. 1,) who may be supposed to use no machinery, will be more affected by the rise than the holders of the second class, (No. 2,) who may be supposed to employ some little machinery; and these again more than the holders of the third class, (No. 3;) and so on till we come to the

holders of the capital of the highest degree of durability, (No. 11,) which may be supposed to consist almost wholly of very durable machinery; and who will, on that account, be comparatively little affected by the rise. Suppose, now, to illustrate the principle, that wages have so risen that the increased rate paid by the proprietors of the most durable capitals to the few labourers they employ—for they must employ a few to superintend their machinery—has reduced their profits *one* per cent: there is obviously no mode in which these capitalists can indemnify themselves for this fall of profits; for, as they employ the fewest labourers, they are least of all affected by the rise of wages, the profits of all other capitalists being more reduced than theirs because of the greater number of their labourers. Thus, supposing the proprietors of the most durable capitals, or of No. 11, to employ a certain number of labourers; the proprietors of the next class, or of No. 10, to employ twice that number; and those of No. 9, three times that number, and so on; then, on the hypothesis that the rise of wages has reduced the profits of the most durable capitals, or No. 11, *one* per cent, it will have reduced those of No. 10 *two* per cent, those of No. 9 *three* per cent, and so on till we come to the least durable class, No. 1, whose profits will be reduced *eleven* per cent. It is plain, however, that this discrepancy in the rate of profit can only be of temporary duration. For the undertakers of those businesses in which either the whole or the greater portion of the capital is employed in paying the wages of labour, observing that their neighbours, who have laid out the greater portion of their capital on machinery, are less affected by the rise of wages, will immediately begin to withdraw from their own businesses, to engage in those that are more lucrative. The commodities produced by the most durable capitals, Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, &c., will, therefore, become redundant, as compared with those produced by the least durable capitals, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, &c.; and this increase on the one hand, and diminution on the other, will sink the value of the former, com-

pared with the latter, till they all yield the same rate of profit.

The value of the commodities produced by capital of the *medium* degree of durability, or by No. 6, would not be affected by the rise; for, whatever they lost in exchangeable value as compared with the commodities produced by the less durable capitals, they would gain as compared with those produced by the more durable capitals.

It has, however, been contended, that though the equalisation in the rate of profit now alluded to might be effected by the destruction of a portion of the less durable capital, or by the comparatively great accumulations that would henceforth be made by the holders of the more durable capitals, who are but little affected by the rise of wages, it could not be effected by such a transference of capital from the one class of businesses to the other as has been supposed; for it is said, that the fixed stock, or machinery, belonging to the holders of capitals of the greatest degree of durability, being itself the produce of labour, it would not be possible to obtain this machinery at its former price after wages rose, so that the profits of the existing holders of Nos. 7, 8, 9, &c. could not be beaten down to a common level with those of the holders of the less durable capitals, by an influx of new competitors. But it is easy to see that this view of the matter is incorrect. Suppose, which is the strongest case for the argument we are combating, that the machines belonging to the capitalists of class No. 11, are made by the labourers employed by the capitalists of class No. 1: when wages rise, it is evident the machines and other commodities produced by No. 1 cannot rise in value, as compared with money, or any other commodity produced under different circumstances, until they are diminished, or the others increased in quantity. And hence there are two very sufficient reasons why the producers of the machines should not be disposed to sell them after wages rise; for, in the *first* place, if they sell them they will get no more for them than they got before the rise;

and, in the *second* place, as the more lucrative businesses, or those that are least affected by the rise of wages, can only be carried on by means of machinery, they could not, if they sold the machines, transfer circulating capital to them, but would be compelled to continue in those businesses that had become relatively disadvantageous. Instead, therefore, of selling the machines, it may be fairly presumed that a considerable number of those by whom they are constructed would be tempted to employ them in the businesses for which they were intended, and would thus come into competition with the holders of the capitals Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, &c., on the same footing that they stand, or with machines that have cost the same price as theirs; nor would this transference cease until the commodities produced on the least durable side of the scale had been so much diminished, and their value so much increased, as compared with those produced on the more durable side, that they were all brought to yield the same common and average rate of profit.

If wages, instead of rising, were to fall, the opposite effects would be produced. The holders of the capitals Nos. 1, 2, 3, &c., who employ a comparatively large proportion of labourers, deriving a greater advantage from the fall of wages than the holders of the capitals Nos. 7, 8, 9, &c., their profits would be raised above the level of the latter. In consequence, capital would begin to move from those businesses that employ the fewest to those that employ the greatest number of labourers; and the average equilibrium of profit would be restored by an increase of the value of the commodities produced by the most durable, as compared with those produced by the least durable capitals.

It is abundantly certain, therefore, that no rise of wages can ever occasion a general rise of prices, and no fall of wages a general fall of prices; but, supposing the productiveness of industry, or the quantity of labour required to produce commodities, to continue stationary, a rise of wages, instead of occasioning a general rise of prices, will occasion a general fall of profits; and a fall of wages, instead of

reducing prices, will occasion a general rise of profits. Owing, however, to the different and ever-varying degrees of the durability of the machinery, or fixed capital, employed in production, and the varying relation which the portion of capital employed as wages, or in the payment of immediate labour, bears to the whole capital employed, it is very difficult to determine, *à priori*, the extent to which any given fluctuation in the rate of wages will affect the rate of profit, and the value of commodities. But when due pains are taken, this may be approximated with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes; and the following three cases will briefly, and we hope satisfactorily, elucidate the manner in which fluctuations in the rate of wages always operate, and the method to be followed in estimating their influence over profits and prices.

1. If all commodities were produced by immediate labour, or by capital employed in the payment of wages, it is obvious, supposing the productiveness of industry not to vary, that every rise of wages would cause an equal fall of profits. A capitalist who employs £1000 in the payment of wages, must, if profits are at 10 per cent, sell the commodities for £1100. But when wages rise 5 per cent, or to £1050, he would not be able to sell his commodities for more than £1100; for money is itself a commodity; and as, by the supposition, all commodities are produced by immediate labour, the rise of wages would affect the producers of money in the same way that it affected the producers of other things. In this case, therefore, it is plain that every rise of wages will equally sink profits, and every fall of wages will equally raise them.

2. If all commodities were produced, *one-half* by immediate labour, and the *other half* by capital, profits would only fall to half the extent that wages rose. Suppose a capitalist employs £500 in the payment of wages, and £500 as a fixed capital, when profits are at 10 per cent, the commodities produced must, as before, sell for £1100. If wages rose 5 per cent, the capitalist would have to pay £525 as

wages, and would, consequently, only retain £75 as profits. In this case, therefore, a rise of wages to the extent of 5 per cent would, because of the employment of equal quantities of capital and immediate labour in the production of commodities, only sink profits $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

3. If all commodities were produced by capital of a very high degree of durability, capitalists, it is obvious, would not be sensibly affected by a rise of wages, and profits would, of course, continue nearly as before.

Now, suppose that commodities, instead of being wholly produced by immediate labour, as in the first case; or wholly by equal quantities of immediate labour and of capital, as in the second; or wholly by fixed capital, as in the third,—are partly produced in the one mode, and partly in the other; and let us see what effect an increase of 5 per cent in the rate of wages would have on their values, supposing, as before, that the productiveness of industry continues constant. To facilitate this inquiry, let us distinguish these three descriptions of commodities by the Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Now it is evident that the rise of wages has affected No. 1 $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent more than it has affected No. 2, and 5 per cent more than it has affected No. 3. No. 1 must, therefore, as compared with No. 2, have risen $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in exchangeable value, and, as compared with No. 3, it must have risen 5 per cent; No. 2 must have fallen $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent as compared with No. 1, and risen $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent as compared with No. 3; and No. 3 must have fallen 5 per cent as compared with No. 1, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent as compared with No. 2. If wages, instead of rising, had fallen, the same effects would obviously have been produced, but in a reversed order. The proprietors of the commodities of the class No. 1 would gain 5 per cent by the fall; those of No. 2 would gain $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; and those of No. 3 nothing; and the marketable values of these commodities would be adjusted accordingly.*

* These examples are substantially the same with those given by Mr James Mill—"Elements of Political Economy," 2d edit. p. 103.

Thus, then, it appears, inasmuch as any commodity taken for a standard by which to estimate the values of other commodities must itself be produced by capital returnable in a certain period, that when wages rise, the commodities produced by *less* durable capitals than that which produces the commodity taken for a standard will rise in value, while those produced by *more* durable capitals will fall; and conversely when wages are reduced. Suppose, as before, that the Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, represent capitals of corresponding degrees of durability: If a commodity produced by the least durable capital, No. 1, which may be supposed to be wholly employed in the payment of wages, be taken for a standard, all commodities produced by the other and more durable capitals, would *fall* in value when wages rose; and if we suppose those produced by No. 2 to decline 1 per cent, those produced by No. 3 would decline 2 per cent, those produced by No. 4, 3 per cent, and so on until we arrive at No. 11, which will have fallen 10 per cent. If, on the other hand, a commodity, produced by the most durable capital, No. 11, and which may be supposed to consist wholly of highly durable machinery, be made the standard, when wages rise, all the commodities produced by the other less durable capitals would also rise; and if those produced by No. 10, rose 1 per cent, those produced by No. 9 would rise 2 per cent, and those produced by No. 1, 10 per cent. If a commodity, produced by a capital of the *medium* degree of durability, as No. 6, and which may be supposed to consist half of circulating capital employed in the payment of wages, and half of fixed capital or machinery, be taken as a standard, the commodities produced by the less durable capitals, Nos. 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, will *rise* with a rise of wages, on the former hypothesis, the first, or No. 5, 1 per cent, the second, or 4, 2 per cent, &c.; while those produced by the more durable capitals, Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, will *fall*, the first, or No. 7, 1 per cent, the second, or No. 8, 2 per cent, &c., exactly the reverse of the other.

Hence it is obvious, that the effect which variations in the

rate of wages have on the *price* of commodities must principally depend on the nature of the capital employed in the production of gold and silver. Whatever may be the proportions of circulating capital appropriated to the payment of wages, and of fixed capital employed in the production of the material of which money is made, those commodities which are produced by the agency of a greater quantity of circulating capital, and with less fixed capital or machinery, will rise when wages rise, and fall when wages fall; but those that are produced by the agency of a less quantity of circulating capital, and with more fixed capital or machinery, will fall when wages rise, and rise when wages fall; while those that are produced under nearly the same circumstances, or by the agency of the same quantities of circulating and fixed capital as money, will not be affected by these fluctuations.

It should be observed, however, that the variations in the exchangeable value of most commodities, caused by variations in the rate of proportional wages, are confined within comparatively narrow limits. We have already seen that, if commodities were either produced wholly by immediate labour, or wholly by capital, or wholly by equal quantities of both, no variation in the rate of wages would have any influence over their value. But in point of fact, a very large class of commodities are produced by means of nearly equal portions of fixed and circulating capital; and as every rise of proportional wages that may take place must, under such circumstances, be balanced either by a fall in the rate of profit or by a proportional increase in the productiveness of industry, it is evident that the value of the commodities in question, as compared with each other, would remain nearly stationary. Although, therefore, a rise of wages has a necessary tendency to raise the exchangeable value of one class of commodities, and consequently to lower that of another class, the fall of profits, which inevitably follows every rise of wages that is not accompanied by an increased productiveness of industry has a contrary effect, and tends to sink the value of the com-

modities which the increased rate of wages would raise, and to elevate the value of those which the same increased rate would sink. And it is only in extreme cases, or in the case of commodities produced almost wholly by direct manual labour, on the one hand, or in that of those produced almost wholly by the aid of fixed capital or machinery on the other, that a variation in the rate of proportional wages occasions a considerable variation in their values.

It should also be observed, that though fluctuations in the rate of wages occasion some variation in the exchangeable value of particular commodities, they neither add to nor take from the *total value* of the entire mass of commodities. If they increase the value of those produced by the least durable capitals, they equally diminish the value of those produced by the more durable capitals. Their aggregate value continues, therefore, always the same. And though it may not be strictly true of a particular commodity, that its exchangeable value is directly as its cost, or as the quantity of labour required to produce it and bring it to market, it is most true to affirm this of the mass of commodities taken together.

In thus endeavouring to trace the value of all descriptions of non-monopolised commodities to the quantity of labour required for their production, it is not meant to deny that a very large portion of the useful or desirable qualities of such commodities may be the result of the action or influence of natural agents. But it is, as was formerly stated, the peculiar and distinguishing feature of natural agents, or powers, that they render their services gratuitously. Whatever is done by them is done without fee or reward. And hence, though their assistance and co-operation be necessary to the production of every species of useful and desirable articles, they add nothing to their value. This is a quality that can be communicated only by the labour of man, or by the instrumentality of that capital that has been appropriated or accumulated by his labour. In esti-

rating the value of a quantity of corn, for example, we include only the value of the labour of the individuals employed, as ploughmen, reapers, thrashers, &c., with that of the corn used as seed, and of the services rendered by the horses and instruments made use of in the different operations. Nothing is set down on account of the aid derived from the vegetative powers of nature, and the influences of the sun and showers; for though without them the crop could not be obtained, and our utmost exertions would be altogether fruitless, yet, as they are the free gift of Providence, they add nothing to the cost or value of the produce, or to its power of exchanging for or buying labour, or other things produced by its intervention.

It may be thought, perhaps, that this principle is at variance with what is observed to take place in the production of certain descriptions of commodities. Thus, if a cask of new wine be kept for a definite period, or till it arrive at maturity, it will acquire a higher value; now, as the change produced in the wine is entirely brought about by the operation of natural agents, and as, without the change, the wine would have no higher value, it has been contended that this is a case in which the labour of natural agents is plainly productive of an increased value. But it is easy to see that this is a mistake. The cask of wine is a capital, or is the result of the labour employed in cultivating, gathering, pressing, and otherwise preparing, the grapes from which it has been made. But it is necessary, in order to give time for the processes of fermentation, decomposition, &c., to effect the desired changes in the wine, that it should be laid aside until they are completed. The producer of wine would not, however, employ his capital in this way, unless it were to yield him the same return that is derived from capital employed in other businesses. And hence it follows, that though the processes carried on by nature render the wine more desirable, or bestow on it a greater degree of utility, they add nothing to its value; the additional value which it acquires being a consequence of the

profit accruing on the capital required to enable the processes to be carried on.

Besides the objection now stated, it has been contended by Colonel Torrens, in his work "On the Production of Wealth," in opposition to the theory we have been endeavouring to establish, that, after capital has been accumulated, the value of commodities is no longer, as in the early stages of society, determined by the quantities of labour required to bring them to market, but by the *quantities of capital* required for that purpose. At bottom, however, this theory is but nominally different from that just explained; for capital, being nothing but the accumulated produce of anterior labour, its value, like the value of every thing else, is estimated by the quantity of labour required for its production. In this respect, too, there is no difference, as has been already shown, between the work of labourers and that of machines. A labourer is himself a portion of the national capital, and may, without impropriety, be considered, in theoretical investigations of this sort, (which merely regard his physical, and have no reference to his mental and moral powers,) in the light of a machine which it has required a certain outlay of labour to construct; the wages which he earns are a remuneration for his services, and, if we may so speak, yield him, at an average, only the common and ordinary rate of profit on his capital, exclusive of a sum to replace its wear and tear, or, which is the same thing, to supply the place of old and decayed labourers with new ones. Whether, therefore, a commodity has been produced by the expenditure of a capital which it cost a certain quantity of labour to provide, or has been produced by the expenditure of that labour directly upon it, is of no moment: in either case, it is produced by exactly the same amount of labour, or, if it should be deemed a better phrase, of capital. In so far as their purely physical powers are concerned, and it is such only that are now in question, men are to be looked upon as capital, or are to be considered in the same point of view as the tools

or engines with which they perform their tasks ; and to say that the value of commodities depends on the quantities of capital expended on their production, is not to contradict, but is, in fact, only another way of expressing the identical proposition we have been endeavouring to illustrate.

Many important practical conclusions may be deduced from the principles developed in this chapter. It was, for example, long and universally supposed, that a country where wages are comparatively low would be able, provided it possessed the same facilities for the production of commodities, to undersell other countries in markets equally accessible to all parties. But the principles now laid down show the fallacy of this opinion. Suppose, to exemplify the mode in which variations in the rate of wages affect foreign commerce, that England and France have *equal* facilities for producing all sorts of commodities, and that the rates of wages are equal in both countries ; and let the following numbers represent the different classes of capital, ranged according to the different degrees of their durability employed in production in England and France, viz.—

Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, &c., England.

Nos. 1', 2', 3', 4', 5', 6', 7', 8', 9', 10', 11', &c., France.

Now, as the two countries are supposed to have equal facilities of production, and as wages in them both are also supposed to be the same, the commodities they respectively produce will sell equally well in any third market, as in that of the United States, equally open to both : but suppose that, while wages continue stationary in France, they rise in England, and mark the result. All those commodities produced in England by the capitals Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, &c., which are above the *medium* degree of durability, and may be supposed to consist chiefly of machinery, will fall, while those produced by the less durable capitals, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, &c., will rise. The former will not, however, fall only as compared with the commodities produced in England by less durable capitals, but they will also fall as compared with the commodities produced in France by the correspond-

ing and equally durable capitals, Nos. 7', 8', 9', 10', &c. ; while the latter, or the commodities produced in England by the capitals Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, &c., will rise in value as compared with the commodities produced in France by the corresponding capitals, Nos. 1', 2', 3', 4', &c. The merchants of England and France will, therefore, no longer come into the American market on the same terms as formerly ; for England will henceforth have a decided advantage over France in the production and sale of those commodities that are produced chiefly by machinery ; while France will, on her part, have an equally decided advantage over England in the production and sale of those commodities that are chiefly the direct produce of the hand. And such, in point of fact, is the case. The bulk of our exports consists of cotton goods and other products of machinery ; whereas the bulk of the exports of France consists of the productions of her soil, and of jewellery and fancy articles, principally the product of manual labour. It is, therefore, difficult to suppose that a rise of wages should be fatal to the foreign commerce of a country, except by reducing profits, and creating a temptation to employ capital abroad. It can hardly fail, however, to turn it, to some extent at least, into new channels : for if, on the one hand, it raises the value of certain descriptions of commodities and checks their exportation, on the other, it proportionally lowers the value of other descriptions, and fits them the better for the foreign market.

The truth, therefore, is, that instead of our high wages laying our cotton manufacturers under any disadvantage in the sale of their goods, their effect is distinctly the reverse. The high wages paid to workmen in England, and the weight of the public burdens, occasion comparatively *low* profits ; and as the principal part of the value of cottons and other commodities chiefly produced by the agency of machinery, consists of profits, it must necessarily be low where the latter are low. Suppose, for example, that two highly durable machines, of equal efficiency, and which may be used with but little manual labour, are erected, the one in France and the other in England : if the machines

cost £20,000 each, and if the rate of profit in France were six and in England five per cent, the work done by the French machine would be worth £1200, whereas that done by the English machine would only be worth £1000. It should also be observed, inasmuch as one description of machinery is for the most part largely employed in the production of another, that it is most probable, in the event of one of the machines being made in England and the other in France, that the English one would not cost so much as £20,000 and that its produce might on that account be sold under £1000. Independently, however, of this circumstance, the advantage that our manufacturers, who are large employers of machinery, must have over those of France, and still more over those of the United States, in consequence of their profits being lower, is obvious and decided. This principle shows that restrictions on the exportation of machinery, even if they could be enforced, and the emigration of the makers prevented, are of less consequence than the manufacturers suppose; for, though the United States possessed every facility for manufacturing cottons we now enjoy, though Massachusetts were a second Lancashire, and Lowell a fac-simile of Manchester, it is plain their manufacturers could not enter into a successful competition with those of England. The possession of better machinery would not lower profits in New England; and, till this be done, we must, supposing we continue to possess equal facilities of production, always have an ascendancy over the Americans, the French, and every other people among whom profits are higher than in England, in the sale of such articles as are mainly produced by means of machinery.

The statement now made is not, however, meant to convey the impression that low profits are really advantageous. On the contrary, the tendency of a low rate of profit is not only to make the countries in which it obtains advance slowly as compared with those in which it is higher, but it also, as previously stated, forms a strong temptation to convey capital from them. A reduction of taxation, or a reduction of wages, following a reduction in the price of corn,

or any of the principal necessities which enter into the consumption of the labourer, would raise the rate of profit, and might, consequently, by raising their price, narrow the demand for cottons. But a diminution in our exports to foreign countries, arising from this cause, if it did take place, would be beneficial rather than otherwise. It would be a consequence of industry having become more productive; and any capital that had previously been employed in the production of goods for the foreign market, that could not, under the supposed change of circumstances, be advantageously sent abroad, would have little difficulty in meeting with more profitable employment in other branches. In so far, however, as the cotton manufacture is concerned, there can be little doubt that the depression in the rate of profit has contributed to its extraordinary extension. And, how paradoxical soever it may seem, it is nevertheless true that, were wages to rise and profits to sustain a further decline, additional capital would be attracted to the manufacture, and the price of cottons would experience a further reduction; whereas, were wages to fall and profits to rise, capital would be diverted from the manufacture to those businesses that employ less machinery, and the price of cottons would rise.¹

¹ Sir William Petty seems to have been one of the earliest writers who has distinctly stated, that the value of commodities depends on the quantities of labour required for their production. "If," says he, "a man bring to London an ounce of silver out of the earth in Peru, in the same time that he can produce a bushel of corn, the one is the natural price of the other: now if, by reason of new and more easie mines, a man can get two ounces of silver as easily as formerly he did one, then corn will be as cheap at ten shillings the bushel as it was before at five shillings, *ceteris paribus*."—*Treatise of Taxes and Contributions*, ed. 1679, p. 31. At page 24 he says, "Let a hundred men work ten years upon corn, and the same number of men the same time upon silver; I say that the neat proceed of the silver is the price of the whole neat proceed of the corn, and like parts of the one the price of like parts of the other:" and at page 67 he says, "Corn will be twice as dear when there are two hundred husbandmen to do the same work which a hundred could perform." These passages are interesting, as exhibiting the first germs of the theory which Mr Ricardo did so much to perfect.

PRINCIPLES

OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PART III.

DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH.

THE inhabitants of such countries as have made any considerable progress in civilisation and the arts, may be divided into the *three* classes of labourers, landlords, and capitalists; and whatever be the condition of any society—whether rude or refined, rich or poor—every person belonging to it, who is not a pauper, or who does not subsist on the bounty of others, may be reckoned in one or other of these classes. They divide amongst them all the wealth of the community. Public functionaries of all sorts, and the various individuals engaged in what are called liberal or learned professions, exchange their services for valuable considerations. The whole subsistence of such persons, in so far as they depend upon their employments, is derived from wages; and they are as evidently labourers as if they handled a spade or a plough. “Every man,” says Dr Paley, “has his work. The kind of work varies, and that is all the difference there is. A great deal of labour exists besides that of the hands; many species of industry beside bodily

operation—equally necessary, requiring equal assiduity, more attention, more anxiety. It is not true, therefore, that men of elevated stations are exempted from work; it is only true that there is assigned to them work of a different kind: whether more easy or more pleasant may be questioned; but certainly not less wanted, nor less essential to the common good.”¹ Hence it is that the inquiry into the distribution of wealth among the different orders of the society, resolves itself into an investigation of the laws which regulate wages, rent, and profit, and of the best methods of providing for the exigencies of the poor, or of those who are unable to provide for themselves. We shall begin by endeavouring to lay before the reader a view of the circumstances which determine the wages of labour in different employments.

¹ “Assize Sermon,” 29th July 1795.

CHAPTER I.

Wages in the different Departments of Industry—Causes of their Apparent Discrepancy—Really approach very near to Equality.

THE wages paid to the labourers engaged in different employments differ so very widely, that, at first sight, it may seem to be impossible to lay down any principles that should be applicable to them all. Such, however, is not the case. The differences in question are apparent rather than real; and when the various favourable and unfavourable circumstances connected with different employments are taken into account, it will be found, that the wages or earnings of those engaged in them are very nearly the same.

If all employments were equally agreeable and healthy; if the labour to be performed in each was of the same intensity; and if each required the same degree of dexterity and skill on the part of those employed, it is evident, supposing industry to be quite free, there could be no permanent or considerable difference in the wages of labour. For if those employed in a particular business were to earn either *more* or *less* than their neighbours, labourers would, in the former case, leave other businesses to engage in it; and in the latter they would leave it to engage in others, until the increase or diminution of their numbers had lowered or elevated wages to the common level. In point of fact, however, the intensity of the labour to be performed in different employments, the degree of skill required to carry them on, their healthiness, and the estimation in which they are held, differ exceedingly; and these varying circumstances necessarily occasion proportional differences in the wages of the workmen engaged in them. Wages are the price paid for the exertion of the physical powers, skill, and ingenuity

of the labourer. They, therefore, necessarily vary according to the severity of the labour, and the degree of skill and ingenuity required. A jeweller or engraver, for example, must be paid higher wages than a common farm-servant or scavenger ; for, a long course of training being necessary to instruct a man in the art of jewelling and engraving, were he not indemnified for its cost by a higher rate of wages, others, instead of learning so difficult an art, would addict themselves, in preference, to such employments as hardly require any instruction. Hence, the discrepancies that actually obtain in the rate of wages are confined within certain limits—increasing or diminishing it only so far as may be necessary fully to countervail the unfavourable or favourable peculiarities attending any employment.

The following, according to Smith, are the principal circumstances which make the rate of wages in some employments fall below or rise above the *medium* or *average* rate of wages :—

1st, The agreeableness and disagreeableness of the employments :

2d, The easiness or cheapness, or the difficulty and expense, of learning them :

3d, The constancy or inconstancy of the employments :

4th, The small or great trust that must be reposed in those who carry them on :

5th, The probability or improbability of succeeding in them.

First, The agreeableness of an employment may arise either from physical or moral causes—from the lightness of the labour, its healthiness or cleanliness, the degree of estimation in which it is held, &c. ; and its disagreeableness from the opposite circumstances—that is, from the severity of the labour, its unhealthiness or dirtiness, the degree of odium attached to it, &c. The rate of wages must obviously vary with the variations in circumstances which exert so powerful an influence over the labourer. It is, indeed, quite out of the question to suppose, that any individual

should be so blind to his own interest, as to engage in an occupation considered as mean and disreputable, or where the labour is severe, if he obtain only the same wages he may get by engaging in employments in higher estimation, and where the labour is comparatively light. The labour of the ploughman is not unhealthy, nor is it either irksome or disagreeable; but being more severe, and requiring greater skill than that of the shepherd, it is uniformly better rewarded. The same principle holds universally. Miners, gilders, typefounders, smiths, distillers, and all who carry on unhealthy, disagreeable, and dangerous businesses, invariably obtain higher wages than those who, with equal skill, are engaged in more desirable employments. The unfavourable opinion entertained respecting certain businesses operates on wages as if the labour to be performed in them were unusually unhealthy or severe. The trade of a butcher, for example, is generally looked upon as rather low and discreditable; and this feeling occasions such a disinclination on the part of young men to enter it, as can only be overcome by the high wages that butchers are said to earn, notwithstanding the lightness of their labour: this, also, is the reason that the keeper of a small inn or tavern, who is never master of his own house, and who is exposed to the brutality of every drunkard, exercises one of the most profitable of the common trades. The contrary circumstances have contrary effects. Hunting and fishing form, in an advanced state of society, among the most agreeable amusements of the rich; but from their being held in this degree of estimation, and from the lightness of their labour, those who practise them as a trade generally receive very small wages, and are proverbially poor: and the agreeableness and healthiness of the employments, rather than the lightness of their labour, or the little skill which they require, seem to be the principal cause of the redundant numbers, and consequent low wages, of common farm-servants, and generally of all workmen employed in ordinary field labour.

The severe discipline and various hardships to which common soldiers are exposed, and the little chance they have of arriving at a higher station, are unfavourable circumstances, which, it might be supposed, could only be countervailed by a high rate of wages. It is found, however, that there are few common trades in which labourers can be procured for such low wages as those for which recruits are willing to enlist in the army. Nor is it difficult to discover the causes of this apparent anomaly. Except when actually engaged in warlike operations, a soldier is comparatively idle; while his free, dissipated, and generally adventurous life, the splendour of his uniform, the imposing spectacle of military parades and evolutions, and the martial music by which they are accompanied, exert a most seductive influence over the young and inconsiderate. The dangers and privations of campaigns are undervalued, while the chances of advancement are proportionally exaggerated in their sanguine imaginations. "Without regarding the danger," says Adam Smith, "soldiers are never obtained so easily as at the beginning of a new war; and though they have scarce any chance of preferment, they figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand occasions of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur. These romantic hopes make the whole price of their blood. Their pay is less than that of common labourers, and in actual service their fatigues are much greater."¹

It is observed by Smith, that the chances of succeeding in the sea service are greater than in the army. "The son of a creditable labourer or artificer may frequently go to sea with his father's consent; but if he enlists as a soldier, it is always without it. Other people see some chance of his making something by the one trade: nobody but himself sees any of his making any thing by the other." But the allurements to enlist in the army are, notwithstanding, found to be much greater than those which prompt young

¹ "Wealth of Nations," p. 49.

men to enter the navy. The life of a sailor is perhaps more adventurous than that of a soldier ; but he has no regular uniform, his employment is comparatively dirty and disagreeable, his labour more severe, and while at sea he he suffers a species of imprisonment, and cannot, like the soldier, excite either the envy or admiration of his countrymen. In consequence, the wages of seamen almost invariably exceed those of soldiers, and there is a greater difficulty of obtaining recruits at the breaking out of a war.

In England, the disadvantages and drawbacks naturally incident to a seafaring life have been considerably increased by the practice of impressment. The violence and injustice to which this practice exposes sailors, tend to prevent young men from entering on board ship, and consequently tend, by artificially lessening the supply of sailors, to raise their wages above their natural level, to the injury both of the king's and the merchant service. "The custom of impressment," says Mr Richardson, "puts a free-born British sailor on the same footing as a Turkish slave. The Grand Seignior cannot do a more absolute act than to order a man to be dragged away from his family, and against his will run his head against the mouth of a cannon ; and if such acts should be frequent in Turkey, upon any one set of useful men, would it not drive them away to other countries, and thin their numbers yearly ? and would not the remaining few double or treble their wages ? which is the case with our sailors, in time of war, to the great detriment of our commerce." ¹

In corroboration of this statement, it may be mentioned, that while the wages of labourers and artisans are uniformly higher in the United States than in England, those of sailors are most commonly lower. The reason is, that the navy of the United States is manned by means of voluntary enlistment only. The Americans are desirous of becoming a great naval power, and they have wisely relinquished a

¹ "Essay on the Causes of the Decline of Foreign Trade." Ed. 1756, p. 24.

practice which would have driven their best sailors from their service, and have forced them to man their fleet with the sweepings of their jails.

It is believed that there were above 16,000 British sailors on board American ships at the close of last war; and the wages of our seamen, which in time of peace rarely exceed 40s. or 50s. a-month, had then risen to 100s. and 120s. ! This extraordinary influx of British seamen into the American service, and the no less extraordinary rise in their wages at home, can be accounted for only by our continuing the practice of impressment, which has been abandoned by the United States. Formerly, our seamen were in the habit, on the breaking out of a war, of deserting to Holland. The difference of language was, however, an insuperable obstacle to this being done to any very injurious extent: but with America the case is different. Our sailors know that in the States they are sure of finding a safe asylum among a kindred people, whose language, religion, customs, and habits are identical with their own—and who will anxiously hold out every temptation to draw them to their service. Nothing but the abolition of impressment can countervail such inducements to desertion, and effectually reduce the wages of our seamen. And as it has been shown that it is nowise necessary to the manning of the fleet,¹ it is to be hoped that it may speedily be abolished; and that the efforts of the Americans to increase their naval power may not be assisted by our obstinately clinging to a system fraught with injustice and oppression.

The officers of the army and navy, and many of those functionaries who fill situations of great trust and responsibility, receive a very inadequate pecuniary remuneration. The consideration attached to such offices, and the influence they confer on their possessors, form a principal part of their salary.

Secondly. The wages of labour, in particular businesses,

¹ See Note on Impressment, in the edition of the "Wealth of Nations," pp. 536-539, by the author of this work.

vary according to the comparative facility with which they may be learned.

There are several sorts of labour which a man may perform without any, or with but little, previous instruction ; and in which he will, consequently, gain a certain rate of wages from the moment he is employed. But, in civilised societies, there are many employments which can be carried on by those only who have been regularly instructed in them ; and it is evident, that the wages of such skilled labour should so far exceed the wages of that which is comparatively rude, as to afford the workmen a sufficient compensation for the time they have lost, and the expense they have incurred, in their education. Suppose that the education of a skilled labourer—a jeweller, or engraver, for example—and his maintenance down to the period when he begins to support himself, cost £300 more than is required for the maintenance of an unskilled labourer down to the same period ; it is plain that, to place these individuals in the same situation, the skilled labourer should earn as much over and above the wages earned by the one that is unskilled as may be sufficient, not only to yield the usual rate of profit on the extra sum of £300 expended on his education, but also to replace the sum itself, previously to the probable termination of his life. If he obtain less than this he will be underpaid, and if he obtain more he will be overpaid, and there will be an influx of new entrants, until their competition has reduced wages to their proper level.

The policy of most European nations has added to the necessary cost of breeding up skilled labourers, by forcing them to serve as apprentices for a longer period than is commonly required to obtain a knowledge of the trades they mean to exercise. But as the wages of labour are always proportioned, not only to the skill and dexterity of the labourer, but also to the time he has spent, and the difficulties and expense he has had to encounter, in learning his business, it is plain that, if an individual be compelled to serve an apprenticeship of *seven* years to a business which

he might have learned in two or three years, he will obtain a proportionally higher rate of wages after the expiration of his apprenticeship. The institution of unnecessarily long apprenticeships is, therefore, productive of a double injury: in the *first* place, it injures the employers of workmen, by artificially raising wages; and, in the *second* place, it injures the workmen from its tendency to generate idle and dissipated habits, by making them pass so large a portion of their youth without any sufficient motive to be industrious.

The common law of England authorises every man to employ himself at pleasure in any lawful trade. But this sound principle was almost entirely subverted by a statute passed, in compliance with the solicitations of the corporate bodies, in the fifth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, commonly called the statute of apprenticeship. It enacted that no person should, for the future, exercise any trade, craft, or mystery, at that time exercised in England or Wales, unless he had previously served to it an apprenticeship of *seven* years at least; so that what had before been a by-law of a few corporations, became the general and statute law of the kingdom. Fortunately, however, the courts were always singularly disinclined to enforce the provisions of this statute. Though the words of the act plainly include the whole kingdom of England and Wales, it was interpreted to refer to *market towns* only, and to those trades which had been practised in England when the statute was passed, without any reference to such as had been subsequently introduced. This interpretation gave occasion to several very absurd and even ludicrous distinctions. It was adjudged, for example, that a coachmaker could neither himself make, nor employ a journeyman to make his coach wheels, but must buy them of a master wheelwright, this latter trade having been exercised in England before the 5th of Elizabeth. But a wheelwright, though he had never served an apprenticeship to a coachmaker, might either make himself, or employ journeymen to make coaches, the trade of a coach-

maker not being within the statute, because not exercised in England at the time when it was passed. The absurdity of these distinctions, and the injurious operation of the statute, were long obvious; but so slow is the progress of sound legislation, and so powerful the opposition to every change affecting private interests, that its repeal did not take place till 1814. The act for this purpose did not, nowever, interfere with the existing rights, privileges, and by-laws of corporate bodies; but wherever these do not interpose, the conditions in apprenticeships, and their duration, are now left to be adjusted by the parties.

Thirdly. The wages of labour, in different employments, vary with the constancy and inconstancy of employment.

Employment is much more constant in some businesses than in others. Many trades can only be carried on in particular states of the weather and seasons of the year; and if the workmen engaged in these trades cannot easily find employment in others during the time they are thrown out of them, their wages must be proportionally augmented. A jeweller, weaver, shoemaker, or tailor, for example, may, under ordinary circumstances, reckon upon obtaining constant employment; but masons, bricklayers, paviors, and, in general, all those workmen who carry on their business in the open air, are liable to perpetual interruptions. Their wages must, however, not only suffice for their maintenance while they are employed, but also during the time they are necessarily idle; and they should also afford them, as Smith has remarked, some compensation for those anxious and desponding moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion.

This principle shows the fallacy of the opinion so generally entertained respecting the great earnings of porters, hackney-coachmen, watermen, and generally of all workmen employed only for short periods, and on particular occasions. Such persons frequently make as much in an hour or two as a regularly employed workman makes in a day; but this

greater hire, during the time they are employed, is found to be only a bare compensation for the labour they perform, and for the time they are necessarily idle : instead of making money, such persons are almost invariably poorer than those engaged in more constant occupations.

The interruption to employments occasioned by the celebration of holidays, has a similar effect on wages. There are countries in which the holidays, including Sundays, amount to about half the year ; and the necessary wages of labour must there be about double what they would be were these holidays abolished.

Fourthly, The wages of labour vary according to the small or great trust which must be reposed in the workmen.

“ The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are every where superior to those of many other workmen, not only of equal, but of much superior ingenuity, on account of the precious materials with which they are intrusted,

“ We trust our health to the physician ; our fortune, and sometimes our life and reputation, to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in society which so important a trust requires. The long time and the great expense which must be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their labour.”¹

Fifthly, The wages of labour in different employments vary according to the probability or improbability of success in them.

This cause of variation chiefly affects the wages of the higher class of labourers, or of those who practise what are usually denominated liberal professions.

If a young man be bound apprentice to a shoemaker or a tailor, there is hardly any doubt he will attain to an ordinary degree of proficiency and expertness in his business, and

¹ “Wealth of Nations,” p. 47.

that he will be able to live by it. But if he be bound apprentice to a lawyer, a painter, a sculptor, or a player, there are five chances to one against his ever attaining to such a degree of proficiency in any of these callings as will enable him to subsist on his earnings. But in professions where many fail for one who succeeds, the fortunate one should not only gain such a rate of wages as may indemnify him for the expenses incurred in his education, but also for all that has been expended on the education of his unsuccessful competitors. It is abundantly certain, however, that the wages of lawyers, players, sculptors, &c., taken in the aggregate, never amount to so large a sum. The lottery of the law and other liberal professions has many great prizes; but there is, notwithstanding, a large excess of blanks. "Compute," says Smith, "in any particular place, what is likely to be annually gained, and what is likely to be annually spent, by all the different workmen in any common trade, such as that of shoemakers or weavers, and you will find that the former sum will generally exceed the latter. But make the same computation with regard to all the counsellors and students of law, in all the different inns of court, and you will find that their annual gains bear but a very small proportion to their annual expense, even though you rate the former as high, and the latter as low as can well be done. The lottery of the law, therefore, is very far from being a perfectly fair lottery; and that, as well as many other liberal and honourable professions, is, in point of pecuniary gains, evidently under-recompensed."

But the love of that wealth, power, and consideration, which most commonly attend superior excellence in any of the liberal professions, and the overweening confidence placed by each individual in his own good fortune, are sufficient to overbalance all the disadvantages and drawbacks that attend them, and never fail of crowding their ranks with all the most generous and aspiring spirits.

The pecuniary wages or earnings of scientific and literary men are, with a few rare exceptions, very inconsiderable.

This arises from a variety of causes ; but principally, perhaps, from the indestructibility, if we may so term it, and rapid circulation of their works and inventions. The cloth of the manufacturer, and the corn of the agriculturist, are speedily consumed, and there is a continued demand for fresh supplies of the same articles. Such, however, is not the case with new inventions, new theories, or new literary works. They may be universally made use of, but they cannot be consumed. The moment that the invention of logarithms, the mode of spinning by rollers, and the discovery of the cow-pox, had been published, they were rendered imperishable, and every one was in a condition to profit by them. It was no longer necessary to resort to their authors. The results of their researches had become public property, had conferred new powers on every individual, and might be applied by any one. The institution of patents does not materially affect what is now stated. That the progress of the arts may not be checked, their duration is limited to a comparatively short period. And as the invention is known in other countries to which the patent does not extend, if the discoverer were to exact a high price for the produce of his invention, it would be clandestinely imported from abroad.

The condition of purely literary men, in a pecuniary point of view, is still less to be envied. However profound and learned, if a work be not at the same time popular and pleasing, its sale will be but limited. And as principles and theories may be developed in an endless variety of ways, whatever is new and original may be appropriated by others, and served up in what may probably prove a more desirable form.

Hence, though a work should have the greatest influence over the legislation of the country, or the state of the arts, it may redound but little to the advantage of the author. A scientific work is seldom very attractive in point of style; and unless it have this recommendation, it will be read only by a few. It may have a great reputation among those

capable of appreciating its merits, but it will not have a great sale. It will be bought, or rather, perhaps, borrowed and consulted by those who are anxious to profit by its statements and discussions ; but the generality of readers will know it only by report. It is not, therefore, so much on the depth, originality, and importance of its views, as on the circumstance of its being agreeable to the public taste, that the success, and consequently the productiveness, of a book to the author must depend. The value of the work of a man's hands is generally proportioned to the quantity of labour expended upon it ; but in works of the mind no such correspondence can be traced between the toil and the recompense. Many a middling novel has produced more money than the "Principia," or the "Wealth of Nations ;" and in this respect, the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" has been far inferior to the "Arabian Nights"! Works of fancy are at once the most popular and the least easily superseded. Success in them is not, however, common ; and except when it is very decided, it rarely confers much celebrity. It is fortunate, therefore, that a few individuals should be at all times captivated by the delights of study, and eager in the pursuit of learned and scientific researches for the gratification resulting from them. Had the taste for study depended only on the pecuniary emoluments which it brings along with it, it may well be doubted whether it would ever have found a single votary ; and we should have been deprived, not only of very many of our most valuable and important discoveries in the arts, as well as in philosophy and legislation, but of much that refines and exalts the character, and supplies the best species of amusement.

It is unnecessary to enter upon any further details with respect to this part of our subject. It has been sufficiently proved, that the permanent differences that obtain in the wages paid to those engaged in different employments in countries where industry is perfectly unfettered,

are rarely more than sufficient to balance the favourable or unfavourable circumstances attending them. When the cost of their education, the chances of their success, and the various disadvantages incident to their professions, are taken into account, those who receive the highest wages are not really better paid than those who receive the lowest. The wages earned by the different classes of workmen are equal, not when each individual earns the same number of shillings, or of pence, in a given space of time, but when each is paid in proportion to the severity of the labour he has to perform, to the degree of education and skill that it requires, and to the other causes of variation already specified. So long, indeed, as the principle of competition is allowed to operate without restraint, or as individuals may employ themselves as they please, we may be assured, that the higgling of the market will adjust the rates of wages in different employments on the principle now stated, and that they will be, all things considered, nearly equal. If wages in one employment be depressed below the common level, labourers will leave it to go to others; and if they be raised above that level, labourers will be attracted to it from those departments where wages are lower, until their increased competition has sunk them to the average standard. A period of greater or less duration, according to the peculiar circumstances affecting each employment, is always required to bring about this equalisation. But all inquiries that have the establishment of general principles for their object, either are or should be founded on periods of average duration; and whenever such is the case, we may always, without falling into any material error, assume that the wages earned in different employments are, all things taken into account, about equal.

It may further be observed in reference to these principles, that wherever industry is unfettered, and knowledge generally diffused, the talents of all are turned to the best account. Indeed it may be safely affirmed, that of the myriads

of individuals engaged in industrious undertakings in Great Britain, as conductors, overseers, or workmen, the situation occupied by each is, in the vast majority of cases, that which is best suited to his capacity, and his salary or wages such as he is fairly entitled to by his services. Agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants, whether their businesses be large or small, are always most anxious to give the greatest efficacy to their establishments; to adapt their means properly to their ends; and to select the parties that are, all things considered, the most suitable for their purposes. In a society like this, integrity, skill, and industry are sure to be duly prized and appreciated; and the fund that should feed labour is never (or, if ever, only for a moment) diverted to the support of idleness. And yet there have been, and still are, persons calling themselves social reformers and friends to the poor, who propose that this admirable system should be subverted, and a meddling despotism substituted in its stead; that the rewards of industry should no longer be apportioned according to the fair and equitable arrangement of the parties concerned; but that the employment and the wages of every man should be determined by agents nominated by government for the purpose! We should show but little respect for our readers were we to waste their time in refuting such palpable absurdities. The abuses to which the adoption of such a scheme would infallibly lead would be such that it could not be maintained for any considerable period: if it were, it would fill the land with robbery, injustice, and ruin.

CHAPTER II.

Circumstances which determine the Rate of Wages. SECTION I.

MARKET OR ACTUAL WAGES—*Depend on the Proportion between Capital and Population—Identity of the interests of the Capitalists with those of the Labourers.* SECTION II.

NATURAL OR NECESSARY WAGES—*Depend on the Species and Quantity of Food and other Articles required for the Consumption of the Labourer. Different in different Countries and Periods—Effect of Fluctuations in the Rate of Wages on the Condition of the Labouring Classes—Advantage of a High Rate of Wages—Disadvantage of having the Labourers dependent for support on the cheapest Species of Food—Circumstances affecting the Condition of the Labourers—Education—Influx of Irish Labourers—Task-work—Limiting the Hours of Labour—High Wages not a Cause of Idleness—Comparative Cheapness of Free and Slave Labour.* SECTION III. PROPORTIONAL WAGES—*Depend partly on the Amount and Species of the Articles consumed by the Labourers, and partly on the Productiveness of Industry.* SECTION IV. DIFFERENCE IN THEIR INFLUENCE OVER WAGES BETWEEN A DEMAND FOR LABOUR, AND A DEMAND FOR THE PRODUCTS OF LABOUR.

It has just been seen that the wages earned by the labourers engaged in different employments may, when all things are taken into account, be considered about equal; and therefore, without regarding the difference that actually exists in the amount of money, or of commodities, earned by different sets of workmen, we shall suppose that the wages of all sorts of labour are reduced to the same common standard, and shall endeavour to discover the principle which determines this common or average rate.

This inquiry, which, as it relates to the means of subsistence of the largest and not least valuable portion of society, is practically one of the most important in the science, will be facilitated by dividing it into three branches; the object in the *first* being to discover the circumstances

which determine the *market* or *actual* rate of wages at any given moment ; in the *second*, to discover the circumstances which determine the *natural* or *necessary* rate of wages, or the wages required to enable the labourer to subsist and continue his race ; and in the *third*, to discover the circumstances which determine *proportional* wages, or the share of the produce of his industry falling to the labourer.

SECT. I.—CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE THE MARKET
OR ACTUAL RATE OF WAGES.

The capacity of a country to support and employ labourers is not directly dependent on advantageousness of situation, richness of soil, or extent of territory. These, undoubtedly, are circumstances of very great importance, and have a powerful influence over the rate at which a people advance, or may advance, in refinement and civilisation. But it is not on them, but on the amount of its wealth, or of its capital applicable to the employment of labour, and on the disposition of the owners of capital so to apply it, that the capacity of a country to support work-people at any given period, and the amount of their wages, wholly depend. A fertile soil may be made rapidly to add to the means of subsistence ; but that is all. Before it can be cultivated, capital must be provided for the support of the labourers employed upon it, as it must be provided for the support of those engaged in manufactures, or in any other department of industry.

It is further evident, that the quantity of produce apportioned to each labourer, or his wages rated in commodities, is determined by the ratio which the capital of the country bears to its labouring population. When, on the one hand, capital is increased without an equivalent increase of population, the portions of it that go to individuals, or their wages, are necessarily augmented in the same ratio ; and when, on the other hand, population happens to increase more rapidly than capital, the latter having to be distributed

among a comparatively great number of persons, their wages or shares are proportionally reduced.

To illustrate this, let it be supposed that the capital of a country appropriated to the payment of wages, would, if reduced to the standard of wheat, be equivalent to 10,000,000 quarters, and that it has 2,000,000 labourers: it is evident in such case that the yearly wages of each, reducing them all to the same common standard, would be *five* quarters; and it is further evident that this rate of wages could not be increased, unless the amount of capital were increased in a greater proportion than the number of labourers, or the number of labourers diminished more than the amount of capital. So long as capital and population march abreast, or increase or diminish in the same proportion, so long must the rate of wages, and, consequently, the condition of the labourers, continue unaffected: and it is only when the proportion of capital to population varies, by its being either increased or diminished, that wages sustain a corresponding advance or diminution. The well-being of the labouring classes is, therefore, especially dependent on the relation which they bear to capital. If they increase faster than it, their condition is deteriorated; and if they increase more slowly, it is improved. This oscillation determines their "weal and their woe." There are no possible means by which the command of the labourers over necessities and conveniences can be enlarged, other than by accelerating the increase of capital as compared with population, or by retarding the increase of population as compared with capital; and we may be assured that every scheme for improving their condition which is not bottomed on this principle, or which has not an increase of the ratio of capital to population for its object, must be nugatory and ineffectual.

And yet it has been said, that an increase of capital may be hostile to the working classes, and that their interests and those of the capitalists may be, and in fact are, frequently opposed to each other! But there is no real room

or ground for any such statement. Capital and labour are alike dependent upon, and necessary to each other : without the former the latter cannot exist, and without the latter the former would be valueless. The notion that an increase of machinery, food, and clothing, (for of such articles does capital consist,) can be injurious to the labourer, is too plainly contradictory and absurd to be entitled to any notice. The truth is, that whatever tends to promote accumulation, to increase the desire for, and the means of, amassing additional wealth, and to give confidence and security to its possessors, contributes in the most effectual manner to advance the interests of the labourers. A capitalist cannot increase his own stock without at the same time, and to the same extent, increasing the wealth, or the means of subsistence, of the working classes. Hoarding is no longer practised in any country in which property is protected. Wherever this is the case, all savings go to swell, directly or indirectly, the amount of the fund for the employment of labour. Industry is benefited in the same way, though not to the same extent, by the thrift of the poor widow, the savings of the retail-tradesman, and the successful enterprises of the manufacturer and merchant. An increase of capital is but another name for an increased demand for labour ; and it is the only way in which it can be really and permanently increased.

But, supposing this to be admitted, it will perhaps be alleged that capitalists endeavour to reduce wages to the lowest possible limits ; that, being able to stop their works for a time, they have a great advantage in the deadly struggle which they are always carrying on against the labourers, who can rarely afford to be idle—at least for any considerable period—and that, consequently, the latter are too often reduced to a state bordering on helotism and wretchedness. While, however, we admit that the condition of the labouring class is not such as it were desirable it should be, and that they have not reaped the advantages which it might have been expected they would have derived, from the extra-

ordinary progress in arts and industry since the peace of 1815, we deny that that is in any degree owing to the efforts of the capitalists to reduce wages. These efforts hinder the work-people engaged in given employments from receiving larger wages, all things considered, than those engaged in other employments—but that is their entire effect. A capitalist has a certain sum of money to expend on wages; and it is, of course, his object to get as large an amount as possible of labour in exchange. But thousands of other capitalists are in the same situation; all of them are employers of labour, and have certain sums to expend upon it. Inasmuch, however, as the supply of labour in the market is limited, wages cannot be artificially reduced. All the capital is sure, through the higgling of the market, to be equitably divided among all the labourers; and with every increase of the former, as compared with the latter, wages will necessarily rise.

Suppose that the stock of any single capitalist, or of a number of capitalists, is increased—that increased amount is of no value till it has been made available in the employment of additional labour. And how is that to be effected? Plainly by its owner or owners offering such an increased rate of wages as may suffice to draw the required supply of labour from other employments. But the amount of the labour engaged in the various departments of industry being limited to that which is necessary to carry them on, a heavy loss would be entailed on their undertakers were the numbers of their work-people materially diminished; and, to avert this result, they would, under the supposed circumstances, offer them higher wages. It is idle, therefore, to suppose that the efforts of capitalists to cheapen labour can have the smallest influence over its medium price. The customers of bakers, butchers, grocers, and other tradesmen, are all most anxious to cheapen the articles they buy of them. But every one knows that this anxiety has no effect, save only to keep the prices of different tradesmen at or about, all things considered, the same level; and that the prices

of the articles in which they deal depend on wholly different principles. And such, also, is the case with the price of labour. It depends on the number of labourers seeking employment, compared with the capital or fund which is to pay their wages, and is alike independent of the schemes and combinations of the buyers on the one hand, and of those of the sellers on the other.

It may, probably, be said, that an increase of capital is not always synonymous with an increase of the means of employing labour; and that, on the contrary, it may consist of machines, by the introduction of which labour may be superseded. But it is unnecessary again to repeat what we have previously stated, perhaps at too great length, in regard to the employment of machinery, (see *ante*, pp. 197–226.) Here it is enough to observe, that the introduction and improvement of machinery is in every case advantageous to the labouring classes; that it uniformly increases the aggregate demand of society for labour and the rate of wages; and that, while it does this, it reduces the cost and price of commodities, making in this way indefinite additions to the wealth, comforts, and enjoyments of all ranks and orders of the community.

The wages of labourers being most commonly paid and estimated in money, it may be thought that they will, in consequence, depend more on the amount of money in circulation than on the amount of capital. It is, however, nearly indifferent to the labourer whether the sum of money he receives as wages be great or small. He will always receive such a sum as will suffice to put him in possession of the portion of capital or produce falling to his share. Men cannot subsist on coin or paper. Labourers whose wages are paid in money, immediately exchange it for necessaries and conveniences; and it is by the quantity of these, and not of the money paid them, that their wages are to be measured. If the money in Great Britain were reduced a half, the rate of wages, estimated in money, would decline in the same proportion; but unless some change were, at

the same time, made in the magnitude of that portion of our capital which consists of food, clothes, and other articles consumed by the labourer, he would continue in substantially the same situation. He would carry fewer pieces of gold and silver to market; but these would exchange for the same quantity of commodities as previously.

Whatever, therefore, may be the rate of money wages—whether they fall to 1s. or rise to 5s. a-day—if capital and population continue the same, or increase or diminish in the same proportion, no real variation will take place in the amount of wages estimated in produce. These never really rise unless the proportion of capital to population be enlarged; and they never really fall unless that proportion be diminished.

The influence of the varying ratios of the increase of capital and population over the condition of the latter, may be strikingly exemplified by comparing the increase and condition of the people of Great Britain with the increase and condition of the people of Ireland. There can be no doubt that the capital of Ireland increased considerably during the century ending with 1831; though no one, in any degree acquainted with the circumstances, has ever pretended that this increase amounted to a *half*, or even to a *third* part of the proportional increase of capital in England and Scotland during the same period. But notwithstanding this difference in the increase of their means of supporting inhabitants, the population of Ireland increased, during the century in question, nearly *twice* as fast as that of Great Britain. According to the tables given in the Parliamentary Returns, the population of this part of the empire amounted, in 1731, to about 7,000,000, and in 1831 it amounted to 16,539,318, having increased $2\frac{1}{3}$ times in the course of the century; while it appears, from the same returns, that the population of Ireland, whose capital had increased so very slowly, amounted to little more than *two* millions in 1731, and to near eight millions in

1831 ; having nearly *quadrupled* in the same time that the population of Britain had little more than doubled.

Without entering upon any lengthened inquiries respecting the causes of this difference, it may be observed that, on the first introduction of the potato into Ireland, in 1610, the peasantry, then very much degraded, and without any elevated notions of what was necessary for comfort or subsistence, eagerly resorted to so cheap a species of food ; and, owing to their habitual improvidence, and to the unfortunate circumstances under which they have since been placed, they have never endeavoured to attain to any thing higher. Provided they have sufficient supplies of potatoes, they are content to vegetate, for they can hardly be said to live, in rags and wretchedness. But whatever may have been the causes which occasioned the disparity in the increase of population in Great Britain and Ireland, as compared with the increase of their capitals, there cannot be so much as the shadow of a doubt that its excessive augmentation in Ireland is the immediate cause of the limited demand for labour in that country, and of the misery and extreme poverty of the people. The number of persons soliciting employment, compared with the means of employing them, is so very great, that wages are reduced to the lowest pittance that can afford a scanty supply of the coarsest and cheapest variety of food capable of supporting human life. The evidence collected by the Commission for inquiring into the condition of the Irish poor, and also by the more recent Commission regarding the occupation of the land, proves that the condition of the peasantry is in the last degree wretched. Their cabins, which are of the most miserable description, are mostly unprovided with any thing that can be called furniture ; many families have no such things as bed-clothes ; in some instances, the children have not a single rag to cover their nakedness ; the corn which they may have grown, and their pigs, have always gone to the owners of the soil, as rent : so that whenever

the potato crop has been even in a slight degree deficient, the scourge of famine and disease has been felt in every corner of the island. In such cases the cottiers quit their habitations in search of employment, offering to work for the merest subsistence that can be obtained—for twopence a-day; in short, for any thing that will purchase food enough to keep them alive for the ensuing twenty-four hours. And it is not to be supposed that this state of things is only or principally a consequence of the late failures of the potato. On the contrary, it may be said to have been the customary state, for a century or more, of the peasantry in Kerry, Clare, Galway, and other western counties, in the period between the planting of the potatoe and its maturity. And when the seasons have been adverse and the crops deficient, as in 1741, 1817, and 1821, famine and disease have extended their ravages over the entire country. The distress in 1846-7 was better known, and greater efforts were made for its mitigation, than on any former occasion; but, as compared with the population, it may be doubted whether it was more extensive or severe than sundry previous visitations.

The passing of the act against subletting, in 1825, gave a check to the baneful and previously universal practice of splitting farms; and the landlords having latterly become more alive to the many pernicious consequences resulting from the too rapid increase of population, have pretty generally exerted themselves to oppose its progress. In consequence of these and other countervailing influences, the increase of population in Ireland was slower, during the 10 years ending with 1841, than it had been during any equal period of the previous century. But the division of the land is still carried on, and the excess of population is so very great, that the check given to its increase has had little or no influence over the condition of the bulk of the people. The statements in the Second Report of the Railway Commissioners for Ireland, compiled in 1838, in the Reports of the Commissioners on the Occupation of Land in Ireland, in 1845, and in those

of the officers employed in the relief of the late scarcity, show conclusively that, notwithstanding the improvements introduced into agriculture, the condition of the peasantry is still, in most districts, as wretched as ever ; and that, by displacing numerous small occupants and cottiers, these improvements have really made it, in many parts, worse even than formerly ! But, should the check given to population be maintained, the farther splitting of the land be by any means prevented, and the dealers in agitation and sedition be effectually put down, the presumption is, that the condition of the peasantry will be gradually though slowly meliorated ; and that they will ultimately participate in the advantages of improvements which have hitherto, if any thing, been injurious to them.

But, whatever may be its future state, the statements now laid before the reader, and which, were it necessary and did our space permit, might be multiplied a thousand-fold, show that there has been a vast increase of population in Ireland, and that it is both superabundant and miserable in the extreme. And hence the obvious inference, that, in the event of the population having increased less rapidly, there would have been fewer individuals soliciting employment, and that, consequently, the rate of wages would have been higher, and the condition of the poor so far improved. No proposition, then, can be more undeniable, than that the unexampled misery of the Irish people is directly owing to the excessive augmentation of their numbers ; and nothing can be more futile, than to expect any real or lasting amendment in their situation, otherwise than through the influence of an increase of capital as compared with population. It is obvious, too, that the degraded condition of the people of Ireland, is that to which every people may expect to be reduced whose numbers continue, for a lengthened period, to increase faster than the means of providing for their comfortable and decent subsistence ; and such will, most probably, be the case in all old settled countries in which the principle of increase is stimulated,

as it has been in Ireland, by the facility of obtaining small patches of land, or in which there is an extremely low standard of comfort, and little or no prudence or forethought manifested in the formation of matrimonial connexions.

SECT. II.—CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE THE NATURAL OR NECESSARY RATE OF WAGES.

There are certain limits, however difficult it may be to specify them, to the extent to which wages may be reduced. The cost of producing labour, like that of every thing else, must be paid by the purchasers. The race of labourers would become extinct were they not supplied with the food and other articles sufficient, at least, for their support and that of their families. This is the lowest limit to which the rate of wages can be permanently reduced ; and for this reason it has been called the *natural or necessary rate of wages*. The market, or actual rate of wages, may sink to the level of this rate ; but it is impossible it should continue below it. It is not, as has been already shown, on the quantity of money received by the labourer, but on the quantity of food and other articles which that money will buy, that his ability to maintain himself, and rear children, must depend. Hence the natural or necessary rate of wages is determined by the cost of the food, clothes, fuel, &c., required for the use and accommodation of labourers.¹ And though a rise in the market or current rate of wages be seldom exactly coincident with a rise in the price of necessaries, they can never, except when the market rate

¹ “L’ouvrier mineur en Saxe reçoit 10 sols par jour de salaire, tandis que l’ouvrier employé au même genre de travail dans la province de Chocho au Perou reçoit en argent six à sept fois plus. Mais ce dernier paie aussi six à sept fois plus cher le pain dont il se nourrit, parceque le farine des Etats-Unis y est transportée à dos de mulet à une longue distance des côtes, par des routes monteuses et difficiles. Ce que le maître doit fournir à l’ouvrier c’est la subsistance, et l’argent donné ne peut jamais être que la représentation de cette subsistance.”—GARNIER, *Richesse des Nations*, tom. v. p. 351.

of wages greatly exceeds the natural or necessary rate, be far separated. However high its price, the labourers must always receive a supply of produce adequate for their support; if they did not obtain this much, they would be destitute; and disease and death would continue to thin the population, until the reduced numbers bore such a proportion to the national capital as enabled them to obtain the means of subsistence.

The opinion of those who contend that the rate of wages is in no degree influenced by the cost of the articles consumed by the labourers, has obviously originated in their confounding the principles which determine the market rate of wages at any given period, with those which determine their natural or necessary rate. No proposition can be better established than that the market rate of wages, at any given moment, is exclusively determined by the proportion between capital and population. But in every inquiry of this nature, we should not only refer to particular points of time, but also to periods of some considerable duration; and if we do this, it will be immediately seen that the average rate of wages does not depend wholly on this proportion. The price of shoes, hats, &c., in this or that market, is plainly dependent on the extent of their supply compared with the demand of those who have the means of purchasing; but it is quite obvious, that if this price sink below the sum required to pay the cost of producing shoes, &c., and bringing them to market, they will no longer be supplied—and such is the case with labourers. They neither will, nor in fact can, be furnished, unless their wages be such as will, at an average, suffice to bring them up and maintain them. From whatever point of the economical compass we may set out, the cost of production is the principle to which we must always come at last. This cost determines the natural or necessary rate of wages, just as it determines the natural or necessary price of commodities. However low the demand for labour, still if the price of the articles necessary for the maintenance of

the labourer be increased, the natural or necessary rate of wages must, in the end, be increased also. Let it be supposed that, owing to a scarcity, the price of the quartern loaf rises to 4s. or 5s. In this case it is plain, inasmuch as the same number of people would be seeking for employment after the rise as before—and as a rise in the price of bread, occasioned by a scarcity, could not increase the demand for labour—that wages would not be increased. The poor would, in consequence, be forced to economise; and the rise of price, how injurious soever in several respects, would be in so far advantageous, that it would immediately lessen consumption, and distribute the pressure equally over the year. But suppose that the rise, instead of being occasioned by the accidental occurrence of a scarcity, has been occasioned by an increased difficulty of production, and that it will be permanent, the question is,—will money wages continue at their former elevation, or will they rise? Now, in this case, it may be easily shown that they will rise; for it is abundantly obvious that the comforts of all classes of labourers would be greatly impaired by the rise in the price of bread; and those who, previously to its taking place, had only enough to subsist upon, would now be reduced to a state of destitution. Under such circumstances, an increase of mortality could not fail of taking place, while the greater difficulty of providing subsistence would interpose a powerful check to the formation of matrimonial connexions and the increase of population. By these means, therefore, the amount of the population, or the ratio of its increase, or both, would be diminished; and this diminution, by lessening the number of labourers, would, in the end, increase the proportion of capital to population, and enable them to obtain higher wages.

The statements now made are not advanced on any arbitrary or supposed grounds, but have been deduced from, and are consistent with, the widest experience. Those who examine the registers of births, marriages, and deaths, in

large and populous cities, will find that there is invariably a diminution of the former, and an increase of the latter, whenever the price of corn, or of the principal necessities, sustains any very material advance. "It will be observed," says Mr Milne, in his "Treatise on Annuities," in reference to the prices of wheat in England, "that any material reduction in the price of wheat is almost always accompanied by an increase both of the marriages and births, and by a decrease in the number of burials; consequently, by an increase in the excess of the births above the deaths. Also, that any material rise in the price is generally attended by a corresponding decrease in the marriages and births, and by an increase in the burials; therefore by a decrease in the excess of the births above the deaths. Thus it appears, that an increase in the quantity of food, or in the facility with which the labouring classes can obtain it, accelerates the progress of the population, both by augmenting the number of births and diminishing the rate of mortality; and that a scarcity of food retards the increase of the people, by producing in both ways opposite effects." And in proof of the correctness of this statement, Mr Milne gives, among others to the same effect, the following account of the number of births and deaths within the London bills of mortality, in 1798, 1800, and 1802:—

	Births.	Deaths.	Price of wheat.
1798	19,581	20,755	£2 10 3 per qr.
1802	21,308	20,260	3 7 5
Medium of these two years, .	20,445	20,508	2 18 10
1800	18,275	25,670	5 13 7
Differences, . .	2,170	5,162	2 14 9
	Decrease.	Increase.	Increase. ¹

M. Messance, the author of a valuable work on the population of France,² collected some important information on the same subject. "It has been established," says he, "by the various investigations that have been made, that

¹ Milne on Annuities, vol. ii. p. 402.

² "Recherches sur la Population," p. 291.

those years in which corn has sold at the highest price, have also been those in which mortality was greatest and disease most prevalent; and that those, on the contrary, in which corn has been cheapest, have been the healthiest and least mortal." The tables M. Messance has published of the number of deaths and the prices of wheat, for a considerable number of years, in Paris, Lyons, Rouen, and other cities, bear unequivocal testimony to the truth of this doctrine. In 1744, for example, when the price of wheat in Paris was 11 livres 15 sols the septier, the number of deaths amounted to 16,205; and in 1753, when the price of wheat was 20 livres 3 sols, the deaths amounted to 21,716. In the *four* years of the *greatest* mortality in Paris, in the interval between 1743 and 1763, the average price of the septier of wheat was 19 livres 1 sol, and the average annual number of deaths 20,895; and in the *four* years of the *least* mortality during the same interval, the average price of the septier was 14 livres 18 sols, and the average annual number of deaths 16,859.¹

It may here, perhaps, be proper to mention, that it has been long observed that, in unusually dear years, the tendency of wages is not to rise, but rather to fall; and several of the witnesses examined before the committees of the Lords and Commons, on the state of agriculture, in 1814, endeavoured to prove, by comparing wages with the prices of corn and other necessities, that there was no such connexion between the two as had been supposed; and that, so far from their varying in the same way, wages were generally lowest in years when the price of corn was highest. But it is not difficult to explain the causes of this apparent anomaly. The truth is, that the number of labourers, which is in no case immediately reduced, is, in most cases, immediately increased by a rise of prices. In dear years, an increased number of females, and of such poor children of both sexes as are fit to work, are obliged to quit their

¹ "Recherches sur la Population," p. 311.

homes to engage in some species of employment ; while the labourers who work by the piece, endeavour, by increasing the quantity of their work, to obtain the means of purchasing a greater quantity of food. Inasmuch, therefore, as the *immediate* effect of a rise of prices is to increase the supply of labour, it is natural that it should lower wages. But it is the greatest imaginable error, to suppose that, because this is the immediate, it is also the lasting effect of such rise ! It is obvious, indeed, that the fall of wages, and the greater exertions which the rise of prices forces the labourers to make, must tend, as well by lessening their supplies of food as by adding to the severity of their labour, to increase the rate of mortality ; and consequently, by diminishing their number, to hasten that rise of wages that will certainly take place in the end, if prices continue high.

But, in endeavouring to show that the market rate cannot be permanently reduced below the natural or necessary rate of wages, it is not meant to represent the latter as fixed and unvarying. If a specified quantity of certain articles were absolutely necessary to enable labourers to subsist and continue their race, such quantity could not be diminished. But such is not the case. By the natural or necessary rate of wages, is meant only, in the words of Adam Smith, such a rate as will enable the labourer to obtain, "not only the commodities that are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without." Now it is plain, from this definition, that there can be no absolute standard of natural or necessary wages. It is impossible to say what commodities are indispensable for the support of life ; for these, as well as the other articles required for the use of the lower orders, depend essentially on the physical circumstances under which every people is placed, and on custom and habit. The differences of climate, for example, by giving rise to different physical wants in the inhabitants of

different countries, necessarily occasion corresponding variations in the necessary rate of wages. Work-people in cold climates, who must be warmly clad, and whose cottages must be built of solid materials and heated with fires, could not subsist on the same wages that would suffice to supply all the wants of those who inhabit more genial climates, where clothing, lodging, and fire are of inferior importance. Humboldt mentions, that there is a difference of nearly a *third* part in the cost of maintaining individuals and consequently in necessary wages, between the hot and temperate districts of Mexico; and there is a still greater discrepancy in the rates of necessary wages in distant quarters. The food, too, of the labourers in different countries varies extremely. In some it is both expensive and abundant, compared to what it is in others. In England, for example, they principally subsist on bread and beef, in Ireland on potatoes, and in China and Hindostan on rice. In many parts of France and Spain, an allowance of wine is considered indispensable to existence; and in England, the labouring class entertain nearly the same opinion with respect to beer; whereas the Chinese and Hindoos drink nothing but water. In Ireland the peasantry live, for the most part, in mud cabins, no better than the wigwams of the American Indians, without, in many instances, either a window or a chimney; while in England the cottages of the peasantry have all glass windows and chimneys, are well furnished, and are as much distinguished for their neatness, cleanliness, and comfort, as those of the Irish for their filth and misery. In consequence of these different habits, there is in these countries, an extreme difference, not in the rate of necessary wages merely, but in their actual or market rate—so much so, that while the average market price of a day's labour in England may be taken at from 20d. to 2s., it cannot be taken at more than 6d. or 7d. in Ireland, and 3d. in Hindostan! The customs of the people of the same countries, and the standard by which the natural rate of wages is determined at different periods,

have been equally fluctuating and various. The habits of the English and Scotch labourers of the present day differ as widely from those of their ancestors in the reigns of Elizabeth, James I., and Charles I., as from those of the labourers of France and Spain. The standard of necessary wages has been raised ; there has been a greater prevalence of moral restraint ; the proportion of capital to population has been increased ; and the poor have happily learned to form more elevated opinions respecting the amount and species of the necessaries and conveniences required for their subsistence.

The natural or necessary rate of wages is not, therefore, fixed and unvarying ; and though it be true that the market rate of wages can never sink permanently below its contemporary necessary rate, it is no less true that the latter has a tendency to rise when the market rate rises, and to fall when it falls. The reason is, that the supply of labourers is neither speedily increased when wages rise, nor speedily diminished when they fall. When wages rise, a period of eighteen or twenty years must elapse before the influence of the increased stimulus given by the rise to the principle of population can be felt in the labour market. During all this period, therefore, work-people have an increased command over necessaries and conveniences ; their habits are, in consequence, improved ; and as they learn to form higher notions of what is required for their support, the necessary rate of wages is augmented. But, on the other hand, when wages decline, either in consequence of a diminution of the capital appropriated to their payment, or of a disproportionate increase of population, no corresponding diminution takes place in the number of labourers, unless they have previously been subsisting on the smallest quantity of the cheapest species of food required to support mere animal existence. If the labourers have not been placed so very near the extreme limit of subsistence, their numbers will not be immediately reduced when wages fall, by an increase of mortality ; but they will be gradually reduced, partly, as has been already shown, in that way, and partly

by a diminished number of marriages and births : and in most countries, unless the fall were both sudden and extensive, it would require some years to make the effects of increased mortality, in diminishing the supply of labour in the market, sensibly felt ; while the force of habit, and the ignorance of the people with respect to the circumstances which determine wages, would prevent any effectual check being given to the formation of matrimonial connexions, and consequently to the rate at which fresh labourers had previously been coming into market, until the misery occasioned by the restricted demand on the one hand, and the undiminished supply on the other, had been generally and widely felt.

It is this circumstance—the impossibility which usually obtains of speedily adjusting the supply of labour proportionally to variations in the rate of wages—that gives to these variations their peculiar and extraordinary influence over the wellbeing of the labouring classes. Were the supply of labour suddenly increased when wages rise, the rise would be of little or no advantage to the existing labourers. It would increase their number, but it would not enable them to mount in the scale of society, or to acquire a greater command over necessities and conveniences : and, on the other hand, were the supply of labourers suddenly diminished when wages fall, the fall would merely lessen their number, without having any tendency to degrade the habits or to lower the condition of those that survived. But, in the vast majority of instances, before a rise of wages can be in any degree countervailed by the increased number of labourers it may be supposed to bring into the market, time is afforded for the formation of new and improved tastes and habits. After the labourers have once acquired these tastes, population advances in a slower ratio, as compared with capital, than formerly ; and the labourers will be disposed rather to defer the period of marriage, than, by entering on it prematurely, to depress their own condition and that of their children. But if the number of labourers cannot be suddenly increased when

wages rise, neither can it be suddenly diminished when they fall ; a fall of wages has, therefore, a precisely opposite effect, and is, in most cases, as injurious to the labourer as their rise is beneficial. In whatever way wages may be restored to their former level after they have fallen, whether it be by a decrease in the number of marriages, or by an increase in the number of deaths, or both, it is never, except in the exceedingly rare case already mentioned, suddenly effected. It must, generally speaking, require a considerable time before it can be brought about ; and, in consequence, an extreme risk arises, lest the tastes and habits of the labourers, and their opinions respecting what is necessary for their comfortable subsistence, should be lowered in the interim. When wages are considerably reduced, the poor are obliged to economise, or to submit to live on a smaller quantity of necessaries and conveniences, and those, too, of an inferior species ; and the danger is, that the coarse and scanty fare which has thus been, in the first instance, forced on them by necessity, should in time become congenial from habit. Should this, unfortunately, be the case, the condition of the poor would be permanently depressed, and there would be nothing left that could raise wages to their former level—for the labourers would no longer have a motive to exercise an increased degree of moral restraint ; and unless they did this, they would have but little chance of again emerging from their depressed condition. Under the circumstances supposed, the cost of raising and supporting labourers would be reduced ; and it is by this cost that the natural or necessary rate of wages, to which the market rate is generally proportioned, is always regulated. This lowering of the opinions of the labouring class with respect to the mode in which they should live, is perhaps the most serious of all the evils that can befall them. Let them once become contented with a lower species of food, and an inferior standard of comfort, and they may bid a long adieu to any thing better. And every reduction in the rate of wages, which is not of a very transient description, will most likely

have this effect, if its debasing influence be not countervailed by an increased prevalence of moral restraint, and a diminished increase of population, or by the opening of new markets, or the discovery of new and improved processes by which the cost of necessities and conveniences may be reduced. Should any such reduction take place, the condition of the labourers may not be injuriously affected by the fall of wages; but if nothing of this kind occur, the labourers can only regain their former command over necessities and conveniences by the exercise of additional economy and forethought.

The example of such individuals, or bodies of individuals, as submit quietly to have their wages reduced, and who are content if they get only mere necessities, should never be held up for public imitation. On the contrary, every thing should be done to make such apathy be esteemed discreditable. The best interests of society require that the rate of wages should be elevated as high as possible—that a taste for comforts and enjoyments should be widely diffused, and, if possible, interwoven with national habits and prejudices. Very low wages, by rendering it impossible for increased exertions to obtain any considerable increase of advantages, effectually hinder them from being made, and are of all others the most powerful cause of that idleness and apathy that contents itself with what can barely continue animal existence.

The state of the peasantry of Ireland strikingly exemplifies the disastrous consequences resulting from the necessary rate of wages being determined by a very low standard. Having no taste for conveniences or luxuries, they are satisfied if they obtain sufficient supplies of potatoes. But as the potato is raised at less expense than any other variety of food cultivated in Europe, and as wages, where it forms the main article of subsistence, are, of course, chiefly determined by its cost, it is easy to see that those, who depend entirely on the potato, must be reduced to a state of extreme and indeed almost irremediable distress, whenever it happens to be deficient. When the standard

of natural or necessary wages is high—when wheat and beef, for example, form the principal part of the food of the labourers, and porter and beer the principal part of their drink, they can bear to retrench in periods of scarcity. Such men have room to fall; they may give up their beer and resort to cheaper sorts of food—such as barley, oats, rice, and potatoes. But those who are habitually fed on the cheapest food have nothing to fall back upon when deprived of it, and are cut off from every resource. You may take from an Englishman, but you cannot take from an Irishman. The latter is at all times placed on the very verge of existence. His wages, being determined by the price of potatoes, will not buy wheat, or barley, or oats; and whenever, therefore, the supply of potatoes fails, it is next to impossible he should escape, by any efforts of his own, from starving.

The history of the scarcities that so frequently occur in Ireland affords many illustrations of the accuracy of the statements now made. Owing, for example, to the failure of the potato crop of 1821, the bulk of the peasantry of Clare, Limerick, and other counties bordering on the Shannon, were reduced to a state of almost absolute destitution, and had nothing but a miserable mixture, consisting of a little oatmeal, nettles, and water-cresses, to subsist upon. In some instances, the potatoes, after being planted, were dug up, and eaten; and in consequence of the insufficiency and bad quality of food, disease became exceedingly prevalent; and *typhus* fever, in its most malignant form, carried its destructive ravages into every corner of the country. The price of potatoes rose in Limerick, in the course of a few weeks, from about 2d. to 5d. and 7d. a-stone, while the price of corn sustained no material elevation,—none at least to prevent its being sent to the then overloaded markets of England!

But it is unnecessary to go back to 1821 for an example of this sort. We have, unhappily, had one very recently before us. Notwithstanding the all but total failure of the potato crop of 1846 in all parts of Ireland, and the con-

sequent destitution of the peasantry, there was no very considerable falling off in the exports of corn and other articles of provision to England, till the contributions of government and of the public were applied to purchase supplies for the people. And it is indeed obvious that, to whatever extremity the Irish peasantry may be reduced, they cannot relieve themselves by purchasing corn. If wheat, barley, or oats, formed the principal part of their food, corn would be poured into Ireland in the same way that it is poured into England, whenever the crop is known or supposed to be materially deficient. But a people habitually dependent on the potato cannot become purchasers of corn; nor can they even become purchasers of foreign potatoes, inasmuch as the freight of so bulky a commodity would raise its price far above their limited means. In a period of scarcity men cannot go from a low to a high level; they must always go from a higher to a lower. But to the Irish this is impossible: they have already reached the lowest point in the descending scale; and a scarcity of potatoes is in their case synonymous with famine.

It is, therefore, essential to the protection of the people from famine, in seasons when the crops happen to be deficient, that they should not subsist principally on so cheap a species of food as the potato. They may advantageously use it in limited quantities, as a subsidiary and subordinate article; but if they once adopt it for the principal part of their diet, their wages will be regulated accordingly; and whenever a deficient supply occurs, they will be absolutely without resource.

The previous statements are sufficient to show the paramount importance, with a view to the wellbeing of the community, of the increase of population being subordinate to that of capital. But, how desirable soever, legislation can do but little to bring about this result. When government has secured the property and the rights of individuals, and has given that freedom to industry which is so essential,

it has done nearly all it can to promote the increase of capital. If it interfere in industrious undertakings, its proceedings will be productive only of injury. The reliance of individuals on their own efforts, and their desire to advance themselves, are the only principles on which any dependence can be safely placed: and it has been fully shown, in the previous parts of this work, that, except in a few peculiar cases, all interference with these fundamental principles, either by government undertaking to carry on certain branches of industry, or to assist those engaged in them, must necessarily, in so far as the influence of its measures extends, weaken the industry, enterprise, and forethought of its subjects; occasioning, at one and the same time, a waste of capital and a diminution of its produce.

It is needless, therefore, to expect any advantageous results from the efforts of government directly to increase capital. It may, however, exercise a considerable indirect influence. Notwithstanding what has been done of late years to give greater scope to enterprise, by opening new channels of trade, and by relieving industry from oppressive burdens, there is still room for additional efforts of the same kind; and it may be hoped that they will be made. But supposing them to be made, and that they are completely successful, it is problematical whether the results will be of a very decided character, and whether they will have any very material influence over wages, by increasing the proportion of the national capital to the labouring classes.

But if there be but slender grounds for anticipating an improvement in the condition of the labourers, from measures having an increase of capital for their object, it may be inquired whether their improvement may not be expected from a change in their habits, and, consequently, in the progress of population? While, however, we do not renounce all expectations from this source, they are not, we confess, of a very sanguine description. It is no doubt true, as has been stated over and over again by Malthus and others, that what government and the employers of labour

can do for the labourers is but as the dust of the balance, compared with what the latter can do for themselves ; that, however reduced, they have the means of raising wages to any higher level ; that if, on the one hand, they understock the market with labour, wages will be high, notwithstanding the means of employment should be diminished ; while, on the other hand, if they overstock the market with labour, wages will be low, however much these means may be increased. But though a statement of this sort be perfectly well-founded and easily made, it is very difficult to turn the principle it involves to any practical account. The conduct of individuals is influenced by circumstances peculiar to the narrow sphere in which they move, and which directly affect themselves, and not by considerations having reference to society. Though a considerable proportion of the population were to acquiesce in the abstract truth of the doctrine now stated, their acquiescence would, most likely, have little or no practical influence. An individual may see what would be of advantage to society, but, to secure that advantage, the co-operation of vast numbers is required ; and as he is *one* only among several millions, he justly concludes that all that he could do would avail nothing in bringing about a general result, and that, consequently, he should act as he thinks best for himself, without regard to others. Ninety-nine out of every hundred persons act on this principle. Combination to bring about a remote or general result is in such cases impossible. But if you satisfy any one that his peculiar interests, or those of his immediate connexions and dependants, will be advanced by his following a certain line of conduct, in preference to another, there is some probability of his profiting by your reasonings. On this principle it may be fairly presumed, that a well-contrived and judicious system of public instruction would have a considerable influence. Were it brought universally, as it should be, within reach of the poor, and made a means of explaining those principles on which their wellbeing really depends, a good deal, though

less, we fear, than is commonly supposed, would most probably be done to check improvidence, and, by improving their conduct, gradually to amend their condition. If you point out the quicksands and pitfalls that encumber a path, a greater or less number of those who pass along it will try to avoid them. The duty of postponing marriage till the parties be in such a position that they may reasonably expect to be able to discharge the duties which they owe to their children should be clearly set forth ; and it should be shown that a man's situation is in all cases mainly dependent on his own conduct ; that industry and economy may always be practised, and can never be without their reward ; that the most prosperous state of things is of little service to the lazy or dissolute ; whereas the laborious, provident, and frugal workman is able to avail himself of every advantageous circumstance, and to maintain a successful struggle with difficulties that would overwhelm every one else. The establishment of a system of education that should impress these doctrines on the minds of the young would, at all events, seem to be the duty of government, and is perhaps as necessary, with a view to its security, as to the welfare of the majority of its subjects.¹

But in this, as in most other questions in regard to our domestic policy, Ireland is the grand difficulty. Had we only to deal with the poor of Great Britain, means for their improvement might be devised with comparative facility ; but, unluckily, we have also to deal with the poor of Ireland ; and the degraded state of the latter, their improvidence and recklessness, make the expectation of their improvement alike feeble and remote. In the mean time, however, they are impelled, partly by the impossibility of providing for themselves at home, and partly by the temptation of comparatively high wages, to emigrate in vast numbers to this country ; and at this moment, from a fourth to a third part of the population of Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow,

¹ For some further remarks on National Education see *post*.

Paisley, and other great towns on the west side of Great Britain, consists of native Irish and their descendants. Recently this immigration has been greater than at any former period; and at present there is but little prospect of its being materially reduced for years to come. Certainly, however, few things could exercise so destructive an influence over the condition and prospects of the English and Scottish labourers. Their forethought and industry have, in fact, tended rather to facilitate the invasion of this pauper horde, than to improve their own condition. Their wages have been reduced by the competition of the famished serfs cast upon our shores; and, which is still worse, their tastes and opinions in regard to what is necessary for their subsistence have been lowered by the contaminating influence of example, and by familiar intercourse with those who are content to live in destitution and misery. It is difficult to see how, with the existing facilities of communication between the two countries, the condition of the working classes in them should not be pretty much approximated; and there is too much reason to fear that, if left to itself, the equalisation will be brought about by the degradation of the English and Scotch rather than by the elevation of the Irish. Hitherto the latter have been very little, if at all, improved by their residence in Britain; but the native population with whom they associate have been not a little deteriorated. Though painful and difficult, the subject is one that must be grappled with. It were better that measures should be adopted for the improvement, if that be possible, of the Irish people in Ireland; and we would fain hope that such may be devised. But if their improvement at home be either impracticable, or can only be effected by slow degrees at some distant period, justice to our own people requires that measures should be adopted to hinder Great Britain from being overrun with the outpourings of this *officina pauperum*, to hinder Ireland from dragging us down to the same hopeless abyss of pauperism and wretchedness in which she is sunk.

In this view it would appear to be expedient to interfere to direct some portion of the tide of pauper emigration which sets against our shores to our colonial possessions. Those who voluntarily emigrate from Ireland, as from most other parts of Europe, to America and Australia, seldom consist of the individuals that might be most advantageously spared. And though the emigration of paupers, and their settlement in distant colonies, on any thing like a large scale, would be a work of great difficulty and expense, still we are disposed to think that, under the peculiar circumstances of the United Kingdom, it should be attempted. There is now, thanks to the introduction of something like an efficient poor-law into Ireland, but little chance that the blank made by the removal of any considerable number of cottiers would be again filled up; so that their emigration, while it would most likely be of service to themselves, would be a permanent gain to the country.

Wages are sometimes paid by the day or other term, and sometimes by the piece or job—that is, by the quantity of work done. Where the latter mode can be introduced, it exactly proportions the reward to the amount of labour, and not only takes away all temptation to idleness, but prompts workmen to put forth all their energies. In some cases, indeed, it has been thought necessary, in the view of preventing labourers by the piece from over-working themselves, to limit the sums which they shall be permitted to earn in a given time. But, except in this respect, piece-work seems to be in all others the preferable mode of hiring labour. Knowing that his wages will entirely depend upon his diligence and perseverance, the undertaker of any piece of job-work is naturally most anxious for the speedy termination of his task; whereas the labourer who is hired by time has no such anxiety, but, on the contrary, tries to save himself as much as he can. Labourers engaged at piece-work are also more their own masters than those engaged for certain terms. They are, in truth, contractors as well as labourers;

and provided they execute their work within the term stipulated, (if such stipulation be made,) they may choose their own time for working, and may begin and leave off when they please.¹

It has sometimes been said, that it would be good policy to endeavour to interest labourers in the zealous prosecution of the tasks in which they may be engaged, by making their wages depend, in part at least, on the result of their exertions. But, except in a few limited cases, this could not be done. The wages of sailors may be, and indeed usually are, made to depend on the successful termination of the voyage ; but how could the wages of the work-people employed on a farm, or in a cotton-mill, be made to depend on the result of their exertions ? Very frequently, however, the work-people now referred to are paid by the piece ; and when such is the case, they have a plain and tangible motive, not depending on any remote or uncertain contingency, to make every exertion.

But, supposing that the practical difficulties in the way of making the wages of the labourer dependent on the result of the employment in which he is engaged, were less formidable than they appear to be, we should not, in the great majority of cases, anticipate any advantages from the scheme being adopted. On the contrary the presumption is, that it would be most injurious. If labourers are to participate in the advantages of successful enterprises, they must also participate in the losses resulting from those of a contrary description ; and must, consequently, be every now and then deprived of their accustomed and necessary means of subsistence. The hazard to which they would thus be exposed might, it is true, be lessened by making a part only of their remuneration depend on the issue of the enterprise. But if it were really an advantage to be allowed to participate in a chance of this sort, the fixed portion of their wages would be proportionally diminished. And at every failure of an

¹ We state the principle generally : but it is affected in this country by the late Act for regulating the hours of labour.

enterprise, the labourers engaged in it would be thrown upon the workhouse, or on the contributions of the benevolent.

It is further obvious, that if work-people are to be interested in the result of an undertaking, they must also have some control over its conduct, and be authorised to inquire into the accounts and proceedings of those by whom the undertaking is managed. All the advantages of individual enterprise and responsibility would, in consequence, be lost, and the most necessary and judicious steps, in the conduct of a business, might be objected to or censured by those most incompetent to form a judgment upon such matters. At present, when a capitalist engages in any undertaking, he knows beforehand that he will reap all the advantage if it be successful, and that, if otherwise, he will have to bear all the loss. He is consequently determined, by the most powerful motives, to act discreetly, to proscribe all useless expense, and to avail himself of every means or incident that may present itself, to facilitate his projects. Except in a very few cases, which have been noticed in a previous part of this work, (*ante*, p. 296,) all industrious undertakings are sure to be carried on most efficiently and economically by individuals. But of all sorts of interference, that of the workmen would be the most objectionable. It would hardly, indeed, be more absurd for a general to take the opinion of the privates of his army on questions of strategy, than it would be for a capitalist to call his labourers to his councils, and mould them according to their opinions, “*Le surcroît d'intérêt qu'auraient les ouvriers à la réussite des opérations, ne saurait compenser ce qui manquerait à l'action du gérant; car ils ne pourraient participer en rien à la direction de l'entreprise, à moins que l'on ne voulût entraver sa marche, la rendre plus versatile et plus incertaine, et renoncer aux avantages de l'unité de gestion, si essentielle au succès. L'application des moyens semblables, loin d'améliorer le sort des ouvriers, n'aboutirait donc qu'à le rendre plus misérable; l'excédant de rémunération qu'ils pourraient obtenir en cas de réussite des opérations serait peu important pour chacun*

d'eux, et il serait loin d'établir une compensation suffisante pour leur participation aux chances des pertes accrues, dans ce système par l'affaiblissement de l'intérêt des gérants.¹

The number of hours during which labourers are employed in the day is usually fixed by custom ; and in industrious countries, where the term is left to be agreed upon by the parties concerned, the hours of labour may be taken, *ceteris paribus*, as a pretty fair test of the condition of the lower classes—short hours being indicative of high, and long hours of low wages. Whenever the demand for labour is brisk and increasing, the hours of work are gradually lessened ; and whenever, on the contrary, the demand for labour is slack and diminishing, they are gradually lengthened ; work-people endeavouring, under these circumstances, to avert the fall of wages that would otherwise take place, by undertaking to extend the term of their employment, or, which is the same thing, to give a greater quantity of work for the same amount of wages. Occasionally, however, governments have not left the hours of work to be settled by the free competition of the parties interested, but have interfered to fix a maximum limit, beyond which it should not be lawful for the individuals engaged in certain branches of industry to be employed in them. And in so far as this rule applies to children and women, the former of whom are naturally, and the latter have been rendered, through custom and the institutions of society, unable to protect themselves, it appears, when not carried to an extreme, to be alike expedient and proper. (See *ante*, p. 184.) But it is otherwise when government interferes in behalf of the labourer who is *sui juris*. And where women and young persons are extensively employed, as in the cotton and other factories, a restriction on their labour may be, and in practice occasionally is, equivalent to a restriction on the entire body of labourers. Under these circumstances, a compromise of

¹ See the excellent essay of M. Clement, "Recherches sur les Causes de l'Indigence," p. 252.

some sort or other had better be effected ; such, for example, as that carried out by the Acts 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 103, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 15, which, amongst other things, limited the labour of young persons under eighteen years of age, and of women, to twelve hours a-day. This arrangement seems, on the whole, to have satisfied the claims of humanity on the one hand, and to have been consistent, on the other, with the interests of the manufacturers, and the circumstances under which the labourers are placed. But we doubt whether so much can be truly said in favour of the provision of the Act 10 and 11 Vict. c. 29, limiting the working hours of women and of young persons under eighteen years of age, to ten hours a-day. Had it been practicable to confine the operation of the Act to the parties now specified, we should have hesitated before we questioned its policy. But such is not, and could not be the case ; and in truth it has limited the labour of all, or of almost all, the work-people engaged in a great variety of factories, about as effectually as if a restriction had been laid on the power by which their machinery is set in motion. And we must, therefore, regard the measure not as applying to a class, but as really reducing most sorts of factory labour to ten hours a-day.

In remarking upon this important subject, it is needless to inquire whether eight, ten, or twelve hours be the more proper period during which labourers should be employed. If, however, the longer be introduced by the custom of the country, in preference to the shorter period, it is a proof that there is, if not an excess, at all events an extremely copious supply of labour ; and that the labourers are, in consequence, obliged to submit to the drudgery of lengthened service.

Now, such being the case, the question is, will their condition be really improved by the legislature interfering to reduce the hours of labour ? To this question an answer must, we apprehend, be given in the negative. A deduction of a fourth, a fifth, or a sixth part from the hours of labour would no doubt be a signal boon to the labouring

classes, provided no corresponding deduction were made from their wages ; but, if the latter should be the case, the shortening of the hours may be not a little injurious to them. It is difficult, however, to perceive how the hours of work—of those, at least, who are engaged by time and not by the piece—should be lessened by a legislative enactment without, at the same time, and by the same act, reducing wages. It is true that, in the event of the trade and capital of the country rapidly increasing, wages may not be perceptibly affected by reducing the period of employment from 12 to 10 hours. But if such should be the case, the increased demand for labour would, without the interference of government, have enabled the working-classes, had they thought fit, to shorten the hours of labour. But in the event of the law having this object in view, not being accompanied or followed by any decided increase of trade or capital, the results will be very different. In such case, capitalists will, most probably, endeavour to carry on their employments by relays of work people, that is, by getting one set to succeed another ; and if that be impracticable, and they are obliged by the influence of the law to pay the wages of 12 hours' work for only 10 hours, they will, it is plain, be placed in a most unfavourable position compared with their foreign rivals engaged in the same businesses, and compared, also, with their fellow-subjects at home, whose businesses are not subject to the limitation. These, however, it is needless to say, are circumstances of grave import, and such as may endanger the total loss of the branch of industry in which the limitation is enforced ; and, though it should continue to be carried on, there can be no manner of doubt that the capital vested in it will, in the end, be adjusted so that the work-people shall only be paid in proportion to the time during which they are engaged. It is idle, indeed, to suppose it should be otherwise. Parliament can do many things, but it cannot take a fifth or a sixth part from the time during which day-labourers are employed, and secure for them their former wages. This is as impossible as it is to make degraded

coins exchange for the same quantities of produce as those of the standard weight and purity.

With labourers employed by the piece or the job, the results of the limitation will be different. They will endeavour, by increased exertion, to accomplish in ten hours the same amount of work which had previously occupied them for twelve hours; and where this can be done, the consequence to the masters and to the public will be comparatively immaterial. And such is said to be the practical effect of the measure in weaving factories, and generally in those departments which are principally or wholly carried on by piece-work. But it may well be doubted whether, even under these circumstances, the restriction of the hours of labour be advantageous; and whether the greater exertion for ten hours be not more severe upon the labourer, than a less degree of exertion extended over twelve hours.

But, admitting the truth of these statements, still it may be contended that, on the whole, the interests of the community will be promoted by the labouring class having a little more time at their disposal, though it should be purchased by a sacrifice of wages or of labour. This, however, is a matter for the consideration of the parties. Where labourers may employ themselves for longer or shorter hours, some will prefer the one and some the other; and the fair presumption is, that they will, in so doing, form a more correct estimate of what is most conducive to their interests, than can be formed by any one else.

It is not by shortening by acts of parliament the hours of labour, nor by any measures of that description, that the condition of the lower classes can be really improved. Nothing, as already seen, can do this, unless the proportion of capital to population be increased; and this result is not very likely to be facilitated by interfering with and abridging the labour by which capital is produced! The great length of the hours of labour is, we willingly admit, an evil much to be deplored. It is a proof and a consequence of the excess of population as com-

pared with capital ; and till the former be diminished, or the latter be increased, it is not possible to shorten the hours of work, and to maintain wages at their old level. Those who really desire to bring about this desirable result should exert themselves, by giving new vigour to industry, and opening new markets, on the one hand, and by furthering emigration, and restraining the increase of population on the other, to enlarge the amount of capital and the field for employment, as compared with the number of labourers. This is the only mode in which wages can be really increased, the hours of work reduced, and the condition of the work-people permanently improved. All measures not founded on these principles, and contributing to these results, how benevolent soever the motives in which they have originated, and how much soever their real operation may be concealed, merely aggravate existing evils. They do not touch the sources of the disease, and only tend, by disguising and perverting its symptoms, to make the public believe that it is being cured, when, in fact, this very treatment is giving it new strength and virulence.

It has been contended by Dr Franklin, and by many very intelligent persons, of whose benevolence no doubt can be entertained, and to whose opinions on most subjects great deference is due, that high wages, instead of encouraging industry, and improving the habits of the labourers, usually become a fruitful source of idleness and dissipation, and are, in fact, injurious alike to themselves and their masters. Nothing, however, can be more entirely incorrect than these representations—more completely opposed both to principle and experience. It is true, indeed, that we meet, in every country and situation of life, with individuals careless of the future, and intent only on present enjoyment ; but these always form a small and mostly even an inconsiderable minority of each particular class. Whatever may be the case with a few persons, the principle of accumulation always predominates in numerous bodies over the passion for

expense. Wherever wages are so low as to render it impossible for any ordinary increase of exertion to add materially to their comforts and conveniences, the labourers either sink into idleness or become factious and discontented. As soon, however, as labour is rendered more productive, as an increase of industry brings a visible increase of comforts and enjoyments along with it, indolence uniformly gives place to exertion; a taste for improved accommodations is diffused; increased exertions are made to obtain them; and, in the end, the work-people consider it discreditable to be without them, and are less disposed to be factious.

“The liberal reward of labour,” says Dr Smith, “as it encourages the propagation, so it increases the industry of the common people. The wages of labour are the encouragement of industry, which, like every other human quality, improves in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A plentiful subsistence increases the bodily strength of the labourer; and the comfortable hope of bettering his condition, and of ending his days, perhaps, in ease and plenty, animates him to exert that strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are low—in England, for example, than in Scotland—in the neighbourhood of great towns, than in remote country places. Some workmen, indeed, when they can earn in four days what will maintain them through the week, will lie idle the other three. This, however, is by no means the case with the greater part. Workmen, on the contrary, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years. A carpenter in London, and in some other places, is not supposed to last in his utmost vigour above eight years. Something of the same kind happens in many other trades, in which the workmen are paid by the piece; as they generally are in manufactures, and even in country labour, wherever wages are higher than ordinary. Almost every class of artificers is subject to some peculiar

infirmity, occasioned by excessive application to their peculiar species of work. Ramazzini, an eminent Italian physician, has written a particular book concerning such diseases. We do not reckon our soldiers the most industrious set of people amongst us : yet when soldiers have been employed in some particular sorts of work, and liberally paid by the piece, their officers have, frequently, been obliged to stipulate with the undertaker, that they should not be allowed to earn above a certain sum every day, according to the rate at which they were paid. Till this stipulation was made, mutual emulation, and the desire of greater gain, frequently prompted them to overwork themselves, and to hurt their health by excessive labour. Excessive application during four days of the week is frequently the real cause of the idleness of the other three, so much and so loudly complained of. Great labour, either of mind or body, continued for several days together, is, in most men, naturally followed by a great desire of relaxation, which, if not restrained by force, or by some necessity, is almost irresistible. It is the call of nature, which requires to be relieved by some indulgence, sometimes of ease only, but sometimes, too, of dissipation and diversion. If it is not complied with, the consequences are often dangerous and sometimes fatal, such as almost always, sooner or later, bring on the peculiar infirmity of the trade. If masters would always listen to the dictates of reason and humanity, they have frequently occasion rather to moderate than to animate the application of many of their workmen. It will be found, I believe, in every sort of trade, that the man who works so moderately as to be able to work constantly, not only preserves his health the longest, but in the course of the year executes the greatest quantity of work.”¹

We may add, that labourers have the same common sense, and are actuated by the same passions, feelings, and principles as other men ; and such being the case, it seems

¹ “Wealth of Nations,” p. 37.

a contradiction to pretend that, if they be able to earn, by an ordinary degree of labour, more than is sufficient for their support, they only, of all the various ranks and orders of the community, will spend the surplus in riot and debauchery. There is, no doubt, in many places much intemperance; and, besides its other mischievous consequences, the poor spend a great deal of money on gin, that would be far better spent in providing improved accommodations for themselves and their families. But it is an error to suppose, that the mere desire to indulge a vitiated appetite is the only, or even the principal cause, that sends so many people to gin-shops. Ardent spirit is really, as Burke has stated, in very many cases, a medicine both for the mind and the body,¹ and is, in truth, abused only by the dregs of the populace—by those who, if they could not intoxicate themselves with gin, would most likely resort to opium, or some other stupifying drug. It would indeed be easy, were this a proper place for such investigations, to show that, notwithstanding its prevalence, gin-drinking, as compared with the population, is less diffused now than formerly, and that the bulk of the labouring poor have become more sober and temperate. A taste for reading and political discussion has begun to furnish amusement and excitement for the working-classes, to a much greater extent than in bygone times. We can, however, merely indicate the fact; it would be premature to attempt, with our limited experience, to estimate the influence of so important a change over their interests, and those of the other classes of society.

But, laying aside general reasoning, the state of industry in countries where wages are low, compared with its state in those where they are high, proves all we have said in favour of the liberal reward of labour. Have the *low* wages of the Irish, Poles, and Hindoos, made them industrious? or the *high* wages of the English, Americans, and

¹ "Thoughts and Details on Scarcity," p. 42.

Hollanders made them lazy, riotous, and profligate? Just the contrary. The former are as proverbially indolent as the latter are laborious and enterprising. This is not a point about which there can be any doubt. The experience of all ages and nations proves that high wages are at once the most powerful stimulus to exertion, and the best means of attaching the people to the institutions under which they live. It was said of old, "*nihil latius est populo Romano saturo*;" and the same may be said of the English, the French, and indeed of every people. *Dans aucune histoire, on ne rencontre une seule trait qui prouve que l'aisance du peuple par le travail a nui à son obeissance.*¹ It is not when wages are high and provisions abundant, but when wages are low, the harvest less productive than usual, and food deficient, that the manufacturing and thickly-peopled districts are disturbed by popular clamour and commotions. It is, in truth, quite visionary to suppose that security and tranquillity should ever exist in any considerable degree, in countries where wages are very much depressed, and the mass of the people sunk in poverty and destitution. Those who have little or no property of their own, and little or no prospect of acquiring any, will never entertain any real respect for that of others; nor can any country be so ripe for revolution as that where the mass of the people may hope to gain something, while they feel they can lose nothing, by subverting the existing institutions. Nothing, therefore, can be so signally disastrous as a permanent depression in the rate of wages. It is destructive alike of the industry of the people, and of that security which is indispensable to the advancement of society.

These statements sufficiently show that it is as much for the interest of governments, with a view to their own security, as it is their duty, with a view to the happiness of their subjects, to make every exertion to improve the

¹ Forbonnais, "Recherches sur les Finances," i. 109.

condition of the labouring classes, by adopting such measures as may be most favourable to the increase of capital as compared with population, and as may contribute most, by elevating the tastes and opinions of the people, to raise the standard of wages. It will be found, too, on taking an enlarged view of the subject, that the wellbeing of the capitalists will be best promoted by their adopting a similar course. At first sight, indeed, it does appear as if their interests were opposed to those of the labourers; but such is not the case. The interests of both are at bottom identical; and it has been already seen that all the wealth of the country, applicable to the payment of wages, is uniformly, in all ordinary cases, divided among the labourers. It is true that, when wages are increased, a less share of the produce of industry remains to the capitalists, and that profits are in so far reduced; but it does not therefore follow that the capitalists would be placed in a really preferable situation were wages to fall and profits to rise. The rate of profit, how important soever, is not the only thing to which they have to look: security and tranquillity are still more indispensable than high profits to the successful prosecution of industrious undertakings. And these are never found in countries where wages are low, and the mass of the people immersed in poverty and destitution. In such countries, the poor are deterred by nothing save the fear of the law from engaging in all sorts of dangerous projects; and are always ready to listen to those who tell them that their unhappy condition is a consequence of misgovernment, and of the misconduct of their employers. Under such unfortunate circumstances, industry and enterprise are paralysed; and the condition of the capitalists is, if any thing, worse than that of the labourers.

Hence, while it is impossible for the employers of labour artificially to reduce the rate of wages, it is farther obvious that such reduction, could it be effected, would rarely, if ever, be for their advantage: for unless wages were at an

extraordinarily high elevation, it would necessarily be followed by a diminution of that security which is so essential to their interests. The conduct of those who pretend to wish for the improvement of the poor, and who, at the same time, complain of high wages, is, in fact, contradictory; and must be ascribed to hypocrisy, or folly, or both: the former, because an increase of wages is the only, or at all events the most effectual and ready means by which the condition of the poor can be really improved; and the latter, because high wages are incomparably the best defence and safeguard of the estates and property of the rich.

But, supposing the conduct of government and of the wealthier classes, as regards the poor, to be all that could be wished for, still, as has been already seen, it usually has but little influence over the condition of individuals. Whatever may be the character of the administration and of the public institutions, every man is always, in a great degree, responsible for his own situation. Industry, frugality, and forethought, can never be dispensed with; and, however unpromising in other respects the situation of the parties, these virtues will, speaking generally, insure the comfort and happiness of those by whom they are practised. The indolent and improvident, on the contrary, though placed under the most favourable circumstances, are uniformly poor and miserable: *Ubi socordie te atque ignavie tradideris, nequicquam Deos implores; irati infestique sunt.* "If," says Barrow, "wit or wisdom be the head, if honesty be the heart, industry is the right hand of every vocation; without which the shrewdest insight and the best intention can execute nothing."¹

In making these statements, we have not certainly been actuated by any desire to apologise for, or palliate the faults or errors of governments. But, how well soever they may be governed, those who are deficient in industry and forethought can never be well off. The eternal law of Providence

¹ "2d Sermon on Industry."

has decreed, that the hand of the diligent shall alone make rich. Wherever indolent habits prevail, wherever the poor grasp at immediate gratifications, without regard to the consequences—wherever they rely on others, rather than on themselves, and depend more on the wretched resource of agitation than on labour and frugality—they will unavoidably sink into the abyss of poverty, and become objects, not of pity, but of contempt.

A controversy has been carried on with respect to the comparative cheapness and efficiency of free and slave labour, upon which it may be proper to offer a few remarks. In so far, indeed, as regards the labour of freemen and slaves, supposing them to be indiscriminately engaged in the same employments, and supposing them both to be natives of, or to belong to the country in which they are employed, and to be equally well fitted for the labour carried on in it, there is little room for controversy. In such cases, the widest experience has proved that the labour of freemen is cheapest; the apathy, idleness, and carelessness of slaves being, in all cases, more than sufficient to countervail the lower rates at which their services may sometimes be procured. This, however, is not the point of view under which the inquiry with respect to free and slave labour is commonly regarded in this country. Here we generally consider it with reference to the West Indies, or some other intertropical region; the question being—whether the products peculiar to such regions, and more especially sugar, may be more cheaply raised by free or by slave labour? Now, in this case, we apprehend that slave labour will be found to be the cheaper of the two—at least if the question be restricted to the growth of sugar. We doubt, indeed, whether any considerable quantity of sugar could be raised in the intertropical regions of the western hemisphere without the aid of slaves, or of compulsory labour of one sort or other. The inhabitants of these countries have few wants. Many articles indispensable in cold or temperate climates, would be there an

encumbrance. Hence, the *curis acuens mortalia corda*, so powerful among the nations of Europe, is but feebly felt by the blacks. Their necessities and desires are of a very limited description; and are generally, indeed, fully supplied by the produce of a small patch of land, requiring but little labour in its cultivation. And such being the case, it would be contradictory to suppose that they should voluntarily employ themselves in the hard labour necessary to produce sugar. Consistently with what is now stated, we find that Hayti or St Domingo, though the most fruitful of the West Indian islands, and though it furnished when a colony of France immense supplies of sugar, no longer exports a single ton! And what ground have we for supposing that the result would be different in Brazil or Cuba, were the blacks emancipated, and were they able easily (which is not the case in Jamaica and most of our islands) to obtain patches of land? The possession of the latter is requisite, to enable them to exist without engaging in laborious service; and in the event of their not being able to obtain land, they may be forced to employ themselves in the culture of sugar—though, as it is against their inclination, they will withdraw from their work on the first opportunity, and will, while employed, indulge as much as possible in idleness. It therefore appears that the question with respect to the cheapness and efficiency of free and slave labour is one that depends, in great measure, on circumstances—that is, on the locality where, and the parties by whom, it is to be carried on, and whether the labour be of that description in which freemen would be disposed voluntarily to engage. It is impossible to bring whites into competition with blacks, in field labour in tropical countries, the constitution of the former not being suited to such an employment in hot climates: and as there are no good grounds for thinking that really free blacks will ever, of their own accord, undertake the drudgery of sugar-planting, it would seem that slave labour is not the cheapest only that can be so employed, but that it is really all but indis-

pensable to the prosecution of the business. We do not state this as any vindication of slavery, but as being the only legitimate solution of the question at issue. We are, indeed, strongly impressed with the conviction that, in the end, the culture of the sugar-cane, on a large scale, will have to be abandoned in all those parts of the New World in which slavery is suppressed.

SECT. III.—CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE THE RATE OF
PROPORTIONAL WAGES.

Proportional wages, or the share of the produce raised by his industry which goes to the workman, depend partly on the magnitude of the market rate of wages at the time, and partly on the difficulty of producing the commodities which enter into and really form this market rate. Suppose, to illustrate this, that the wages of labourers in England and the United States are, when reduced to the standard of wheat, about equal. Under these circumstances, the condition of the labourer, or his power over necessaries and luxuries, will also be about equal in both countries; but the rate of proportional wages will, notwithstanding, be higher in England than in the United States; for, owing to the greater fertility of the inferior soils under cultivation in America, the same quantity of labour that would there produce 100 quarters of wheat will not probably produce more than 80 quarters in England; and as the labourers in both countries are supposed to get the same quantity of produce in return for a given quantity of work, they are obviously getting a greater proportion of the produce of their labour in England than in the United States.

Hence it is plain, that proportional wages may, as was previously remarked, be increased, at the same time that wages, if estimated in silver, corn, or any other commodity, are reduced; and such, in point of fact, is almost uniformly found to be the case when tillage is extended over inferior soils. Wherever the best lands only are cultivated, the

proportion, or share of the produce falling to the labourer, is, generally speaking, but small; but as labour is, under such circumstances, comparatively productive, a small share of its total produce gives a large absolute quantity of necessities and conveniences: while in the more advanced stages of society, when cultivation is widely extended over lands of inferior fertility, proportional wages are almost invariably high; but, owing to the increased difficulty that then obtains of producing supplies of food, these high proportional wages rarely afford a large supply of necessities and conveniences.

SECT. IV.—DIFFERENCE IN THEIR INFLUENCE OVER WAGES
BETWEEN A DEMAND FOR LABOUR, AND A DEMAND FOR THE
PRODUCTS OF LABOUR.

It is very generally supposed that the influence of a demand for labour, and of a demand for the products of labour, over the rate of wages and the condition of the labouring class, are all but equivalent; and most generally, indeed, they are used as synonymous expressions. There is, however, no such identity between them. A demand for labour always differs in a less or greater degree from a demand for commodities — the extent of the difference depending principally on the description of commodities for which there is a demand.

It is plain that an increased demand for labour in general, or for a particular variety of labour, necessarily makes a proportional addition to the wages, and, consequently, to the comforts and conveniences of the labouring class. If the increased demand comprise all sorts of labour, the improvement occasioned by it will be immediately experienced by all sorts of labourers; and if it be for one or a few sorts only, its beneficial influence will be gradually diffused over the whole class, in the way previously pointed out.

But the influence of an increased demand for commodities, or for the produce of labour, is by no means identical with an increased demand for labour, and would depend partly on whether the commodity was wholly or in part the pro-

duce of labour or of machinery, and partly on its being suited or unsuited to the employment and subsistence of work-people.

1. If a sum be expended on commodities wholly produced by labour, its influence will, in so far, be nearly the same as if it were directly expended upon labour. It is contended, indeed, that if the commodities be partly produced by the aid of machinery or capital, the result will be different; and that the sum expended upon them will not, in such case, wholly go to replace labour, but will partly go to replace the wear and tear of the capital employed in their production, and the profits of the capitalist. But though this be true, the difference is of little importance; for, capital being itself the result of antecedent labour, whatever is expended upon it really goes to replace labour, and in the end is identical in its effects with a direct expenditure upon the latter.

2. The influence of an increased demand for commodities over the wages and condition of the labouring class depends materially on their nature, and the uses to which they may be applied.

(a.) Suppose an individual has £100 or £1000 to expend, and that he lays it out in the purchase of pictures, statues, mirrors, books, jewellery, or some such articles: In such case, it is plain that the £100 or £1000 so expended can afford no farther employment or means of subsistence to any one. The articles for which it has been exchanged yield, no doubt, a gratification to their owner, and their accumulation and diffusion may, and most probably will, improve the public taste. But they cannot do more than this: they cannot serve as capital, or as food, or clothes, for the farther employment or support of the labouring classes. They supply moral and intellectual, not physical wants.

(b.) But suppose that, instead of expending his £100 or £1000 upon pictures, statues, &c., the owner expends it upon food and clothes, and brings these into his house:

in this case he may employ a number of individuals, either as menial servants, or as manufacturing or agricultural labourers, giving them portions of his stock of food and clothes in return for their services. Hence it results that the influence of a demand for commodities over the condition of the labourers depends to a considerable extent on the description of commodities in demand. This, we think, must be already sufficiently obvious; but, to set it in a clearer point of view, let it be supposed that two capitalists, A and B, go to market with equal sums, and replace by their purchases equal amounts of previous labour, or expenditure. Thus far they both give the same encouragement to the employment of labour. But suppose, farther, that A buys articles that can neither be used as food nor as capital in industrious undertakings, and that B buys articles that may be and are intended to be so used, it is evident their means of employing labour will henceforth be different. A has his books, his pictures, his cabinets, vases, gems, and so forth, which he shuts up, enjoys himself, and exhibits to his friends; but how much soever this may purify or refine the taste, the possession of the greatest amount of such articles does not give him the means of supporting or employing a solitary individual. B, on the contrary, who bought provisions, or machinery, or both, has it plainly in his power to employ an additional number of menials, or of manufacturing or agricultural work-people, occasioning in either case an immediate demand for labour, and providing, in the latter, for its continued extension. The expenditure of the latter must, therefore, have a different effect upon wages, and be more beneficial to the labouring class, than the expenditure of the former.

Precisely the same effects would follow were those who buy food and clothes, and assign portions thereof to menials or other dependants, to buy the services of such parties directly with money, leaving it to them to supply themselves with necessaries. Thus, suppose that an individual who has £500 or £1000 to expend, employs it in

paying the wages of labourers, the latter will carry the sums paid to them to market, and buy food and clothes with them, exactly as the owner would have done had he carried the amount there himself, and subsequently employed the produce in boarding the parties in his house.

It therefore results—should there be a preference among the more opulent classes for fine houses, costly furniture, or generally for the products of the fine arts—that any circumstance that should tend to change such fashion, or should lessen the demand for these articles, and increase that for gardeners, grooms, footmen, and other servants, would add proportionally to the employment of the labouring class. And upon this ground Mr Ricardo has concluded that the produce of the additional taxes imposed upon the richer classes during war, being mostly expended upon soldiers and sailors, affords subsistence to a greater number of persons than it would have done had it been left with its original owners—the probability in such case being that it would have been, partly at least, expended on unconsumable articles. And the preceding statements show that there can be no reasonable doubt that Mr Ricardo is well founded in his conclusion.¹

But in showing the greater influence of expenditure upon certain descriptions of articles than upon others, over the demand for labour, we should not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion in favour of expenditure upon menial services over expenditure upon articles of virtu, or of luxurious accommodation. It is much better, we think, for the interests of the public, as well as of the wealthier classes, that there should be an excess of expenditure upon houses, pleasure-grounds, costly furniture, &c., than upon footmen and menials. The latter are the true *fruges con-*

¹ Mr Senior has attempted (art. Political Economy, “Encyc. Metropolitana”) to show the error of this conclusion. But his statements and reasonings on this subject seem to be in no ordinary degree fallacious. It is singular, indeed, that so clear-sighted a writer should have supported a doctrine so erroneous.

sumere nati; and though their services, when confined within due limits, be necessary to the wellbeing of society, any excess of expenditure upon them is the most wasteful imaginable. As a class they are proverbial for want of industry, enterprise, and foresight; and the circumstances under which they are placed go far to preclude the expectation of their making any considerable improvement. Unnecessary expenditure upon them tends merely to nourish idleness and improvidence; whereas an expenditure upon houses, ornamental grounds, works of art, and costly furniture, enriches and beautifies the country, improves the tastes and habits of the people, and powerfully contributes to the progress of civilisation.

CHAPTER III.

Impotent Poor should be provided for by a Poor's Rate—Question as to the best Means of providing for the Able-bodied Poor—Arguments in favour of a Compulsory Provision—Objections to it—May be so administered as to obviate most of these Objections—Operation of the English Poor Laws—New Poor Law.

How prosperous soever the condition of the bulk of the inhabitants, still it is found, even in the most favoured countries, that poverty and destitution are the lot of a considerable number of persons; and the questions whether, and to what extent, the public should interfere to relieve those in this unfortunate condition, are among the most important that the legislature has to resolve.

The poor and destitute may be divided into two great classes: the *first* comprising maimed and impotent persons, or those whom natural or accidental infirmities disable from working; and the *second* those who, though able and willing to work, are unable to find employment, or do not receive wages adequate for their own support and that of their families. There is a wide difference between these classes; and the same means of relief that may be advantageously afforded to the one, may not, in various respects, be suited to the other.

I. With respect, however, to the first class, or the impotent poor, there does not seem to be much room for doubt as to the policy, as well as humanity, of giving them a legal claim to relief. It has sometimes, indeed, been contended, that by affording relief to those who are unable, from age or the gradual decay of their bodily powers, to provide for themselves, the motives that prompt individuals, while in health, to make a provision against future contingencies, are weak-

ened ; so that, in attempting to protect a few from the effects of their own improvidence, an injury is done to the whole community. This statement is, probably, true to a certain extent ; though it is difficult to imagine that any considerable portion of a moderately intelligent population will ever be tempted to relax in their efforts to save and accumulate, when they have the means, from a knowledge that the workhouse will receive them in old age !¹ But whatever may have been the faults or follies of individuals, it would be abhorrent to all the feelings of humanity to allow them to suffer the extremity of want. An individual is unfortunate, perhaps, or he may not have been as thrifty or as prudent as he ought—but is he, therefore, to be allowed to die in the streets ? It is proper, speaking generally, to do nothing that may weaken the spirit of industry ; but if, in order to strengthen it, all relief were refused to the maimed and impotent poor, the habits and feelings of the people would be degraded and brutalised by familiarity with the most abject wretchedness ; at the same time that, by driving the victims of poverty to despair, a foundation would be laid for the most dreadful crimes, and such a shock given to the security of property and of life, as would very much overbalance whatever additional spur the refusal of support might give to industry and economy. It does, therefore, appear sufficiently clear, that this class of poor should be supported in some way or other ; and that, when the parties are without relatives or friends, or when these do not come voluntarily forward to discharge this indispensable duty, the necessary funds should be provided by a tax or rate, made equally to affect all classes ; for, if they are not so raised, the poor will either not be provided for, or the burden of their support will fall wholly on the benevolent, who should not, in such a case, be called upon to contribute more than their fair share.

¹ Mr Howlett has some forcible observations on this point in his Tract on the Poor Laws, p. 6.

II. The only question, then, about which there seems to be any real ground for doubt or difference of opinion, is—whether any legal claim for relief should be given to the able-bodied poor, or to those who, though able and ready to work, cannot find employment, or cannot earn wages adequate for their support? Now this, it must be confessed, is, abstractly considered, rather a difficult question, and does not, perhaps, admit of any very satisfactory solution. But, whatever theoretical objections may be alleged against it, the necessity of the case not unfrequently overwhelms every other consideration, and compels the institution of a compulsory provision for this class of paupers. This necessity may not probably be felt, and is always comparatively gentle in agricultural countries, like Austria, Prussia, or Russia; but it seldom fails to manifest itself, in its most unreasoning and sternest form, in countries far advanced in manufactures and commerce: a compulsory provision for the able-bodied poor may, indeed, be regarded as an indispensable part of their domestic economy.

In the first place, it may be observed that, owing to changes of fashion, to variations in the supply and value of money, to the miscalculation of producers and merchants, and to unforeseen political events, those engaged in manufacturing employments are necessarily exposed to many vicissitudes. And when their number is so very great as in this country, it is quite indispensable that a resource should be provided for their support in periods of adversity. In the event of no such provision being made, and of the distress being at the same time extensive and severe, the public tranquillity would, most likely, be seriously endangered. “Of all rebellions,” says Lord Bacon, “those of the belly are the worst;” or, as Seneca has it, *Cum ventre humano tibi negotium est, nec rationem patitur, nec œquitate, mitigatur, nec ulla prece flectitur populus esuriens*.¹ It would be visionary indeed to imagine, that those who have nothing should quietly submit

¹ “De Brevitate Vitæ,” cap. 13.

to suffer the extremity of want without attacking the property of others. And hence, if we would preserve unimpaired the internal peace, and consequently the prosperity of the country, we must beware of allowing any considerable portion of the population to fall into a state of destitution. But without the establishment of a compulsory provision for the support of the unemployed poor, it is difficult to see how they could avoid occasionally falling into this state. Through its instrumentality, however, they are sustained in periods of adversity, without being driven by necessity to attack the property of others and to commit outrages. It is, no doubt, true that a provision of this sort is extremely liable to abuse. Means have, however, been devised for checking this tendency; and whatever imperfections may, after all, attach to it, it has not yet been shown how security and good order could be maintained in periods when either employment or food is deficient, were it abolished.

In the second place, supposing it were possible (which it is not) to maintain tranquillity without making a legal provision for the support of the unemployed poor, the privations to which, under such circumstances, they would be forced to submit, would, in all probability, lower their estimate of what is required for their comfortable and decent subsistence, and exert a most pernicious influence over their conduct and character. It is perhaps unnecessary, after what has been advanced in the preceding chapter, to enter into any further statements to show the importance of endeavouring to guard against any such results. But the observations of Mr Barton on this point are so striking and conclusive, that we cannot forbear laying them before the reader. "It is to be remembered," says he "that even those who most strongly assert the impolicy and injurious tendency of our poor laws, admit that causes wholly unconnected with these laws do, at times, depress the condition of the labourer. Poor families are often thrown into a state of severe necessity by long-continued illness or unavoidable misfortunes, from which it would be impossible for them to return to the

enjoyment of decent competence, if not supported by extraneous means. It is well known, too, that a general rise in the price of commodities is seldom immediately followed by a rise in the wages of country labour. In the mean time, great suffering must be endured by the whole class of peasantry, if no legislative provision existed for their relief; and when such a rise of prices goes on gradually increasing for a series of years, as sometimes happens, the suffering resulting from it must be proportionally prolonged. The question at issue is simply this—whether that suffering be calculated to cherish habits of sober and self-denying prudence, or to generate a spirit of careless desperation?

“During these periods of extraordinary privation, the labourer, if not effectually relieved, would imperceptibly lose that taste for order, decency, and cleanliness, which had been gradually formed and accumulated in better times, by the insensible operation of habit and example. And no strength of argument, no force of authority, could again instil into the minds of a new generation, growing up under more prosperous circumstances, the sentiments and tastes thus blighted and destroyed by the cold breath of penury. Every return of temporary distress would, therefore, vitiate the feelings and lower the sensibilities of the labouring classes. The little progress of improvement made in happier times would be lost and forgotten. If we ward off a few of the bitterest blasts of calamity, the sacred flame may be kept alive till the tempest be past; but if once extinguished, how hard is the task of rekindling it in minds long inured to degradation and wretchedness!”¹

In the third place, it will, we suppose, be admitted that, when a considerable number of destitute poor persons are thrown out of employment, a provision of some sort or other should, or rather must, be made for their support. Suppose now that it is made, not by a compulsory rate, but by the voluntary contributions of the benevolent—it is contended

¹ “Inquiry into the Causes of the Depreciation of Agricultural Labour,” p. 32.

that such a mode of relieving their distress tends to nourish the better feelings of the poor; and that many would rather submit to the greatest privations than solicit a share of these contributions, who yet would make no scruple of claiming relief had the state legalised their right to support. But, admitting the truth of this statement, it has been already seen that it is not for the advantage of society that the poor should be forced to submit to extraordinary privations. It is, besides, abundantly certain that many would not be influenced by the motives alluded to; and in the event of the distress being either very severe or long-continued, those most disinclined to become a burden on others might be forced, if they did not resort to outrage, to beg a pittance. And it is pretty obvious, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, that the necessary result of such a state of things would be far more prejudicial to the character of the poor—that it would do more to prostrate their pride and independence, and to sink them in their own estimation, than the acceptance of relief from a poor's rate. It is idle, indeed, to talk about the independence of a man who is receiving charity; but an individual supported by the poor's rate cannot fairly be regarded in such point of view. He is merely sharing in a public provision made by the state; and as all property has been acquired with the knowledge that it is responsible to this claim on the part of the poor, it cannot justly be considered as entailing any burden on any particular individual. It may, therefore, one should think, be fairly presumed, that the decent pride and independence of the poor will be more likely to be supported under a system of this sort, than if they were obliged to depend, in periods of distress, on the bounty of others. Wherever the poor have not, either *de jure* or *de facto*, a claim for support, they must unavoidably, in such periods, be allowed to beg. But of the scourges that afflict and disgrace humanity, there is, perhaps, none more destructive than the prevalence of mendicancy. A common beggar is the most degraded of beings; and the experience of

Ireland, France,¹ Italy, Spain, and, in short, of every country where there is no established provision for the support of the poor, shows, that wherever they are compelled to depend on so precarious a resource as charity, we look in vain for that manliness and independence of character which dis-

¹ A committee of the National Assembly, appointed to inquire into the state of the poor of France, described our poor laws as *la plaie politique la plus dévorante de l'Angleterre*—an expression that has been often quoted on this side the Channel. There are, however, pretty good grounds for thinking that the condition of all classes in France would have been decidedly improved had she been subjected to the operation of a similar code. Very large sums have been expended by government, and by individuals in that country, in efforts to relieve the distresses of the poor; but as the burden of their support was removed from those who could, by their interference, have prevented the misapplication of the funds, and the undue increase of the poor, the efforts in question have been of very little use. In despite of the repeated enactment of laws of the most extreme severity, mendicity has been at all times the scourge and disgrace of France. It is stated, in a valuable communication addressed by one of the ministers of Orleans to Mr Howlett, immediately before the Revolution, that no season of "uncommon scarcity occurs but vast numbers of entire families, especially in the country, perish for want, being literally starved and frozen to death!"—(MR HOWLETT'S "Tract," p. 18.) At the Revolution, the property of the hospitals, and other establishments for the support of the poor, was confiscated; and the seductive, but dangerous and inapplicable principle laid down, that the care and support of the poor was the duty of government, and not of municipalities. Practically, indeed, owing to the confusion of the times, this declaration had no effect. When, however, order was again restored, the attention of government was forcibly drawn to the wretched condition of the poor, who had for some years been wholly neglected. In consequence, *dépôts de mendicité*, and *bureaux de bienfaisance*, were established, the prefects being at present authorised, in the event of the funds derived from charitable contributions being inadequate for their support, to levy in aid thereof, *octrois municipaux*, or duties on some of the principal articles conveyed into the towns where they are established. This is plainly a species of poor's rate; but it is a most objectionable one, inasmuch as it does not lay the burden upon those who alone have power to prevent the multiplication of the poor. But this new system has only been introduced into the more considerable towns; so that, in the country, pauperism and mendicity are still as prevalent as ever, licenses to beg being frequently granted even by the public authorities. It is affirmed by the Baron Dupin, ("Secours Publics," p. 460,) that "in the country, in the dead season, want and misery abound, and *there are no means of relief*." Whenever, therefore, there is a deficient crop, famine and disease prevail to a frightful extent. Farther information as to the state

tinguish the poor of England, and find in their stead all the degrading vices which beggary is sure to produce.

But whatever may be the disadvantages incident to charitable contributions for the support of the able-bodied poor, it is contended, by some who admit them fully, that they are the only means that can be resorted to without leading to still more destructive consequences than any previously pointed out. A regard for their own interest, were there no other motives to be depended upon, will, it is affirmed, teach those who possess property the advantage of providing for the really necessitous, and will consequently prevent the outrages to which allusion has been made. Such contributions will, however, cease with the necessity which gave them birth. When the pressure has passed away, they will not remain to tempt the idle and dissipated to linger on in their vicious courses. It is alleged that the labouring class would, under such circumstances, feel that they had nothing real to depend upon but their own efforts; and that no one would hesitate about saving a little stock when in his power, by trusting to the precarious and humiliating resource of mendicancy. But such, we are assured, is not the case with an established compulsory provision; and granting all that has been urged in its defence, it is contended, that the evils inseparable from it outweigh its advantages. It is acknowledged by all parties to be in most cases quite impossible to discriminate between the poverty and misery which has originated in accidental and uncontrollable causes, and that which has originated in folly or ill conduct. And yet it is said to be obvious, that, unless this be done, the establishment of a provision on which every pauper has a legal claim, must, by placing the industrious and the idle, the frugal and the dissipated, on

of the French poor will be found in the work just quoted of M. Dupin, entitled, "*Histoire de l'Administration des Secours Publics*;" in the "*Visiteur de Pauvre*" of M. Degerando; and in the excellent and elaborate work of the latter, "*Sur la Bienfaisance Publique*."

the same footing, powerfully tend to weaken the motives to good conduct in the virtuous part of the community, and to strengthen the vicious propensities in those that are bad.

But supposing that it were possible to organise a system which should prevent all poor persons, except the really deserving, from participating in the parish funds, still its operation would, it is affirmed, be most objectionable. We are desired to remember that no man loves exertion and industry for their own sakes; that every one has some end or object in view, the accomplishment of which is to repay the toils and privations to which he submits in bringing it about; that the desire to provide subsistence, and to amass a little capital for the support of old age and infirmity, are the principal motives that impel the great body of mankind to industry and economy; and that whatever tends, like the establishment of a poor's rate, to weaken or rather to destroy these motives—whatever tends to make a man trust to others instead of himself must, in so far, paralyse his exertions, and render him less industrious and economical. “*Languescet industria, intendetur socordia, si nullus ex se metus aut spes, et securi omnes aliena subsidia expectabunt, sibi ignavi, nobis graves.*”¹

But, though apparently formidable, it will be found, on a little examination, that the objections to a compulsory provision for the support of the able-bodied poor are not really entitled to much weight. And though they were, no one acquainted, in any degree, with the perilous situation in which a large portion of the population of England is placed, can doubt that here, at least, such provision is altogether indispensable. Without it the peace of society could not be preserved; and those who possess property would, every now and then, have to defend it, at the point of the sword, against the attacks of myriads of paupers, impelled by necessity, and made desperate by despair. Under such circumstances, it is fortunate that the inconveniences sup-

¹ Taciti “Annal.” lib. ii. cap. 38.

posed to be inherent in the principle of compulsory provision may be obviated by regulations in respect to its management, and that its advantages may be secured without any material alloy.

A statutory provision, for all who cannot support themselves, has been established in this country for nearly two hundred and fifty years ; and we are bound to avail ourselves of this experience, and to decide with respect to its effects, not upon theoretical grounds, or conclusions drawn from imagining what the conduct of the labouring class will be when they have a recognised claim to public support in seasons of difficulty, but by looking to what that conduct really has been during this lengthened period of probation. Now the fact is, that there was no considerable increase of pauper population in England from the period when the poor laws were established down to the middle of last century; and it is alleged, that its recent increase has been wholly owing to the prodigious extension of manufactures and commerce, and has not exceeded its increase in Scotland, where the system of compulsory provision has made very little progress. It is farther affirmed, that the labouring population of England have never discovered any want of forethought and consideration ; that in bygone times they were eminently distinguished for these virtues ; and that, notwithstanding the unfavourable influence of the rise of prices, and the revulsions of industry, since the commencement of the late war, they will still bear an advantageous comparison in these respects with the people of any other country : and, in proof of this, we are referred to returns obtained under authority of the House of Commons, which show that in 1815 there were no fewer than 925,439 individuals in England and Wales, being about *one-eleventh* part of the then existing population, members of friendly societies, formed for the express purpose of affording protection to the members during sickness and old age, and enabling them to subsist without resorting to the parish funds ; and that the sums deposited by individuals, exclu-

sive of those deposited by charitable and friendly societies, in savings' banks amounted, in England and Wales, on the 20th November 1844, to £23,987,719. It is alleged, that no such unquestionable proofs of the prevalence of a spirit of providence and independence are exhibited in any other European country. If the poor have in some districts become degraded, this, it is affirmed, has not been owing to the poor laws, but to extrinsic and adventitious causes, such as an increased dependence on the potato, and an excessive influx of paupers from Ireland, a country where, till very recently, there were no poor laws; and the condition of which affords, it is said, a decisive proof of the fallacy of the complaints of their injurious operation.

Independently, too, of these considerations, the circumstance of a legal provision existing for their support, by binding the poor to the state, and giving them, as it has been termed, a *stake in the hedge*, interests them in the public tranquillity, and inspires them with an attachment to their country and its institutions, which they could not otherwise feel. In densely-peopled manufacturing districts, where the poor have nothing but their wages to depend upon, and where hardly one in a hundred can reasonably hope to attain to a more elevated situation, the poor laws are their only security against falling a sacrifice to absolute want. They constitute a bulwark raised by the state to protect its subjects from famine and despair; and while they support them in seasons of calamity, and prevent their being driven to excesses ruinous alike to themselves and others,¹ they do not degrade them by making them depend on what is often the grudging and stunted charity of others. A wise statesman will pause before attempting

¹ It was stated in the debates in the House of Commons on the corn laws, in 1846, that Mr Canning had, more than once, expressed his conviction that the poor laws had preserved this country from revolution. And though this may, perhaps, be ascribing too great an influence to them, there can be no manner of doubt that they have, on various occasions, preserved it from being a theatre of outrage, crime, and disorder.

to pull down so venerable and so useful an institution ; and will prefer exerting himself to repair the defects that have been discovered in its structure, and to make it effectual to its truly benevolent object of affording an asylum to the really necessitous, without at the same time becoming an incentive to sloth and improvidence.

Such, in a few words, is the substance of the statements that have been or may be put forth by the apologists of the poor laws ; and it is impossible to deny that they are well founded. From the period (1601) when the act of the 43d of Elizabeth, the foundation of the existing poor laws, was promulgated, to the commencement of the late war, there was scarcely any increase of pauperism ; and few or none of those pernicious consequences had resulted from their operation which we might suppose, looking only to some of the principles they involve, they must have necessarily produced. This apparent anomaly, may, however, be satisfactorily explained. A compulsory provision for the support of the poor would, undoubtedly, have the effects commonly ascribed to it, *unless it were accompanied by some very powerful counterrailing checks*. But a very little consideration will show that the establishment of such provision can hardly, unless some formidable barrier be thrown in the way, fail of speedily producing these checks. The error into which the opponents of the poor laws have universally fallen, does not consist so much in their having made any false estimate of their operation on the labouring classes, as in their having fixed their attention exclusively on it, without adverting to their operation on others. It is plain, however, that the rates affect the payers as well as the receivers ; and that no sound conclusion can be drawn as to their real operation, without looking carefully at the circumstances under which both parties are placed, and at the conduct which they respectively follow.¹ If the object of the

¹ Public attention was, we believe, first directed to this view of the subject by Mr Black, the late learned and able editor of the "Morning Chronicle."

one party be, speaking generally, to increase the rates to the highest limit, that of the other is to sink them to the lowest ; and it not unfrequently happens that the latter is the more powerful of the two. The act of the 43d of Elizabeth laid the burden of providing for the poor on the landlords and tenants of the country ; but (unlike the new poor law) it wisely left them to administer that relief in the way they thought best ; and it stimulated them to take measures to check the growth of a pauper population, which not only prevented it from increasing in an unnatural proportion, but which, there are good grounds for thinking, confined it within decidedly narrower limits than it would have attained had the poor laws not been in existence.

The truth is, that the act of the 43d of Elizabeth has not been *bonâ fide* carried into execution. The act says, that employment and subsistence shall be found for all who are unable to find them for themselves. But those who had the interpretation of the act were long in the habit, when they suspected fraud and imposture, of tendering relief in workhouses ; and there are very many needy persons who would be eager to claim assistance from the public, if it could be obtained without any extraordinary sacrifice, who would yet reject it when coupled with the condition of imprisonment in workhouses, and of submitting to the rules enforced in such establishments.

In 1723 the workhouse system was placed on a greatly improved footing by the act 9 Geo. I., cap. 7, which authorised parishes to unite for building workhouses, and also gave them power, if they saw cause, to refuse relief except in a workhouse. This act formed, during the next half century, a principal bulwark against the progress of pauperism. It is stated by Sir F. M. Eden, that when workhouses began to be generally erected, after the above-mentioned act, great numbers of persons, who had previously received a pension from the parish, preferred depending on their own exertions, rather than take up their abode in them ; and the aversion of the poor to these establishments was so

great, that we are told, by the same excellent authority, of some whose humanity seems to have exceeded their good sense, proposing, by way of weakening this aversion, "*to call workhouses by some softer and more inoffensive name.*"¹

But of all the circumstances which have contributed to retard the growth of pauperism in England, the most powerful, perhaps, has been, that the system of compulsory provision made their opposition to the too rapid increase of the labouring population the obvious policy of the landlords and occupiers of land. They saw that if, by the erection of cottages, the splitting of farms, or otherwise, the population upon their estates or occupancies was augmented unnecessarily, they would, through the operation of the poor laws, be burdened with the support of all who, from old age, sickness, want of employment, or other cause, might, at any future period, be unable to provide for themselves. The wish to avoid incurring such an indefinite responsibility, not only made landlords and farmers cautious about admitting new settlers upon their estates and farms, but it farther stimulated them to take vigorous measures for diminishing the population, wherever the demand for labour was not pretty brisk and constant. The complicated system of laws with respect to settlements owed its origin to this principle; and, until relaxed, it opposed a formidable barrier to the increase of population. There is, indeed, great reason to doubt whether the rural population of England was not rather diminished than increased in the interval between the Revolution and 1770. And it is to the operation of the poor laws, more than to any thing else, that we find so few small occupancies in England, and that she has been saved from that excessive subdivision of the land that has been, and *is*, the curse of Ireland. Considering, indeed, the high rents that cottagers will offer for slips of land, and the circumstance that the law of England, by granting the elective franchise to all persons

¹ "State of the Poor," vol. i. p. 285.

possessed of a cottage and a piece of land valued at 40s. a-year, gave a strong stimulus to the increase of cottages, we must be satisfied that it required some powerful counter-vailing principle to render their multiplication so inconsiderable. Political influence is as dear to an English as to an Irish gentleman; but the former, had he manufactured voters by the hundred or the thousand, would have made himself directly responsible for their maintenance; and he has been, consequently, determined by a motive which had no influence over the latter, to abstain from so ruinous a practice. Most landlords early saw the consequences that would in the end result, unless they adopted the necessary precautions, from their being bound to provide for the settlers on their estates who, through misfortune or misconduct, could not provide for themselves; and since they could not subvert the principle of the compulsory system, they exerted themselves to prevent its abuse, by adopting every device for checking the undue increase of population, and by administering relief in such a mode as might hinder any but the really indigent from having recourse to it.

The truth is, that down to 1795 it was not said that the poor laws had increased population and lowered wages, but that they had diminished it and raised wages. A host of authorities, some of which are referred to below,¹ might be quoted in proof of this statement, and explanatory of the means by which so singular a result was brought about; but the following passage from Young's "Farmer's Letters" will probably be deemed sufficient.

"The law of *settlement*," says Young, "is attended with nearly as many ill consequences as that of *maintenance*."

¹ "Britannia Languens, or a Discourse of Trade," &c., p. 155. Lond. 1680. Alcock's "Observations on the Effects of the Poor Laws," pp. 19, 20. Lond. 1752. Burn's "History of the Poor Laws," p. 211. Lond. 1764. Arthur Young's work, quoted in the text. Brown's "Agricultural Survey of the West Riding of Yorkshire," p. 13. Lond. 1793, &c. Debates in the House of Commons, 28th April, 1773.

I have said enough to prove of how great importance our labouring poor are to the public welfare: the strength of the state lies in their numbers; but the prodigious restrictions thrown on their settlements tend strongly to prevent an increase. One great inducement to marriage is the finding, without difficulty, a comfortable habitation; and another, nearly as material, when such requisite is found, to be able to exercise in it whatever business a man has been educated to or brought up in. The first of these points is no easy matter to be accomplished; for it is too much the interest of a parish, both landlords and tenants, to decrease the cottages in it, and, above all, to prevent their increase, so that, in process of time, habitations are extremely difficult to be procured. There is no parish but had much rather that its young labourers would continue single: in that state they are not in danger of becoming chargeable, but when married the case alters; all obstructions are, therefore, thrown in the way of their marrying; and none more immediately than that of rendering it as difficult as possible for the men, when married, to procure a house to live in; and this conduct is found so conducive to easing the rates, that it universally gives rise to an open war against cottages. How often do gentlemen who have possessions in a parish, when cottages come to sale, purchase them, and immediately raze them to the foundation, that they may never become the *nests*, as they are called, of *beggars' brats!* by which means their tenants are not so burdened in their rates, and their farms let better; for the rates are considered as much by tenants as the rent. In this manner cottages are the perpetual objects of jealousy, the young inhabitants are prevented from marrying, and population is obstructed.”¹

It may perhaps be said, had the poor laws never existed—had they not tempted the poor to place a deceitful trust in parish assistance—their natural sagacity would have led them to act with prudence and consideration, and pre-

¹ “Farmer’s Letters to the People of England,” 3d ed. vol. i. pp. 300-302.

vented the multiplication of their numbers beyond the demand. That such would have been, in some measure, the case, is perhaps true; though, considering the state of depression in which the poor have usually been involved, and their total ignorance of the most efficient causes of poverty, there are but slender grounds for thinking that the influence of the prudential check would have been very sensibly felt. A man must be in what is called a comfortable situation before he is likely to be much influenced by prospective considerations. The pressure of actual, not the fear of future want, is the great incentive to the industry of the poor. Those who have speculated upon the operation of the poor laws over the prudential virtues, have usually belonged to the upper classes, and have supposed that the lower classes are actuated by the same motives that actuate those to whom they belong. But the circumstances under which these classes are placed are so very different, that, in questions of this sort, it is exceedingly difficult to draw any accurate conclusion in regard to the conduct of the one, from observations made upon the conduct of the other. A man who is in easy circumstances, must, if he would not lose *caste*, and secure a continuance of the advantages which he enjoys, exercise a certain degree of prudence; but those who possess few comforts, who are near the extreme verge of society, and have but little to lose, do not act under any such serious responsibility. A want of caution, and a recklessness of consequences, are in their case productive of comparatively little injury, and are less guarded against. The widest experience proves that this is the case. The lower we descend in the scale of society, the less consideration and forethought do we find to prevail. When we either compare different classes in the same country, or in different countries, we invariably find that poverty is never so little dreaded as by those who are most likely to become its victims. The nearer they approach it, the less is it feared by them. And that generally numerous class who are already so low that they can fall no lower, scruple not to plunge into excesses

that would be shunned by others, and often indulge in gratifications productive of the most injurious consequences.

On the whole, therefore, there seems little reason for thinking that the fear of being left destitute in old age, had a compulsory provision not existed, would have operated with any thing like the same force, in deterring the lower classes from entering into improvident unions, as the formidable restraints that grew out of the poor laws. "A labouring man in his youth," it has been justly observed, "is not disposed to look forward to the decline of life, but listens to the impulses of passion. He sees the picture through the deceitful mirror which his inclinations hold up to him. Hence those restraints which persons of property, interested in keeping down poor rates, will infallibly impose upon him, are far more likely to be efficacious than those which he will impose on himself."

It may be inferred, from the statements of contemporary writers, that the poor's rates amounted to about a million at the commencement of last century.¹ In 1776 they amounted, according to the official returns, to £1,720,316; and at an average of the years 1783, 1784, and 1785, being those immediately subsequent to the American war, they amounted to £2,167,748. This, when we consider the rise in the price of food, the great increase of population, and the distressed situation of the country at the termination of a disastrous contest, if it be really an increase, is certainly a very small one, and shows that the checks that had grown out of the system were quite sufficient to hinder the growth of factitious pauperism.

But notwithstanding the unanswerable evidence that was thus afforded of the advantageous working of the old system, some of its strongest bulwarks were unfortunately removed in the interval between 1782 and 1795, and a door was consequently opened for the growth of abuses under which the country still suffers. At the first of the epochs now referred to, the act (commonly called Gilbert's Act from the

¹ Sir F. M. Eden on the "State of the Poor," vol. i. p. 408.

name of its author) 22 Geo. III., cap. 83, repealed the salutary statute of 1723, authorising parishes, if they thought fit, to refuse relief except in workhouses ; and enacted, that in future no able-bodied paupers should be obliged to resort to those establishments, but that work should be provided for them at or near their own houses ! This throwing down of one of the principal barriers that had hitherto prevented the growth of factitious pauperism, could hardly have failed, under any circumstances, to be in the end productive of the worst consequences ; but its injurious operation was accelerated by accidental occurrences, and by the folly of the magistrates.

The price of corn, which, at a medium of the three years ending with 1794, averaged 48s. 2d., rose, in 1795, to 75s. 2d. As wages continued stationary at their former elevation, the distress of the poor was very great ; and many able-bodied labourers, who had rarely before applied for parish assistance, became claimants for relief. Instead of meeting this emergency, as it should have been met, by temporary expedients, and grants of relief proportioned to the exigency of each case, a uniform system was adopted. The magistrates of Berks, and some other southern counties, issued tables, showing the wages which, as they affirmed, every labouring man should receive, according to the number of his family, and the price of bread ; and they accompanied these tables with an order directing the parish officers to make up the deficit to the labourer, in the event of his wages falling short of the tabular allowance !

As might have been expected, this practice did not cease with the temporary circumstances which gave it birth, but continued to be acted upon down to the passing of the Poor Law Amendment Act. It was, in fact, very generally established in the southern half of England, in large districts of which there were no longer any independent labourers to be found ; and produced an extent of artificial pauperism, and moral degradation, that could hardly have been conceived possible.

Under these circumstances, the necessity of making a vigorous effort for the extirpation of the abuses that had been ingrafted on the system of compulsory provision, became obvious; and the previous statements show that the desired reform might have been brought about with but little difficulty. No doubt it is always unsafe, in matters of this sort, to trust wholly to general principles, how well soever they may appear to be established. But, in this case, we had the safe and solid ground of a lengthened experience, whence to conclude that the abuses, of which we have briefly traced the growth, might have been extirpated, by reverting to the system which obtained previously to their origin, or to 1782; the efficacy of which might also, it is generally admitted, have been very greatly increased by amending the constitution of vestries, so as to give their due influence to people of property, and by lessening or suppressing the interference of the Justices of Peace. Nothing, in fact, is ever required to insure the economical administration of a compulsory provision for the poor, beyond vesting its management in the hands of those by whom it must be wholly or principally paid. We may be quite sure that, if this be done, relief will be furnished with the greatest economy. Those who have to be generous at their own expense, are usually models of circumspection, and have seldom, indeed, injured their fortunes by their liberality to the unfortunate. In this, as in most other things, we may safely trust to the judgment and interest of individuals. In Scotland, where this system has been long established, the complaint is, not that the poor get too much, but that they get too little; that the funds intended for their support are too economically laid out; that, in many cases, relief is altogether withheld from necessitous individuals; and that, when granted, the allowances are generally too small. Had the English poor laws been amended in the way now suggested, it would have been necessary, to prevent the too great reduction of their allowances, to give the poor a right of appeal, from the parochial

authorities, to some easily accessible and less interested tribunal. Under the supposed circumstances this would have been the only danger to provide against.

But *Diis aliter visum!* Any thing so simple as this, so consistent with experience and the plainest principles, did not suit the taste of the day, or the prevalent rage for innovation. In 1832 a Commission was appointed to inquire into the operation and administration of the laws for the relief of the poor; and the commissioners-in-chief employed a number of sub-commissioners, who proceeded to different parts of the country to collect information. The reports of these functionaries, and the evidence taken before them, fill several folio volumes; and contain a curious medley of authentic, questionable, and erroneous statements. The commissioners, with but few exceptions, appear to have set out with a determination to find nothing but abuses in the old poor law, and to make the most of them; and this, after all, was only what might have been expected, seeing that it was the most likely way to effect its abolition, and to secure employment for themselves, under the system proposed to be adopted in its stead. Hence the exaggeration, partiality, and quackery so glaringly evident in most of their reports. But, such as they were, they became the foundation of, or rather the pretext for, a measure of the most sweeping description, by which, with few exceptions, every vestige of the old system for managing the affairs of the poor was wholly abolished. It is, however, much easier to subvert what is established than to construct any thing better in its stead; and the statute 4 and 5 Will. IV. c. 76, commonly called the Poor Law Amendment Act, is a striking example of this; no statute ever having been passed more contradictory of the best established principles, or more productive of mischievous results.

Down to this period, it had been generally supposed that individuals would take better care of their estates and interests than any one else, and that these could nowhere be so safe as in their own keeping. But the Poor Law Amend-

ment Act is bottomed on the assumption, that a regard to self-interest is not a principle on which any stress can safely be laid ; and that the interests of individuals will be best protected by salaried officers appointed by government, and responsible to it only ! To carry this principle, if we may so call it, into effect, in the administration of the poor laws, a Central Board of three commissioners was established in London, empowered to control and direct parishes and unions (collections of different parishes) in the mode of relieving the wants of the poor. For this purpose the commissioners were authorised to decide upon the kind and amount of pauper relief ; to issue rules and regulations with respect to the treatment of the poor, which all inferior officers are bound to obey ; to determine in regard to the erection and government of workhouses, and the education of parish children ; to form unions of parishes for the better administration of the law, &c. Boards of guardians, consisting, for the most part, of people of property and respectability, are chosen in the different unions for superintending the workhouses and administering relief. But these functionaries to whom, from their local knowledge, and their interest in the proper administration of the rates, much power might have been safely conceded, are, in fact, rendered all but ciphers : they cannot, however well satisfied of their expediency, adopt any rules or modes of relief not sanctioned by the Central Board in London ; and are substantially mere tools or instruments in the hands of the latter and its officers. Justices of the Peace have been properly prohibited from interfering, in any way, with the rules laid down by the Central Board, or with the proceedings of the various parties acting under its orders.

It would be to no purpose to enter into any lengthened inquiries with respect to the working of this system. It has filled the country with well-founded complaints, and has been productive of much irritation and disgust. But what else could any rational person anticipate ? Adam Smith has said, that it is the highest impertinence in kings and

ministers to pretend to instruct private people how they should employ their capital and industry. But this pretension, like every other put forward by the advocates of the mercantile system, appears to be modesty itself compared with the pretensions put forward by the authors and abettors of the new poor law. They take for granted that the country gentlemen, and people of property in England, are simpletons, incapable of managing their own affairs; that they are wholly unfit to take care of their estates and most obvious interests; and unable to do that which every kirk-session in Scotland is admitted to do admirably well! It may be questioned whether, in the whole history of the legislation of the least enlightened and most despotically-governed nations, any instance can be pointed out in which the rage for interference (inflamed no doubt by the scent of the patronage it was to bring along with it) has been carried to such an extreme, not to say offensive, extent.

The administration of the act has been, also, very unsuccessful. Differences of opinion, in regard to some fundamental points, speedily manifested themselves between those functionaries who were inclined to proceed cautiously and prudently, and those who were inclined to carry out the principles of the measure with less regard to circumstances. These differences, having attained to a most unseemly height, were at length fully investigated, and brought under the notice of the public, by a committee of the House of Commons, appointed to inquire into alleged abuses in the Andover Union. Some of the disclosures made by the committee were of a very revolting description; and, having roused the public indignation, led to a reconstruction of the Central Board, and to some other changes, effected by the act 10 and 11 Viet. c. 109. But though this act embodies some improvements, it touches none of the principles on which the Poor Law Amendment Act was founded. We therefore anticipate little advantage from its being enacted. It is probable, indeed, that the functionaries employed under it, profiting by the errors of their prede-

cessors, will act with greater discretion, and defer more to public opinion ; but all the really objectionable parts of the system continue unchanged.

Among other consequences, the Poor Law Amendment Act may be truly said to have given birth to a new political power of the most dangerous description. Previously to its being passed, the management of the poor belonging to the different parishes was the private affair of the parties resident in them, and interested no one else ; so that, if the poor of a particular parish felt themselves aggrieved, they had nothing for it but to appeal to the parochial authorities, or to the courts, for redress. But the present state of things is totally different. The poor, no doubt, are distributed over different unions ; but these being all subject to similar rules and regulations, enforced by government agents, the interests of the poor in them, and in the kingdom generally, have been substantially identified. Instead of the authorities, in any single parish, having to deal with some twenty or fifty paupers, the Central Board, or rather the government, by whose orders it is directed, has to deal with all the paupers in the kingdom. It has made itself their dry-nurse and foster-mother ; is responsible for every real or fancied abuse that may any where exist in their treatment, and must stoop to interfere in every work-house squabble ! Can the mischievous consequences of such a state of things be exaggerated ? Had the framers of the measure wished to bring government into contempt, by loading it with impracticable and odious duties, they could not have adopted any course more likely to be successful. People of property on the spot, acquainted with the peculiar circumstances of every case, and interested in the judicious and economical treatment of the poor on their estates and in their neighbourhood, are the only parties to whom the administration of workhouses, and of the public charity, can be safely intrusted. Government and its agents are as completely unfit for any such duty, as they are for managing the private affairs of individuals. In a country

like England, with an immense manufacturing population exposed to the greatest vicissitudes, could any one imagine that the agents of the Central Board would be permitted, in periods of difficulty, to carry its repulsive theories into effect? The suppression of out-door relief was announced as one of the grand objects of the new law; and this was to be effected by making workhouses "tests of destitution," and refusing assistance to all who did not choose to accept it in them. But it admits of demonstration that relief may, in very many cases, be more economically afforded otherwise than in workhouses; and, in such cases, where is the advantage of compelling really necessitous parties to resort to them? Waiving, however, all considerations of this sort, and admitting that the rule now referred to might be enforced in thinly-peopled country parishes, what sane person could suppose that this could be so much as attempted in populous towns, in seasons of commercial or manufacturing distress? Any government that should have endeavoured to carry such a regulation into effect, under such circumstances, would have been overthrown in six weeks. The truth of this statement was, indeed, admitted by the warmest advocates of the new system, who boasted, during the discussions in 1844, on the Act 7 and 8 Vict. c. 101, for amending the poor laws, that relief was every where administered, to a vast extent, out of workhouses, and that it never had been intended it should be otherwise! And such is uniformly the case when attempts are made to enforce impracticable regulations. The moment any difficulty arises, we hear little or nothing of the "stern path of duty;" but, on the contrary, are told that, *tempori cedere, id est necessitati parere, semper sapientis est habitum*. And, when once begun, occasions for fresh relaxations are never wanting. The new poor law could not be, and has not been, honestly acted upon. No government will incur the odium of seriously attempting to carry out its provisions. In such matters, present convenience is sure to outweigh every other consideration. It is not often that we have a

Timoleon at the head of the home department; and we may be pretty well assured that this, like every similar project attempted to be carried into effect by salaried agents, in the teeth of public opinion, will terminate by being made a screen for all sorts of jobbing and mal-practices.

The smaller, speaking generally, the divisions into which a country is parcelled, and the more directly the burden of providing for the poor is brought home to the door of those upon whom it must fall, the greater will be the security against the mismanagement of the rates, and the less room will there be for imposture, menace, and cabal, on the part of the poor. But the authors of the new poor laws treat such considerations with contempt! They say, in effect, it matters not how well the affairs of the poor in one parish may have been administered, or how badly they may have been administered in another; we shall combine these and a dozen more parishes into the same union, and subject them to the same rates and mode of management! This is taking away, in as far as can be done, every motive to the prudent and economical treatment of the poor by parishes and individuals, who are no longer to profit by it, and giving a corresponding encouragement to abuse. Under the old system, parishes might, if they thought it would be for their interest, join together, and erect workhouses, managing their poor in common. But it was reserved for the legislators of the nineteenth century, who pique themselves upon their devotion to free principles, to make such junctions imperative—to force ill-omened unions between well-managed and badly managed parishes, between prudence and folly, economy and waste!

It has been said that, without the supervision of a Central Board, it would be impossible to introduce any sort of uniformity into the treatment of the poor; and this, perhaps, is true. But why should there be any uniformity? Any one who reflects for a moment on the subject, must see that the treatment of the poor should vary in different parishes and parts of the country, and that it would be the climax

of folly to treat the poor of a manufacturing and of an agricultural district in the same way. Why should it not be left to those who pay the rates, and are, consequently, most interested in their proper outlay, to decide upon the best means of maintaining the poor? It is, if any thing can be, an insult to common sense to pretend that any three, or any three hundred individuals, resident in London, should be able to instruct private parties resident in the different parishes of England, how the poor in them may be best and most economically provided for!

It is needless to inquire into the abstract merit of the various rules and regulations framed by the Central Board; though it seems rather difficult to discover the wisdom or possible utility of the greater number. But the treatment of the poor is, obviously, a matter in which the most carefully drawn up general rules can, speaking generally, be of little or no service: it is one in which we have to deal with conflicting interests and opinions, conflicting and perpetually varying circumstances, in which expediency must be allowed quite as much weight as right or principle, and in which most cases have something peculiar. And, such being the fact, can there be a doubt that all attempts to apply the same rules to so many different and opposite interests and cases are fraught with gross injustice and extreme danger?

It is sometimes said, by way of apology for the new system, that, under its influence, the rates have been materially reduced, and that, therefore, it must at least be in so far advantageous. While, however, we admit the fact, we deny the inference. All changes in the public economy of a great nation, and especially those which deeply affect the interests of the poorer classes, should be brought about gradually and slowly. Had the charge of providing for the poor been committed, as it should have been, to the people of property in the different parishes, without any interference on the part of the justices, under the regulations established previously to 1782, it is probable that the reduction of the rates, though more effectual in the

end, would have been less rapid at first than under the new system. At the outset of all projects of this description, the officers have an extraordinary anxiety to discover their zeal; and seldom, indeed, hesitate about availing themselves of any means, however questionable, to evince their desire to be useful to their employers, and to prove the value of their services. But this ultra zeal very soon cools down to something like apathy, or, it may be, connivance at abuse; whereas the watchful care individuals take of their own interests, is a principle which no fancied security can ever relax, or time wear out; so that while reforms, effected by the agency of those to whom they are profitable, are usually introduced with caution, they are invariably carried out to the fullest extent, and enforced with untiring vigilance.¹

Such are some of the contradictions that appear to be involved in the amended poor law, and of the mischievous consequences of which it has been and will, most likely, continue to be productive. It would be inconsistent with the plan and objects of this work to subject it to a more lengthened examination. We do not presume to cast its horoscope, to conjecture how long it is destined to be the law of the land, or to measure the degree of rigour with which its provisions may be enforced; but we have seen that it is opposed to all sound doctrine; that it makes that a public and national, which is essentially a private and local affair; and that it is an uncalled-for interference with the rights and duties of individuals. Should it be permitted to run its full course, without some material modifications, the presumption is that, in the end, it will be found to be as expensive and disastrous in its practical results, as it is vicious in its principles, and audacious in its pretensions.

¹ The sums paid for the relief and maintenance of the poor of England and Wales, during the years ending the 25th March 1839, 1840, and 1841, were respectively £4,421,714, £4,576,965, and £4,760,928, and during 1844, 1845, and 1846, they were £4,976,003, £5,039,703, and £4,954,204. In 1847, the expenditure amounted to £5,298,787.

CHAPTER IV.

Education of the Poor—Importance of a National System of Education—Difficulties in the way of its Establishment—Influence of Friendly Societies and Savings' Banks.

OF the various means for providing for the permanent improvement of the poor, few, if any, promise to be so effectual as the establishment of a really useful system of public education. Poverty is, no doubt, the grand source of misery and crime. Ignorance, however, is admitted, on all hands, to be also a prolific direct source of crime; and its indirect influence is still more powerful, by its contributing, in no ordinary degree, to the increase of poverty. It is now, indeed, pretty generally acknowledged, that the providing of elementary instruction for all classes of its subjects is one of the most pressing duties of government; and, during the last half century, and especially since the termination of the late war, some of the principal Continental states have taken every means in their power to ensure the efficient discharge of this important duty. But, except in Scotland, no plan of national instruction has been organised in any part of the United Kingdom. And though much has been done to supply this deficiency by benevolent individuals and societies, and more recently by government, a great deal remains to be accomplished, both as respects the diffusion of instruction, and the improvement of its quality. In this country, those who have laboured to promote the education of the poor seem, generally speaking, to be satisfied, provided they succeed in making them able to read and write. But, though this much be a material gain, the education that stops at this point omits those parts that are, perhaps, most important. A knowledge of the arts of reading, writing, and arithmetic, may, and

indeed very often does, exist along with the grossest ignorance of all those principles with respect to which it is most for the interest of the poor, as well as of the other classes, that they should be well informed. To render education productive of all the utility that may be derived from it, the poor should, in addition to the elementary instruction now alluded to, be made acquainted with the duties enjoined by religion and morality, and with the circumstances which occasion that gradation of ranks and inequality of fortunes that usually exist; and they should be impressed, from their earliest years, with a conviction of the important truth, that every man is, to a great extent, the arbiter of his own fortune; and that the most tolerant and economical government, and the best institutions, can shield none from poverty and degradation, who do not exercise a reasonable degree of industry, forethought, and good conduct. That the ultimate effect of such a system of education would be most advantageous, appears abundantly obvious. Neither the errors nor the vices of the poor are incurable: they investigate all those plain practical questions which affect their immediate interests with the greatest sagacity and penetration, and do not fail to trace their remote consequences; and if education were made to embrace objects of real utility—if it were made a means of instructing the poor in the circumstances which elevate and depress the rate of wages, and which, consequently, exert the most powerful influence over their condition, and in those by which individuals are raised to comparative comfort, there can be little doubt they would endeavour to profit by it. It would be unreasonable, indeed, to expect that it should produce any very immediate effect on their habits; and we are not of the number of those who expect that any system of education will ever insure tranquillity in periods of distress, or that it will obviate the vicissitudes and disorders inherent in the manufacturing system. But though the harvest of sound instruction may be late, and not so extensive as many suppose, it would, notwithstanding

ing, be most valuable. By raising the intelligence of the poor, and enabling them the better to appreciate the worthlessness of the quacks on whom and on whose nostrums they are so often called upon to depend,¹ and to estimate the more remote, as well as the immediate consequences of their actions, it could hardly fail to contribute materially to their advantage.

It has been well observed, in reference to the diffusion of education, that—"Of all obstacles to improvement, ignorance is the most formidable; because the only true secret of assisting the poor is to make them agents in bettering their own condition, and to supply them, not with a temporary stimulus, but with a permanent energy. As fast as the standard of intelligence is raised, the poor become more and more able to co-operate in any plan proposed for their advantage, more likely to listen to any reasonable suggestion, more able to understand, and therefore more willing to pursue it. Hence it follows, that when gross ignorance is once removed, and right principles are introduced, a great advantage has been already gained against squalid poverty. Many avenues

¹ The agitation in Ireland for a repeal of the Union has afforded the most striking example in modern history of the influence of the continued iteration of unfounded assertions, and of the merest quackery, in deluding and misleading a people. Those who set on foot the clamour for repeal were much too clear-sighted to imagine it could succeed; and it is doubtful, perhaps, whether they really wished that it should. They knew, however, that by pandering to the prejudices of a susceptible and confiding people, and assuring them that they were nowise to blame for their low and depressed condition, which, they affirmed, was wholly a consequence of their ruinous connexion with England, they would make themselves be regarded as patriots *par excellence*: and that, having in this way acquired great popular influence, they might make it subservient to any purpose of personal aggrandisement, and even levy heavy contributions on their unsuspecting dupes! It is not easy to say whether this fraudulent juggle has been most disgraceful to its contrivers or to the successive governments by which it has been tolerated, and sometimes all but abetted. It has done more than any thing else to retard the improvement of Ireland. The late attempt at an outbreak, and the prevalent disaffection of the peasantry, are the necessary results of more than twenty years' incessant abuse of England, and of the English government and people.

to an improved condition are opened to one whose faculties are enlarged and exercised : he sees his own interest more clearly, he pursues it more steadily, he does not study immediate gratification at the expense of bitter and late repentance, or mortgage the labour of his future life without an adequate return. Indigence, therefore, will rarely be found in company with good education.”¹

We fear, however, that these, and other advantages of sound instruction, can never be fully realised so long as we are left, without any adequate public provision, to depend principally on the efforts of individuals and associations. The country is, no doubt, under great obligations to those who have come forward to provide that instruction for their indigent fellow-countrymen that should have been provided by the state. But while we give every credit to the praiseworthy efforts of the benevolent individuals now referred to, still it would not be difficult to show, that no extension of the system of charity and subscription schools can ever fully compensate for the want of a statutory provision for the education of the public. Something of degradation always attaches to the fact of one's having been brought up in a charity school. The parents who send children to such an institution, and even the children, know that they have been received only because they are paupers unable to pay for their education ; and this consciousness has a tendency to weaken that sense of independence and self-respect, for the want of which the best education may be but an imperfect substitute. But no such feeling could operate on the pupils of schools established by the state. And, in addition to this, the public would be entitled to superintend its own schools, to decide upon the qualifications of the masters, and the species of instruction to be afforded to the pupils. But, in the case of private schools, these important matters are left to the discretion of irresponsible individuals ; and the masters and the instruction may be alike deficient.

¹ Sumner's "Records of the Creation," vol. ii. p. 298.

At the same time it must be admitted, that it is an exceedingly difficult matter to suggest any plan for a national system of education against which many very weighty objections may not be fairly urged. Suppose it were enacted, that a school for the elementary branches of instruction should be founded and endowed by government in every parish, or other convenient district: the knotty questions would immediately occur—Whether shall any and, if any, what system of religious instruction be introduced into these schools?—To whom shall the drawing up, or choice, of class-books be intrusted?—Shall the same class-books, and the same plan of instruction, be adopted in all the schools, or if not, how, and to what extent, shall it be varied?—Shall it be compulsory, as in Prussia, on parents to send their children to school, or shall it be optional?—In whom shall the appointment of schoolmasters be vested, and what shall be the test of their qualifications? These, and other questions of the same kind, involving considerations of the highest importance, must all be investigated and disposed of, in one way or other, before any system of national education can be established. But so many and such formidable objections, originating partly in the difficulties inherent in the subject, and partly and principally in the discordant views and prejudices of the different religious sects and political parties amongst us, might be, and no doubt would be, made to every proposal for a national system of education, that, however beneficial, there are certainly but slender grounds on which to hope for its establishment.

The formation of benefit clubs, or friendly societies, seems to be one of the best devices for enabling the poor to provide for themselves, without depending on the charity of their more opulent neighbours. Friendly societies are formed on a principle of mutual insurance. Each member contributes a certain sum by weekly, monthly, or annual subscriptions, while he is in health, and receives from the society a

corresponding pension or allowance when he is incapacitated for work by accident, sickness, or old age. Nothing, it is obvious, can be more unexceptionable than the principle of these associations. Owing to the general exemption from sickness till a rather late period of life, if a number of individuals under thirty or thirty-five years of age form themselves into a society, and subscribe each a small sum from their surplus earnings, they are able to secure a comfortable provision in the event of their becoming unfit for labour. But any single individual who should trust to his own unassisted efforts for support, would obviously be placed in a comparatively hazardous situation; for, however industrious and parsimonious, he might not be able to accomplish his object, inasmuch as the occurrence of any accident, or an obstinate fit of sickness, might, by throwing him out of employment, and forcing him to consume the savings he had accumulated against old age, reduce him to a state of indigence, and oblige him to become dependent on others. It may, therefore, be regarded as an exceedingly favourable circumstance, that the number of persons in England enrolled in friendly societies is supposed at this moment to exceed a *million*. But, though great, the progress of these societies has hitherto been much counteracted by the ignorance and mismanagement of their officers, and by the real difficulty of establishing them on a solid foundation. The principal error has consisted in their fixing their allowance scales too high. When instituted, they consist, for the most part, of members in the prime of life, and there is comparatively little sickness and mortality amongst them: in consequence, their funds rapidly accumulate, and they are naturally tempted, from the apparently flourishing state of their affairs, to deal liberally by those members who are occasionally incapacitated. But the circumstances under which the society is placed at an advanced period are materially different: sickness and mortality are then comparatively prevalent; the contributions to the fund decline at the same time that the outgoings increase; and it has not unfrequently

happened that the society has become altogether bankrupt, and that the oldest members have been left, at the close of their lives, destitute of all support from a fund on which they had relied, and to which they had largely contributed.

But the defects in the constitution of friendly societies have been, in a considerable degree, amended; various efforts, many of which have been productive of the best effects, having been made by private individuals and associations, as well as by the legislature, to obviate the chances of their failure, and to encourage their foundation on sound principles. Two reports by a committee of the House of Commons, "On the Laws respecting Friendly Societies," printed in 1825 and 1827, contain a great deal of authentic information as to their constitution; and the Report and Tables published by the Highland Society are also valuable. It is true that several important points still remain to be satisfactorily cleared up; but, in the mean time, enough has been done to enable the legislature to interfere in assisting the formation of friendly societies on a solid foundation. The regulations enacted in that view are embodied in the 10 Geo. IV., c. 56; 4 and 5 Will. IV., c. 40; and 7 and 8 Vict. c. 83.

The institution of savings' banks deserves also the warmest support of all who are friendly to the improvement and independence of the poor. The want of a safe place of deposit for savings, where they would yield a reasonable interest, and whence they could be withdrawn at pleasure without loss, has formed one of the most serious obstacles to the formation of a habit of accumulation among labourers. The difficulty of investment has led many to neglect opportunities of saving of which they might have availed themselves; and it has frequently happened that those who, in despite of every discouragement, had accumulated a little capital, have been tempted, by the offer of a high rate of interest, to lend it to persons of doubtful characters and desperate fortunes, whose bankruptcy has involved them in

irremediable ruin. But this state of things has been in so far obviated, that the poor man may now readily deposit his smallest savings in banks, where they are faithfully preserved, with the interest accruing upon them, to assist his future wants: and as there are but few who are insensible of the blessings of independence, the system has made an extraordinary progress, the deposits in the savings' banks of the United Kingdom having amounted, in 1846, to the sum of £31,743,250.

Still, however, it must be admitted, that these banks do not fully remove the difficulty that has always existed in England of profitably investing small sums. They are, in fact, applicable only to the exigencies of servants and labourers, and not to those of little tradesmen, farmers, &c. No depositor can contribute more than £30, exclusive of compound interest, at the rate of £3, 0s. 10d. per cent per annum, to a savings' bank in any one year; the total amount of the deposits to be received from one individual is not to exceed £150; and whenever the deposits and the compound interest accruing upon them, standing in the name of an individual, amount to £200, no farther interest is paid upon such deposit. But it is exceedingly desirable that this system should be extended as widely as possible. In Scotland, it has long been customary for the public banks to receive deposits of such small sums as £10, or even £5, and to allow interest upon them at about one per cent less than the interest obtained by investing in the funds. And perhaps no single circumstance has done more than this to generate and diffuse those habits of foresight and economy by which the Scotch peasantry and small tradesmen are so honourably distinguished. Such facilities of accumulation have not been at any time afforded in England; and tradesmen in London and other places, who wish to invest a small sum so as to make it profitable, have had either to lend it to a private individual, which is in most cases attended with risk, or to buy funded property with it. This latter mode

of investment, however, though extensively practised, has several drawbacks: it renders the sum invested liable to be affected by fluctuations of the funds; the investment cannot be made without the assistance of third parties; the money cannot be drawn out at once without any sort of trouble; and some little acquaintance with the nature of stocks and the business of stock-jobbing is required. These inconveniences have now, however, been partially obviated by the formation of joint-stock banks, which generally, we believe, grant interest on deposits, in the same way as the Scotch banks. It would be very desirable, provided it could be done without involving the establishment in any risk, were the plan of giving interest on deposits also adopted by the Bank of England and her branches.

CHAPTER V.

Conflicting Opinions with respect to the Origin of Rent—Theory of Dr Anderson—Nature and Progress of Rent—Not a Cause but a Consequence of the High Value of Raw Produce—Does not enter into Price—Distinction between Agriculture and Manufactures—Rents depend partly on the Extent to which Tillage has been carried, and partly on Situation—Inequality and Mischievous Operation of Taxes on Rent.

M. QUESNAY and Dr Smith supposed, as has been already seen, that rent formed the recompense of nature for services rendered to the husbandman after all that part of the produce had been deducted which could be considered as the recompense of the work of man.¹ Others supposed that rent originated in the circumstance of the landlords enjoying a monopoly of the soil, and being, in consequence, enabled to obtain an artificially enhanced price for its produce. The latter contended, of course, that rent entered as an important element into the cost of corn and other agricultural products. But in the system of the Economists, rent, being looked upon as a free gift of nature, was not supposed to affect prices. Smith, though he adopted the opinions of the Economists in regard to the origin of rent, is not very consistent in his statements as to its operation on prices: on the whole, however, it would seem that he considered it as directly influencing them.²

The fallacy of these contradictory statements is sufficiently obvious. Were rent really the recompense of the work of nature, it would always exist, wherever cultivation is practised, and would be equal at all times; neither of which is the case. To suppose that it is the result of a

¹ *Ante*, p. 45, and "Wealth of Nations," p. 161.

² "Wealth of Nations," p. 23.

monopoly, in the ordinary sense of the term, on the part of the landlords, is still more visionary. No combination of any sort exists among them ; and at the very moment that some are receiving high rents, the rents of others are so trifling as to be next to nothing—a sufficient proof that they depend on something else than monopoly.

The true theory of rent was, for the first time, satisfactorily unfolded, very soon after the publication of the “*Wealth of Nations*,” by Dr James Anderson. He showed, by an original and able analysis, that rent is not the recompense of the work of nature, nor a consequence of land being made private property ; but that it owes its origin to the latter being of various degrees of fertility, and to the circumstance of its being impossible to apply capital indefinitely to any quality of land without, generally speaking, obtaining from it a diminished return. He further showed, that corn is always sold at its natural price, or at the price necessary to obtain the required supply, and that this price is totally unaffected by the payment of rent ; and he deduced from this doctrine many important practical conclusions, particularly with reference to the influence of tithes and other taxes over raw produce. These doctrines have since been illustrated and enforced by others. But the subject is not yet exhausted ; and we shall endeavour to place it in a somewhat novel point of view, and to obviate some of the objections that have been made to the theory.¹

¹ Dr Anderson was born at Hermandston, in Midlothian, in 1740. He was long engaged in the business of farming in the neighbourhood of Aberdeen. In 1777 he published a pamphlet, entitled, “*An Inquiry into the Corn Laws*,” in which (pp. 45–50) he has explained the theory of rent with a sagacity and discrimination that have never been surpassed. Having left Aberdeenshire, Anderson resided for some time in the neighbourhood of Edinburgh, where he projected and edited the “*Bee*,” a respectable weekly publication. In 1797 he removed to the vicinity of London, where he edited “*Recreations in Agriculture, Natural History, Arts*,” &c. In this work (vol. v. pp. 401–405) he gave a new and able exposition of the nature, origin, and progress of rent. But notwithstanding these repeated publications, it does not appear that his profound and important disquisitions attracted any attention. And so completely were they forgotten, that when

To acquire clear and correct ideas with respect to the nature and origin of rent, it is necessary to discriminate between the sources whence it arises ; that is, between the portion of the gross rent of an estate or farm which is really paid for the use of the natural and inherent powers of the soil, and the portion paid for the use of the buildings, fences, drains, roads, and other improvements (if such there be) made upon the soil. Two farms may be naturally of about equal goodness, and equally well situated ; but, if little or no capital have been expended upon the one, while a great deal has been judiciously expended upon the other, they will let for very different sums. It is usual, no doubt, to call all sums derived by the landlords from land, whatever be their origin, by the name of rent ; but, in an inquiry of this sort, it is necessary to distinguish between the sums paid for the use of the land and those paid for improvements, or for the use of the capital laid out upon the land. The latter are obviously profits ; and their amount, at any given period, must consequently depend on the principles which govern the rate of profit. And hence, to obviate confusion and inaccuracy, we shall, in this inquiry, regard rent as consisting of that portion of the gross sum paid for the land, which is paid for the use of its natural or inherent powers, or which would be paid for it, supposing it were in a state of nature, without any improvement upon it. Whatever the landlords receive beyond this, is profit, not rent.

On the first settling of any country abounding in large tracts of unappropriated land, no rent is paid ; and for this obvious reason, that no person will pay rent for what may be procured in unlimited quantities for nothing. Thus, in Australia, where there is an ample supply of unappropriated

Mr Malthus and Sir Edward West published their tracts on rent, in 1815, they were universally supposed to be the real authors of the theory ! There is, perhaps, no good reason to doubt their originality ; but it may well be doubted whether they explained the theory as satisfactorily as it had been explained about forty years before. Anderson died in 1808.

land, rent, in the proper and scientific sense of the word, will not be heard of until the best lands have become private property and been occupied. Suppose, however, this comes to be the case, and that the population has increased, so that the demand for raw produce can no longer be supplied by the culture of the best lands : under these circumstances, it is plain that population will become stationary, unless the price of corn and other raw produce rise so as to enable inferior lands to be cultivated. No advance short of this will procure another bushel of corn ; and competition will not, as will be immediately seen, allow prices to rise permanently above this level. The inhabitants have, therefore, but one alternative. If they pay a price sufficient to cover the expense of cultivating secondary lands, they will obtain additional supplies ; if they do not, they must be without them.

Suppose, now, that the price rises so as to pay the expense of raising corn on soils which, in return for the same expenditure that would yield 100 quarters on lands of the *first quality*, yield only 90 quarters : it is plain it will then be indifferent to a farmer whether he pay a rent of ten quarters for the first quality of land, or farm the second quality, which is unappropriated and open, without paying any rent. If the population went on increasing, lands which would yield only 80, 70, 60, 50, &c., quarters in return for the same expenditure that had raised 100 quarters on the best lands, might be successively brought under cultivation. And when recourse has been had to these inferior lands, the corn rents of those that are superior will plainly be equal to the differences between the quantities of produce obtained from them and the quantity obtained from the worst quality under tillage. Suppose, for example, that the worst quality cultivated yields 60 quarters, then the rent of the *first quality* will be 40 quarters, or $100 - 60$; the rent of the *second quality* will, in like manner, be equal to the difference between 90 and 60, or 30 quarters ; the rent of the third quality will be equal to $80 - 60$, or 20 quarters, and so on ; the produce

raised on the land last cultivated, or by means of the capital last applied to the soil, being all the while sold at its necessary price, or at that price which is merely sufficient to cover the cost of its production, including therein the ordinary rate of profit, on the capital of the cultivators. If the price were above this level, agriculture would be a peculiarly profitable business, and tillage would be immediately extended; whereas, on the other hand, if the price fell below this level, capital would be withdrawn from the soil, and the poorer lands be thrown out of cultivation. Under such circumstances, it is clear that rent would not enter into the price of the produce raised by means of the capital last applied to the soil, that being exclusively made up of wages and profits. The proprietors of the superior lands obtain rent; but this is the necessary result of their greater fertility. The demand cannot be supplied without cultivating inferior soils, the produce of which must necessarily sell for such a price as will afford the ordinary rate of profit to *their* cultivators. This price will, however, yield a surplus, over and above this ordinary rate, to the cultivators of the more fertile lands; and this surplus forms rent.

“In every country,” says Dr Anderson, “there are various soils which are endued with different degrees of fertility; and hence it must happen, that the farmer who cultivates the most fertile of these can afford to bring his corn to market at a lower price than others who cultivate poorer fields. But if the corn that grows on these fertile spots be not sufficient fully to supply the market, the price will naturally be raised to such a height as to indemnify others for the expense of cultivating poorer soils. The farmer, however, who cultivates the rich spots, will be able to sell his corn at the same rate with those who occupy poorer fields; he will, consequently, receive more than the intrinsic value for the corn he raises. Many persons will, therefore, be desirous of obtaining possession of these fertile fields; being content to give a certain premium for an exclusive privilege to cultivate them, varying, of course, according to the more or less

fertility of the soil. It is this premium which constitutes what we now call *rent*; a medium by which the expense of cultivating soils of very different degrees of fertility is reduced to a perfect equality.”¹

Rent, therefore, in so far as it is a return for the use of the soil, and not for the capital laid out on its improvement, results entirely from the necessity of resorting, as population increases, to soils of a decreasing degree of fertility, or of applying capital to the old land with a less return. It varies inversely as the produce obtained by means of the capital and labour employed in cultivation, increasing when the profits of agriculture diminish, and diminishing when they increase. Profits are at their maximum in countries like Australia, Indiana, and Illinois, and generally in all situations in which no rent is paid, and the best of the good lands only cultivated; but it cannot be said that rents have attained their maximum so long as capital yields any surplus in the shape of profit.

A quarter of wheat may be raised in Kent or Essex, or in the Carse of Gowrie, for a *fourth* or a *fifth* part, perhaps, of the expense necessary to raise it on the worst soils in cultivation in the least fertile parts of the country. The same article cannot, however, have two or more prices at the same time and in the same market. Hence, if the price be not such as will indemnify the producers of the wheat raised on the worst soils, they will cease bringing it to market, and the required supplies will no longer be obtained; while, if the price exceed this sum, fresh capital will be applied to its production, and competition will soon sink prices to their natural level—that is, to such a sum as will afford the common and ordinary rate of profit to the raisers of that portion of the required supply which is produced under the most unfavourable circumstances, or at the greatest expense. The cost of producing this last portion determines the price

¹ “Observations on the Means of exciting a Spirit of Industry,” p. 376, published in 1777, the same year as the tract on the Corn Laws, already referred to.

of the whole crop. And, therefore, it is plainly the same thing to the consumers whether, in an advanced stage of society, the excess of return over the cost of production, on lands of the first quality, goes to a non-resident landlord or an occupier. It must go to the one or the other. Corn is not high because rent is paid, but rent is paid because corn is high—because the demand cannot be supplied without cultivating soils of a diminished degree of fertility as compared with the best. Suppose there is in any country an effectual demand for ten millions of quarters of corn; that nine millions may be raised upon lands that yield a high rent, but that it is necessary to raise the other million on inferior lands which yield nothing but ordinary profits to their cultivators: under these circumstances, it is clear that the relinquishing of the rents payable by the superior lands would be no boon to the cultivators of those that are inferior. It would not lessen their expenses; that is, it would not lessen the capital and labour employed by them in raising that portion of the required supply which is produced on their lands; and unless it did this, it is obviously impossible, supposing the demand not to decline, that it should lower prices. Although, therefore, the landlords should give up the whole of their rents, it would have no influence over prices. Such an act would turn farmers into landlords, and landlords into beggars; but there its effect would stop. The case, however, is entirely different when the cost of production varies. If it diminish, the competition of the producers will infallibly sink prices in the same proportion; while, if it increase, supplies will not continue to be brought to market, unless the price rise to a corresponding level. In no case, therefore, whether the demand be great or small—whether for one thousand or one million of quarters—can the price of raw produce permanently exceed or fall below the sum necessary to pay the cost of producing that portion of the supply which is raised on the worst land, or by means of the last capital laid out on the soil.

It has been objected to this theory, that though it may apply in unappropriated countries like Australia, it will not apply in countries like England, where land is universally appropriated, and where, it is alleged, the worst qualities always yield some small rent to the proprietor.

It may be observed of this objection, that even were it well-founded, it would not practically affect the previous conclusions. There are in England and Scotland vast tracts of land which do not let for 6d. an acre; but to cultivate these would require an outlay of many thousands of pounds; and the rent would consequently bear so small a proportion to the expenses of production, as to become altogether evanescent and inappreciable.

There can be no doubt, however, that there is in this, and most other extensive countries, a great deal of land which yields no rent.¹ In the United States and Russia such is unquestionably the case; and yet no one presumes to say, that the laws which regulate rent in them, are different from those which regulate it in England and France. The poorest lands are always let in immense tracts. If it were attempted to let particular portions of these tracts separately, no one would offer for them; but they appear to yield rent, because, though they really fetch nothing, the more fertile spots with which they are intermixed, may, in most cases, be let for a larger or smaller rent. But although every rood of land in Britain paid a high rent, it might still be truly affirmed, that such rent did not enter into the price of raw produce. Rent consists of the difference, or of the value of the difference, between the produce obtained through the agency of the capital first applied to the land, and that which is last applied

¹ A noble marquis is the owner of a farm in Ayrshire, consisting of about 10,000 English acres, which is let for about £70 a-year! There is a house upon the farm, and some further capital has been laid out upon it. Perhaps, taking these circumstances into account, it may be truly said that this vast tract fetches no rent properly so called. Several similar instances might be mentioned.

to it. It would, as already seen, be indifferent to a cultivator, whether he paid a rent of ten quarters to a landlord for land yielding, with a certain outlay, 100 quarters of corn, or employed the same capital in cultivating inferior land yielding only 90 quarters, for which he paid no rent. Were it possible always to obtain 100 quarters for every equal additional capital applied to the superior soils, no person, it is obvious, would ever resort to those of inferior fertility; and, under such circumstances, the largest population might be supported on the smallest extent of land. But such is not the law under which food is obtained; and the fact that, in the progress of society, new and less fertile land is invariably brought under cultivation, demonstrates that additional capital and labour cannot be indefinitely applied with the same advantage to the old land. The state of a country may be such, the demand for agricultural produce may be so great, that every quality of land actually yields rent; but it is the same, in respect of this theory, if there be any capital employed in husbandry which yields only ordinary profits, whether it be employed upon old or new land. And that a large amount of capital is every where employed in such manner, is a fact of which there cannot be a doubt. The owners and occupiers of land are influenced by the same principles, in the employment of their capital and labour, that influence other men. Like them, they endeavour, in prosecuting their own interests, so to adjust their capital that the last quantity laid out may yield the ordinary rate of profit, neither more nor less. Suppose, for example, that a landlord occupies a farm which he might let for £200 a-year, producing, with a certain outlay of capital, 300 quarters of wheat: If the farm be managed with the requisite skill and attention, the wheat should, at an average, sell for so much money as is equivalent to the rent, the expense of labour, and the profit on the capital employed. Suppose, now, that the landlord finds that, by laying out additional capital on the farm, it may be made to yield 10, 20, 50, or 100 quarters

more; he will make the outlay, provided the additional produce yield the ordinary rate of profit. He will not wait, to commence the outlay, till prices rise to a still higher elevation. It will be quite enough to make him immediately set about it, if they be such as afford a fair prospect of his realising the usual profits on the capital to be expended. He will, in fact, act exactly as the merchant or manufacturer acts who sends another ship to sea, or builds another cotton-mill, whenever he supposes that the capital so embarked will yield customary profits. And supposing the farm were let to a tenant, he, it is obvious, will do the same as the proprietor, in the event of his being able to obtain so much profit as may suffice, over and above the usual return, to replace the capital itself previously to the termination of the lease. Whether he will employ this additional capital depends entirely on the circumstance of prices being such as will repay his expenses and profits; for he knows he will have no additional rent to pay. Even at the expiration of his lease, the fact of an additional capital being employed would not occasion a rise of rent, unless in so far as some portion of it, by being permanently incorporated with the soil, may increase its inherent powers; and were his landlord to require more rent because a greater movable capital had been employed, he would cease to employ it; since, by the supposition, he gets only the same profits he might get by employing it in any other department of industry.

If we reverse the previous suppositions, and suppose that the owner of the farm finds that, owing to a fall in the price of corn, the capital employed in its cultivation does not yield the common and ordinary rate of profit, he will then, acting on the same principle that led him in the other case to increase the capital on the farm, immediately withdraw a part of it; and, supposing it to be let, the rent would be proportionally reduced at the end of the lease, or sooner.

It is hardly, perhaps, necessary to state that, in practice, these results do not follow, as here supposed, imme-

diately, and without any difficulty, on a rise or fall of prices: on the contrary, they take place only by degrees; and are often productive, on the one hand, of peculiar advantages, and, on the other, of peculiar sacrifices. But in purely theoretical inquiries, or such as have the establishment of principles for their object, such accidental circumstances may be overlooked; and it may, speaking generally, be said, that the last portion of capital laid out on the soil yields only the common and average rate of profit: if, on the one hand, it were to yield *more*, fresh capital would be drawn to agriculture, and competition would sink prices to the level that would merely yield this rate. If, on the other hand, the capital last applied to the soil should yield *less* than this common and average rate, it would be withdrawn, until, by the diminution of produce and consequent rise of price, the last remaining portion of capital left this rate to its owners; and hence it follows, that whether the last quality of land taken into cultivation yield rent or not, the last capital applied to the land yields only the common and average rate of profit; and consequently, the price of the produce which it yields, and which regulates the price of all the rest, is totally unaffected by rent.

It has been said that this reasoning involves a contradiction, and that it accounts for a rise and a fall of price in the same way, or by an extension of cultivation! But it is easy to see that it does no such thing. The price of corn will always be low where it is cheaply produced, as in Poland; and it will occasionally be low where it costs a great deal to produce it, as in England, when a redundant supply is brought to market. Suppose that the effectual demand for corn in Great Britain is such as will enable lands of the third or fourth degree of fertility to be cultivated with the customary return to the cultivators, but that, owing to variable harvests, to injudicious encouragement held out by the legislature, the ardour of speculation, the miscalculation of farmers, or any other cause, inferior lands, or those of

the fifth degree of fertility, have been brought under tillage : the increased quantity of produce that will then be brought to market will plainly depress prices to such an extent that, instead of yielding average profits to the cultivators of the fifth class, they will not yield them to the cultivators of the fourth class. But they will yield *more* to the cultivators of the fourth than to those of the fifth ; the latter, therefore, will be first driven from their business ; and when they have retired, prices will rise, not indeed to such a height as to enable the fifth class of lands to be cultivated, but so high as to enable the cultivators of the fourth class to continue their business ; that is, as has been already shown, to the sum that will enable the raisers of the last portion of the produce required to supply the effectual demand to obtain ordinary profits. Should the demand, instead of continuing stationary, increase so that it could not be supplied without resorting to still inferior lands, the price of corn would rise in proportion to the increased expense of their cultivation. But to whatever extent the demand might increase, if such improvements were made in agriculture, or in the art of raising corn, as should enable the supply to be obtained from land of the highest degree of fertility, prices would necessarily fall to the level required to pay the expenses of its cultivators, inferior lands would be abandoned, and rent would disappear.

It is farther said, by those who have cavilled at this theory, that it represents the cultivation of inferior land as the cause of rent ; whereas it is, they affirm, the growing demand of the population for food that is its cause, it being the rise of price consequent to this increased demand that occasions the cultivation of inferior lands, and the payment of rent for those that are superior. This, however, is at best mere verbal trifling. The demand of the population for corn elevates its price to the height necessary to obtain the required supply, and may, therefore, be truly said to be the cause of its being produced ; but rent originates in the

peculiar circumstances under which supplies of corn are produced. Were it not that it is most frequently necessary, in order to obtain an increased supply, to resort to soils of different degrees of fertility, or to apply capital, with a less return, to the old land, rent would be altogether unknown ; nor, though the demand for corn were increased in a tenfold proportion, would prices be permanently elevated. It does, therefore, seem to be logically as well as substantially correct to affirm, that the decreasing fertility of the soil is the immediate cause of rent ; and that its amount is determined by the extent to which inferior land is cultivated or good land forced.

This analysis of the nature and causes of rent discovers an important distinction between agricultural, and commercial and manufacturing industry. In manufactures, the worst machinery is first set in motion, and every day its powers are improved by new inventions, and it is rendered capable of yielding a greater amount of produce with the same expense ; and as no limits can be assigned to the quantity of improved machinery that may be introduced, as a million of steam-engines may be constructed for the same, or rather for a less, proportional expense than would be required for the construction of one, competition never fails to reduce the price of manufactured commodities to the sum for which they may be produced according to the least expensive method.

In agriculture, on the contrary, the best machines, or best soils are brought first into use, and recourse is afterwards had to inferior soils, or those requiring a greater expenditure to make them yield the same supplies. It is true that improvements in the construction of farming implements, the discovery of more efficient manures, the introduction of more prolific crops, and of improved systems of management, increase, in a high degree, the productiveness of the soil, and proportionally reduce the price of raw produce ; but a fall of price, though permanent in manu-

factures, is temporary only in agriculture. When the price of corn is reduced, all classes obtain greater quantities than before in exchange for their products or their labour : hence the rate of profit, and consequently the accumulation of capital, are both increased ; and this increase, by causing a greater demand for labour and higher wages, leads, in the end, to an increase of population, and, consequently, to a further demand for raw produce and an extended cultivation. Agricultural improvements obviate, sometimes for a lengthened period, the necessity of having recourse to inferior soils ; still, however, their influence in this respect cannot be permanent. The stimulus which they at the same time give to population, and the natural tendency of mankind to increase up to the means of subsistence, are sure, in the long run, to raise prices, and, by forcing recourse to poor lands, rents also.

In illustrating this important distinction between agricultural and manufacturing industry, Mr Malthus has set the theory of rent in a striking point of view. "The earth," he observes, "has been sometimes compared to a vast machine, presented by nature to man for the production of food and raw materials ; but to make the resemblance more just, as far as they admit of comparison, we should consider the soil as a present to man of a great number of machines, all susceptible of continued improvement by the application of capital to them, but yet of very different original qualities and powers.

"This great inequality in the powers of the machinery employed in procuring raw produce, forms one of the most remarkable features which distinguishes the machinery of the land from the machinery employed in manufactures.

"When a machine in manufactures is invented which will produce more finished work with less labour and capital than before, if there be no patent, or as soon as the patent is over, a sufficient number of such machines may be made to supply the whole demand, and to supersede entirely the use of all the old machinery. The natural consequence is,

that the price is reduced to the price of production from the best machinery ; and if the price were to be depressed lower, the whole of the commodity would be withdrawn from the market.

“The machines which produce corn and raw materials, on the contrary, are the gifts of nature, not the works of man ; and we find by experience that these gifts have very different qualities and powers. The most fertile lands of a country, those which, like the best machinery in manufactures, yield the greatest products with the least labour and capital, are never found sufficient to supply the effective demand of an increasing population. The price of raw produce, therefore, naturally rises till it becomes sufficiently high to pay the cost of raising it with inferior machines, and by a more expensive process ; and, as there cannot be two prices for corn of the same quality, all the other machines, the working of which requires less capital compared with the produce, must yield rents in proportion to their goodness.

“Every extensive country may thus be considered as possessing a gradation of machines for the production of corn and raw materials, including in this gradation not only all the various qualities of poor land, of which every large territory has generally an abundance, but the inferior machinery which may be said to be employed when good land is further and further forced for additional produce. As the price of raw produce continues to rise, these inferior machines are successively called into action ; and as the price of raw produce continues to fall, they are successively thrown out of action. The illustration here used serves to show at once the necessity of the actual price of corn to the actual produce, and the different effect which would attend a great reduction in the price of any particular manufacture, and a great reduction in the price of raw produce.”¹

It appears, therefore, that in the earlier stages of society,

¹ “Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent,” p. 37.

and when only the best lands are cultivated, rent is unknown. The landlords, as such, do not begin to share in the produce of the soil until it becomes necessary to cultivate lands of an inferior degree of fertility, or to apply capital to the superior lands with a diminished return. Whenever this is the case, rent begins to be paid; and it continues to increase according as cultivation is extended over poorer soils, and diminishes according as they are thrown out of cultivation. Rent, therefore, depends exclusively on the extension of tillage. It is high where tillage is widely extended over inferior lands, and low where it is confined to the superior descriptions only. But in no case does rent enter into price; for the produce raised on the poorest lands, or by means of the capital last applied to the culture of the soil, determines the price of the entire crop; and this produce yields only the common and average rate of profit.¹

In the previous statements we have, to simplify the question, omitted to notice the influence of situation on rent. It is plain, however, that this must be an important element in determining its amount; and that differences of situation must have precisely the same sort of influence

¹ The rise in the price of raw produce, occasioned by the decreasing fertility of the soils to which every advancing society must resort, was, we incline to think, first distinctly shown in a work in which there are many just and ingenious, intermixed with many fanciful and erroneous views, entitled "*Principes de tout Gouvernement*," in two vols. 12mo, published in 1766. The author has, on one occasion, hit upon the real origin of rent:—"Quand les cultivateurs, devenus nombreux," says he, "auront défriché toutes les bonnes terres, par leur augmentation successive, et par la continuité du défrichement, il se trouvera un point où il sera plus avantageux à un nouveau colon de prendre à ferme des terres fécondes, que d'en défricher de nouvelles beaucoup moins bonnes."—(Tom. i. p. 126.) It is plain, however, from his not reverting to the subject, that he was not at all aware of the importance of the principle on which he had stumbled; and it is apparent, indeed, from other passages of the work, that he supposed rent entered into price.

over rent as differences of fertility. Thus, suppose two farmers employ equal *quantities* of capital, in the cultivation of farms of the same goodness, the one situated in the immediate vicinity of London, and the other in Yorkshire; and suppose, farther, that London is the market to which the produce of both farms is sent, and that the cost of conveying corn from Yorkshire to London is 5s. a quarter: under these circumstances, if the gross produce of each farm was 1000 quarters, of which the landlord received *one-fifth* part, or 200 quarters, as rent, the farm near London would fetch £50 a-year more than the farm in Yorkshire. For, as the corn raised in the districts adjacent to London is not adequate for its supply, its price in the city must suffice to pay those who bring any portion of the necessary supplies from the greatest distance, as well for the expenses of carriage as for those of production; and the farmer in the immediate vicinity, who gets this increased price for his produce, will have to pay a proportional increase of money rent, in the same way that the occupier of good land has to pay an increased rent, as soon as inferior lands are taken into cultivation.

It may, however, be worth remarking, that if rents were paid in corn and not in money, there would be little if any difference in their amount. At first sight, no doubt, it appears that the Middlesex farmer should not only pay a higher money rent, but also a higher corn rent; for, if he do not, it is contended that he will have as great a quantity of corn as profit as the Yorkshire farmer; and as the value of corn in Middlesex is greater than in Yorkshire, his profits would, under the circumstances, be proportionally higher, which cannot be the case. But the fact of their paying equal corn rents would not really cause any sensible discrepancy in their profits. We have supposed that both farmers employ equal *quantities* of capital; but it must be kept in mind that, generally speaking, to whatever extent the value of raw produce in Middlesex may exceed its value in York-

shire, the value of by far the largest portion of the capital belonging to the Middlesex farmer will be increased in about the same degree: and hence it follows, that the increased value or price of the produce belonging to the latter as profit, is only about equal to the additional value of the capital he has employed, and that he is not really in a better situation than the other.

It would, on many accounts, be desirable to be able readily to distinguish between that portion of the *gross* rental of a country, which is to be considered as rent properly so called, or as the remuneration paid to the landlords for the use of the natural powers of the soil, and that portion which is the return to, or the interest upon, the capital laid out upon houses, fences, drains, roads, and other improvements. But how desirable soever, it is admitted by all practical men, that it is quite impossible to make such a distinction with any thing approaching to accuracy. No two agriculturists, supposing them to be desired to resolve the gross rent of a single improved farm into its constituent parts, would arrive at the same result. Improvements become so much blended with the natural powers of the soil, that the influence of the one cannot be separated from that of the other; and it is merely the joint value of the two that can be estimated. No doubt can, however, be entertained by any one who reflects for a moment on the vast sums—the many hundreds, or rather thousands of millions—that have been laid out upon the soil of England, that the rent paid to the landlords for the use of its natural powers is but inconsiderable compared with what is paid to them on account of improvements. And hence the inequality and mischievous operation of taxes on rent. Two landlords receive equal rents from their estates; but the rent of one is principally a consequence of natural fertility, while that of the other is derived principally from outlays of capital. What, then, could be more unfair than to subject

them both to the same equal tax? And yet the amount of their rents is the only criterion to which recourse could be had in fixing the amount of the tax—for all the tax-collectors in the world could not separate between what was really rent, in the scientific sense of the term, and what was interest on capital. Such a tax would oppose the most effectual obstacle to improvements. Instead of carrying capital from other employments to the land, it would henceforth be carried from the land to them. The object would not then be to have an estate look well, but to have it look ill. And it may be said of estates as of individuals,

“*Pauper videri vult Cinna, et est pauper.*”

The effects formerly produced by the *taille*, and those now produced by the *contribution foncière* in France, and the fluctuating land taxes imposed in other countries, abundantly confirm the truth of this statement; their influence having been most disastrous.

Before closing this chapter, we may observe that the author of the “*Critical Dissertation on Value*,”¹ contends that, because the value of the corn raised on lands paying rent is not, after inferior lands are taken into cultivation, proportioned to the cost of its production, it is incorrect to represent the value of the aggregate produce raised in countries where cultivation is extended over inferior lands, as depending on that principle. But those who contend that the value of raw and other products, the quantities of which admit of indefinite increase, is determined by the cost of their production, invariably refer to the labour required to produce that portion of raw produce, or of any required article which is raised under the most unfavourable circumstances. “The exchangeable value of all commodities,” says Mr Ricardo, “whether they be manufactured, or the produce of the mines, or the produce of land, is always regulated, not by the less quantity of labour that will suffice

¹ P. 194.

for their production under circumstances highly favourable, and exclusively enjoyed by those who have peculiar facilities of production, but by the greater quantity of labour necessarily bestowed on their production by those who have no such facilities; by those who continue to produce them under the most unfavourable circumstances—meaning, by the most unfavourable circumstances, the most unfavourable under which the quantity of produce required renders it necessary to carry on the production.”¹

This is the sense in which we are always to understand the proposition, that the value of commodities depends on the cost of their production, or on the quantity of labour required to produce them and bring them to market. It is not meant to affirm, that the value of every particular hat or bushel of corn offered for sale is determined by the quantity of labour actually expended on *its* production. What is really meant is, that the value of all the hats, as of all the corn required for the supply of the market, is determined by the quantity of labour required to produce that hat, or that bushel of corn, which has been produced with the greatest difficulty.

It is obvious that no error can arise in estimating the value of raw produce, from supposing it to have been wholly raised under the same circumstances as that portion which is raised by means of the capital last applied to the soil; for though portions of it may have been raised under very different circumstances, it is certain that their value must, notwithstanding, be exclusively determined by, and identical with, the value of that which is raised by this last applied capital. And hence, when corn is employed as capital in any industrious undertaking, we are to consider it as being, in fact, either the actual product, or the equivalent of the product, of some quantity of the labour of those who raise corn on the worst lands under tillage; and the quantity of

¹ “Principles of Political Economy,” 3d edit. p. 60.

labour so wrought up in this capital, or represented by it, must plainly determine the cost of the commodities produced by its agency. This principle holds in the case of all commodities, the supply of which admits of being indefinitely extended. On tracing the cost of any article of this description, we shall find that it is determined, in all ordinary states of the market, by the quantity of labour actually expended on its production, if it be produced under the most unfavourable circumstances, or that is actually expended on a similar article produced under these circumstances.

CHAPTER VI.

Influence of Improvements—Slowness with which they spread—Beneficial to all Classes—Different methods of Letting Lands—Remarks upon those Methods—Increase and Reduction of Rents—Regulations as to Management—Size of Farms—Influence of the granting of the Elective Franchise to Tenants over Agriculture—Profits of Farmers.

A GOOD deal of misconception has been entertained with respect to the influence of improvements over rent. It has been already seen that rent depends on the extent to which tillage has been carried ; but the most common effect of improvements being to enable the same quantity of produce to be obtained from a less extent of land, it would seem, on a superficial view, that they are injurious to the landlord. But there is no such opposition between his interests and those of the rest of the community ; and it will be found, when rightly examined, that improvements are no less advantageous to the owners and occupiers of land than to others.

1. To have a distinct idea of the operation and influence of improvements, it may be proper to consider them both as applying generally to all sorts of land, and to some particular sorts only. In the first case, then, let it be supposed to illustrate the principle, that the following quantities of produce are obtained from the different qualities of land under cultivation, and the following rents paid, viz.

A	B	C	D	E	Qualities of Land.
100	90	80	70	60	{ Quantities of produce obtained with equal capitals.
40	30	20	10	0	
					Rent.

Now, suppose an improvement is made which enables

ten per cent more produce to be obtained with the same outlay, and that this improvement extends to all qualities of land, the quantities produced, and the rent, would then be—

110	99	88	77	66	Quantities of produce.
44	33	22	11	0	Rent.

In this case it is plain, that if the demand for corn were increased so as to take off the greater quantity brought to market, the landlord would not sustain any inconvenience whatever from the improvement, but would be immediately as well as permanently benefited by it. He would obtain a greater quantity of corn as rent; and notwithstanding the reduction of its price, it would exchange for the same quantity of other things that the smaller quantity did before. If, however, there were no increase of demand, ten per cent of the capital at present employed in agriculture would be withdrawn from that business, so that the quantity of produce would be the same as before the improvements; the corn rent would also be the same; though, as corn would, under the circumstances supposed, be ten per cent cheaper, money rents would fall in that proportion. But it is abundantly obvious, that though the demand might not be immediately increased, so as to take off the whole additional quantity brought to market in consequence of the improvement, it would not remain stationary. It is impossible, indeed, that such should be the case. The consumption of the lower classes, and the quantity of corn given to the horses employed in industrious undertakings, or kept for pleasure, is invariably increased when prices fall; at the same time that the stimulus which the fall gives to population, would, in the end, increase the demand, so as to absorb not only the increased quantity of corn, but to occasion the cultivation of fresh soils.

2. Let it now be supposed that the improvement is partial; that it affects the *superior* qualities of land only; and

that the quantities produced after it has been carried into effect are as follow, viz. :—

A	B	C	D	E	Qualities of land.
110	95	$82\frac{1}{2}$	70	60	{ Quantities of produce after improvement.
50	35	$22\frac{1}{2}$	10	0	
					Rent after ditto.

Now it is evident, that if the improvement in the productiveness of the qualities A B C increased the produce brought to market, so as merely to lessen the extent of land of the class E under tillage, without causing its cultivation to be entirely relinquished, it would not affect prices; and the money rents, as well as the corn rents of the proprietors of A B C, would rise so as to enable them to gain the whole advantage resulting from the improvement.

If the whole of the class E were thrown out of tillage, corn rents would be as follow :—

A	B	C	D	Qualities of land.
40	25	$12\frac{1}{2}$	0	Rent.

But in this case, as in the former, the contraction of cultivation would be but of very short duration; for, owing to the increased cheapness, the demand would very speedily rise so as to require the renewed cultivation of E; so that any inconvenience that might by possibility arise to the proprietors in the first instance, would at most be only trifling and transitory, while the advantage would be great and permanent.

3. In the third and last case, let it be supposed that the improvement is greatest on the *worst* lands, and that it decreases as their fertility improves. Thus suppose

A	B	C	D	E	Qualities of land.
100	90	80	70	60	Quantities before improvement.
40	30	20	10	0	Rent before ditto.
100	90	$82\frac{1}{2}$	75	70	Quantities after improvement.
30	20	$12\frac{1}{2}$	5	0	Rent after ditto.

If the improvement were so great as to throw E out of cultivation, rents would be 25, 16, $7\frac{1}{2}$, 0. But as in this case the fall of price, and consequent rise of profits, would be very great, a proportionally powerful stimulus would be given to population; and the increased demand that would, at no distant period, be experienced, would be such as inevitably to bring the next qualities of land, or F G, &c., under cultivation; so that in this, as in all other cases, both corn and money rents would be, in the end, very greatly increased by the improvement.

These statements sufficiently show, that, supposing an improvement were introduced so rapidly and widely as to occasion an immediate fall of price, and consequently of money rents, these effects would be of very limited duration; for the greater cheapness of raw produce, by increasing the demand for it by the existing population, as well as by stimulating its increase, could not fail speedily to raise prices to their old level, and even to carry them beyond it.

But it is material to observe, that these suppositions have been made merely to illustrate the principle, and that, in point of fact, they are never realised. In the vast majority of cases, improvements apply nearly equally to all sorts of soil. They take place principally in machinery, in the rotation of crops, in the breeds of stock, the better drainage of wet soils, the composition and application of manures, &c., which are generally applicable not to one or a few only, but to almost every description of land. Improvements, too, rarely precede, but most commonly follow, a rise of prices, occasioned either by an increased demand for raw produce, or by some previous scarcity. Neither do they ever rapidly spread over any considerable extent of country; they make their way only by slow, and, indeed, almost imperceptible degrees; and tend not so much to occasion any actual reduction of prices, as to prevent their rising to an oppressive height. Improvements are at first adopted

by a few of the more intelligent proprietors and farmers in different districts, and are thence gradually diffused throughout the country. This progress is, however, much more tedious than one not acquainted with the obstacles by which it is opposed might be inclined to believe. Improvements which effect material changes in long-established customs have always been slowly and reluctantly admitted. But the agricultural class is the least of all disposed to innovation, and the most peculiarly attached to ancient customs and routine. "The farmer is not so much within reach of information as the merchant and manufacturer; he has not, like those who reside in towns, the means of ready intercourse and constant communication with others engaged in the same occupation. He lives retired; his acquaintance is limited, and but little varied; and unless he is accustomed to read, he is little likely to acquire any other knowledge of his art than what is traditionary—what is transmitted from father to son, and limited in its application to his own immediate neighbourhood."¹

So powerful has been the influence of these circumstances, that notwithstanding the advances in agricultural science during the last century, and the efforts made to diffuse it, there is but a comparatively small portion of England and Scotland where the most improved system of husbandry is followed, while in Ireland it can hardly be said to be yet introduced. Even in some of the counties adjoining the metropolis, practices are persevered in that are utterly inconsistent with all the rules of good agriculture. In the rich soil of Essex, the wretched system of fleet ploughing and whole year fallows is still pretty generally followed; the agriculture of Sussex is said to be at least a century behind that of East Lothian or Norfolk; and in some of the midland counties, it is customary to yoke four or five horses to a plough for the tillage of light land! "Those improvements that are well known and systematically prac-

¹ Preface to Rigby's "Translation of Chateaubriand on the Agriculture of Italy."

tised in one county, are frequently unknown or utterly disregarded in the adjacent district; and what is to every unprejudiced observer evidently erroneous and injurious to the land, is, in some quarters, persisted in most pertinaciously, though a journey of not many miles would open to view the beneficial effects of a contrary practice."¹

Practically, therefore, nothing can be more futile and visionary than to suppose that there is the least chance of improvements ever becoming, even for the shortest period, injurious to the landlords, by their causing a fall of prices. There is not the shadow of a ground for supposing that they can ever be so rapidly diffused as to produce this effect; and the most extensive and successful improver may prosecute his patriotic labours, without any apprehension that either his efforts or example will be sufficiently powerful to occasion any glut of the market, or fall of price.

It is unnecessary, perhaps, to say more in illustration of the importance and advantage of improvements. We may, however, observe, that were it not for their influence, it is most probable that the progress of society would have been long since arrested. The nearer that the quantity of produce necessarily consumed in carrying on industrious undertakings approaches to that which is obtained from them, the smaller is the rate of profit, and the slower the advance of the society: were the two quantities to become nearly equal, or to balance each other, society would be at a stand; and if, under such circumstances, population increased, the standard of competence would necessarily be lowered. But the inventions and discoveries that are every now and then occurring, prevent the progress of society from being arrested in the way now mentioned. No limits can be set to the inventive powers; and the very moment when cultivation seems improved to the utmost, may be distinguished by discoveries sufficient to give a new aspect to the whole

¹ Kennedy and Grainger "On the Tenancy of Land." Introd. p. 8.

business of husbandry, and to carry the society forward for many generations.

For reasons similar to those now stated, we have always contended that the landlords did not really gain any thing by the restrictions imposed on the importation of foreign corn previously to 1846; and that their interests would be best promoted by throwing the ports open to importation from abroad, under such reasonable fixed duty as might suffice to countervail any excess of taxation, if such there were, to which they might be subject above what was borne by the manufacturing and commercial classes. We have elsewhere stated, at considerable length, the reasons which made us look upon this conclusion as little susceptible of doubt or controversy.¹ Here it is enough to state, that to whatever extent restrictions on the importation of corn into a comparatively populous and highly manufacturing country like Great Britain, raise its average price above its natural level, they can hardly fail, exclusively of their other ill effects, to depress proportionally the rate of profit, and, consequently, to stimulate the transfer of capital to other countries. But it would be folly to imagine, that a system productive of such results should be really beneficial to those who have so deep an interest in the public prosperity as the landlords. Numerous and affluent consumers, or, which is substantially the same thing, flourishing manufactures and commerce, are indispensable to a flourishing agriculture; and those who impose oppressive burdens on the former in order to promote the interests of the latter, are, in fact, contradicting and defeating the very purpose they are anxious to forward. Perseverance in such short-sighted policy might eventually, by injuring or ruining those on whom the agriculturists must depend for a market, or driving them and their capital to other countries, seriously injure, if it did not ultimately ruin, agriculture itself.

¹ "Wealth of Nations." Supplementary Note on the Corn Laws.

This is a point on which Colonel Torrens has made some pertinent observations. "The landed proprietors of England," says he, "possess the important advantage of immediate vicinity to the largest and most flourishing manufacturing towns in the world; and the consequence is, that in proportion to its fertility, land in England pays a higher rent, whether estimated in produce or in money, than in any other country. Let not short-sighted avarice destroy the sources of the golden egg: let not the proprietors of England, by restricting the importation of foreign agricultural produce, artificially raise the value of such produce in our markets, and thus depress the rate of profit, until the seats of manufacture are transferred to France, or Holland, or Germany. No proposition, we believe, admits of a more rigid demonstration, than that the highest rents will be paid in countries in which manufacturing industry is carried to the greatest height. But it is obviously impossible that manufactures should continue to flourish in a country where restrictions on the importation of corn raise the value of raw produce in relation to wrought goods, and thereby depress manufacturing profits below the rate prevailing in the neighbouring countries. If we do not freely import foreign produce, our manufacturing superiority cannot be maintained, and, by necessity, our high comparative rents cannot continue to be paid."¹

It would lead us too far from the proper object of this work, were we to attempt to enter, at any considerable length, on an examination of the more interesting questions connected with the letting of land. Perhaps, however, there is no single circumstance that has so much influence over the prosperity of agriculture, and the condition of the agricultural class, as the terms of leases, or the stipulations

¹ "Treatise on the External Corn Trade," 4th edit., p. 168. The question, whether manufactures should, in certain cases, be restrained, in the view of providing for the interests and security of the public, depends on other considerations.—See Part I., cap. 6.

usually entered into between the landlords and those to whom they let or assign the power of cultivating their estates.

The most important of these stipulations are those which respect the duration of the lease, the payment of the rent, and the mode of management.

Though there may be various opinions as to what should be the duration of a lease, and though it may differ in different cases, there is no room for doubt as to the superiority of the plan of letting lands for a number of years certain. When a tenant is secured in the possession of his farm for a fixed and reasonable period, he has every inducement to exert himself, and to apply whatever capital and skill he may possess to its improvement. But a tenant at will, or a tenant who may be turned out of his farm at any time, without having any good grounds for affirming that he has been ill treated, dares not venture upon any outlay. Such a tenant is really, in so far at least as the business of farming is concerned, without the security of property. And having no guarantee that he will be allowed to continue in the occupation of his farm for such a period as would give him the means of reaping the advantage of improvements, he never once thinks of undertaking any. He continues to move on in the accustomed routine of the district to which he belongs; and if he should be so fortunate as to accumulate a little capital, which is but seldom the case, he either employs it in some other business, or in taking a greater extent of land; but he scrupulously abstains from laying out any thing on improvements, unless they happen to be such as promise an almost immediate return. There can, therefore, be no question, that the granting of leases for a fixed and reasonable number of years has been of the utmost consequence to agriculture; and those best acquainted with the business affirm, that it has done more for its improvement than all the other encouragements that have been given to it.

The term "tenants at will" is sometimes rather impro-

perly applied to tenants who have no leases, but who, notwithstanding, either from the custom of the estate or district, or the promises of the landlord, have a pretty good security that they will not be capriciously ejected, and that their rents will not be raised immediately upon their making an improvement. Still, however, the security afforded by such a tenure is far short of what is afforded by a lease.

Where the rights of both parties are not clearly defined, disputes may unintentionally arise; the tenant is in such cases kept in a state of dependency upon his landlord; and however well he may be treated by the individual now in possession of the estate, he cannot foretell what may be the views and objects of his successor. And hence, as Mr Loudon has observed, "no prudent man will ever invest his fortune in the improvement of another person's property, unless, from the length of his lease, he has a reasonable prospect of being reimbursed with profit; and the servility which a holding at will necessarily exacts, is altogether incompatible with that spirit of enterprise which belongs to an enlightened and independent mind."¹

It is, perhaps, needless to add, that the want of leases is, in most cases, as injurious to the interests of the landlord as to those of the tenant. Besides diminishing the value of estates by obstructing improvements, it has the effect, which might not at first be anticipated, of frequently hindering landlords from dismissing indolent, impoverished tenants. There are numerous estates in England without leases, that have been occupied for generations by the same families, the sons succeeding the fathers in an unbroken series. It must, however, unavoidably happen, that several of these occupiers have neither intelligence, enterprise, nor capital sufficient to enable them to farm their lands in the most approved manner; and the interests of the owners of the farms occupied by such persons, and of the public, would be equally consulted by their removal. But the circumstances

¹ "Encyclopædia of Agriculture," p. 699.

under which they hold their lands are such, that they can seldom be removed without occasioning much misrepresentation and abuse of the landlords; whereas, when a farm is let on lease, the landlord may, at its termination, if he be dissatisfied with the tenant, decline reletting the farm to him without exposing himself to any invidious remarks; and may, in this way, select the best and most industrious tenants. The marked preference given to tenants of skill and capital wherever leases are granted, has contributed as much, perhaps, as any other circumstance, to the extraordinary spread of agricultural improvement in Scotland.

The rent of a farm is sometimes fixed in money, sometimes in a given quantity of produce, sometimes in a proportional quantity of its produce, and sometimes in services.

With respect to money rents it may be observed, that when the lease is only for a few years, during which no great change in the value of money or in the price of corn can reasonably be anticipated, they are, perhaps, the best of any; but when the lease embraces a period of nineteen or twenty-one years, which is believed to be the most proper for leases of ordinary tillage farms, it would appear that the safer plan is to fix the rent at a certain quantity of produce, making it convertible into money at the current prices of the day. By this means the disturbing influence of changes in the value of money is averted, at the same time that the influence of such as occur in the cost of producing corn is mitigated. This plan is, however, defective, inasmuch as it obliges the tenant to pay more than the fair value of his farm in scarce years; while, on the other hand, it depresses the landlord's rents in years of unusual plenty below the proper level. A simple device has, however, been fallen upon, which has gone far to remove these defects. This consists in fixing a *maximum* and a *minimum* price; it being declared in the lease that the produce to be paid to the landlord shall be converted into money according to the current prices of the year; but that to whatever extent prices

may rise above the maximum price fixed in the lease, the landlord shall have no claim for such excess of price. By means of this check, the tenant is prevented from paying any great excess of rent in scarce years. And to prevent, on the other hand, the rent from being improperly reduced in very plentiful years, a minimum price is agreed upon by the parties; and it is stipulated that, to whatever extent prices may sink below this limit, the landlord shall be entitled to receive this minimum price for the fixed quantity of produce payable to him. This plan has been introduced into some of the best cultivated districts of the empire, particularly the Lothians and Berwickshire. And the experience of the estates in which it has been adopted shows, that it is as effectual as can well be desired for the protection of the just rights of both parties, and for securing the progress of agriculture.

The mode of letting lands for proportional rents, that is, for a half, a third, a fourth, or a fifth, &c., of the produce, whatever it may be, is the most objectionable of any. The widest experience shows that tenants never make any considerable improvements, unless they have a firm conviction that they will be allowed to reap the whole advantage arising from them. It is in vain to contend that, as the tenant knows beforehand the proportion of the increased produce going to the landlord, if the remainder be a due return to his capital, he will lay it out. Not one tenant out of a hundred would so act. There are always very considerable hazards to be run by those who embark capital in agricultural improvements; and if to these were added the obligation to pay a half, a third, or a fourth part of the *gross* produce arising from an improvement, to the landlord, none would ever be attempted by a tenant, or none that required any considerable outlay, or where the prospect of a return was not very immediate. A flourishing and improving system of agriculture cannot be carried on except by enterprising tenants, ready to avail themselves of new discoveries; and such are only found where they have leases, or are secured

in the possession of their farms for adequate periods, and allowed to reap, during their continuance, the entire benefit arising from whatever improvements they may execute. If either of these principles be encroached upon, the spirit of industry will be paralysed. Those who insist upon immediately sharing the benefit resulting from meliorations effected by the capital or labour of their tenants, will effectually prevent them from being undertaken; and if they do not make agriculture retrograde, will, at least, hinder it from making the smallest advance.

Unluckily, however, it is not necessary to argue this question speculatively. The practice of letting lands by proportional rents, or, as it is there termed, on the *métayer* principle, is very general on the Continent; and wherever it has been adopted, it has put a stop to all improvement, and has reduced the cultivators to the most abject poverty.¹

The method of paying rent by services—the last of those previously alluded to—is also very objectionable. This method, which grew out of the feudal system, was at one time spread over almost all Europe, and is still maintained in many countries; but wherever civilisation has made considerable progress, and manufactures and commerce been extensively introduced, it has been superseded by money or produce rents. It is needless to dwell on its inexpediency. The labour of tenants on the grounds, or for the behoof of their landlords, is usually performed in a lazy and slovenly

¹ For an account of the principles and practical working of the *métayer* system, see “Young’s Travels in France,” &c., second edition, i. 404, and ii. 216; and the articles on France, Italy, Tuscany, &c., in the “Geographical Dictionary.”

Most part of India is occupied by *métayers*, or tenants paying from two-thirds to one-third of the produce to government as rent; no wonder, therefore, that the occupiers are in the most abject state of poverty. This, however, is a subject which we cannot now enter upon; but those who wish to inform themselves with respect to it, would do well to consult Mr Rickards’ work on India, in which the important questions with respect to the state of landed property in India, the revenue systems adopted by its successive rulers, and the condition and capacity of the natives, are ably discussed.

manner. Men do not exert themselves with spirit and effect, unless when they work on their own account, and directly reap all the advantages of superior industry and enterprise. In Great Britain these sort of services are now almost wholly abolished; or if any vestiges of them still exist, they are to be found only in a few Highland counties. Their abolition has been of the greatest service to agriculture, and has redounded, in a very high degree, to the advantage of the landlords. The tenants, relieved from every sort of service, secured in the possession of their farms by leases of a reasonable length, and left to pursue their own interest in their own way, subject only to restrictions preventing the exhaustion of the land, have exerted themselves with a degree of energy and success, and have carried agriculture to a pitch of improvement that could not previously have been supposed possible.

We have already noticed the injurious consequences resulting from the under-renting of land;¹ and we are well assured that, in very many parts of England, rents might be considerably raised without injury to the tenants, and with great advantage to agriculture. It would, in fact, be among the most effectual means that could be adopted to force the occupiers to profit by those improved processes and modes of management by which the produce of the land is so greatly increased, and the expense of its culture so much diminished. In many extensive districts, especially in the western, southern, and midland counties, half the horses used in husbandry might be advantageously dispensed with. No such useless expenditure could, however, prevail in districts where rents are raised to their proper level; for there every extravagance must be proscribed, and the land be farmed in the most efficient and economical manner. "It is rare," says Arthur Young, "to see land very high let badly cultivated. Indeed, the very circumstance of high rent is a

¹ Part I. cap. 2, § 3.

cause of good husbandry ; for without it the farmers must be ruined. They are very sensible that, when a great rent is paid, they must either gain good crops or starve ; and this general idea is so strong as to make them uncommonly industrious, and to exert all their abilities in cultivating their farms in a masterly manner. When you see a man with a rent of £300 or £400 a-year, with not more than as many acres for it, (this was written in 1770,) you may lay it down as a maxim, previously to walking over his farm, that it is well cultivated ; that the arable lands are tolerably clean, well manured, drained, and yielding good crops ; that the grass is well stocked with a good breed of cattle, and none of it overrun with rubbish. When men pay dearly for their farms, they learn to value land, and let none of it be lost. On the contrary, view the same land let much under value, and twenty to one but the prospect is, in every respect, the reverse. A landlord who boasts of his cheap tenures, boasts of living in the midst of slovens, instead of spirited farmers.”¹

Still, however, it is not to be denied that land is sometimes over as well as under rented : and whenever it is ascertained that such is the case, and that, with the utmost exertions of industry and economy, a skilful tenant cannot pay his rent and gain a fair return for his outlay and trouble—the landlord, if he consult his own interest, should make an adequate reduction. If he attempt to hold the farmer to the letter of his agreement, he will most likely occasion his ruin ; but in the efforts of the latter to save himself and his family, the farm is sure to suffer. It will not be properly manured or tilled,—scourging crops will be resorted to ; so that, though the landlord should succeed in squeezing the stipulated rent out of the occupier during the currency of the lease, the bad state of the farm at its close, and the bad character the landlord will have justly acquired in the vicinity, will occasion a far greater reduction of rent

¹ “ Northern Tour,” iv. 377.

than would have taken place had it been made at the proper period. It appears, also, that when a reduction of rent is necessary, it should be made unconditionally, and for the whole course of the lease, or at least for a reasonable and definite period. Some landlords are in the habit, when their tenants are unable to pay their entire rents, of taking what they can afford, and giving them a receipt for so much on account; but this is a most pernicious practice, and is not more injurious to the tenant than to the landlord. The fear of being called upon, at some future period, for bygone arrears, makes the tenant counterfeited poverty, even though he be not really poor; at the same time that his liability to such claims prevents him from getting any assistance from those who might otherwise be disposed to support him. The same effects, though not quite in the same degree, are experienced when the landlord grants an unconditional abatement only for some short period. The consciousness that the farm is too dear, and that he may be called upon, at the expiration of the specified period, to pay the full rent, cripples the energies of the tenant. In this, as in the former case, his credit is at an end; for no one, how much soever he might otherwise feel disposed, would ever think of accommodating so dependent an individual with a loan. A tenant in this unhappy situation invariably becomes dispirited: instead of zealously exerting himself, as he would do were his rent permanently reduced to the real value of the farm, he strives only to take unfair advantages, to defeat the stipulations in his lease as to management, and is, through poverty and inability to pay, protected from an increase of rent.

As soon, therefore, as it is discovered that a farm, let to an industrious tenant, is really too dear, and that neither skill nor economy can make it pay, the rent should be unconditionally abated, if not at once for the whole lease, at least for a period of not fewer than five or seven years, with a stipulation that it shall not even then be raised unless prices have advanced. The estates of those landlords who

act on this sound principle are always in the best order, and, at an average, their rents are decidedly higher than the rents of those who refuse to make any abatements, or make them only from year to year. The policy of the latter is quite destructive of the spirit, credit, and industry of their tenants; and where these are wanting, agriculture must be comparatively degraded, and rents, though nominally high, really low and ill paid.

Much difference of opinion has existed as to the expediency of inserting conditions in leases with respect to management. Those who are adverse to them argue, that being in general framed by the landlord, whose knowledge of the practical business of farming is seldom very accurate or extensive, they are exceedingly apt to proceed on mistaken views, and are for the most part either vexatious or impossible; that the strict observance of conditions can rarely be enforced; that if it were, it would reduce the occupiers to the condition of mere machines; that it would prevent them from taking advantage of such discoveries as might be made during the currency of their leases; and that, having no means of escaping from the prescribed mode of management, they would cease to interest themselves in the progress of agriculture, and would become indifferent to every sort of improvement. Dr Smith, who has given the sanction of his authority to these objections, proposes that, in the event of a tax being laid upon rent, it should be made somewhat heavier on farms the tenants of which are bound by their leases to a prescribed mode of management. Such conditions originate, he says, in the ill-founded conceit entertained by the landlord of his own superior knowledge, and uniformly tend to the prejudice of agriculture.¹

But notwithstanding the plausible nature of some of these objections, and the authority by which they are supported, they seem to be, speaking generally, without foundation; and the best practical farmers concur in the opinion, that

¹ "Wealth of Nations," p. 374.

conditions, when judiciously devised, are of great service to agriculture, and that they should never be dispensed with.

This, it must be observed, is not a question that can be decided on the principle of leaving every one to be regulated by his own sense of what is most advantageous ; for here we have two parties, the landlord and tenant, each with separate and often conflicting interests. It is for the landlord's interest that his farm should always be in good order, and more especially that it should be in good order when the lease is about to expire, inasmuch as the rent that it will then bring will depend very much upon this circumstance. But the tenant is in a very different situation : his interest in the farm being limited to the period for which his lease endures, his object naturally is to make the most of it during that period, without caring about the state in which he leaves it. Although, therefore, restrictions as to the mode of cultivation in the early part of a lease of considerable duration may perhaps be fairly objected to, we do not think that any landlord who has a proper sense of his own interest, or who wishes to get his estate restored to him in good order, should ever let a farm without prescribing certain conditions as to its management, which it should be imperative on the tenant to follow during the six or seven years immediately preceding the termination of his lease. These conditions may not, indeed, always be the best that might be devised, but they can hardly be so defective as not to hinder the farm from being over-cropped and exhausted previously to the tenant's leaving it ; and if they do this, they must, both in a private and public point of view, be decidedly beneficial.

Much discussion has taken place as to the proper size of farms. This, however, is not a point as to which it is possible to come to any precise conclusions. A great deal must obviously depend on the purposes to which the farm is to be applied. Farms that are to be wholly employed in pasture may be very much larger than those that are to be

employed partly only in that way, and partly in tillage ; and the latter, again, than those that are to be wholly employed in tillage. And in regard to tillage farms, it is plain that their size must depend on various circumstances, but principally, perhaps, on the amount of the tenant's capital. But supposing that the tenants offering for farms have sufficient capital, their size should, as it appears to us, be determined by considering what extent of land an individual may be able to manage in the best and most approved manner. Most practical farmers, in this country at least, seem to think that this size might run from 400 to 600 acres, or 500 at a medium. This conclusion has, however, been strongly denied ; and it has been contended that the public interests are best consulted by letting land in small farms, or in farms of from 15 to 30 or 40 acres. To enter fully into an examination of this question would encroach too much on our limits : it may, however, be observed, that the opinions of the great majority of those who, from their acquaintance with agriculture, are best entitled to decide upon such matters, are exceedingly hostile to the small farming system ; and that their statements as to its inexpediency seem to be founded on the soundest principles, and to be consistent with the most extensive experience. It is plain that that system of occupation must, in all ordinary cases, be the best which gives the greatest scope to improvement, which allows the division of labour to be carried to the farthest extent, and which enables the occupier to avail himself of every new improvement and increased facility of production. But it is almost superfluous to say that these objects can only be attained when the lands of a country are divided into extensive farms occupied by opulent farmers. The produce of a farm of 15, 20, or even 50 acres, cannot, after paying rent, do more than furnish the barest subsistence to its occupiers. To suppose that the latter should accumulate capital, or that they should be in a condition to undertake any considerable improvement, is quite visionary. " In England," says Mr Young, " there are no persons who

work so hard and fare so ill as the small farmers.”¹ And Mr Oliver tells us, that “in Scotland it is the rarest thing imaginable to find a small farm, say from 20 to 50 acres, that would not be a disgrace to the cultivators of a century ago.”²

Perhaps it may be thought that it is superfluous to enforce the propriety of letting land in large farms; that the occupiers of such farms are able to pay higher rents than those who occupy small ones; and that, according as capital is accumulated in a country, the size of farms is sure to be augmented. But these statements are by no means so well-founded as we might at first be disposed to conclude. Nothing is so much coveted by a poor man as the possession of a small piece of ground. It goes far to secure him, so long as he holds it, against absolute want; it renders him, in some measure, his own master, and relieves him from the necessity of unremitting labour. In consequence, there is often a very keen competition for cottages and slips of land. An individual possessed of capital will not engage in farming unless he expect to realise, over and above a remuneration for his trouble in superintending the business, the common and average rate of profit on his capital. But the offerer for a small piece of ground is not influenced by such considerations; he is anxious to get it, not that it may bring him profits and wages, but that he may live. He is willing, indeed, to pay the proprietor all that it can be made to yield over and above his subsistence and that of his family; and this, not unfrequently, amounts to more than would be offered by a tenant possessed of capital, and capable of farming the land in the best manner. But any advantage that a landlord may occasionally gain, in the first instance, by the adoption of such a system as this, is sure to be more than counterbalanced in the end. The

¹ “Travels in France,” vol. i. p. 415.

² “Wealth of Nations,” p. 567. Mr Oliver’s authority is the greater, from his having, united to an intimate practical acquaintance with the most improved systems of modern husbandry, an extensive and profound knowledge of the history and principles of the art.

small farmer having no means of disposing of his children when they grow up, they naturally look to the land for support; and if his little possession be not divided during his life, it can hardly escape being divided at his death. In this way the country is overspread with a redundant and wretched population; so that, in the end, rents are not paid, and the whole produce of the land becomes barely sufficient for the support of its occupiers. The splitting of farms, in the way now described, has been carried to a very great extent in Ireland, and has been productive of the most mischievous consequences. Instead of increasing, the size of Irish farms has rapidly diminished since 1770; so that large tracts are now parcelled out into patches of the size of potato-gardens, occupied by the merest beggars. Nothing, therefore, should be more cautiously gone about by landlords than a reduction in the size of farms. If they ever allow them to be frittered down into minute portions, they will find that the improvement of their estates is at an end; that they have no security that their rents will continue to be paid; that the poor rates will, most likely, be increased; and that very formidable obstacles will stand in the way of the ejectment of the tenants, and of a return to a better system.

Before dismissing this part of our subject, we may perhaps be allowed to observe, that few things have been more injurious to agriculture than the conferring the elective franchise on tenants. For a lengthened period, most part of the occupiers of land in England and Wales have been entitled to vote in elections for county members; and we believe it would not be difficult to show, that this circumstance has contributed, in no slight degree, to establish the practice of holding at will, or without a lease. In Scotland, however, down to the passing of the Reform Act, extremely few occupiers of land were possessed of the franchise; and there leases of 19 or 21 years' duration were nearly universal: farms, instead of being subdivided, were gradually

increased in size ; and, provided the tenants paid their rents and managed their lands according to the most approved systems, the landlords rarely or never made any inquiry respecting their political or religious opinions. But since the franchise was, in an unlucky hour, given to the holders of lands worth £50 a-year and upwards, it has been altogether different. The landlords, desirous, like other people, of extending their political influence, endeavour to control the suffrages of their tenants, and to multiply the dependent voters on their estates. In furtherance of these objects, numbers of them have not scrupled to resort to intimidation, and to adopt vindictive measures against such of their tenants as have voted contrary to their wishes. This, however, though the most prominent at the time, is but the least evil resulting from the new state of things. It has already led, in many parts, to a change in the mode of letting land ; and there is but too much reason to fear that it may, in the end, go far to subvert that system of giving leases for 19 or 21 years certain, that has been a main cause of the astonishing improvement of Scottish agriculture. It has also occasioned, in numerous instances, a subdivision of farms for the purpose of creating voters ; and there cannot, in fact, be a question that, however well intended, the investing the tenants with the elective franchise has been one of the most fatal blows ever struck at their independence, and at the prosperity of agriculture in Scotland. Nor is there any thing in this but what might have been, and indeed was, anticipated from the outset. Tenants, as such, whether they hold farms worth £50 or £500 a-year, under leases of one year or twenty years' duration, are, speaking generally, about the very last description of persons to be intrusted with the franchise. Very many of them are indebted to, and dependent, to a less or greater extent, on their landlords ; and the few who are independent are so because they have accumulated property, and would in consequence have been entitled to the franchise, had it been vested, as it should have been,

in those only who possess a certain amount of realised property. Notwithstanding the existing prevalence of long leases, it is at present, in most parts of Scotland, quite enough to know the politics of a landlord to learn those of his tenants. Some few are, no doubt, occasionally found, bold enough and honest enough to assert their independence; but these, wherever the landlords take an active part in politics, form an inconsiderable minority, not 5 per cent probably, and certainly not 10 per cent of the entire number. So complete is their dependence, that instances have occurred of the event of an election having been changed within a few days of its taking place, by the mere purchase of an estate! Hence, if that be, as it undoubtedly is, the best system of voting that brings the greatest number of independent electors to the poll, and keeps back the greatest number of those that are dependent, the giving the franchise to the tenants and occupiers of land must be about the very worst system; for they are, of all classes, that which is most dependent, and most under the command of others.

There can be no doubt, taking every thing into account, that the profits of farmers are upon a level with those of the parties engaged in other businesses. It is generally believed, however, that when estimated in money, they are about the lowest of any. This arises from a variety of circumstances. The healthy and agreeable nature of the business, and the prevalence among the other classes of the unfounded notion, that every man may become a farmer without any previous learning or education, occasion a very keen competition for land; while the uncertainty of the seasons, the multiplicity of operations and details to which the farmer has to attend, and the difficulty of giving that attention to each which is so very essential, conspire powerfully to increase the hazard, and to lessen the profit of farming. In many places, indeed, the business is carried on according to a system of routine. But wherever an improved

plan of agriculture is practised, or where it is carried on by persons of considerable capital farming for a profit, skill and attention are alike indispensable. The farmer has to decide upon the rotation of crops, and the species of stock best fitted for the soil and situation which he occupies; he has to fix the number of horses and labourers that he will employ, so that there may neither be too many nor too few; he has to seize upon the proper moment for performing the various operations of the farm, and to arrange them in such a manner that none may be neglected or cause the neglect of others; and he has to make himself acquainted with the state of the markets, and decide as well upon the most advantageous period for selling his produce, as upon the quantities he should sell. No business, in short, requires greater sagacity or more constant application. The best-laid combinations and plans of the farmer are always liable to be overturned by changes of weather, or by prices proving different from what he anticipated; and he should be able to act with promptitude and decision in the altered circumstances under which he may, on such occasions, be placed. To suppose that a successful farmer can be unskilful, indolent, or inattentive, argues an entire ignorance of the practice of agriculture. There is, in fact, no employment where intelligence, industry, and that vigilant activity, "which has no such day as to-morrow in its calendar," can be less dispensed with. Those who enter on this business in the view of making it profitable, must be ready to say with the poet,

"Steriles transmissimus annos,
Hæc ævi mihi prima dies, hæc limina vitæ."

And even with the greatest sagacity, attention, and industry, it is but rarely that farmers make a fortune. The great majority merely manage to live respectably, and to bring up their family. "The few," says the ablest agricultural writer of the present day, "who do more than this, will be found to have had leases at low rents; indulgent landlords;

to have profited by accidental rises in the market or depreciation of currency, or to have become dealers in corn or cattle; and rarely, indeed, to have realised aught by the mere good culture of a farm at the market price.”¹ The opinion of Mr Burke, who, in the estimation of those most capable of judging, stood high both as a scientific and practical farmer, is to the same effect. “The farmer’s trade,” says he, “is a very poor trade; it is subject to great risks and losses. In most parts of England which have fallen within my observation, I have rarely known a farmer (I speak of those who occupy from 150 to 300 or 400 acres) who to his own trade has not added some other employment or traffic, that, after a course of the most unremitting parsimony and labour, (such for the greater part is theirs,) and persevering in his business for a long course of years, died worth more than paid his debts, leaving his posterity to continue in nearly the same equal conflict between industry and want, in which the last predecessor, and a long line of predecessors before him, lived and died.”²

¹ Loudon’s “Encyclopædia of Agriculture,” p. 719.

² “Thoughts and Details on Scarcity,” p. 21.

CHAPTER VII.

Division of the Produce of Industry, under Deduction of Rent, between Capitalists and Labourers—Definition of Profits—Mr Ricardo's Theory of Profits ; Sense in which it is true—Causes which occasion a Rise or Fall of Profits—Accumulation not the Cause of a Fall of Profits—Influence of the decreasing Fertility of the Soil, and of Taxation on Profits—Influence of Loans to Government, and of Changes in the Value of Money on Profits.

BEFORE attempting to investigate the circumstances which determine the rate of profit, it is necessary to be aware of those which determine the proportions in which the whole produce of industry, under deduction of rent, is divided between labourers and capitalists.

This preliminary inquiry may be disposed of in a few words. We have seen that the whole produce of the land and labour of every civilised society is always divided, in the first instance, into *three*, and not more than *three*, portions ; the *first* of which goes to the labourers, the *second* to the capitalists or proprietors of stock, and the *third* to the landlords : and we have also seen, that the portion of the produce of industry received by the landlords, as proprietors of the soil, or as rent properly so called, is altogether extrinsic to the cost of production ; and that their giving it up would not occasion any change in the productiveness of industry, or any reduction in the price of produce. Supposing, then, that rent is deducted or set aside, it is obvious that all the remaining produce of the land and labour of every country must be primarily divided between the two great classes of labourers and capitalists. And it is further obvious, that were there no taxes in a country, or were the rate of taxation stationary, the proportion of the whole

produce of industry, under deduction of rent, falling to the share of the labourers could not be increased except by an equivalent reduction in the proportion falling to the share of the capitalists, and *vice versâ*. Suppose, still better to illustrate this proposition, that the whole produce of industry in Great Britain is represented by the number 1000 : suppose, farther, that the landlords get 200 of this produce as rent, or as the amount paid them for the use of the natural and inherent powers of the soil, and that the remaining 800 is divided, in equal portions, between labourers and capitalists. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that nothing could be added to the share of the produce, or to the 400 falling to the labourers, except at the expense of the capitalists ; nor to the share, or 400 falling to the latter, except at the expense of the former.

Whether the 800 were increased to 1600 or reduced to 400, so long as those between whom it must be divided receive each a half, their *relative* condition must continue the same. And hence the propriety of the distinction between *proportional* and *real* wages, or between wages estimated in parts of the produce raised by the labourer, and in definite quantities of money or produce. If the productiveness of industry diminish, proportional wages may rise, notwithstanding that real wages, or the absolute quantity of produce received by the labourer, may be diminished ; and if, on the other hand, the productiveness of industry increase, proportional wages may be diminished, while real wages may, at the same time, be increased.

It is plain, therefore, that were taxation unknown or stationary, the whole produce of industry, under deduction of rent, would be divided between capitalists and labourers ; and that the portion falling to either party, would vary inversely as the portion falling to the other—that is, the portion falling to the capitalists would be increased when that falling to the labourers was diminished, and diminished when it was increased.

Profits must not, however, be confounded with the pro-

duce of industry primarily received by the capitalists. They really consist of the produce, or its value, remaining to those who employ capital in industrious undertakings, after all their necessary payments to others have been deducted, and after the capital wasted or used in the undertakings has been replaced. If the produce derived from an undertaking, after defraying the necessary outlay, be insufficient to replace the capital expended, a loss will have been incurred: if the capital be merely replaced, and there is no surplus, there will neither be loss nor profit; and the greater the surplus, the greater, of course, will be the profit. Profits are not measured by the proportion which they bear to the rate of wages, but by the proportion which they bear to the capital by the agency of which they have been produced. Suppose an individual employs a capital of 1000 quarters of corn in the cultivation of a farm, that he expends 700 quarters in the payment of wages, and 300 in seed and other outgoings, and that the return to this capital is 1200 quarters: Under these circumstances, the proportion of the produce which goes to the labourers as wages will be to that which goes to the capitalist as 7 to 2; for, of the 1200 quarters that go, in the first instance, to the capitalist, 200 only are profits, 1000 being required to replace the capital he has expended. In this case, therefore, the *rate* of profit would be said to be 20 per cent; meaning, that the *excess* of produce belonging to the cultivator, after the capital employed in its production is fully replaced, amounts to 20 per cent upon that capital.

We have been thus particular with respect to the definition of profits, because, from not keeping it sufficiently in view, Mr Ricardo has been led to contend, that the *RATE* of profit depends on the proportion in which the produce of industry, under deduction of rent, is divided between capitalists and labourers; that a rise of profits cannot be brought about except by a fall of proportional wages, nor a fall of profits except by a corresponding rise of proportional wages. It is evident, however, that this theory is true only

in the event of our attaching a radically different sense to the term profit from what is usually attached to it, and supposing it to mean the cost or real value of the whole produce which goes, in the first instance, to the capitalist, without reference to the proportion which it bears to the capital employed in its production. If we understand the terms in this sense, Mr Ricardo's theory will hold universally; and it may be affirmed, that so long as the proportion in which the produce of industry, under deduction of rent, is divided between capitalists and labourers, continues the same, no increase or diminution of the powers of production will occasion any variation in the rate of profit. But if we consider profits in the light in which they are invariably considered in the real business of life,—as the produce accruing to capitalists after the capital expended by them in payments and outgoings of all sorts is fully replaced,—it will immediately be seen that there are innumerable exceptions to Mr Ricardo's theory.

It will facilitate the acquisition of clear and precise ideas respecting the circumstances which determine the average rate of profit in different employments, as that term is commonly understood, if we confine our attention, in the first place, to those which determine profits in agriculture, both because the latter admit of being accurately measured, and because they may be taken as representing profits in other businesses. Agriculture is a branch of industry that must be carried on at all times, and under all circumstances: but it would not be carried on, did it not, at an average, yield as great a return on the capital vested in it as other businesses; nor would these others be carried on, if they yielded a less return than is derived from agriculture. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the returns obtained from agricultural industry, or agricultural profits, may, in ordinary cases, be considered as identical with the returns or profits obtained from other businesses. Whenever, for example, the average return to an outlay of capital or labour

worth 100 quarters of wheat, employed in the cultivation of the soil, amounts to 110 quarters, we may safely infer, that £100 employed in manufactures is also yielding £110: for, a regard to their own interest will not permit those engaged in such departments, to prosecute them for *less* profit than is obtained in agriculture; and the competition of the agriculturists will not permit them to obtain more.

Taking, then, as we are entitled to do, agricultural profits as a standard of other profits, let us suppose that a landlord employs a capital equivalent to 10,000 quarters, or £10,000, in the cultivation of an estate; that he expends 5000 quarters, or £5000 of this capital in seed, in the keeping of horses, and in defraying the wear and tear of implements and machines; and 5000 quarters, or £5000, in paying the wages of labourers. Suppose, now, that the return obtained by this landlord is 12,000 quarters, or £12,000; of which 10,000 quarters, or £10,000, go to replace his capital, and 1000 quarters, or £1000, to pay his taxes, leaving 1000 quarters, or £1000 as profits, being 10 per cent on the capital employed. It is plain from this case, (which is, in point of principle, the actual case of all cultivators,) that the rate of profit may be increased in *three*—and only in one or other of three—ways, viz., (1) by a fall of wages, (2) a fall of taxes, or (3) an increased productiveness of industry.

Thus, it is obvious, (1) that if wages were reduced from 5000 to 4000 quarters, profits, supposing other things to be stationary, would be increased from 1000 to 2000 quarters, or from 10 to 20 per cent: if (2) the burden of taxation were reduced from 1000 to 500 quarters, profits would be increased from 1000 to 1500 quarters, or from 10 to 15 per cent: and if (3), owing to the introduction of an improved system of agriculture, the return to a capital of 10,000 quarters were increased from 12,000 to 13,000 quarters, profits, supposing wages still to amount to 5000 and taxes to 1000 quarters, would be increased to 2000 quarters, or to 20 per cent; and though, in this last case, after the pro-

ductiveness of industry had been increased, wages would form a less proportion of the whole produce of industry than they did previously, it is to be observed, that this diminished proportion is the *consequence*, and not the cause of profits having risen; and therefore, in such cases as this, and they are of very frequent occurrence, it is true to say, that proportional wages fall because profits rise, but the converse of the proposition is not true; for the rise of profits was occasioned by causes that had nothing whatever to do with wages, and which were, in fact, totally independent on them.

It is, indeed, true, inasmuch as the rise of profits is the result of an increased productiveness of industry, that the cost or real value of the 13,000 quarters will not exceed the cost or real value of the 12,000 previously obtained by the same quantity of labour: but profits, in the sense in which they are practically understood, and as we understand them, do not depend on cost, but on the excess of the commodities produced above the commodities or capital expended in their production; and whenever this excess is augmented without any previous depression in the rate of wages, the rate of profit must evidently be increased by the operation of causes extrinsic to variations in that rate.

Nor is this all. The rate of profit may remain stationary, or rise, though the proportion of the produce of industry falling to the share of the labourer be actually increased. Suppose, to exemplify this, that a landlord employs 1000 quarters of wheat as a capital, 500 of which are expended on seed, keep of horses, &c., and 500 on wages; if the produce be 1200 quarters, and the taxes to which he is subjected 100, his profits, will amount to 100 quarters, or 10 per cent: suppose now that, owing to the introduction of improved machinery, or improved methods of culture, he only requires to expend 400 quarters on seed, keep of horses, &c., but that wages rise from 500 to 550 quarters, and that the same return is obtained—in this case, supposing taxation to be stationary, the profits of the landlord will be increased from 10 to $15\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, though propor-

tional wages have risen from $5\text{-}12\text{ths}$ to $5\frac{1}{2}\text{-}12\text{ths}$ of the whole produce.

It may perhaps be said, that if this increased productiveness were confined to agriculture, and did not extend to most other important businesses, the price of agricultural produce would fall, while that of other produce would remain stationary; and that, in such case, the profits of agricultural industry, if estimated in money, or in any commodity other than corn, would be diminished in consequence of the rise of wages. This is true; but Mr Ricardo made no exception, in laying down his theory, in favour of those possible, and indeed frequently occurring cases, when, from any single circumstance, or combination of circumstances, industry becomes generally more productive, and when, consequently, profits, estimated in money, corn, cloth, or any commodity in extensive demand, would have risen, without their rise having been occasioned by a fall of wages. And it is also true, that an increased productiveness of agricultural industry, whether it has been caused by the introduction of an improved system of agriculture, or by the repeal of restrictions on the importation of corn, most commonly extends itself to other businesses, and brings about, in the end, a universal rise of profits: for, as raw produce forms the principal part of the labourer's subsistence, and as he obtains a larger quantity in exchange for the same amount of money, after it has fallen in price, his condition is in so far improved; and a stimulus being, in this way, given to population, and the supply of labour increased, wages are reduced, and the rate of profit proportionally raised.

When industry, instead of becoming more, becomes less productive, the opposite effects follow. Profits then fall, without any fall having previously taken place in the rate of wages.

It is evident, therefore, that the proposition that a rise of profits cannot be brought about otherwise than by a fall of wages, or a fall of profits otherwise than by a rise

of wages, is true only in those cases in which the productiveness of industry and the burden of taxation remain stationary. So long as this is the case, or, which is the same thing, so long as the same capital is employed, and the same quantity of produce has to be divided between capitalists and labourers, the share of the one cannot be increased without the share of the other being equally diminished: and it is also true, that if profits depended on the *proportion* in which the produce of industry is divided between capitalists and labourers, they could not be affected by variations in its productiveness, but would be determined wholly by the state of proportional wages. But profits depend, as already seen, on the proportion which they bear to the capital by which they are produced, and not on the proportion which they bear to wages. Suppose an individual employs a capital of 1000 quarters, or £1000, in cultivation, that he lays out half its amount in the payment of wages, and obtains a return of 1200 quarters, or £1200; in this case, assuming he is not affected by taxation, his profits will amount to 200 quarters, or £200, being at the rate of 20 per cent, and will be to wages in the proportion of 2 to 5. Suppose, now, that the productiveness of industry is *universally doubled*, and let it be farther supposed that the additional 1200 quarters, or £1200, is divided between the capitalist and his labourers in the former proportion of 2 to 5, or that the capitalist gets 343 quarters, or £343, of additional profits, and the labourers 857 quarters, or £857, of additional wages: in this case, both parties will still obtain the same proportions of the produce as before; and if we look only to them, we must say that neither profits nor wages have risen. But when we compare, as is invariably done in estimating profits, the return obtained by the capitalist with the capital he employs, it will be found, notwithstanding the constancy of proportional wages, that the *rate* of profit has increased from 20 to 54 per cent.

Thus, then, it appears, as was previously stated, that profits

rise in one or other of the three following ways, viz., (1) from a fall of wages, or (2) from a fall of taxes directly or indirectly affecting capitalists, or (3) from an increased productiveness of industry; and they *fall*, (1) from a rise of wages, or (2) from an increase of taxes, or (3) from a diminished productiveness of industry. But they can neither rise nor fall, except from the operation of one or more of the causes now stated.

It is consistent with universal experience, that profits are invariably higher in colonies, and thinly-peopled countries, than in those that have been long-settled, or where the population is comparatively dense; and that (referring to periods of average duration) their tendency is to fall in the progress of society. This sinking of profits in rich and populous countries has been ascribed by Smith to the competition of capitalists. He supposes that, when capital is augmented, its owners endeavour to encroach on each other's employments; and that, in furtherance of their object, they offer their goods at a lower price, and give higher wages to their workmen; which has a twofold effect in reducing profits. This theory was long universally assented to. It has been espoused by MM. Say, Sismondi, and Storch, by the Marquis Garnier, and, with some trifling modifications, by Mr Malthus. But, notwithstanding the deference due to these authorities, it is easy to see that competition can never bring about a general fall of profits. It prevents any individual, or set of individuals, from monopolising a particular branch of industry; and reduces the rate of profit in different businesses nearly to the same level; but this is its whole effect. Most certainly, it has no tendency to lessen the productiveness of industry, or to raise wages or the burden of taxation; and if it do none of these things, it is impossible it should lower profits. So long as an individual employing a capital of 1000 quarters, or £1000, obtains from it a return of 1200 quarters, or £1200, of which he has to pay 100 quarters, or £100, as taxes, so long will his profits con

tinue at 10 per cent, whether he has the market to himself, or has 50,000 competitors. It is not competition, but the increase of taxation, and the necessity under which a growing society is placed of resorting to soils of less fertility to obtain supplies of food, that are the principal causes of that reduction in the rate of profit which usually takes place in advanced periods. When the last lands taken into cultivation are fertile, there is a comparatively large amount of produce to be divided between capitalists and labourers; and both profits and *real* wages may, consequently, be high. But with every successive diminution in the fertility of the soils to which recourse is had, the quantities of produce obtained by the same outlays of capital and labour necessarily diminish.¹ And this diminution obviously operates to reduce the rate of profit—(1) by lessening the quantity of produce divisible between capitalists and labourers, and (2) by increasing the proportion falling to the share of the latter.

The effect of the decreasing productiveness of the soil, as well on the condition of society, as on the rate of profit, is so very powerful, that we shall endeavour to trace and exhibit its operation a little more fully. It has already been seen, in treating of population, that the principle of increase in the human race is so very strong, as not only to keep population steadily up to the means of subsistence, but to give it a tendency to exceed them. It is true that a peculiar combination of favourable circumstances occasionally causes capital to increase faster than population, and wages are in consequence augmented. But such augmentation is rarely permanent, at least to the whole extent; for the additional stimulus it is almost sure of giving to population, seldom fails, by proportioning the supply of labour to the increased demand, to reduce wages to their old level, or to one not much above it. If, therefore, it were possible always to employ additional capital in raising raw

¹ This supposes, of course, either that no improvements are made, or that their influence has been taken into account.

produce, in manufacturing that raw produce when raised, and in conveying the raw and manufactured products from place to place, with an equal return, it is evident, supposing taxation to be stationary, that, speaking generally, the greatest increase of capital would not occasion any considerable fall in the rate of profit. So long as labour may be obtained at the same rate, and as its productive power is not diminished, so long *must* the profits of stock continue unaffected. It is evident, then, that the mere increase of capital has, by itself, no lasting influence over wages; and it is obviously immaterial, in so far as the rate of profit is concerned, whether ten or ten thousand millions be employed in the cultivation of the soil, and in the manufactures and commerce of this or any other kingdom, provided the last million so employed be as productive, or yield as large a return as the first. Now this is invariably the case with the capital vested in manufactures and commerce. The greatest amount of capital and labour may be employed in fashioning raw produce and adapting it to our use, and in transporting it from where it is produced to where it is to be consumed, without a diminished return. Whatever labour may now be required to build a ship, or to construct a machine, it is abundantly certain that an equal quantity will, at any future period, suffice to build a similar ship or to construct a similar machine; and, although these ships and machines were indefinitely multiplied, the last would be as well adapted to every useful purpose, and as serviceable as the first. The probability, indeed, or rather the certainty, is, that the last would be more serviceable than the the first. It is not possible to assign limits to the powers and resources of genius, nor consequently to the improvement of machinery, and of the skill and industry of the labourer. Future Watts, Arkwrights, and Wedgwoods, will arise; and the stupendous discoveries of the last and present age will doubtless be equalled, and most probably surpassed, in the ages that are to come. It is, therefore, clear, that if equal outlays of capital and labour always

raised the same quantities of raw produce, their increase, however great, could not lessen the capacity of employing them with advantage, or sink the rate of profit. But here, and here only, the bounty of nature is limited, and she deals out her gifts with a frugal and parsimonious hand.

“ Pater ipse COLENDI
Haud facilem esse viam voluit.”

Equal outlays of capital and labour do not always yield equal quantities of raw produce. The soil is of limited extent and limited fertility; and this limited fertility proves the real check—the insuperable obstacle—which prevents the means of subsistence, and consequently the inhabitants, of every country, from increasing in a geometrical proportion, until the space required for carrying on the operations of industry should become deficient.

But it is plain, that the decreasing productiveness of the soils to which every improving society is obliged to resort, will not, as was previously observed, merely lessen the *quantity* of produce to be divided between profits and wages, but will also increase the *proportion* of that produce forming the share of the labourer. It is quite impossible to go on increasing the cost of raw produce, the principal part of the subsistence of the poor, by forcing good, or taking inferior lands into cultivation, without increasing wages. A rise of wages is seldom, indeed, exactly coincident with a rise in the price of necessities, but they can never be very far separated. The price of necessities is in fact the cost of producing labour. The labourer cannot work if he be not supplied with the means of subsistence; and though a certain period of varying extent, according to the circumstances of the country at the time, must generally elapse, when necessities are rising in price, before wages are proportionally augmented, such augmentation will, in most ordinary cases, be brought about in the end.

It is plain, therefore, inasmuch as there is never any falling off, but a constant increase, in the productiveness of manufacturing and commercial industry, that the subsis-

tence of the labourer could not be increased in price, and consequently that it would not be necessary to make any additions to his *necessary* wages, or the wages required to enable him to subsist and continue his race, but for the diminished power of agricultural labour, originating in the inevitable necessity of resorting to inferior soils to obtain larger supplies of raw produce. The decreasing fertility of the soil is, therefore, at bottom, the only necessary cause of a fall of profits. The quantity of produce forming the return to capital and labour would never diminish but for the diminution that uniformly takes place in the end, in the productiveness of the soil; nor is there any other physical cause why the proportion of wages to profits should be increased, and the rate of profit diminished, as it usually is, in the progress of society.

We have thus endeavoured to exhibit the ultimate influence of the necessity of resorting to poorer lands for supplies of food on profits and wages. But though this cause of the reduction of profits be “of such magnitude and power as finally to overwhelm every other,”¹ its operation may be, and indeed always is, counteracted or facilitated by extrinsic causes. It is obvious, for example, that every discovery or improvement in agriculture, which enables a greater quantity of produce to be obtained for the same expense, has the same influence over profits as if the breadth of superior soils were increased, and may, for a lengthened period, increase the rate of profit.

Had the inventive genius of man been limited in its powers, and the various machines and implements used in agriculture, and the skill of the husbandman, speedily attained to their utmost perfection, the rise in the price of raw produce, and the fall of profits consequent to the increase of population, would have been so apparent as to force themselves on the attention of every one. When, in such a state of things, it became necessary to resort to poorer soils

¹ Malthus's “Principles of Political Economy,” &c. p. 317.

to raise additional quantities of food, a corresponding increase of labour would have been required ; for, supposing the perfection of art to be attained, nothing except greater exertion can overcome fresh obstacles. Not only, therefore, would more labour have been necessary to the production of more food, but it would have been necessary precisely according to the increased difficulty of its production. So that, had the arts continued stationary, the price of raw produce would have varied with every variation in the qualities of the soils brought under tillage.

But the circumstances which really regulate the value of raw produce are extremely different. It is true, indeed, that even in those societies that are most rapidly improving, it has, as was previously shown, a constant *tendency* to rise ; for, the rise of profits consequent to every invention, by occasioning a greater demand for labour, gives a fresh stimulus to population ; and thus, by increasing the demand for food, again inevitably forces the cultivation of poorer soils, and raises prices. But it is evident that improvements render the effects of this great law of nature, from whose all-pervading influence the utmost efforts of human ingenuity cannot enable man to escape, far less palpable and obvious. After inferior soils are cultivated, more labourers are, in most cases perhaps, required to raise the same quantities of food ; but as the efficiency of the labourers is gradually improved in the progress of society, a much smaller number is required, in proportion to the work that is performed, than if no such improvement had taken place. The tendency to an increase in the price of raw produce is in this way counteracted. The productive energies of the earth gradually diminish, and we are compelled to resort to less fruitful soils ; but the productive energies of the labour employed in their tillage are as constantly augmented by the discoveries and inventions that are always being made. Two directly opposite and continually acting principles are thus set in motion. From the operation of fixed and permanent causes, the increasing sterility of the soil is sure,

in the long run, to overmatch the improvements already made in machinery and agriculture, prices experiencing a corresponding rise, and profits a corresponding fall. Frequently, however, these improvements more than compensate, during lengthened periods, for the deterioration in the quality of the soils successively cultivated, and occasion a fall of prices and rise of profits; and when the increase of population has again forced the cultivation of still poorer lands, new improvements may again restore prices to their old level, or sink them to a lower.

In so far as the general principle is concerned, the previous reasoning is applicable alike to the commercial world, or to a single nation. It is plain, however, that the fall in the rate of profit, and the consequent check to the progress of society, originating in the necessity of resorting to poorer soils, will most likely be sooner felt in an improving country, which excludes foreign corn from her markets, than in one which maintains a free intercourse with her neighbours. When a manufacturing and commercial country, like England, deals with all the world on fair and liberal principles, she avails herself of the various capacities of production which Providence has given to different countries; and, besides obtaining supplies of food at the cheapest rate at which they can be raised, the numberless markets to which she can resort prevents her from feeling any very injurious consequences from the occasional failure of her own harvests, or from deficiencies in one or a few of the sources whence she draws her foreign supplies; so that she thus goes far to secure for herself constant plenty, and, what is of hardly less importance, the greatest attainable steadiness of price. "Those famines," says Gibbon, "which so frequently afflicted the infant republic, were seldom or never experienced by the extensive empire of Rome. The accidental scarcity in any single province was immediately relieved by the plenty of its more fortunate neighbours."¹

¹ "Decline and Fall," vol. i. p. 86. 8vo edition.

Under such circumstances, it may be supposed that the foundations of our greatness would be established on a broad and solid basis, inasmuch as they would rest, not on the productive energies of our own soil only, but on those of all the countries of the world. And so long as we preserved our ascendancy in manufactures, such would be the case. Whether, however, commerce be free or restricted, it cannot be carried on otherwise than by an exchange of equivalents. A nation that draws any very considerable portion of her supplies from abroad, must be able to supply those whence they are brought with equivalents on more advantageous terms than they can procure them elsewhere. This is a necessary condition of the existence of that portion of the population of a country that is not, or cannot be, fed on the produce of her own territory. It is not enough, as many would seem to suppose, to secure plenty for such a population, that restrictions on commerce should be abolished, and a free intercourse established with every other country. It is also indispensable that the corn-importing country should preserve her ascendancy in manufactures. Unless she do this, she will not have the means of paying foreigners for corn; and her population will be exposed to extreme privations.

It is one of the most difficult questions in practical politics to decide how far a government is warranted in modifying a policy, productive in the mean time of considerable advantage, in order to provide against contingent and eventual evils. Certainly, however, such prospective considerations should not be wholly left out of view, though the practical influence to be allowed to them must depend on the estimate that may be formed of the proximity and magnitude of the evil to be guarded against, and a variety of other circumstances. But it will readily appear, that a government influenced by such considerations might, with a view to check what it believed to be the too rapid progress of manufactures, impose restraints on the free importation of corn. The policy of such a measure would, of course,

depend wholly on the nature of the grounds on which the government proceeded in taking such a step, and the magnitude of the restraints. The presumption, indeed, is against all such interferences with the free course of industry; and the chances are, that the measure would be unpopular at the outset. But though such interferences be universally exceptions to subordinate and secondary principles, they are in accordance with those paramount principles that teach individuals and nations to regulate their conduct with a view not merely to immediate, but also to prospective and remote considerations; and to sacrifice present enjoyment for the sake of lasting security and independence.

There is, we believe, no country in the world possessed of such extraordinary natural and acquired facilities for the successful prosecution of manufacturing industry as Great Britain; and, provided tranquillity be maintained at home, we have really very little to fear from foreign competition. But the continued increase of manufactures makes it every day more difficult to maintain tranquillity. Do what we will, they must be exposed, from an infinity of causes, over some of the more powerful of which we have no control, to vicissitudes; and it is not easy to see to what extent the outrages and agitation thence arising may endanger that security which lies at the foundation of manufacturing eminence. If it should be seriously shaken, the consequences would be most disastrous.

But where there is no room for considerations like those now adverted to, or where they are not reckoned of sufficient importance to warrant any interference on the part of government, the free importation of foreign corn, subject only to such fixed duty as may be sufficient to countervail the peculiar burdens (if there be any such) falling on the land, would seem, for the reasons already stated, to be the best and safest policy. And even in those cases in which it was deemed right and proper, with a view to prospective considerations, to impose duties on corn, they should be fixed and invariable. If the duty fluctuate, like that for-

merly existing in this country, with fluctuations of price, its influence can never be previously ascertained. Its magnitude depends on contingent and accidental circumstances; and it must therefore, of necessity, occasion or aggravate that uncertainty, and those sudden and capricious movements, that are so destructive of the interests of all classes.

The influence of the corn laws, which existed previously to 1846, in enhancing average prices, had been materially diminished for several years, partly by the restrictions on importation having been modified, and partly and principally by the extraordinary spread of agricultural improvement in Great Britain, and the increased importations from Ireland.

The progress of agricultural improvement, which, during the late war, had been extremely rapid, was retarded for a few years by the sudden and heavy fall of prices that took place after the peace; but since 1825 it has been rapid beyond all former precedent. One of its chief causes has been the establishment of steam communications between the most distant parts of the country. These, by rendering the great markets of London and Liverpool easily accessible to the cultivators in the remotest districts, gave a powerful stimulus to agriculture. To this opening of new markets have to be added the influence of improved processes and modes of management in agriculture, especially the introduction of bone manure, and the spread of the practice of furrow-draining. These have done for agriculture in the present, what the substitution of green crops for fallows did for it in the last century, and have had, and will no doubt continue to have, an extraordinary influence.

The increase of population in Great Britain (exclusive of Ireland) from 1770 to 1841, amounted to about ten millions; and may now (1848) be estimated at little short of twelve millions. And we believe it would not be difficult to show that this vast additional population is wholly supported on the produce of the soil of Great Britain, and that

the increased imports from Ireland and foreign parts are not really, in ordinary seasons, more than adequate to meet the increased consumption of corn in the feeding of horses, the manufacture of beer and spirits, &c. If we be nearly right in this estimate, and take the average annual expenditure of each individual in Great Britain on farm produce at £7, it will be seen that the agricultural produce of this part of the United Kingdom has been increased since 1770 by the immense sum of £84,000,000 a-year !

The imports of corn (principally oats) from Ireland into Great Britain, increased from about 400,000 quarters in 1806, to about 3,000,000 in 1845;¹ and its capacities for farther production are still very great. Its soil is of the finest quality ; and were its husbandry, which is of the most wretched description, only a little improved, it is not easy to estimate the immense additions that would be made to its produce. And this is a result that may, perhaps, be anticipated. A considerable check has been given to that vicious practice of dividing and subdividing land, that has long been the curse of Ireland ; tithes, which did so much to prejudice agriculture, and were a prolific source of discord and bloodshed, have been adjusted on a tolerably satisfactory footing ; and the introduction of a compulsory provision for the support of the poor, will most likely oblige the landlords to take that interest in the number and condition of the cottiers on their estates, to which they have hitherto been, for the most part, entire strangers. It is true, however, that till agitation has been effectually suppressed, and the attention of the public has ceased to be engrossed by the machinations of the anti-union faction, it were idle to look for any improvement. But surely it is not too much to expect that an end should be speedily made of the repeal juggle. It is difficult, indeed, supposing the Irish not to be utterly destitute of penetration and

¹ The imports in 1846 and 1847 were so much affected by the failure of the crops of potatoes in Ireland in 1845 and 1846, that they afford no test of their amount in ordinary years.

common sense, that it can exist much longer. But if it do, it will be the bounden duty of government to interfere to abate the nuisance. Indeed, it should have interfered long ago. It is a disgraceful fact, that a junto of mendicant impostors should have been permitted for years to advance their own base purposes, at the expense of the peace and wellbeing of Ireland, and of the security of the empire. In the event of their being put down, and of good order and tranquillity being established, a great increase of the industry of Ireland, and consequently, also, of the imports from her, may be reasonably looked for. But, independently altogether of this, there is still, fortunately, great room for improvement in the agriculture of Great Britain. We believe it may be safely affirmed, that were the whole island as well cultivated as the Lothians, Berwickshire, Northumberland, Lincoln, and Norfolk, its produce would be more than doubled!

It has been said that agriculture is likely to be seriously injured by the measures with respect to the corn trade adopted in 1846; but we do not suppose they will have any such unfortunate result. The price of wheat in England and Wales amounted, at an average of the five years ending with 1845, to 54s. 9d. a quarter, though the crops of 1841 and 1842 were considerably deficient, and the importations in these years unusually large. Without, however, taking these circumstances into account, we have elsewhere shown ("Commercial Dictionary," article "Corn Laws and Corn Trade,") that there are no good grounds for thinking that the average prices of corn in this country will sink, under the free system about to be established, to less than from 42s. to 48s. a quarter, which is above the average price (44s. 8d.) of 1834, 1835, and 1836, all years of great agricultural improvement. We may further state that, after allowing for the depreciation of the currency, the average price of wheat during the five years ending with 1810 was 83s. 3d. a quarter, being no less than 28s. 6d. a quarter above its average price during the five years ending with 1845. And yet, despite this im-

mense fall, there was in the interval an extraordinary improvement in agriculture, a vast increase of production, and a great rise of rent. Surely, however, when such results have taken place coincidently with a fall of 28s. 6d., it would be visionary to anticipate that any very serious injury should be done to agriculture, by a further fall of 8s., or 10s., or even of 12s. a quarter.

At the same time, we are ready to admit that we should have preferred seeing this question settled by imposing a low fixed duty of 5s., 6s., or 7s. a quarter on wheat, and other grain in proportion, accompanied with a corresponding drawback. We make this statement on general grounds, and without any reference to the peculiar burdens that affect the agriculturists, though these should neither be forgotten nor overlooked.¹ In scarce years a duty of this description would fall wholly on the foreigner, without affecting prices or narrowing importation; for, in such years, the prices of corn are wholly determined by the demand and supply, without reference to the cost of the corn, including therein any reasonable duty with which it may be charged. The latter is then, in truth, deducted from the profits of the foreign grower or merchant, and its repeal would not sensibly affect prices. But, while in scarce years, when importation is necessary, the influence of a low duty is thus innocuous, it would lessen or prevent importation in unusually abundant years, when the home supply is sufficient. The drawback by which it is supposed to be accompanied would then also come into play and facilitate exportation; so that their conjoined effect would be to hinder the overloading of the market, and, consequently, to prevent prices falling so low as to be injurious to the agriculturists and those dependent on them. And it must be borne in mind that the distress of the agriculturists never fails to react on the other classes: when the former are involved in difficulties the demands for the products of the loom and of our colonial possessions are proportionally

¹ See "Treatise on Taxation," by the author of this work, p. 190.

diminished, so that the market is glutted with manufactured goods, sugar, &c., as well as with corn. It is, indeed, uniformly found, that the injury that is thus inflicted on the manufacturing and trading part of the community very much exceeds all that they gain by the temporary fall in the price of raw produce. It is plainly, therefore, a capital mistake to suppose that the duty and drawback now referred to would be advantageous only to the agriculturists: they would redound quite as much to the advantage of the other classes. And though this were less certain than it appears to be, still, in a matter of such importance as the welfare of agriculture, and of those dependent thereon, a wise government should be extremely cautious about taking any step, of the consequences of which it is not fully assured. But, even if our limits permitted, it would be to little purpose to insist on these or any similar considerations. The pertinacity with which the agriculturists opposed every approach to a more liberal system, roused a spirit which would not be satisfied with any thing short of a complete abandonment of all restrictions. The time for compromise and arrangement having been allowed to go by, government had to deal with an irritated and an unreasoning populace.

“ Summa favoris

Annona momenta trahit; namque adserit urbes

Sola fames, emiturque metus, cum segne potentes

Vulgus alunt: nescit plebes jejuna timere.”

LUCAN, iii., lin. 55.

Under such circumstances, it was better, perhaps, to make an end of the matter, than, by attempting to introduce any intermediate system, however well devised, to prolong, as it would have done, a sense of insecurity, and the pernicious trade of agitation. The agriculturists need not, however, despond; they have little to fear from the downfall of the protective system. There is no real room or ground for thinking that it will occasion such a fall of average prices as will do them any material injury; and should there be at any time so very abundant a season, or

cycle of seasons, in this country and in the north of Europe, as to threaten such a fall of prices as might give a serious shock to agricultural industry, the crisis may be averted by some temporary expedient. It is not, however, very probable that it will be often necessary to interpose in the way now alluded to. The notions current among us respecting the extreme cheapness of corn in foreign parts have no very solid foundation. Though sound in principle, and beneficial in its operation, there seem to be good reasons for thinking that the late measure will disappoint alike the fears of the agriculturists, and the glowing expectations of the manufacturing and commercial classes. Indeed, the chances are, that the former will gain by the change; for it will teach them to depend for success on practical skill, science, and industry, and to cease to rely on the worthless resource of custom-house regulations and parliamentary majorities; and it will give them increased security, by identifying their interests in opinion, as well as in fact, with those of the public.¹

But to return:—An unusually low rate of profit in a particular country not only lessens its power to accumulate capital, and, by consequence, to add to its population, but it also creates a strong temptation to transmit portions of its capital to other countries. The same principle that would prevent the employment of capital in Yorkshire, if the return to it were less than in Kent or Surrey, regulates its distribution among the different nations of the world. It is true that the love of country, the thousand ties of society and friendship, the ignorance of foreign languages, and the desire to have our stock employed under our own inspection, render a greater difference in the rate of profit necessary to occasion the transfer of capital from one country to another, than from one province of the same country

¹ For a further and full discussion of this interesting subject, see "Descriptive and Statistical Account of the British Empire," 3d ed., ii., pp. 450-596.

to another. But this love of country has its limits. The love of gain is a no less powerful principle; and whenever capitalists feel assured that their stock may be laid out with tolerable security, and considerably greater advantage in foreign states, its efflux, to a greater or less extent, invariably takes place.

When the taxes which affect the industrious classes are increased, such increase must either immediately fall wholly on profits or wages, or partly on the one and partly on the other. If it fall on profits, it makes, of course, an equivalent deduction from them; and if it fall on wages, it proportionally depresses the condition of the great mass of the people. There are limits, however,—and these in most countries are not, unfortunately, very remote,—to the power of the labourers to pay taxes; and were their situation more improved, were they habituated to comforts, and tolerably intelligent, the increased pressure of augmented taxes, by giving additional strength to the principle of moral restraint, and retarding the increase of population, would most probably raise wages to about their old level, throwing the taxes affecting them wholly or principally on their employers.

The oppressive weight of taxation has been the principal cause of the lowness of profits in the United Provinces during the last two centuries, and of the decline of their manufacturing and commercial prosperity. Notwithstanding the severe and laudable economy of her rulers, the vast expense incurred by the republic in her revolutionary struggle with Spain, and in her subsequent contests with France and England, led to the contraction of an immense public debt, the interest and other necessary charges on which obliged her to lay heavy taxes on the most indispensable necessities.¹

¹ In 1579, at the Union of Utrecht, the interest of the public debt of the province of Holland amounted to only 117,000 florins; but so rapidly did it increase, that in 1655, during the administration of the famous John de Witt, the States were compelled to reduce the interest from 5 to 4 per cent, and yet, notwithstanding this reduction, it amounted in 1678 to 7,107,000 florins! See Metelerkamp, "*Statistique de la Hollande*," p. 203.

Among others, high duties were laid on foreign corn when imported, on flour and meal when ground at the mill, and on bread, when it came from the oven. Taxation affected all the sources of national wealth; and so oppressive did it ultimately become, that it was a common saying at Amsterdam, that every dish of fish brought to table was paid once to the fisherman and *six times* to the state! Wages being necessarily raised so as to enable the labourers to subsist, the weight of these enormous taxes fell almost wholly on the capitalists: and profits being, in consequence, reduced below their level in other countries, the prosperity of Holland gradually declined, her capitalists choosing rather to transfer their stocks to the foreigner than to employ them at home. “L’augmentation successive des impôts, que les payemens des intérêts et les remboursemens ont rendu indispensable, a détruit une grande partie de l’industrie, a diminué le commerce, a diminué ou fort altéré l’état florissant où étoit autrefois la population, en resserrant chez le peuple les moyens de subsistance.”¹

In the previous statements we have endeavoured to show how variations in the rate of taxation, affecting those engaged in production, would affect the rate of profit; but we have said nothing in regard to the influence which loans to government exercise over that rate. Indeed, as they seldom occur except during war, and are, consequently, of an incidental character, they could not properly be classed among the circumstances that permanently influence profits, however deserving of separate investigation.

¹ “Richesse de la Hollande,” tom. ii., p. 179. This work is full of valuable information. The author (M. de Luzac) mentions, that the Hollanders had, in 1778, about 1500 millions of livres (62 millions sterling) in the public funds of France and England!—See also, as to the taxation of Holland, a “Memoir on the Means of Amending and Redressing the Commerce of the Republic,” drawn up from information communicated by the best-informed merchants, and published by order of the Stadtholder, William IV., Prince of Orange, in 1751. This “Memoir” was translated into English, and published in London in the same year.

If the loans made to government be of trifling amount compared with the disposable capital of the country, they will either exercise no influence, or next to none, over the rate of profit ; but if they be large, and particularly if they be negotiated during two or three successive years, their influence can hardly fail of being very sensibly felt. When government comes into the market for money, it necessarily offers such a rate of interest as is sufficient, all things considered, to procure the sum which it wants. Now it is plain, that if the rate offered by government be greater than the rate at which money was previously obtainable on good security, and if it continue for two or three years to negotiate fresh loans on the same or higher terms, the rate of interest will be universally raised ; for individuals would be unable to obtain loans, except on the same terms as government.

This, however, is not the only effect of loans to government. Had the latter abstained from borrowing, the stockholders would either have employed the capital which they have lent to government in industrious undertakings, or they would have lent it to others who would have so employed it ; and hence the negotiation of a loan, by causing the immediate consumption of a quantity of capital that would otherwise have been reserved as a fund to employ labourers in all time to come, will have an injurious effect upon wages. Capital and population always bear a certain relation to each other ; the latter being, in the majority of instances, stationary when the former is stationary, or varying at about the same rate and in the same way that it varies. It is, therefore, clear, that the negotiation of a loan, or the diversion of a portion of stock that has, or would, partly at least, have been employed in industrious undertakings, to military purposes, must unavoidably change the existing relation of stock and labour. Capital is, on the one hand, either actually diminished, or the rapidity of its increase checked, while, on the other, the population is not diminished, nor the rate of its increase retarded ; for, it has

been already seen, that neither the number nor the habits of the people can be sensibly affected, except by slow degrees. The immediate effect of loans is, therefore, to render population redundant as compared with capital; and, by depressing wages, to raise, for a while at least, the rate of profit.

Such a rise cannot, however, be permanent. The distressed condition of the labourers naturally adds new strength to the principle of moral restraint, and, by retarding the progress of population, gradually raises wages to their old level, or to one not much inferior. It is, however, easy to discover that there are other circumstances that conspire to bring about this result, and which are powerful enough not only to reduce profits to their old level, but to one still lower. It is difficult to imagine that it would be practicable, were the attempt made, so to impose the taxes required to defray the interest of loans, that a considerable portion of them should not fall either directly or indirectly on profits. But, however imposed, the pressure of these new taxes would naturally tend, as was formerly explained, to infuse a greater spirit of industry and economy into those on whom they fell, and would, consequently, occasion a more rapid accumulation of capital when government ceased to borrow. The growing demand for labour, resulting from the operation of this principle, combined with the more powerful influence of moral restraint, over the supply of labour, could not fail of ultimately raising wages to about their old level; and when this is done, profits (supposing, of course, the productiveness of industry not to have varied) will be depressed, because of the increased weight of taxation, to a lower level than they stood at previously to the negotiation of the loans.

These conclusions seem to be verified by what has taken place in this country. According to the researches of Arthur Young, to whom we are indebted for much valuable information respecting the rate of wages at different periods, the medium price of agricultural labour in England in 1767, 1768, and 1770, was very nearly 1s. 3d. a-day; and he

further states, that its medium price in 1810 and 1811, when money wages were at the highest elevation to which they attained during the war, amounted to about 2s. 5d., being a rise of nearly, though not quite, 100 per cent. But the price of wheat, according to the account kept at Eton College, during the first-mentioned years, was 51s. a quarter; and during 1810 and 1811 its price was 110s., being a rise of 115 per cent; and Mr Young estimates that butcher's meat had, during the same period, risen 146, butter 140, and cheese 153 per cent; being, at an average, a rise of $138\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, showing that wages, as compared with these articles, had declined in the interval $38\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, or considerably more than a third; and if the increased cost of beer, leather, and some other necessary articles, had been taken into account, the fall in the rate of real wages would have appeared still more striking. No doubt, it is true, that most articles of clothing, particularly cottons, to which Mr Young has not alluded, fell very greatly in price during the period in question. These, however, do not form such prominent articles as provisions in the consumption of the working-classes; so that, notwithstanding what they gained by their fall, it is abundantly certain that real wages sunk considerably during the latter years of the war; and this fall satisfactorily accounts for a part, at least, of the rise that then took place in the rate of profit.

The circumstances that have occurred since the termination of the war, and the return to specie payments, appear equally consistent with what has previously been advanced. Wages not having fallen in the same proportion as the prices of corn and most articles of subsistence, profits have been consequently depressed; and they have also been depressed through the operation of the taxes imposed during the war to pay the interest of the loans.¹

It has sometimes been stated, that a loan occasions, during the time it is being spent by government, a greater demand for labour than it would have afforded had it continued in

¹ See "Edinburgh Review," vol. xl. p. 28.

the possession of individuals. We confess, however, that we have not been able to discover any good grounds for this opinion. If government expend the loan in the purchase of military stores, they will not thereby give any greater stimulus to labour than the capitalists who have made the loan would have given had they employed it to purchase ordinary goods: and if government employ it in hiring soldiers and sailors, that will not occasion a greater demand for labour than if it had been employed to hire common labourers. That there is frequently a very brisk demand for labour during periods of war, is no doubt true; but the cause will be found in something else than the mere substitution of government employment for that of individuals.

It has been previously seen (*ante*, p. 443,) that the rate of wages may be increased, for a while at least, by the imposition of taxes falling principally on fine houses, furniture, horses, and other articles of luxurious accommodation. The produce of such taxes being, for the most part, expended upon soldiers and sailors, it may be fairly concluded that they tend to increase the demand for labour, and, consequently, also the rate of wages. Practically, however, it is very doubtful whether the taxes imposed in this country have ever had any material or, indeed, sensible operation in the way now pointed out; and it would seem that the principal cause why the heavy taxation to which we were subjected during the war, and the loans then contracted, did not more seriously injure the labourer, is to be found in their influence in stimulating industry and economy.

Besides being affected by variations in the burden of taxation, and by the negotiation of loans on account of government, the rate of profit is affected by changes in the value of money—increasing when it falls, and diminishing when it rises.

Hume has observed, in his “*Essay on Money*,” that “in every kingdom into which money begins to flow in greater

abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face ; labour and industry gain life, the merchant becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer more diligent and skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater alacrity and attention. But when gold and silver are diminishing, the workman has not the same employment from the manufacturer and merchant, though he pays the same price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot dispose of his corn and cattle, though he must pay the same rent to the landlord. The poverty, beggary, and sloth that must ensue, are easily foreseen."

Hume supposed that the stimulus he has so well described, given by an influx of money to industry, originates in the circumstance of the additional money coming first into the hands of capitalists, and consequently enabling them to employ more workmen, and to increase their demand for valuable products. It has, however, been shown that an influx of money could not operate in the way now alluded to, so as to have any very material influence over industry.¹ But although the philosophical historian seems to have mistaken, or rather overlooked, the mode in which an increase of money principally contributes to excite industry and enterprise, there is not, we apprehend, so much as the shadow of a ground for doubting that such is its effect. Periods when the quantity of money and the prices of commodities are increasing, are invariably distinguished by a comparatively brisk demand for labour, and an unusual degree of activity and invention among the industrious classes ; and it is not difficult to discover why such is the case. Variations in the value of money obviously influence the pressure of taxation, rents, annuities, and other fixed money payments. When its value declines, all the ascertained burdens affecting the productive classes decline in the same proportion. Fundholders, all sorts of annuitants, landlords,

¹ Mr James Mill contends, ("Elements of Political Economy," 2d ed. p. 160,) that it would have *no* influence ; but this, were the point worth investigating, might be shown to be an error.

during the currency of their leases, persons employed in public offices, the holders of mortgages,—suffer universally in proportion to the fall in the value of money; their money incomes remaining the same, while the price of all articles is raised: but farmers, while they pay the same rent to their landlords, the same taxes to government, and perhaps the same composition for tithes, sell their produce for a price increased proportionally to the reduced value of money. In like manner, merchants, manufacturers, and tradesmen, pay the same duties on their goods, the same port dues, the same tolls, the same rent for shops and warehouses, the same rate of interest for capital borrowed, at the same time that they obtain increased prices for whatever they have to sell. The profits of such persons are consequently raised by the whole amount of the sums deducted from the fixed charges to which they are subject through the fall in the value of the money in which they are rated and paid. In other words, the condition of husbandmen, manufacturers, tradesmen, and labourers of all descriptions, is improved at the expense of the landed gentry, of their creditors and those of the state, professional parties, &c., whose incomes are immediately, and in some instances permanently reduced,¹ by the reduction in the value of the currency.

Now, when we consider the immense number of individuals in Great Britain, such as landlords, fundholders, annuitants, persons living on the interest of money, persons who, having retired from business, receive a fixed salary from their successors, clergymen, lawyers, physicians, &c., it is evident that the total aggregate loss such persons would sustain by any considerable fall in the value of money would be exceedingly great. But it is also evident, that what is thus lost by them is gained by others,—by those who are actively employed in industrious undertakings, and whose prosperity is always supposed to be identical with that of the public.

¹ Those who made advances on loan would get back less than they really lent when money fell in value, and would, therefore, be permanently injured.

A depreciation of the currency must, therefore, by lightening the pressure of taxation, and of all fixed charges affecting individuals engaged in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, proportionally increase their profits; and it is hardly necessary to add, that this increased profit will operate as a spur to production, quicken all the operations of trade, and occasion an increased demand for labour.

The opposite effects will of course follow, when, instead of falling, the currency becomes more valuable; taxes and fixed charges being then augmented in an equal degree, the profits of those by whom those taxes and other fixed charges are borne are necessarily reduced in the same proportion. Here, then, is a key by which we may readily explain many apparent anomalies. The prosperity of the country during the latter years of the war, and its more recent prosperity in 1824 and 1825, and in 1835 and 1836, was undoubtedly owing, in a very considerable degree, to the fall in the value of money, originating in the great additions that were then made to the paper currency; while the peculiarly severe distresses to which the industrious classes were exposed in 1815 and 1816, 1819, 1826, and 1838, are chiefly ascribable to the reductions that were then made in the quantity of money, and the consequent increase of its value. There can be no doubt, indeed, that a rapid reduction of the quantity, or a rapid increase of the value of money, by giving a sudden shock to industry, and vitiating the basis on which innumerable contracts have been framed to the prejudice of the industrious classes, has, in the first instance, a far more pernicious influence than can be fairly ascribed to the mere increase of their burdens. Still, however, the effects of an increase of this sort are always obvious, and are disastrous according to the degree in which the value of the currency may be raised.

We should be sorry were it imagined, from any thing now stated, that we are disposed to approve, in any degree, of the policy of those who recommend that, to lighten the pressure of taxation and the burdens falling on the indus-

trious classes, the value of money should be reduced by a legislative enactment. Our object has merely been to explain the influence of changes, which, originating in variations in the cost of the precious metals, or in political or financial measures, or the abuse of banking, affect, without its being intended, the value of money. An intentional reduction of the standard would have the effects already mentioned ; but it would also have others, which must not be lost sight of in estimating its probable influence. Besides diminishing the weight of taxation and of the other burdens laid upon the industrious classes, it would partially subvert the right of property, and go far to annihilate all confidence in the legislature. Whatever, therefore, might be gained on the one hand by such a measure, would, there is every reason to think, be much more than lost on the other. Public and private credit would, for a while, be destroyed ; and a large amount of capital would be transferred to foreign countries, as to places of security. In this respect a degradation of the standard would be worse than an avowed public bankruptcy, to the same,¹ or even to a greater extent ; for the latter would affect the creditors of the state only, whereas the former would, besides them, affect the creditors of all private individuals, and would, in fact, defraud every one who had lent money or capital, or sold goods on credit, of a portion of his just claims ! Perhaps, as Hume conjectures, credit might, at no distant period, grow up again, even after so flagrant a breach of faith ; but such a result could hardly be expected, unless the country were to continue at peace, and to become decidedly more prosperous. Should we be involved in war, or should the measure not be followed by the anticipated effect in relieving the national distresses, it is very unlikely that credit should revive ; for, in the former case, few would be willing, unless tempted by the offer of a large bonus, to lend to a government which

¹ By the same extent is meant, that if the standard be reduced any given amount, as 10 per cent, the sums due the public creditor should be reduced in the same proportion, and conversely.

had so strikingly evinced its contempt for the most sacred engagements ; and in the latter, the continuance of the distress would naturally excite a fear lest it should lead to a repetition of the same violence for which it had already been made the pretext. Nothing, in fact, can ever justify a government in resorting to such a dishonest, pettifogging trick as a reduction of the value of money. If the public affairs should ever be so desperate as to require that some extraordinary effort should be made to lighten the pressure on the national resources, the exigency should be met by a contribution on capital, or, if that should be impracticable, by compounding with the national creditors. The honour and wellbeing of a nation will always be best consulted by looking its difficulties fairly in the face ; and will, on the contrary, be most deeply compromised by attempting to evade them by a miserable fraud. The advantages that a change in the value of money has occasionally conferred on the industrious classes, are the result of natural or fortuitous causes. They cannot be secured by voluntarily enfeebling the standard ; for this, being a scheme to benefit one part of society by defrauding another part, is sure to bring along with it evils that will not merely neutralise, but very greatly overbalance its advantages. At bottom there is no real distinction between what is just and what is useful. The accidental conflagration of the fleets of their rivals would no doubt have increased the power of the Athenians ; but had they adopted the advice ascribed to Themistocles, and attempted to secure their ascendancy by the basest treachery, they would certainly have missed their end, and have become objects of universal hostility as well as of contempt. “ *Nihil est quod adhuc de republicâ putem dictum, et quo possim longiùs progredi, nisi sit confirmatum, non modò falsum esse illud, sine injuriâ non posse, sed hoc verissimum, sine summâ justitiâ rempublicam regi non posse.*”¹

The statements now made sufficiently show, that loans

¹ Cic. Frag. lib. ii. de Repub.

to government, and changes in the value of money, affect profits only by affecting wages, or the taxes, or other fixed charges which enter into the cost of production : so that whether government be borrowing or paying off debts, and whether the value of money be rising, falling, or stationary, it is still true that profits do not rise except when industry becomes more productive, or when wages or taxes are reduced ; and that they do not fall except when industry becomes less productive, or wages or taxes are augmented.

We have seen in a previous chapter, that a low rate of profit, by lessening the means of accumulating capital, and stimulating its transfer to countries where profits are higher, can hardly fail to be, in the end, most injurious. The investigations in which we have now been engaged, show that this calamity can be averted, or, if it have occurred, can be got rid of, only by increasing the productiveness of industry, or diminishing the burdens that fall on the labouring classes. Hence the vast importance of economy in the national expenditure, and hence also a principal advantage of improvements in the arts, and of the opening of new facilities for commercial intercourse. Whatever tends to make industry more productive, and to diminish the burdens of the industrious classes, must in so far increase the rate of profit ; and this is never increased without a corresponding increase of capital, or of the means of making new improvements and of employing more work-people.

CHAPTER VIII.

*Interest and Nett Profit identical—Circumstances which occasion
Variations in the Rate of Interest—Impolicy of Usury Laws.*

WHEN an individual, instead of employing his own capital, lends it to another, he stipulates for a certain annual premium or return, which has been denominated interest.

In the preceding chapter we have considered profits as they are usually considered—that is, as consisting of the produce, or its equivalent, remaining to the undertaker of any sort of work, after his various outgoings have been replaced. But to ascertain the relation of profits and interest, this residue must be further analysed. Now it is obvious, that it consists of two portions, whereof one is the return to the capital employed, and the other the wages or remuneration of the capitalist for his skill and trouble in superintending its employment, with a compensation for such risks as it may not have been possible to provide against by insurance. Hence the distinction between *gross* and *nett* profits. The first comprises the wages of the capitalist, the return to his capital, and the compensation now alluded to, while the second consists of the return to capital only. In laying it down, when treating of the “Accumulation and Employment of Capital,” that high profits are the best criterion of national prosperity, we had gross profits only in view. And it is, indeed, evident, that the condition of those engaged in industrious undertakings depends on the magnitude of the produce or sum remaining to them, after their various expenses are deducted, without being in any degree influenced by the names they may give to portions thereof.

When the parties to a loan are left, without any sort of interference, to adjust its terms, and when the security

offered by the borrower is unexceptionable, and payment may be had on the shortest notice, the interest that will, under such circumstances, be stipulated for the capital or money advanced, will be identical with the rate of nett profit at the time. The lender having nothing to do with the employment of the loan, is not entitled to any compensation on that head ; but he is entitled to all that can fairly be considered as the return to it after the risks, wages, and necessary emoluments of those who undertake its employment, are deducted ; and this much he will get, and no more. Whatever else may be realised by the investment of the loan in an industrious undertaking, or otherwise, will belong to the borrower, and will form the wages or compensation due for his skill and trouble in superintendence, &c. We are supported in this view of the matter by the authority of Mr Tooke. "The rate of interest," says he, "*is the measure of the nett profit on capital.* All returns beyond this on the employment of capital, are resolvable into compensations under distinct heads for risk, trouble, or skill, or for advantages of situation or connexion."¹

Whatever, therefore, may at any time occasion a brisk demand for capital, without also occasioning an increase in the productiveness of industry, or a fall of wages or taxes, may raise the rate of interest, or of *nett* profit, without affecting *gross* profits, or profits in the customary acceptance of the term. And this, as has been already observed, is most commonly the immediate effect of government loans. They raise the rate of interest without affecting profits ; the rise merely diminishing that part of the total produce falling to the employers of capital which is to be considered as wages, and making a corresponding addition to the other part, or that which is to be considered as the nett return or interest of capital.

Hence the advantage of a loan to the moneyed interest or to those who have capital to lend ; and hence, also, its uni-

¹ "Considerations on the State of the Currency," 2d ed. p. 12.

versally remarked injurious operation upon those who are employing borrowed capital.

The rate of interest is not, therefore, as has sometimes been supposed, always a correct test of the rate of profit. When, however, allowance is made for the disturbing effects of government loans, and other accidental causes of variation, the rate of interest or nett profit varies, generally speaking, directly as the rate of gross profit. Whenever interest is low during a period of peace, it is found that profits are also low, and conversely.

There are but few species of security in which there is no risk, either of the repayment of the loans themselves, or of the interest at the stipulated periods. And as the trustees of many public bodies, as well as those of many private individuals, are obliged to invest in such securities only, the rate of interest which they bring is frequently very much depressed below what may be considered as the common and average rate of interest at the time. Government securities are liable to be deeply affected by political considerations, by the greater or less latitude for a rise or fall in the capital sum invested, and by a variety of circumstances which it is always very difficult, or rather perhaps impossible, even for those most experienced in such matters, to distinguish and appreciate. Mercantile bills of unquestionable credit, and having two or three months to run, are generally discounted at a lower rate of interest than may be obtained for sums lent upon mortgage, on account of the facility they afford of repossessing the principal, and applying it in some more profitable manner. Other things being equal, the rate of interest must of course vary according to the supposed risk incurred by the lender of either not receiving payment at all, or not receiving it at the stipulated term. No person of sound mind would lend on the personal security of an individual of doubtful character and solvency, and on mortgage over a valuable estate, at the same rate of interest. Wherever there is risk, it must be compensated by a higher premium or interest.

And yet, obvious as this principle may appear, all governments have interfered with the terms of loans—some to prohibit interest altogether, and others to fix a certain rate which it should be deemed legal to exact and illegal to exceed. It is needless, however, to waste the reader's time by entering into lengthened arguments to show the mischievous effect of such interferences. This has been done over and over again. It is plainly in no respect more desirable to limit or reduce the rate of interest than it would be to limit or reduce the rate of insurance, or the prices of commodities; and though it were desirable, it cannot be accomplished. Legislative enactments for such an object invariably increase the rate of interest. When the rate fixed by law is less than the market or customary rate, lenders and borrowers are obliged to resort to circuitous devices to evade the law; and as these devices are always attended with more or less trouble and risk, the rate of interest is proportionally enhanced. During the late war it was not uncommon for persons to pay ten or twelve per cent for loans, which, had there been no usury laws, they might have got for six or seven per cent. It is singular that an enactment which contradicted the most obvious principles, and had been repeatedly condemned by committees of the legislature, should have been allowed to preserve a place in the statute-book for so long a period; but at length it was substantially repealed by the act 2 & 3 Victoria, cap. 37, which exempts bills of exchange, having not more than twelve months to run, and contracts for loans of money above £10, from its operation.¹

¹ The prejudice against taking interest seems to have principally originated in a mistaken view of some enactments in the Mosaic law, (see Michaelis on the "Laws of Moses," vol. ii. pp. 327-353, Eng. edit.) and in a statement of Aristotle, to the effect, that as money does not produce money, no return could equitably be claimed by the lender! The famous reformer Calvin has the merit of being one of the first who saw and exposed the futility of such notions. "*Pecunia non parit pecuniam. Quid mare, quid domus, ex cujus locatione pensionem percipio? An ex tectis et parietibus argentum propriè nascitur? Sed et terra producit, et mari advehitur quod pecuniam deinde producat, et habitationis commoditas cum certâ pecuniâ*"

parari commutarive solet. Quod si igitur plus ex negotiatione lucri percipi possit, quàm ex fundi cujusvis proventu. An feretur qui fundum sterilem fortassè colono locaverit ex quo mercedem vel proventum recipiat sibi, qui ex pecuniâ fructum aliquem perceperit, non feretur ? et qui pecuniâ fundum acquirit, annon pecunia illa generat alteram annuam pecuniam ? Undè vero mercatoris lucrum ? Ex ipsius, inquires, diligentia atque industriâ. Quis dubitet pecuniam vacuam inutilem omnino esse ? neque à me mutuam rogat, vacuam apud se habere à me acceptam cogitat. Non ergo ex pecuniâ illâ lucrum accedit, sed ex proventu. Illæ igitur rationes subtiles quidem sunt et speciem quandam habent, sed ubi propiùs expendentur, seipsa concidunt. Nunc igitur concludo, judicandum de usuris esse, non ex particulari aliquo Scripturæ loco, sed tantùm ex æquitatis regulâ.”—*Calvini Epistolæ*, quoted by Stewart in the notes to his “Preliminary Dissertation” to the “*Encyclopædia Britannica*.”

PRINCIPLES

OF

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

PART IV.

CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH.

HAVING, in the preceding parts of this work, endeavoured to explain the means by which labour is facilitated and wealth produced, and to investigate the laws regulating its distribution among the various classes of society, we come now to the *fourth* and last division of the subject, or to that which treats of the Consumption of Wealth.

Definition of Consumption—Consumption the End of Production—Test of advantageous and disadvantageous Consumption—Sumptuary Laws—Advantage of a Taste for Luxuries—Error of Dr Smith's Opinion with respect to unproductive Consumption—Error of those who contend, that to facilitate Production it is necessary to encourage wasteful Consumption—Statement of Montesquieu—Consumption of Government—Conclusion.

It was formerly shown, that by the production of a commodity is not meant the production of matter, that being the exclusive prerogative of Omnipotence, but the giving to matter already in existence such a shape as may fit it for ministering to our wants or enjoyments. In like manner, by consumption is not meant the consumption or annihila-

tion of matter, for that is as impossible as its creation, but merely the consumption or annihilation of those qualities which render commodities useful and desirable. To consume the products of art and industry, is to deprive the matter of which they consist of the utility, and consequently also of the value, communicated to it by labour. And hence we are not to measure consumption by the magnitude, weight, or number of the products consumed, but by their value only. Large consumption is the destruction of large value, however small the bulk in which it may be compressed.

Consumption, in the sense in which the word is used in this science, is synonymous with use; and is, in fact, the great end and object of industry. The various products of art and industry are produced only that they may be employed to satisfy our immediate wants or to add to our enjoyments, or that they may be employed as capital, and made to assist in producing others. In most cases, too, it is advantageous, after commodities are in a state fit to be used, that we should avail ourselves of their services. Indeed, a large proportion of the products used as food can seldom be preserved for any considerable period without loss; and in delaying to employ those that are to be used as capital, we allow the instruments of production to lie idle, and lose the profit we might realise through their agency.

But, though commodities be produced only that they may be consumed, we must not thence suppose that all sorts of consumption are equally advantageous. It is not always, however, very easy to distinguish between advantageous or disadvantageous, or, as it is more commonly termed, productive and unproductive consumption. In so far, however, as the public interests are involved, (and it is with such only that we have to deal,) it may be laid down, that the consumption of any given amount of the products of art and industry is productive, if it occasion, whether directly or indirectly, the production of the same or a greater amount of equally valuable products,

and unproductive if it have not that effect. A knowledge of the mode in which, or the purpose for which, wealth has been laid out or consumed, will not warrant our affirming that its consumption has been productive, or the reverse. To decide as to this, we must look at the *results* of the consumption, and at them only. By fixing the attention on the *species* of consumption carried on, and not on its results, this part of the science has been encumbered with imaginary distinctions, and has been rendered, in no ordinary degree, obscure and unintelligible. It is plainly not enough, for example, to prove that a quantity of wealth has been productively employed, to be told that it has been expended in the improvement of the soil, in the excavation of a canal, or in any similar undertaking; for it may have been laid out injudiciously, or in such a way that it cannot reproduce itself. Neither, on the other hand, is it enough to prove that a quantity of wealth has been laid out unproductively, to be told that it has been expended on equipages or entertainments; for the desire to indulge in this expense may have been the cause that the wealth was originally produced, and the desire to indulge in similar expense may occasion the subsequent production of a still greater quantity.

Hence, if we would come to an accurate conclusion upon such points, we must carefully examine not the immediate only, but also the remote effects of expenditure; pronouncing it to be productive when it causes, either by its direct or indirect operation, the reproduction of the same or of a greater amount of wealth, and unproductive when it is not fully replaced. It is not practicable to adopt any other criterion of productive and unproductive expenditure, without leading to the most contradictory conclusions.

But, in whatever way wealth may be consumed, it is plain that the advance or decline of every nation depends on the balance between consumption and reproduction. If, in given periods, the wealth produced exceeds that consumed in a country, the means of increasing its capital will be provided,

and its population will increase, or the actual numbers be better accommodated, or both. If the consumption in such periods fully equals the reproduction, no means will be afforded of increasing the stock or capital of the nation, and society will be at a stand; and if the consumption exceed the reproduction, every succeeding period will see the society worse supplied: its prosperity will evidently decline, and pauperism will gradually spread itself among the population.

It is impossible to fix on any standard for the regulation of individual expenditure. The sentiments of no two persons ever exactly coincide with respect to the advantage derivable from any outlay of wealth; and as each is held to be the best judge of what is profitable and advantageous for himself, we cannot decide *à priori* which is right or which is wrong. The opinions of different individuals depend on the circumstances under which they are placed. A rich man is naturally inclined to extend the limits of advantageous consumption farther than a man of middling fortune, and the latter farther than he who is poor. And it is sufficiently plain, that a man's expenses should always bear some proportion to his fortune, his prospects, and station in society; and that what might be proper and advantageous expenditure in one case, might be most improper and disadvantageous in another. These, however, are matters which should be left to the discretion of individuals; and though a few may waste their fortunes wantonly and unprofitably, we may be assured that the efforts of a great majority will be directed to their increase.

Though governments have been generally, or rather, perhaps, it should be said, universally, more profuse than their subjects, they have, notwithstanding, very frequently enacted sumptuary laws, to restrain the extravagant expenditure of the latter. These laws were long popular in Rome, and were formerly enforced in this and most other European countries; but it may be safely affirmed that they have not, in any instance, been productive of any good effect. They

are a manifest infringement of the right of property ; and no legislator can ever fetter his subjects in the disposal of the fruits of their industry, without rendering them less zealous about their acquisition, and in so far paralysing their exertions.

Sir Dudley North has set the effect of sumptuary laws in its true light. "Countries," he says, "which have these laws are generally poor ; for, when men are thereby confined to narrower expense than they otherwise would be, they are, at the same time, discouraged from the industry and ingenuity which they would have employed in obtaining wherewithal to support them in the full latitude of expense they desire. It is possible families may be supported by such means, but then the growth of wealth in the nation is hindered ; for that never thrives better than when riches are tossed from hand to hand. The meaner sort, seeing their fellows become rich and great, are spirited up to imitate their industry. A tradesman sees his neighbour keep a coach ; presently all his endeavours are at work to do the like, and many times he is beggared by it ; however, the extraordinary application he makes to gratify his vanity is beneficial to the public."¹

The public interest requires that the national capital should, if possible, be kept constantly on the increase ; or, which is the same thing, that the consumption of any given period should be the means of reproducing a greater amount of useful and desirable products. But it has been sufficiently shown that this cannot be brought about by a system of *surveillance* and restriction. Industry and frugality never have been, and never can be, promoted by its means. To render a man industrious, secure him the peaceable enjoyment of the fruits of his industry ; to wean him from extravagance, and to render him frugal and parsimonious, allow him to reap all the disadvantage of the one line of conduct, and all the advantage of the other.

Besides, it is clear that sumptuary laws, even were they

¹ "Discourses on Trade," p. 15.

in other respects advantageous, must operate partially and oppressively. What would be wanton and ridiculous extravagance in one man may be well-regulated moderate expenditure in another. If, therefore, for the sake of the prodigal, this expense be proscribed, the other is deprived of gratifications which his fortune gives him a right to command; and if it be allowed to those who can afford it, then, in order to ascertain to whom the regulation is applicable, an odious, and generally ineffectual, investigation must be instituted into the circumstances of individuals. Certainly, however, it is no part of the business of government to pry into the affairs of its subjects. It was not framed to keep their accounts and balance their ledgers, but that it might protect their rights and liberties. "If its own extravagance do not ruin the state, that of its subjects never will." The poverty and loss of station which are the inevitable result of improvident consumption, are a sufficient security against its ever becoming injuriously prevalent; and wherever the public burdens are moderate, property protected, and the freedom of industry secured, the efforts of the great body of the people to rise in the world, and to improve their condition, will insure the continued increase of national wealth. It is idle to expect that unproductive expenditure should ever be wholly avoided; but the experience of every tolerably well-governed state proves, that, speaking generally, an incomparably greater amount of capital is expended productively than unproductively.

It was long a prevalent opinion among moralists, that the consumption, and consequently, also, the production of luxuries, was unprofitable and disadvantageous. If a man wished to get rich, his object, it was said, should not be to increase his fortune, but to lessen his wants. "*Si quem volueris esse divitem,*" says Seneca, "*non est quod augeas divitias, sed minuas cupiditates.*" Had these opinions ever obtained any considerable influence, they would have formed an insuperable obstacle to all improvement; and men would

never have advanced beyond the state in which we find the wretched natives of Australia. Whoever is contented with the situation in which he is placed has no motive to aspire to any thing better ; and hence it is to the absence of this feeling of contentment, and the existence of that which is directly opposed to it—the desire to rise in the world, to improve our condition, and to obtain a constantly increasing command over conveniences and luxuries—that society is indebted for every improvement. It is not matter of blame, but of praise, that individuals strive to attain to superior wealth and distinction ; that they scruple not

“Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
Noctes atque dies niti præstante labore
Ad summas emergere opes, rerumque potiri.”

LUCRET., ii. lin. 11.

Ambition to rise is censurable only when, to forward our object, we resort to means injurious to our own character or the wellbeing of others. So long as we avoid this, and depend for success on the fair exercise of our talents and industry, it is deserving of every commendation. Until it has been excited, no progress can be made in civilisation ; and the more it increases in strength, the more rapid will be the accumulation of wealth, and the more prosperous will every individual become. The mere necessities of life may, in favourable situations, be obtained with but little labour ; and the uncivilised tribes that have no desire to possess its comforts are proverbially indolent and poor, and are exposed in bad years to the greatest privations. To make men industrious—to make them shake off that lethargy which benumbs their faculties when in a rude or degraded condition, they must be inspired with a taste for comforts, luxuries, and enjoyments. When this is done, their artificial wants become equally clamorous with those that are strictly necessary, and increase exactly as the means of gratifying them increase. Wherever a taste for comforts and conveniences is generally diffused, the desires of man become altogether illimitable. The gratification of

one leads directly to the formation of another. In highly civilised societies, new products, and new modes of enjoyment are constantly presenting themselves as motives to exertion, and as means for its reward. Perseverance is, in consequence, given to all the operations of industry; and idleness, and its attendant evils, almost entirely disappear. "What," asks Paley, "can be less necessary, or less connected with the sustentation of human life, than the whole produce of the silk, lace, and plate manufactory? yet what multitudes labour in the different branches of these arts! What can be imagined more capricious than the fondness for tobacco and snuff? yet how many various occupations, and how many thousands in each, are set at work in administering to this frivolous gratification?" The stimulus which the desire to possess these articles gives to industry renders their introduction advantageous. The earth is capable of furnishing food for a much greater number of human beings than can be profitably employed in its cultivation. But the occupiers of the soil will not part with its produce for nothing, or, rather, they will not raise what they can neither use themselves nor exchange for what they want. As soon, however, as a taste for conveniences and luxuries has been introduced, they extort from the ground all that it can be made to produce, exchanging the surplus for the conveniences and gratifications they desire to obtain; so that those by whom these accommodations are furnished, though they have no property in the soil nor any concern in its cultivation, are regularly and liberally supplied with its produce. In this way the stock of necessaries, as well as of useful and agreeable products, is vastly increased by the introduction of a taste for luxuries; and the population, besides being better provided for, is rapidly augmented.

Locke has given the sanction of his authority to this doctrine. "What," says he, "would a man value ten thousand or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked, too, with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no

hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money (or the conveniences and luxuries produced by others) to him by the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature whatever was more than would supply the conveniences of life, to be had there for him and his family.”¹

And yet there is hardly a single article among those now reckoned most indispensable to existence, or a single improvement of any sort, which has not been denounced at its introduction as a useless superfluity, or as being in some way injurious. Few articles of clothing are at present considered more essential than shirts; but there are instances on record of individuals being put in the pillory for presuming to use so expensive and unnecessary a luxury! Chimneys were not commonly used in England until the middle of the sixteenth century; and, in the introductory discourse to “*Hollinshed’s Chronicles*,” published in 1577, there is a bitter complaint of the multitude of chimneys lately erected, of the exchange of straw pallets for mattresses or flock-beds, and of wooden platters for earthenware and pewter. In another place, he laments that nothing but oak is used for building, instead of willow as heretofore;—adding, that “formerly our houses indeed were of willow, but our men were of oak; but, now that our houses are of oak, our men are not only of willow, but some altogether of straw, which is a sore alteration!”

Many volumes have been filled with lamentations over the prevalence of a taste for tea, sugar, coffee, spices, and other foreign luxuries; and the idea that their consumption is prejudicial to the increase of wealth, is still very common. Voltaire, whose opinions on such subjects are, for the most part, very correct, has in this instance given currency to the prevailing delusion. “*Henry IV.*,” says he, “breakfasted on a glass of wine and wheaten bread; he neither used tea, nor

¹ “*Second Treatise concerning Government*,” cap. 5.

coffee, nor chocolate ; whereas the products of Martinique, Mocha, and China, are now served up at the breakfast of a lady's maid ! And if we reflect that these products cost France upwards of 50 millions a-year, we must obviously be carrying on some very advantageous branches of commerce, to support this *continued loss*." But the gold and silver exported to India and China are procured in exchange for commodities produced in France ; and what is the motive that made these commodities be produced ? Evidently, that they might be employed as means to obtain the tea, coffee, sugar, &c., for which there is a demand. Take away the taste for these articles, or prohibit their importation, and the export of the precious metals to the East will no doubt cease ; but so will also the production of the commodities with which these metals are purchased ; for, to suppose that they should still be produced, would be to suppose that men may be industrious without an object ! Instead, therefore, of being enriched by the cessation of the demand for the articles in question, France would be rendered so much the poorer ; she would retrograde in the scale of civilisation ; her inhabitants would be less industrious, and enjoy fewer gratifications.

" Un préjugé vulgaire," says the Marquis Garnier, " porte à regarder comme désavantageux l'échange dans lequel on donne un morceau de métal qui peut durer des siècles, pour avoir une denrée que la consommation va détruire en une minute. Cependant, le métal, ainsi que la plante, n'ont de valeur qu'en raison du travail qu'ils ont coûté ; l'argent ne manquera pas plus que le thé au travail qui voudra l'extraire du sein de la terre ; et de ces deux substances, celle qui se consomme le plus rapidement est, par cette même raison, celle qui tient plus de travail en activité. Une révolution qui abîmeroit sous les eaux toutes les mines de l'Amérique appauvrirait fort peu les nations de l'Europe. Mais si le sucre, le café, le thé, &c., venaient à perdre tout-à-coup leur saveur et leur arôme, s'ils n'avaient plus la propriété de charmer le palais, ils ces-

seraient de tenir rang parmi les richesses ; alors s'arrêterait le travail qui les produit dans les deux Indes, et, par contre-coup, tout le travail qui s'exerce en Europe pour les acheter." ¹

The admirers of simplicity, or rather of rusticity, may perhaps urge, that the happiness of mankind is not increased by this never-ceasing pursuit of new gratifications and additional wealth ; that habit reconciles individuals to the state in which they are accustomed to live ; and that the Irishman or the Greenlander, when abundantly supplied with potatoes or fish, is as cheerful and happy as the lordly inhabitant of the Palais Royal, or of Belgrave Square. We may observe, however, that none but rich and refined countries can ever be secure against the devastations of famine, which frequently sweep off almost the entire population of semi-barbarous hordes ; and it is in them only that the intellectual powers are ever fully exercised, or that man can make that progress in knowledge which constitutes so great a part of the excellence or perfection of which he is capable. But whether the attainment of wealth, or of distinction of any sort, be favourable or unfavourable to happiness, there can be no doubt of its pursuit being eminently congenial to human nature. The desire to improve our condition, though it may, for a while, be overpowered by circumstances, can never be wholly eradicated ; and, speaking generally, is always impelling us forward in the career of invention and discovery. The prospect extends and varies as we advance. "The natural flights of the human mind are not from pleasure to pleasure, but from hope to hope ;" and at every step of his progress man dis-

¹ "Richesse des Nations," tom. v. p. 509. The indolence of the Mexicans has been ascribed partly to the facility of obtaining supplies of food by the cultivation of the banana, and partly to the mildness of the climate, which renders clothing and lodging of inferior importance. Humboldt mentions it as a prevalent opinion, that nothing short of the extirpation of the banana will ever render them industrious ; and the state of sloth and debasement into which the Mexicans are now sunk would seem to countenance this opinion. See "Geographical Dictionary," art. *Mexico*.

covers new motives of action, new excitements of fear and allurements of desire. The paths of enterprise and ambition are uniformly most crowded, and pursued with the greatest eagerness, where there is most prosperity and freedom; and are deserted only in those unfortunate countries where distress and tyranny weigh down all the moral energies. When, indeed, the end is compassed, when the object of our exertions has been attained, it may, perhaps, be found not worth the trouble of acquiring; or, though prized at first, the enjoyment may pall upon the sense. But this, instead of discouraging, invariably tempts to new efforts; so that the pursuit of even imaginary conveniences—of riches, distinctions, and enjoyments that can never be realised—is productive of an intensity of gratification, unknown in the apathy of a fixed or permanent situation.

The truth is, that repose, and a contempt for wealth and power, how much soever they may have been lauded by moralists, are not consistent with the nature or the destiny of man. He is a progressive, not a stationary animal; and hence the happiness of every people emerged from barbarism is never found in indolence or enjoyment, but in continued exertion—in extending still farther the boundaries of science, and increasing their command over luxuries and conveniences. No degree of intelligence, or amount of fortune, or height of grandeur, ever sufficed to satiate the cravings of the human breast. “When,” said Pyrrhus, “we have conquered Italy and Sicily, we shall enjoy repose;” but had he accomplished this much, his fancied enjoyment would have been deferred till Greece and Asia had been added to his conquests. The remark of the Abbé Mably is as true as it is happily expressed—“*N’est on que riche? On veut être grand. N’est on que grand? On veut être riche. Est on et riche et grand? On veut être plus riche et plus grand encore.*”¹

It is not, however, meant, by any thing now stated, to imply that the stimulus given to industry and invention,

¹ “Œuvres,” vol. iv. p. 76.

by a desire to indulge in luxurious gratifications, is the best imaginable. Undoubtedly it were better were the immense sums so often lavished on the most ridiculous frivolities, applied to promote some useful art, science, or industrious undertaking, or expended in relieving those whom accident or misfortune has involved in unmerited distress. Self-aggrandisement, the indulgence in a taste for luxuries, and the exercise of power, should in all cases be made subservient to a man's character, and to the interests of his country and of humanity. Riches, when honestly acquired, are an evidence of industry and economy, and should have the consideration which they deserve; but they should not be allowed to place their possessors on a level with men distinguished for great talents, extensive learning, tried integrity, and true patriotism. But, in matters of this sort, it is useless to say what should or should not be. We have to deal with man as he is, and not as we might wish to find him. And such is human nature, that the great bulk of mankind have always preferred the palpable though vulgar distinctions of rank and riches to the highest moral and intellectual endowments; and that the desire of doing good to others, or of promoting the interests of science, has never, generally speaking, influenced man half so strongly as the desire to command some additional, though perhaps trivial, personal indulgence. The selfish passions are not, however, strengthened by a taste for luxurious accommodations. On the contrary, experience shows that, when this taste is comparatively feeble, sloth and barbarism uniformly usurp its place; and that the more generous sympathies are always most powerful in opulent, industrious, and refined communities.

The supposed pernicious influence which moralists have so often ascribed to luxury and refinement in the arts, seems to have principally originated in their contrasting the rapid growth of the Roman republic, during the period of its rusticity and poverty, and the disinterestedness then so frequently displayed, with the decline of the martial

spirit, the loss of liberty, and the venality that universally prevailed after the revenues and refinements of Greece and Asia had been introduced into Rome. But these disorders really arose from the defective nature of the government at home, the too great extension of the territory, and the oppressions exercised upon the provinces. "Refinement," says Hume, "on the pleasures and conveniences of life, has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The value which all men put upon any particular pleasure depends on comparison and experience; nor is a porter less greedy of money, which he spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier who purchases champagne and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times and to all men, because they always purchase pleasures such as men are accustomed to and desire; nor can any thing restrain and regulate the love of money but a sense of honour and virtue, which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will generally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement."¹

It is plain, therefore, that a taste for luxuries cannot, provided it be confined within proper limits, be justly considered as prejudicial either in a moral or a political point of view. If, indeed, a man consume more luxuries than his fortune enables him to command, his consumption will be disadvantageous; but it will be equally so if he consume a greater quantity of necessaries than he can afford. The mischief does not consist in the species of articles consumed, but in their excess over the means of purchasing possessed by the consumer. This, however, is a fault which should be left for correction to the good sense of those concerned. The poverty and degradation caused by indulging in unproductive consumption is a sufficient guarantee against its being carried to an injurious extent; and to attempt to lessen it by proscribing luxury, is, in effect, attempting to enrich a country by taking away the most powerful incentives to production!

¹ "Philosophical Works," vol. iii. p. 310.

Dr Smith has given another criterion of productive and unproductive consumption ; but his opinions on this subject, though ingenious, and supported with his usual ability, appear to be destitute of any solid foundation. He divides society into two great classes ; the first consisting of those who fix, or, as he terms it, “realise their labour in some particular subject, or vendible commodity, which lasts, for some time at least, after that labour is past ;” and the second, of those whose labour leaves nothing in existence after the moment of exertion, but perishes in the act of performance. The former are said by Smith to be productive, the latter unproductive, labourers. Not that, in making this distinction, he meant to undervalue the services performed by the unproductive class, or to deny that they are often of the highest utility, for he admits that such is frequently the case ; but he contends that these services, however useful, add nothing to the wealth of the country, and, consequently, that the commodities consumed by this class are unproductively consumed, and have a tendency to impoverish, not to enrich. But, to avoid the chance of misrepresentation, we shall give Smith’s opinions in his own words.

“There is one sort of labour,” says he, “which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed ; there is another which has no such effect. The former, as it produces a value, may be called productive ; the latter, unproductive labour. Thus, the labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his master’s profit. The labour of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing. Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he, in reality, costs him no expense, the value of those wages being generally restored, together with a profit, in the improved value of the subject upon which his labour is bestowed ; but the maintenance of a menial servant never is restored. A man grows rich by employing a multitude of manufacturers ;

he grows poor by maintaining a multitude of menial servants. The labour of the latter, however, has its value, and deserves its reward, as well as that of the former. But the labour of the manufacturer fixes and realises itself in some particular subject or vendible commodity, which lasts, for some time at least, after that labour is past. It is, as it were, a certain quantity of labour stocked and stored up, to be employed, if necessary, upon some other occasion. That subject, or, what is the same thing, the price of that subject, can afterwards, if necessary, put into motion a quantity of labour equal to that which had originally produced it. The labour of the menial servant, on the contrary, does not fix or realise itself in any particular subject or vendible commodity. His services generally perish in the very instant of their performance, and seldom leave any trace or value behind them, for which an equal quantity of service could afterwards be procured.

“ The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society is, like that of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or realise itself in any permanent subject or vendible commodity, which endures after that labour is past, and for which an equal quantity of labour could afterwards be procured. The sovereign, for example, with all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive labourers. They are the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other people. Their service, how honourable, how necessary, or how useful soever, produces nothing for which an equal quantity of service can afterwards be procured. The protection, security, and defence of the commonwealth, the effect of their labour this year, will not purchase its protection, security, and defence for the year to come. In the same class must be ranked some, both of the gravest and most important, and some of the most frivolous professions—churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds ; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers, &c. The labour of

the meanest of these has a certain value, regulated by the very same principles which regulate that of every other sort of labour; and that of the noblest and most useful produces nothing which could afterwards purchase or procure an equal quantity of labour. Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production.”¹

But though these statements be plausible, it will not, we apprehend, be difficult to show the fallacy of the distinction Smith has endeavoured to establish. To begin with his strongest case, that of the menial servant: He says, that his labour is unproductive, because it is not realised in a vendible commodity, while the labour of the manufacturer is productive, because it is so realised. But what, may we ask, are the results of the labour of the manufacturer? Do they not consist of comforts and conveniences required for the use and accommodation of society? The manufacturer is not a producer of matter, but of utility only. And is it not obvious that the menial servant belongs to the same class, and is also a producer of utility? It is universally allowed that the husbandman who raises corn, beef, and other articles of provision, is a productive labourer; but if so, why is the cook or menial servant who prepares and dresses these articles, and fits them for use, to be set down as unproductive? It is clear there is no difference whatever in the nature of their services—that they are either both productive, or both unproductive. To have a fire, it is quite as indispensable that coals should be carried from the cellar to the grate, as that they should be carried from the bottom of the mine to the surface of the earth: and if it be said that the miner is a productive labourer, must we not say as much of the servant employed to make and mend the fire? The whole of Smith’s reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis: he has made a distinction where there is none, and where it is not in the nature of

¹ “Wealth of Nations,” p. 145.

things there can be any. The end of all human exertion is the same—that is, to increase the sum of necessities, comforts, and enjoyments; and it must be left to the judgment of every one to determine what proportion of these he will have in the shape of menial services, and what in the shape of material products. It is true, as has been sometimes stated, that the results of the labour of menial servants are seldom capable of being estimated in the same way as the results of the labour of agriculturists, manufacturers, or merchants; but are they, on that account, the less real or valuable? Could the same quantity of work be performed by those who are called productive labourers, were it not for the assistance they derive from those who are falsely called unproductive? A merchant or banker, realising £5000 or £10,000 a-year by his business, may perhaps be expending £1000 on servants: now, suppose that he tries, by turning his servants adrift, to save this sum; he must henceforth, it is obvious, become coachman, footman, cook, and washer-woman for himself; and if he do this, he will, instead of making £5000 or £10,000 a-year, be most probably unable to make even £50! No doubt, a man will be ruined if he keep more servants than he has occasion for, or than he can afford to pay; but his ruin will be equally certain if he purchase an excess of food or clothes, or employ more workmen in any branch of manufacture than are required to carry it on, or than his capital can employ. To keep two ploughmen where one only would suffice, is as improvident and wasteful expenditure as if two footmen were kept to do the business of one. It is in the extravagant quantity of the wealth we consume, or of the labour we employ, and not in the species of wealth or labour, that we must seek for the causes of impoverishment.

The same reasoning applies to all the cases mentioned by Smith. Take, for example, that of the physician. We are told that he is an unproductive labourer, because he does not directly produce something that has exchangeable value: but if he do the same thing indirectly, what is the difference?

If the exertions of the physician be conducive to health, and if, as is undoubtedly the case, he enable others to produce more than they could do without his assistance, it is plain he is, indirectly at least, if not directly, a productive labourer. Smith makes no scruple about admitting the just title of the workman employed to repair a steam-engine to be enrolled in the productive class; and yet he would place a physician, who had been instrumental in saving the life of Arkwright or Watt, among those that are unproductive! It is impossible that these inconsistencies and contradictions could have occurred to Dr Smith; and the errors into which he has fallen in treating this branch of the science, evince the necessity of advancing with extreme caution, and of subjecting every theory, how ingenious soever it may appear when first stated, to a severe and patient examination.

An occupation may be futile and trifling to the last degree without being unproductive. We are entitled, at once, to affirm, that an individual who employs himself an hour a-day in blowing bubbles, or building houses of cards, is engaged in a futile employment; but we are not, without further inquiry, entitled to affirm that it is unproductive. This will depend on a contingency: the employment will be as unproductive as it is frivolous, if it do not stimulate the individual to make any greater exertion during the remaining twenty-three hours of the twenty-four than he did previously; but if, in order to indemnify himself for the time that is thus spent, he render as much service, or produce as many useful and desirable commodities, during the period he may still devote to that purpose, as he previously rendered or produced, the employment will not be unproductive; and if the desire to indulge in it lead him to produce more commodities than he did before, it will be profitable.

Paley had a distinct perception of this doctrine, and has stated it with his usual clearness. "It signifies nothing," he observes, "to the main purpose of trade, how superfluous the articles which it furnishes are; whether the want of them be real or imaginary; whether it be founded in nature or in

opinion, in fashion, habit, or emulation ; it is enough that they be actually desired and sought after. A watch may be a very unnecessary appendage to the dress of a peasant ; yet if the peasant will till the ground in order to obtain a watch, the true design of trade is answered ; and the watch-maker, while he polishes the case, or files the wheels of his machine, is contributing to the production of corn as effectually, though not so directly, as if he handled the spade or held the plough. The use of tobacco is an acknowledged superfluity ; yet if the fisherman will ply his nets, or the mariner fetch rice from foreign countries, in order to procure to himself this indulgence, the market is supplied with two important articles of provision by the instrumentality of a merchandise which has no other apparent use than the gratification of a vitiated palate.”¹

Hence, also, the productiveness of players, singers, operadancers, buffoons, &c. A taste for the amusements they afford has the same influence over national wealth as a taste for tobacco, champagne, or any other luxury. We wish to be present at their exhibitions ; and, consequently, pay the price required to get admittance. But this price is not a gratuitous product—it is the result of industry. And hence the amusements in question—how trifling soever they may seem in the estimation of cynics and *soi-disant* moralists—create new wants, and, by doing so, stimulate our industry to procure the means of gratifying them. They are unquestionably, therefore, a cause of production ; and it is very like a truism to say, that what is a cause of production must be productive.²

¹ Works, vol. ii., p. 80, ed. 1819.

² The doctrine now laid down has been set in a clear point of view, in an able and ingenious work entitled, “*Théorie du Luxe*,” published in 1771. “Celui qui veut avoir le bijou le plus frivole, ou le meuble le plus utile, ne peut acquérir l’un ou l’autre que par son travail, ou en payant le travail d’un ouvrier. S’il travaille lui-même la chose, soit utile soit frivole, qu’il veut avoir, il doit être précédemment pourvu de sa subsistance et des autres besoins : s’il emprunte la main d’un autre, il doit pourvoir de son côté à la subsistance et au reste des besoins de cet autre, ou lui donner un équivalent

Our great moralist, Dr Johnson, has maintained the same doctrine. "Many things," he observes, "which are false are transmitted from book to book, and gain credit in the world. One of these is the cry against the evil of luxury. Now, the truth is, that luxury produces much good. Take the luxury of the buildings in London: does it not produce real advantage in the conveniency and elegance of accommodation, and this all from the exertion of industry? People will tell you, with a melancholy face, how many builders are in gaol. It is plain they are in gaol—not for building, for rents have not fallen. A man gives half-a-guinea for a dish of green pease. How much gardening does this occasion! how many labourers must the competition to have such things early in the market keep in employment! You will hear it said, very gravely, 'Why was not the half-guinea thus spent in luxury given to the poor?' Alas! has it not gone to the *industrious* poor, whom it is better to support than the *idle* poor? You are much surer that you are doing good when you pay money to those that work, than when you give money

au prorata du tems que la chose exige. Dans les deux cas, il n'y a d'employés que du tems et des soins qui ne sont point sous traits au nécessaire. Les deux habitans sont entretenus; les charges de l'état sont acquittées; le produit de ce travail, soit dans un genre soit dans l'autre, augmente également la masse des richesses nationales. Les superfluités ont au prix comme les choses utiles.

"Supposons les superfluités défendues ou ignorées; et supposons, ce qui est aujourd'hui bien éloigné de la réalité, que chacun ait la liberté de tirer de la terre ses besoins: alors l'homme actif, qui par le produit de son travail seroit en état de se procurer des superfluités, et qui n'est pas tenté d'autre chose, ne sachant que faire du fruit de ses peines, ne travaille plus tant. Celui qui se seroit addonné à fabriquer les superfluités, cultive pour obtenir sa subsistance, et ne va pas au-delà. Voilà donc deux habitans seulement entretenus, comme dans l'hypothèse contraire. L'état a de moins une place dans l'agriculture, et la valeur des superfluités qui auroient été fabriquées.

"Il en est de même des satisfactions que l'on tire des choses non matérielles; telles que la danse, la musique, &c. Supprimez ces plaisirs, les hommes qui y sont employés cultivent la terre; ceux qui les employoient cultivent moins. Il n'y a ni plus d'hommes ni plus de produits, et la société a moins d'arts et de jouissances."—P. 64.

merely in charity. Suppose that the ancient luxury of a dish of peacocks' brains were to be revived, how many carcasses would be left to the poor at a cheap rate? And as to the rout that is made about people who are ruined by extravagance, it is no matter to the nation that some individuals suffer. When so much general productive exertion is the consequence of luxury, the nation does not care though there are debtors in gaol; nay, they would not care though their creditors were there too."¹

The productiveness of the higher class of functionaries mentioned by Smith is still more obvious. Far, indeed, from being unproductive, they are, when they properly discharge the duties of their station, the most productive labourers in a state. He says, that the results of their service—that is, to use his own words, “the production, security, and defence of the commonwealth, any one year, will not purchase its protection, security, and defence, for the year to come.” But this is plainly an error. Every one will allow that the corn and other commodities produced by the society this year form, along with portions of those produced in previous years, its capital, or its means of producing a supply of necessaries, conveniences, and enjoyments, for the ensuing year. But, without the security and protection given by government, this capital would either not exist at all, or be very greatly diminished. How, then, is it possible to deny that those by whose exertions the requisite security is afforded, are productively employed? Take a parallel case, that of the labourers employed to construct fences: no one ever presumed to doubt that their labour is productive; and yet they do not contribute directly to the production of corn or any other valuable product. The object of their industry is to give protection and security; to guard the fields, that have been fertilised and planted, from depredation; and to enable the husbandman to prosecute his employment without having his atten-

¹ Boswell's "Life of Johnson," Pickering's ed. vol. iii. p. 44.

tion distracted by the care of watching. But if the security and protection afforded by the hedger or ditcher justly entitle him to be classed among those who contribute to enrich their country, on what pretence can those public servants who protect property in the mass, and render every portion of it secure against hostile aggression, and the attacks of thieves and plunderers, be said to be unproductive? If the herdsmen who protect a single corn-field from the neighbouring crows and cattle be productive, then surely the judges and magistrates, the soldiers and sailors, who protect every field in the empire, and to whom it is owing that all classes feel secure in the enjoyment of their rights and privileges, have a good claim to be classed among those who are supereminently productive.

That much wealth has been unproductively consumed by the servants of the public, both in this and other countries, it is impossible to doubt. But we are not to argue, from the abuses extrinsic to a beneficial institution, against the institution itself. If the public pay their servants excessive salaries, or employ a greater number than is required to insure good government and security, it is their own fault. Their conduct is similar to that of a manufacturer who pays his labourers comparatively high wages, and employs more of them than he has occasion for. But, though a state or an individual may act in this foolish and extravagant manner, it would be rather rash thence to conclude that *all* public servants and *all* manufacturing labourers are unproductive! If the establishments which provide security and protection be formed on an extravagant scale—if we have more judges or magistrates, more soldiers or sailors, than necessary, or if we pay them larger salaries than would suffice to procure their services—let their numbers and their salaries be reduced. The excess, if there be any, is not a fault inherent in the nature of such establishments, but results entirely from the extravagant scale on which they have been arranged.

But, in showing that Dr Smith was mistaken in consider-

ing the consumption of menial servants, and of lawyers, physicians, and public functionaries, unproductive, we must beware of falling into the opposite extreme, and of countenancing the erroneous and infinitely more dangerous doctrine of those who contend that consumption, even when most unproductive, should be encouraged as a means of stimulating production, and of increasing the demand for labour! The consumption of the classes mentioned by Smith is advantageous, because they render services which those who employ them, and who are the only proper judges in such cases, consider of greater value than their wages. But the case would be totally different were government and others to employ individuals, not that they might profit by their services, but that they might stimulate production by their consumption! It is absurd to suppose that wasteful consumption can ever encourage production. A man is stimulated to produce when he finds a ready market for his products—that is, when he can readily exchange them for others. And hence the efficient and only real encouragement of industry consists, not in an increase of wasteful and improvident consumption, but, as was formerly shown, in an increase of production.

It must, however, be remembered, consistently with what has been previously advanced, that, in deciding upon the character of the consumption or expenditure of any quantity of wealth, we must look at its indirect and ultimate, as well as at its direct and immediate effects. An outlay of capital or labour which, if we take its immediate results only into account, we should pronounce improvident and unproductive, may yet be discovered, by looking at it in its different bearings, and in its remote influences, to be distinctly the reverse; and it is also true, that cases frequently occur in which an expenditure which is ruinous to the individual may not be injurious, but beneficial to the state.

Montesquieu has said, "*Si les riches ne dépensent pas*

beaucoup, les pauvres mourront de faim."¹ The truth of this proposition has, however, been disputed; and this is not to be wondered at, seeing that it may be either true or false according to the sense in which it is understood. If it be construed to mean, that a rich man will be able directly to employ a greater number of servants or labourers if he spend his revenue in luxurious accommodations, than if he lay out part of it on the improvement of his estate, or accumulate it as a provision for his younger children, it is plainly erroneous. The demand for labour cannot be sensibly increased without an increase of capital; and it is quite impossible for those who spend their whole revenue on immediate gratifications to amass capital, or, consequently, to employ additional individuals. But the proposition advanced by Montesquieu should not be interpreted in this confined sense, or as referring only to the influence of the expenditure of wealthy individuals over their own demand for labour, but as referring to its influence over that of the society: and if we so interpret it, and suppose it to mean, that the lavish expenditure and luxury of the great and affluent materially benefit the poor by exciting the emulation of others, who cannot expect, except through an increase of industry and economy, to indulge in a similar scale of expense, it will, we apprehend, be found to be perfectly correct. To suppose, indeed, that the passion for luxurious gratifications should decline amongst the rich, and that men should, notwithstanding, continue equally industrious, is a contradiction. Riches are desirable only because they afford the means of obtaining these gratifications; and so powerful is the influence of a taste for them, that it may be doubted whether the extravagance which has ruined so many individuals, has not been, by giving birth to new arts and new efforts of emulation and ingenuity, of material advantage to the public.

These remarks are not made in the view of countenancing

¹ "Esprit des Loix," liv. vii. cap. 4.

extravagant expenditure, but merely to show that those who attempt to decide as to the influence, in a public point of view, of any outlay of wealth, without endeavouring to appreciate and weigh its remote as well as its immediate effects, must, when they are right in their conclusions, be so only through accident. But without insisting further on this point, it is abundantly certain that there is nothing to fear from the improvidence of individuals. There is not, as has been already observed, an instance of any people having ever missed an opportunity to save and amass; and in all tolerably well-governed countries, the principle of accumulation has always had a marked ascendancy over the principle of expense.

Individuals are fully sensible of the value of the wealth they expend; for, in the vast majority of instances, they owe it to their own industry and frugality; and they rarely lay it out unless to defray the cost of their subsistence, or to obtain some really equivalent advantage. Such, however, it must be allowed, is not often the case with governments and their servants. They do not consume their own wealth, but that of others; and this circumstance prevents their being so much interested in its profitable outlay, or so much alive to the injurious consequences of wasteful expenditure. But economy on the part of governments, though more difficult to practise, is of infinitely greater importance than economy on the part of the most considerable individuals. A private gentleman may, inasmuch as he is the master of his own fortune, dispose of it as he pleases. He may act on the erroneous principle of profusion being a virtue, or he may attempt to excite the emulation and industry of his fellow-citizens by the splendour of his equipages and the magnificence of his mode of living. But government can, with propriety, do none of these things. It is merely a trustee for the affairs of others; and it is, consequently, bound to administer them as economically as possible. Were the principle admitted, that government might raise money, not for the protection and good government of the

state, but to excite industry and ingenuity by the pressure of taxation, or by the luxury of public functionaries, an avenue would be opened to every species of malversation. It is, indeed, pretty certain that no people would submit to be taxed for such purposes; but if they did, the flagrant abuses to which it would inevitably lead, could scarcely fail of ending either in revolution or in national poverty and degradation. Economy in expenditure is, upon all occasions, the first virtue of government, and the most pressing of its duties.

We here close this view of the Principles of Political Economy. We have endeavoured to show the indissoluble connexion subsisting between private and public opulence,—that whatever has any tendency to increase the former, must, to the same extent, increase the latter,—and that, speaking generally, SECURITY OF PROPERTY, FREEDOM OF INDUSTRY, DIFFUSION OF SOUND INFORMATION, AND MODERATION IN THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, appear to be the only means by which the various powers and resources of human talent and ingenuity may be called into action, and society made continually to advance in the career of wealth and civilisation. Every increase of security, freedom, and intelligence, is a benefit, as every diminution, whether of one only or of all, is an evil. We have endeavoured to show that there is no real opposition of interests amongst the various classes of the community—that they mutually depend upon each other; and that any peculiar favour or advantage given to one class, is not only immediately injurious to the others, and subversive of that equality of protection which every just government will always grant indiscriminately to all who are under its protection, but that it is not either really or lastingly beneficial to those whose interests it is intended to promote. Except on extraordinary occasions, the true line of policy is to leave

individuals to pursue their own interest in their own way, and not to lose sight of the maxim *pas trop gouverner*. It is by the spontaneous and unconstrained, but well protected efforts of individuals to improve their condition, and to rise in the world, that nations become rich and powerful. Their labour and their savings are at once the source and the measure of national opulence and public prosperity. They may be compared to the drops of dew which invigorate and mature all vegetable nature : none of them has, singly, any perceptible influence ; but we owe the foliage of summer and the fruits of autumn to their combined action.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A. Page 50.

THAT M. Quesnay is entitled to the merit of originality, cannot be disputed. He had, however, been anticipated in several of his peculiar doctrines by some English writers of the previous century. The fundamental principles of the economical system are distinctly stated in a tract entitled, "Reasons for a limited exportation of Wool," published in 1677. "That it is of the greatest concern and interest of the nation," says the author of the tract, "to preserve the nobility, gentry, and those to whom the land of the country belongs, at least, much greater than a few artificers employed in working the superfluity of our wool, or the merchants who gain by the exportation of our manufactures, is manifest—1. Because they are the *masters and proprietaries of the foundation of all the wealth in this nation, all profit arising out of the ground, which is theirs*: 2. *Because they bear all taxes and public burdens*; which, in truth, are only borne by those who buy, and sell not; all sellers raising the price of their commodities, or abating of goodness, according to their taxes."—P. 5.

In 1696, Mr Asgill published a treatise entitled, "Several Assertions proved, in order to create another Species of Money than Gold," in support of Dr Chamberlayne's proposition for a Land Bank. The following extract from this treatise breathes, as Stewart has justly observed, in his "Life of Dr Smith," the very spirit of Quesnay's philosophy:—

"What we call commodities is nothing but land severed from the soil—*man deals in nothing but earth*. The merchants are the factors of the world, to exchange one part of the earth for another. The king himself is fed by the labour of the ox; and the clothing of the army and victualling of the navy must all be paid for to the owner of the soil as the ultimate receiver. All things in the world are originally the produce of the ground, and there must all things be

raised.”—(This passage has been quoted in Lord Lauderdale’s “Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth,” 2d ed. p. 109.)

These passages are interesting, as exhibiting the first germs of the theory of the Economists. But there is no ground for supposing that Quesnay was aware of the existence of either of the tracts referred to. The subjects treated of in them were of too local a description to excite the attention of foreigners; and Quesnay was too candid to conceal his obligations, had he really owed them any. It is probable he might have seen Locke’s treatise on “Raising the Value of Money,” where the idea is thrown out that all taxes fall ultimately on the land. But there is an immeasurable difference between the suggestion of Locke and the well-digested system of Quesnay.

We subjoin from the work of Dupont, “Sur l’Origine et Progrès d’une Science Nouvelle,” a short statement of the various institutions which the Economists held to be necessary for the good government of a country.

“Voici le résumé de toutes les institutions sociales fondées sur l’ordre naturel, sur la constitution physique des hommes et des autres êtres dont ils sont environnés.

“*Propriété personnelle*, établie par la nature, par la nécessité physique dont il est à chaque individu de disposer de toutes les facultés de sa personne pour se procurer les choses propres à satisfaire ses besoins, sous peine de souffrance et de mort.

“*Liberté de travail*, inséparable de la propriété personnelle, dont elle forme une partie constitutive.

“*Propriété mobilière*, qui n’est que la propriété personnelle même, considérée dans son usage, dans son objet, dans son extension nécessaire sur les choses acquises par le travail de sa personne.

“*Liberté d’échange*, de commerce, d’emploi de ses richesses inséparable de la propriété personnelle et de la propriété mobilière.

“*Culture*, qui est un usage de la propriété personnelle, de la propriété mobilière, et de la liberté qui en est inséparable : usage profitable, nécessaire, indispensable pour que la population puisse s’accroître, par une suite de la multiplication des productions nécessaires à la subsistance des hommes.

“*Propriété foncière*, suite nécessaire de la culture, et qui n’est que la conservation de la propriété personnelle et de la propriété

mobiliaire, employées aux travaux et aux dépenses préparatoires indispensables pour mettre la terre en état d'être cultivée.

“ *Liberté de l'emploi de sa terre*, de l'espèce de sa culture, de toutes les conventions relatives à l'exploitation, à la concession, à la rétrocession, à l'échange, à la vente de sa terre, inséparable de la propriété foncière.

“ *Partage naturel des récoltes, en reprises des cultivateurs*, ou richesses dont l'emploi doit indispensablement être de perpétuer la culture, sous peine de diminution des récoltes et de la population et *produit net*, ou richesses disponibles dont la grandeur décide de la prospérité, de la société, dont l'emploi est abandonné à la volonté et à l'intérêt des propriétaires fonciers, et qui constitue pour eux le prix naturel et légitime des dépenses qu'ils ont faits, et des travaux auxquels ils se sont livrés pour mettre la terre en état d'être cultivée.

“ *Sûreté*, sans laquelle la propriété et la liberté ne seraient que de droit et non de fait, sans laquelle le *produit net* serait bientôt anéanti, sans laquelle la culture même ne pourrait subsister.

“ *Autorité tutélaire et souveraine*, pour procurer la sûreté essentiellement nécessaire à la propriété et à la liberté ; et qui s'acquitte de cet important ministère, en promulguant et faisant exécuter les loix de l'ordre naturel, par lesquelles la propriété et la liberté sont établies.

“ *Magistrats*, pour décider dans les cas particuliers quelle doit être l'application des loix de l'ordre naturel, réduites en loix positives par l'autorité souveraine ; et qui ont le devoir impérieux de comparer les ordonnances des souverains avec les loix de la justice par essence, avant de s'engager à prendre ces ordonnances positive pour règle de leurs jugemens.

“ *Instruction publique et favorisée*, pour que les citoyens, l'autorité, et les magistrats, ne puissent jamais perdre de vue les loix invariables de l'ordre naturel, et se laisser égarer par les prestiges de l'opinion, ou par l'attrait des intérêts partiens exclusifs, qui, dès qu'ils sont *exclusifs*, sont toujours malentendus.

“ *Revenue publique*, pour constituer la force et la pouvoir nécessaire à l'autorité souveraine, pour faire les frais de son ministère protecteur, des fonctions importantes des magistrats, et de l'instruction indispensable des loix de l'ordre naturel.

“ *Impôt direct*, ou partage du produit net du territoire entre les propriétaires fonciers et l'autorité souveraine, pour former le revenu

public d'une manière qui ne restreigne ni la propriété ni la liberté, et qui par conséquent ne soit pas destructive.

"*Proportion essentielle et nécessaire de l'impôt direct avec le produit net, telle qu'elle donne à la société le plus grand revenu public qui soit possible, et par conséquent le plus grand degré possible de sûreté, sans que le sort des propriétaires fonciers cesse d'être le meilleur sort dont on puisse jouir la société.*

"*Monarchie héréditaire, pour que tous les intérêts présents et futurs du dépositaire du l'autorité souveraine, soient intimement liés avec ceux de la société par le partage proportionnel du produit net.*"

NOTE B. Page 211.

Mr Barton, in an ingenious pamphlet, published in 1817, entitled, "Observations on the Circumstances which influence the Condition of the Labouring Classes," has contended, in opposition to the principles laid down in this work, that the introduction of machinery most commonly occasions a decline in the demand for labour. Mr Barton has illustrated his argument by the following statement, which we shall take the liberty briefly to examine:—

"As the doctrine, that the progress of population is measured by the increase of wealth, does not appear to be true in fact, so, on the other hand, it seems to me not consistent with sound reasoning. It does not seem that every accession of capital necessarily sets in motion an additional quantity of labour. Let us suppose a case: a manufacturer possesses a capital of £1000, which he employs in maintaining twenty weavers, paying them £50 per annum each. His capital is suddenly increased to £2000. With double means he does not, however, hire double the number of workmen, but lays out £1500 in erecting machinery, by the help of which five men are enabled to perform the same quantity of work that twenty did before. Are there not, then, fifteen men discharged in consequence of the manufacturer having increased his capital?

"But does not the construction and repair of the machinery employ a number of hands? Undoubtedly. As in this case a sum of £1500 was expended, it may be supposed to have given employment to thirty men for a year at £50 each; if calculated to last fifteen years (and machinery seldom wears out sooner,) then thirty workmen might always supply fifteen manufacturers with these machines: therefore, each manufacturer may be said constantly to employ two. Imagine, also, that one man is employed

in the necessary repairs; we have then five weavers and three machine-makers where there were before twenty weavers.

"But the increased revenue of the manufacturer will enable him to maintain more domestic servants. Let us see, then, how many. His yearly revenue, being supposed equal to 10 per cent on his capital, was before £100, now £200: supposing, then, that his servants are paid at the same rate as his workmen, he is able to hire just two more. We have, then, with a capital of £2000, and a revenue of £200 per annum,

5 weavers,
3 machine-makers,
2 domestic servants.
<hr/>
10 persons in all employed. •

"With half the capital, and half the income, just double the number of hands were set in motion."—Pp. 15, 16.

But plausible as this statement may at first sight appear, it will not, we apprehend, be very difficult to show, that the conclusions at which Mr Barton has arrived, are not fairly deduced from the premises he has laid down, and that, in the case supposed, there would not be a diminution, but an increase of the demand for labour.

In the *first* place, supposing, with Mr Barton, profits to be 10 per cent, the goods produced by the capital which the manufacturer laid out upon the twenty weavers must have sold for £1100, viz. £1000 to replace the capital, and £100 as profits.

In the *second* of the supposed cases, the manufacturer employs a capital of £1500 in the construction of a machine: now, as this machine is fitted to last *fifteen* years, the goods produced by it must sell (exclusive of the wages of the men employed to attend to it) for £197; for a part of this annuity (£47) being accumulated for fifteen years, at the rate of 10 per cent, will replace the capital of £1500 at the expiration of that period, while the other part (£150) will pay the profits of the proprietor; and, adding to the annuity of £197 the wages of the five weavers, and of the person employed to repair the machine, at the rate of £50 a-year each, and profits on them at 10 per cent, the total cost of the goods will be—

Profits of machine, and sum to replace it,	£197	0	0
Wages of six men, at £50, . . .	300	0	0
Profits on wages,	30	0	0
	<hr/>		
Prices at which the goods are now sold,	£527	0	0

But, previously to the introduction of the machine, the same quantity of goods cost £1100: the consumers will consequently have the difference, or £573 to lay out on other things; the production of which will afford immediate employment for between eleven and twelve men. But this is not all. According to the principle explained at p. 209, a portion of this saving—perhaps £250 of the £593—will, in future, be employed as a capital in carrying on industrious undertakings; and in this way a fresh fund will be provided that will furnish wages, or the means of subsistence, for a number of individuals, (most probably *five*,) at the end of the first year, more than would otherwise have been employed; and supposing, as we ought, that this sum goes on increasing at the rate of 10, or even that it increases only at the rate of 5 per cent compound interest, it would very soon afford the means of employing a vast number of individuals.

There is also another fund, of the existence of which Mr Barton appears to have been as completely unaware as of the latter. It has been seen that of the £197 produced directly by the machine, £150 only are profits; the surplus £47 being the annuity which is to replace the capital of the machine when it is worn out; but as this annuity is to be accumulated at the rate of 10 per cent, it will afford employment, in the first year, for one individual; in the second for two; in the third for more than three; in the fifth for nearly six; and in the fifteenth year for upwards of eight-and-twenty individuals!

It will be observed, too, that in the second case supposed by Mr Barton, there is £200 not employed at all; and which, if employed, would afford wages for four individuals. Instead, therefore, of a single labourer being turned out of employment, in the case supposed, or in any similar case, it admits of demonstration, that the demand for labour would be much more than doubled.

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